As a doctrinal matter, this article applies the generally overlooked constitutional requirements of inventorship and originality and concludes that broad claims to gene discoveries cannot be supported because gene discoveries are essentially copied from nature and thus relatively unoriginal. As a policy matter, the article finds that broad gene patents are also a demonstrably worse bargain for society. Broad gene patents run contrary to patent law's own drive to encourage desirable forms of competition.

Having addressed the policy and doctrinal problems with broad gene patents, the article proposes not invalidating gene patents per se but rather narrowing their claim scope. The article proposes a narrower model claim to realign gene patenting with patent law's doctrinal and policy foundations. Following copyright's treatment of low authorship works like maps and charts, the model claim narrows claims in low inventorship works like gene discovery. The model claim protects the initial gene discovery against outright piracy but it is narrow enough to allow for independent creation, and thus competition, from later arriving discoverers.

This Essay aims to dispel the sense of bewilderment, pessimism and attendant paralysis that afflicts intertemporal justice assessment. It works toward that end by demonstrating that the most vexing puzzles raised by questions of intergenerational justice afflict only one family of justice theories, a family whose members never were coherent to begin with. By contrast, it argues, the correct approach to justice is no more challenged by transtemporal puzzles than is any other exercise in future planning.

The Essay proceeds first by showing that puzzles concerning intergenerational - or what it also calls "intertemporal," "transtemporal," or "diachronic" - justice can be helpfully divided into two classes. One such class the Essay calls "epistemic." The other it calls "analytic." The epistemic puzzles are those occasioned by uncertainties endemic to all contemplation of future contingencies, not simply our justice assessments thereof.

The analytic puzzles, by contrast, afflict only one family of justice conceptions -those that erroneously take maximizing ("efficiency") imperatives to be logically independent of distributive imperatives. The analytic puzzles afflict these conceptions, moreover, irrespective of whether the latter be applied synchronically or diachronically. The supposed intractability of intergenerational justice, that is to say, is in fact nothing more than an incoherence afflicting that mistaken understanding of justice which currently predominates in intertemporal distributive-ethical inquiry.

The Essay next shows that all of the notorious intertemporal impossibility results from Koopmans' on down afflict only the erroneous justice conceptions just mentioned. Indeed, like all of the other best known impossibility results from Arrow's on down, the intertemporal results are no more than instances of a more general incoherence - an incoherence the Author has shown elsewhere to afflict all putatively independent maximizing imperatives mistaken for justice conceptions.

The Essay concludes by showing that the correct, analytically coherent take on justice faces little more challenge from the diachronic than from the synchronic case. In both cases, it demonstrates, the correct account of justice offers straightforward guidance to all who would act in a pragmatic spirit to work justice among persons across space and through time.

Part I of this paper focuses on the explanatory question - from a trade and development perspective, how can we understand the breakdown in Doha negotiations? This paper draws attention to institutional dynamics exacerbating the current stalemate.

In answering that question, Part I draws from two disparate methodological traditions, which can be described as "economistic" and "constructivist." Constructivist analysis suggests a focus on the discursive subtexts that constitute the identity and interests of participating states. With that focus, it becomes clear that a variety of discursive contradictions have intensified over recent years, deeply destabilizing the WTO as a context for deliberation and political resolution. Economistic analysis, as applied here, focuses on the transaction costs confronting institutional coordination.

Beyond the explanatory perspective, however, some normative inquiry into the basis for a proceduralist approach is desirable, especially when illustrious recent applications of moral theory to distributive justice have called for the institutionalization of strong substantive principles. Part II will consider two substantive arguments for distributive justice, in the context of the multilateral trade regime: Frank Garcia's argument for S&D as a Rawlsian application of the "international difference principle"; and Carol Gould's call for human rights, and especially social and economic rights, as a basis for grounding global economic justice.

Part III studies emerging "equality jurisprudence" in the GATT/WTO. The "legalization" of the trade regime has resulted in the adoption of an equality, or non-discrimination, doctrinal foundation for the judicialized decision-making of the dispute settlement wing of the WTO, over and above the "reciprocity" model that characterizes WTO negotiations.

This essay examines the influence of these basic insights on discourse on legal reform in developing countries. The prioritization of legal and institutional reforms to achieve "good governance" seems to be part of a larger intellectual shift to the problems and challenges of "governance" in a globalizing world.

Transmitters of Weberian analysis in this milieu, however, have at times elided important nuances in Weber's own thought -- nuances that, if incorporated, might have significant implications within development discourse.

