Document Type
Article
Comments
This revised version of the original paper was submitted on October 23, 2007.
Abstract
Most normatively oriented economists appear to be “welfarist” and Paretian to one degree or another: They deem responsiveness to individual preferences, and satisfaction of one or more of the Pareto criteria, to be a desirable attribute of any social welfare function. I show that no strictly “welfarist” or Paretian social welfare function can be normatively prescriptive. Economists who prescribe must embrace at least one value apart from or additional to “welfarism” and Paretianism, and in fact will do best to dispense with Pareto entirely.
Date of Authorship for this Version
October 2007
Keywords
Paretianism, Welfarism
Recommended Citation
Hockett, Robert C., "The Impossibility of a Prescriptive Paretian" (2007). Cornell Law Faculty Publications. 25.
https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/lsrp_papers/25
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