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Japan’s TICAD: Alternative Global Framework for Africa’s Development?

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Since 1993, Japan has sought to aid Africa’s development through the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD). TICAD is a multilateral, donor-recipient framework within which Japan interacts with Africa on a range of development issues. It represents the Post Washington Consensus approach as an alternative donor strategy and development model, with the hope of replicating the East Asian development miracle in Africa. TICAD makes Japan an important source of development assistance to Africa and for facilitation of South-South cooperation. This article discusses TICAD’s principles, objectives and programmes. It focuses on TICAD’s achievements in terms of its impact on African development and the extent to which it can be viewed as an alternative development mechanism.

1. Introduction

Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) is a developing and marginalized region. It has high levels of poverty. This is in spite of an abundance of natural resources. It thus needs to interact with donors to facilitate growth and bring about development. Africa remains poverty-ridden, de-industrialised and has a marginalized position in the global economy in spite of implementing development strategies borrowed from the West over the years. Since their independence, African countries have tried a number of development strategies. These include state intervention in the economy in the 1960s, structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) in the 1970s and 1980s and economic and political liberalisation since the 1980s. In an effort to transform their economies, African governments have reached out to a range of donors; former colonial powers, the United States of America (USA), China, India and Japan. Japan is the focus of this article, as it has become a major role player in Africa, an important donor and a champion of Africa’s development. Japan sees itself as representing an alternative foreign aid framework for Africa to that of the West, popularly known as the Post Washington Consensus. This is manifested in the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD). This article examines TICAD in terms of its principles and objectives; its development programmes, involving economic and technical assistance to Africa and their impact; the rationale for Japanese assistance; and the extent to which TICAD constitutes an alternative donor development framework to the Washington Consensus.
2. **Background: Japan-Africa Relations**

Japan has gone through a transition with respect to its relationship with Africa. From the outset, Japanese policy towards Africa was informed by the philosophy of separating “politics from the economy” (“seikeri bunri”), a policy first applied to China in the absence of formal diplomatic relations. This policy enabled Japan to trade with South Africa during the apartheid era despite criticism against expanding trade with that country. When it became a donor in 1954, Japanese foreign aid policy focused on Asia and emphasized the principles of ‘aid on request’ (“yosei shugi”) and support for ‘self-help’ in the development efforts of recipient countries (Katada, 2005; Sato, 2005). This meant that Japan responded to the requests of countries that had proposed and initiated their own projects. Once Japan gave the financial and technical assistance and the project started, the recipient country assumed full responsibility. These principles were, later on, applied to all Japanese aid globally. These were initially the bases of the TICAD framework of aid to Africa (Sato, 2005). However, the reformed Official Development Assistance (ODA) Charter of 2003 emphasized policy dialogue (“seisaku taiwa”) and policy-based lending (“seisaku shien”) instead of aid on request (“yosei shugi”) (Inada, 2005). The revised 2005 Mid Term Policy on ODA emphasized peace building, while most recently the ODA White Paper of 2008 added another preoccupation, environmental and climate change issues (MOFA, 2009a and 2009b). Generally, a combination of loans, grants and technical assistance is viewed as the most effective way to assist Africa’s growth and development.

The oil crisis, brought about by the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, changed Japanese policy towards Africa to emphasize Japan’s vulnerability due to its lack of natural resources. Japan no longer viewed Africa as “the backyard of Europe” and began to build better relations with resource-rich Africa to ensure a sustained supply of natural resources (Ochiai, 2001:39). In the 1980s, the policy of “sogo anzem hosho” (“comprehensive security”) relied on the use of diplomatic, economic and cultural initiatives for securing Japanese and international peace and security. A key aspect of this policy was the expansion of ODA for strategic purposes and the expansion of Japanese aid to resource-rich Africa (Ochiai, 2001).

The motivations for Japanese aid to Africa are numerous and complex. They include long-term rather than short-term interests: gaining increased support for Japan in the international arena, for example, in the United Nations (UN); humanitarian concerns, including famine relief campaigns; considerations of the reactions of countries other than African countries; and counterbalancing trade with South Africa during apartheid with expanded trade and other economic ties with independent Africa.