The paper's objectives are: first, to conduct an intellectual history that shows how one of the greatest sociologists influenced an increasingly important area of law reform in the age of globalization; second, to surface critiques arising within that field of law reform; and third, to suggest that there may be some connection between the two. In that sense, the paper seeks to make a contribution to two discourses: to enrich the study of the history of legal thought the reception of an important thinker has shaped contemporary law and policy in a relatively understudied field in the academy; and at the same time to underscore and contextualize policy critiques that have arisen in an increasingly important field of practice.

The second decision point concerns how to respond to certain paradoxes and/or indeterminacies that typically attend recursive, reflexive, or self-referential capacities in the discipline in question. Many practitioners attempt to circumvent or head-off such difficulties merely by fiat: They impose, in the form of axioms, ad hoc restrictions that simply rule out self-reference itself. Other practitioners, by contrast, face the difficulties occasioned by self-reference head-on. They then endeavor to ascertain what these tell us about the underlying structures of the subjects treated of in the disciplines in question.

The Article argues that the most important lesson that has emerged in foundational mathematics since the time of Cantor is that neither a fully intensionalist nor a fully extensionalist understanding of the foundational concepts upon which the discipline is built - whether these be categories, classes, or sets - is sustainable. What the author calls a "thin" form of intensionalism has proved to be the most graceful and intuitively plausible means of accommodating the puzzles raised at the full intensionalist and extensionalist extremes. These means have been discovered, moreover, precisely by reflecting with care upon what the puzzles occasioned by self-reference reveal about cognition as engaged in by self-conscious, freely creative yet norm-observant creatures such as ourselves.

The Article shows that we find the "thin intensionalist" accommodation that it advocates at work in both of the best known nonclassical logics upon which workable, non-paradox-ducking foundational mathematics programs have come to be based: Those are so-called "epistemic," or "intuitionist," logics in the one case, and one or another of the best known "paraconsistent" logics in the other. In effect, the Article shows, these logics compensate for the fully extensional treatments of classes or cognate foundational objects necessary to found Peano arithmetic, by reintensionalizing certain erstwhile extensional, truth-functional logical operators. The latter include negation in the intuitionist case, and either or both of negation and the material conditional in the most attractive paraconsistent cases.

It is no accident, the Article argues, that its thin intensionalist accommodation, within foundational mathematics, of the puzzles arising at the intensional versus extensional choice divide, is discovered precisely upon confronting the puzzles that arise at the self-reference decision-point. For reflection upon our forms of cognition.

It is not clear, on reflection, how to regard these developments from a normative point of view. On the one hand, there seems no gainsaying the claim that the gradual removal of transnational trade and investment barriers have resulted in more rapid economic growth worldwide. And that growth appears to be lifting many once desperately poor persons out of their erstwhile penury. Yet on the other hand, there also would seem no denying that global trade and investment liberalization are wreaking losses at least as conspicuous as the gains. For many if not most of the victims of globalization are those who till recently occupied positions much like those that are coming to be occupied by globalization's more sympathetic beneficiaries, and who climbed out of them via precisely such legislated standards as offshoring firms now evade. Might we pay Peter without robbing Paul?

This Article proposes an ethically and intuitively attractive answer to that question rooted in financial engineering. The key is to channel a portion of the globalization-wrought gains reaped by outsourcing firms to the outsourced employees themselves. This way the latter are directly benefited by the very processes that currently harm them. The method proposed is to adapt the familiar Employee Stock Ownership Plan, or "ESOP," to spread firm-shares not simply to current labor, but to outsourced and otherwise harmed "shadow" labor as well. The Article also proposes means of diversifying the portfolio risk that will face "OutsourceSOP" participants, and maps the supporting role apt to be played by such globalization-constitutive financial institutions as the IMF and the World Bank. In the long run, the Article urges, we have here the makings of a grander ambition that all the world's inhabitants can jointly support - a "Global Shareholder Society."

The early twentieth century debate over pleading was at least in part a jurisprudential debate, waged between legal formalists and Legal Realists. The different interpretations the two camps gave to the pleading rules under the Field Code and, later, the Federal Rules, reflected their differing views of the role of positive law in adjudication. Formalists believed that a viable complaint must set out a theory of recovery, or 'cause of action,' based on existing rules of law. Legal Realists believed that the rules governing complaints should allow plaintiffs to present their stories to the courts and courts to do justice according to the facts that evolved at trial. The formalist view made legal claims dependent on supporting rules of substantive law, and so increased the chances that the course of litigation, and the resolution of litigated disputes, would be governed by articulable legal rules. The Legal Realist view loosened the grip of substantive law on trials, favoring instead a mode of adjudication in which judges aimed for just outcomes, case-by-case.

The article sets out my interpretation of the pre-Conley pleading debate, then describes the rather haphazard way in which the debate was resolved. It concludes with some brief comments on the implications the early debate for civil rights litigation.