Document Type
Article
Abstract
How should the law respond when one person (D) kills another person (V), who is black, because D believes that V is about to kill him, but D would not have so believed if V had been white? Should D be exonerated on grounds of self-defense? The canonical case raising this question is People v. Goetz. Some commentators argue that norms of equal treatment and anti-discrimination require that D’s claim of self-defense be rejected. I argue that denying D’s claim of self-defense would be at odds with the principle that criminal liability should only be imposed on an actor if he culpably chooses to cause or unjustifiably risk causing harm, not for possessing or choosing to possess racist or otherwise illiberal beliefs or desires. Moreover, insofar as this harm principle can fairly be characterized as one to which a liberal state must adhere, then a liberal state should acknowledge D’s claim of self-defense, norms of equal treatment and anti-discrimination to the contrary notwithstanding.
Date of Authorship for this Version
February 2007
Keywords
Bernhard Goetz, Racism
Recommended Citation
Garvey, Stephen P., "Racism, Unreasonable Belief, and Bernhard Goetz" (2007). Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers. 24.
https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clsops_papers/24