Japan-Africa relations should be seen within the context of thriving linkages between the continents of Africa and Asia and South-South cooperation. TICAD has been important in Asia’s contribution to Africa’s socio-economic development since its inception. Essentially, TICAD, in the context of South-South cooperation and unlike North-South cooperation, is expected to forge equitable relationships and collaboration to overcome mutual development challenges. Japan acts as a
bridge between the two continents by building multiple ties. It sees its relationship with Africa as an engagement with and on behalf of Africa, based on the conviction that the world will not enjoy any prosperity or stability until there are resolutions to Africa's socio-economic problems.

The end of the Cold War gave Japan an opportunity to chart its course and position in the global arena and exert its own leadership credentials by influencing the global agenda through a focus on the African continent. The post Cold War era was characterized by ‘aid fatigue’ to Africa by Western donor countries. The break up and fall of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) gave rise to new independent states which became the major recipients of Western aid. TICAD provided donor support for Africa and articulated the Japanese belief that world peace and prosperity are intertwined with that of Africa's. This necessitated international action (Donnelly, 2008; TICAD, 2009).

The end of the Cold War and the diminished importance of ideology in global relations and politics made it possible for Japan to go its own way in external relations. The policies of TICAD are expressions of this shift, and a demonstration of active involvement in international affairs. The importance of the establishment of TICAD lies in the fact that it prioritized Africa’s development when other donors and players had shifted their attention away from Africa, particularly to the new nations of Eastern Europe (International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF), 2007). Its aim was “to help in the process of Africa overcoming its difficulties and building a bright future” (Mori, 2001:1). Seen in this way, the Japanese interest in Africa is a reaffirmation of its commitment to assist in the continent's development and its support for Africa. However, in reality, Japanese interests in Africa are much more complex, especially viewed from the context of a donor-recipient relationship. Adem (2006: 7) notes that “the relation between Japan and Africa is generally one of major aid donor and aid recipient...” and, therefore, not purely altruistic in nature.

3. Principles, Objectives and Functioning of TICAD

TICAD was established in 1993 by the government of Japan. Japan hosts TICAD with other international organizations. These are the United Nations Office of the Special Advisor on Africa (UN-OSAA), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank and civil society organizations (CSOs) or non-governmental organizations (NGOs). TICAD has been convened successfully every five years since 1993 to build collective international action on Africa (TICAD, 2009). TICAD I, held in 1993, identified development aid as the driver of sustainable development programmes in Africa to promote stability and prosperity on the continent through development partners. Specifically, the Conference adopted the “Tokyo Declaration on African Development” whose aims were to pursue political and economic reforms; marshal the Asian development experiences for the benefit of Africa; increase private sector development; pursue regional cooperation and integration; and promote South-South cooperation (TICAD, 2009; Donnelly, 2008; Ochiai, 2001). At that time, the emphasis was on African ownership of the development process and the role of the state in development (Donnelly, 2008).
TICAD II, in 1998, was preoccupied with two development challenges in Africa: poverty reduction and the continent’s full integration into the global economy. The formulation of the Tokyo Agenda for Action (TAA) provided strategic and action-oriented guidelines to address socio-economic growth through poverty reduction with a role for the private sector. It called for conflict resolution and peace building, good governance, trade access and export diversification, and debt relief by donors (Donnelly, 2008).

TICAD III, held in 2003, signalled the acceptance of the Conference as a development forum. It attracted a large attendance. This included twenty-three heads of state and government and the chairperson of the African Union. It conducted a review process of its first ten years and mapped out its future direction. At TICAD III there was support for the New Economic Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) which advocates continent-wide development, regional priorities and African-led development efforts. The Conference addressed the continent’s progress on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs); opportunities for Asia-Africa cooperation; resolution of conflicts; consolidation of peace; good governance; private sector development; expansion of the partnership between Asia and Africa; dialogue with civil society; capacity building; and agricultural development. (Donnelly, 2008).

By 2008, when TICAD IV was held, the Conference was accepted as a multilateral forum for shaping Africa’s development. Its theme was “Towards a Vibrant Africa”. The preparatory meeting for TICAD IV, held in Gabon in March 2008, reaffirmed several priorities which formed the focus of the Conference. These included strengthening regional infrastructure such as roads and power; the use of ODA for private sector initiatives; the prevention and eradication of diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis and Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS); the promotion of maternal and new born health; education for all; the provision of safe water and sanitation; and the promotion and consolidation of peace in conflict areas (Donnelly, 2008).

TICAD’s goal of fostering African development rests on two principles. These are: African ‘ownership’ and international ‘partnership’. The principle of African ownership is expected to allow African countries to identify, initiate and craft priorities for the continent’s socio-economic development. Therefore, ownership is grounded on the idea of self-directed development in which the recipient country identifies its own priorities and marshals domestic and foreign resources. International partnership, on the other hand, aims at promoting development through a common framework for cooperation among all development actors. The emphasis is on partnership to try and forestall the development of a dominant-subordinate relationship characteristic of conventional donor-recipient relations. Lehman (2008:6) notes “the main characteristics of Japan’s ODA are to facilitate self-help and partnership through industrialisation and trade”. Thus, in relation to ownership and partnership, TICAD’s main objectives include the facilitation of high level policy dialogue between African leaders and their development partners and mobilizing support for African-owned development initiatives (TICAD, 2009; TICAD/UNDP,
Africa’s collective voice expressed in TICAD fora can be channelled into the G8, contributing to informed decision-making on Africa. This was the case at the G8 Hokkaido Toyako Summit held from 7 to 9 July 2008 (TICAD, 2009).

Collaboration with the UNDP, dialogue with Asian countries as development partners and cooperation with research institutes are used to realize TICAD’s objectives. Through TICAD, dialogue has become a core element of Africa’s development. The dialogue, through Asia-Africa Forums (AAFs), is to give African and Asian policy makers and development practitioners opportunities to exchange ideas and share knowledge as to how best to assist Africa to tackle its development challenges. TICAD, through self-help and partnership, seems to demonstrate that Japan and recipient countries function on an equal footing. Moreover, sharing of ownership facilitates accountability and responsibility. Akira and Yazutami (1999) and Ishikawa (2005) argue that Japan is guided by the principle of not forcing its views on recipients of aid. It tries to cultivate a relationship with African countries and other developing nations that allow independence, the establishment of mutual trust, dialogue based on equal partnership and aid without conditionality. However, in practice, Japanese aid does sometimes have conditions attached to it.

In TICAD’s support for NEPAD, Japan has demonstrated its acceptance of African initiated development ideas. NEPAD mirrors TICAD’s principles and objectives. This includes South-South collaboration and the promotion of regional development. NEPAD’s key elements are consistent with Japan’s overall purpose in the TICAD initiative, especially the determination to promote peace, security, democracy, good governance, and sound economic management among African countries (TICAD, 2009).

4. TICAD and African Development
The Japanese assistance programme to Africa, channelled through ODA and TICAD, is intended to be a new donor model, the Post Washington Consensus, based on the East Asian miracle. It serves as an alternative development framework for Africa in contrast to the Washington Consensus spearheaded by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which emphasizes markets and a minimal role for the state. TICAD presents Africa with a choice of development models, an alternative to that of the West, and another multilateral forum to articulate Africa’s development problems. Consequently, Africa has become a “battleground for development ideas and the focus of foreign aid activities” (Katada, 2005: 6, 10). Japan has been engaged in a “battle of ideas over development strategies” with the West to the extent that “the Japanese government hoped that the World Bank would acknowledge an alternative path to development following the Japanese case, which emphasizes ‘self-help in development’, the state’s role and the importance of public policy, rather than just market forces” (Katada, 2005: 6, 9, 10). Japan hopes to utilize its own development experience through ODA, loans, technical assistance and foreign direct investment (FDI) to export its brand of development strategy to Africa, as it
did successfully in Asia (Katada, 2005). Thernstrom (2005:1) states that “Official Development Assistance (ODA) remains the cornerstone of Japanese foreign policy, and Japan has helped lift countless people out of poverty by providing some US$ 221 billion since it joined the club of donors”.

TICAD serves as a mechanism through which ODA is channelled to promote development in Africa. One of the goals of the Tokyo Declaration at TICAD I was to apply the development experience of East Asia to Africa. In this respect, TICAD is seen as a process:

- to introduce an alternative development paradigm based on the successful development experience of many East Asian countries and thus help expand the tool kits at the disposal of African development practitioners (Harsch, 2004:4).
- Japan has a unique position as a member of both the developed countries and developing Asia (through regional bodies such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Plus Three, and the East Asian Summit) which facilitates a distinct relationship with Africa. Japan’s status as a major donor in Africa is also heavily influenced by the image it wants to portray. This is the image of Japan as an economic power and an “alternative type of donor support” which is unique and distinctive from that of Western donors. Japan, a successful non-western country, “has looked towards its Asian heritage as a reason to continue to assert itself as an Asian leader in foreign policy” (Lehman, 2008:5). As East Asia becomes developed and needs less development assistance, Japanese attention has turned increasingly to Africa. TICAD is seen as a replication and extension of Japan-Asian policy to the African continent, an affirmation of Japan’s self-identity and as a leading donor country (Lehman, 2008). Katada (2005: 10) reinforces this argument succinctly “… the Japanese government … must increasingly engage in the battle of ideas over development to become a respected leader in developmental financing and foreign aid”.
- Japan represents a new and alternative donor framework to that of the Washington Consensus. The failure of the SAPs has reinforced the view that the Japanese framework would lead to better development outcomes than the neoliberal approach. Africa has welcomed and has been receptive to the post Washington Consensus viewpoint. The framework lacks the paternalism of the Washington Consensus which has been unsuccessful in promoting development (Hailu, 2009). It holds the promise of transforming African economies into developed ones with a new emphasis on African development that is sustainable. It also offers a new donor assistance approach that facilitates Africa’s self-reliance (MOFA, 1993), and “stresses the maturity and symmetry of the relationship with African countries” (King, 2007: 5).

As an alternative framework to that of the Washington Consensus, TICAD has serious policy implications for African countries. Among them are the role of the government and the market in the economy; growth versus development; the nature of aid; and the goals of development. The Japanese model of development assigns an instrumental role to the government to ‘govern’ the market through planning and to ensure both growth and development that benefit ordinary citizens.
The duty of government is to ensure that the private sector facilitates growth while promoting people's welfare. Thus, development, not only growth, is emphasized. Donnelly (2008:4) considers Japanese aid as an alternative model of development to that of the West, "one which has seen a combination of private sector investment, trade and aid boost Asian development". The importance of development planning in second-generation newly industrializing Asian countries, such as Malaysia, further underscores "how government can work closely with the private sector, while at the same time maintaining a focus on the social needs of the people" (Harsch, 2004:5). African governments have become aware of the significant involvement of governments in East Asian economies and wish to emulate this in opposition to the World Bank and Western donor countries' emphasis on sweeping liberalisation and the state's limited involvement in the economy.

Japanese aid departs from the Washington Consensus in two major ways. First, recipients are not required to create macroeconomic stability and a free market as preconditions for receiving aid. Instead, the government "governs" the market and prioritizes production and employment creation to guarantee growth and development. These form the core elements of the East Asian model of development driven by Japan. The Japanese model also accommodates an authoritarian state in the early years of the development process (Lehman, 2008). Second, aid consists of loans and not grants as a major element. Loans are directed at such areas as infrastructural development that facilitates both internal and external economic linkages. Therefore, through TICAD, Japan offers a process of development and engagement different from structural adjustment. It also offers a new strategic development based on self-reliance of African countries (King, 2007).

Furthermore, while the Washington Consensus holds the view that poverty reduction is an outcome of economic growth, the post Washington Consensus (TICAD) sees poverty reduction as an immediate objective of development. Therefore, TICAD stresses the key role of the government in distributing income to the poor and the importance of foreign aid for poverty alleviation (Hayami, 2003), hence TICAD's projects that involve support for social development and achievement of MDGs. The Japanese stress on policies which immediately benefit the poor is appropriate to addressing poverty on the African continent.

In a nutshell, Japanese foreign aid to Africa may be viewed from a developmental perspective in terms of the Japanese wish to articulate "its own developmentalist model as a series of lessons which African countries could adopt and modify according to their own constraints and development objects" (Lehman, 2008: 3). Of special importance, is the fact that the developmental model of East Asia emphasizes supply side economics such as production and employment, a long term perspective based on economic growth, government involvement in the market and use of government regulations including subsidies and trade barriers to promote economic growth. Therefore, the Japanese approach is mid-way between neo-liberalism and bureaucratic intervention, emphasizing an "appropriate mixture of government and market functions" (Lehman, 2008: 11; Jayasuriya and Rosser, 2001).
Japan’s TICAD: Alternative Global Framework for Africa’s Development?

TICAD is more than a Conference. It is a global multilateral framework for Africa’s development that has helped to push Africa’s development challenges onto the world stage. It has provided an additional forum within which to articulate Africa’s problems. Japan has extended collaboration to other development agencies and stakeholders which gives TICAD international legitimacy, wide representation and participation. TICAD is not a bilateral forum, but a multilateral one, hosted, supported, and attended by the government of Japan and other development partners (Lehman, 2008; TICAD, 2009; TICAD III, 2009).

5. Development Assistance to Africa

Japanese foreign aid takes the form of ODA allocated through bilateral and multilateral channels. Some of the bilateral ODA is channeled through TICAD. Although there have been fluctuations in Japanese foreign aid since 2000, Japan remains one of the major contributors of development finance to SSA. In 2002, Japan, then the world’s second largest economy, contributed an estimated US$9.3 billion to bilateral ODA to developing countries. Of this amount, 40 SSA countries received US$610 million. This represented 8.7% of the total amount (Harsch, 2004). In 2004, Japan was the third major donor of ODA after the USA and United Kingdom (UK), contributing US$8.86 billion. In 2007, Japanese ODA decreased by 30%, placing it fifth among the world’s 22 major donors. This was its lowest rank since 1972. Japanese total ODA to Africa fell by 8% between 2006 and 2007. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Japanese bilateral ODA to SSA in 2007 was US$1.161 billion. Therefore, although bilateral ODA fell short of its target by US$20 million in 2007 (From TICAD to the G8 Summit, 2009), its contribution to Africa’s financial inflows and development remained considerable.

Loans provide an additional flow of funds to Africa. For example, in 2008, at TICAD IV, the Japanese Prime Minister, Yasuo Fukuda, announced loans of Yen 415 billion (US$4 billion) with low interest rates for African roads and other infrastructure development. A further Y260 billion (US$2.5 billion) of financial assistance to Japanese companies to finance investments in Africa during the period 2008 - 2012 (From TICAD to the G8 Summit, 2009; Gouede, 2008). This signified a commitment to infrastructure development as a prerequisite to growth and poverty reduction.

Japanese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Africa complements ODA as a source of development funds. However, its FDI remains low. This amounted to US$899 million in 2006. Fifty percent of which was in South Africa. This was higher than in 2004 when FDI totaled US$203 million. And between 2002 and 2004, when it amounted to US$415 million. However, 85% of this FDI went to South Africa and Egypt (Gouede, 2008).

Trade between Japan and Africa has steadily grown over time. However, it is still very low. Japanese exports to Africa stood at US$11.6 billion in 2007. This accounted for only 1.6 % of its total exports. This was far below its exports to other countries such as China and the USA (Breitbart, 2009). In 2008, Japan announced
a package of initiatives to boost Africa’s development and to demonstrate its support for trade and investment. This included the doubling of Japanese ODA to Africa to US$1.8 billion by 2012, availing loans to Africa and giving incentives to Japanese investors in Africa. In addition, Japan also pledged to double Japanese private sector direct investment in Africa to US$3.4 billion by 2012 (Gouede, 2008).

Japan hopes to increase trade and investment to SSA countries in collaboration with the private sector to facilitate development, employment creation, and the transfer of technology and expertise (MOFA, 2009a). Between 2008 and 2012, measures would be introduced to promote and expand trade, encourage foreign investment, assist private sector development and promote tourism. To promote and expand trade, efforts would be directed at providing duty free and quota free access to markets for products originating from Africa’s least developed countries. There would also be a “scaling up aid for trade to increase the global competitiveness of African countries by accelerating assistance...” (Gouede, 2008: 5). Japan provides technical assistance on trade and “access to the market for African products through the One Village One Product movement” (MOFA, 2009a: 30). Trade expansion would give SSA an opportunity to make inroads into the global commodity chain.

TICAD has provided a bridge between Africa and Asia. African countries have increasingly forged and nurtured economic ties with Asian countries and vice versa. As a Tanzanian official noted: “We are shifting our eyes to Asia”, and “Asia is looking in Africa’s direction” (Harsch, 2004:2-3). Asia has become an important trading, investment and technical assistance partner for Africa, as well as an appropriate “economic model in a globalizing world” (Harsch, 2004: 2-3). Through TICAD, Asian countries provide knowledge and access to technologies to Africans. This has contributed to human capacity building, production of goods and services, employment creation and improvements in the quality of life. Of special importance are scholarships and specialized training courses in farming, fishing, running small businesses, and techniques to improve output. (Harsch, 2004).

Through TICAD, Asian development partners supplement Japan’s contribution to investment inflows to Africa and facilitate South-South cooperation. Asian FDI in Africa, though small, has assumed significance. It has, every year between 2002 and 2004, reached US$1.2 billion and has become a “promising fact of South-South economic cooperation” (UN, 2007: iii). Between 2002 and 2005, there were 126 FDI projects undertaken by Asian countries in Africa (UN, 2007). For example, Malaysia has been a major investor in diverse but important undertakings, although its FDI flows have fluctuated over time. These have fluctuated from US$222.2 million in 1999, to US$77.7 million in 2002, to US$411 million in 2003 and to US$175.6 million in 2004 (UN, 2007). Most prominent are Malaysia’s oil production ventures in several African countries. This includes a 35% stake in the Doba oil fields in Chad. Malaysia’s Petronas has petrol stations in South Africa and palm oil interests in Gabon. Malaysia is also involved in the telecommunications sector in Ghana, Guinea, Malawi, and South Africa. It is active in banking in Mozambique, tourism in the Seychelles and textiles in Namibia.
The total of Malaysia’s FDI stock in SSA was US$1.1 million in 1999. This rose to US$1.463.2 billion in 2004.

Similarly, the Republic of Korea’s FDI stock increased from US$16.8 million in 1995 to US$131.5 million in 2002. Singapore’s FDI stock in SSA expanded from US$3,508.9 million in 2003 to US$2,076.2 million in 1999 (UN, 2007). Furthermore, there were 77 contracts with respect to cross-border mergers and acquisitions between Asian transnational corporations and African firms during the period 1987 to 2005. Malaysian firms have been the most active. They participated in about 30% of the contracts. The largest acquisition was the US$1.8 billion purchase of LNG of Egypt by Petronas (Malaysia) in 2003 (UN, 2007). Chinese investments, though controversial, have been growing rapidly. It is estimated that Chinese investment in Africa increased more than fourfold from US$1.2 billion in 2006 to US$5 billion in 2008 (Manji, 2009:36). There were 450 Chinese-owned investment projects in Africa with 46% of these in manufacturing, 40% in services and 9% in resources (Baah and Jauch, 2009:19). Asian FDI in Africa is expected to grow due to the complementary nature of the economies of the two regions and the rapid economic growth in Asia. Potential Asian investments in Africa would be in natural resources, manufacturing and services. Moreover, the rapid industrial upgrading in Asia may lead to opportunities for Africa to attract “efficiency seeking” and “export oriented” FDI from Asia (UN, 2007: 4).

Asian markets have become very important to Africa because trade has increased dramatically since the 1990s and accelerated since 2003. For example, Africa’s exports to the five ASEAN countries of Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, expanded from US$2.3 billion in 2001 to US$39 billion in 2005 (Yoshino, 2008). Africa-Asia trade has increased almost to the level of Africa’s traditional partners of the USA and Europe. The tripling of exports from Africa to Asia has made Asia Africa’s third largest trading partner after Europe and the USA (Broadman, 2007). Much of Africa’s trade growth has been in oil, natural gas and metals. In 2007, China’s total trade with Africa was worth US$73.5 billion while that of Japan stood at US$26.6 billion (Gouede, 2008). Malaysian trade tripled from US$423 million in 1993 to US$1.4 billion in 2002. Trade with Vietnam grew four times between 1991 and 2002. It increased from US$15 million to US$200 million respectively. