Document Type

Article

Publication Date

Fall 1999

Keywords

Analogical reasoning, Legal reasoning by analogy, Henry Hart, Albert Sacks

Disciplines

Common Law | Judges | Litigation

Abstract

This Article defends the practice of reasoning by analogy on the basis of its epistemic and institutional advantages. The advantages identified for analogical reasoning include that it produces a wealth of data for decisonmaking; it represents the collaborative effort of a number of judges over time; it tends to correct biases that might lead judges to discount the force of prior decisions; and it exerts a conservative force in law, holding the development of law to a gradual pace. Notably, these advantages do not depend on the rational force of analogical reasoning. Rather, the author contends that, as open-ended reasoning and analogical reasoning alike may sometimes result in incorrect decisions, these qualities of analogical reasoning make it a desirable method of deciding legal disputes.

Comments

This article predates the author’s affiliation with Cornell Law School.

Publication Citation

Published in: The University of Chicago Law Review, vol. 66, no. 4 (Fall 1999).

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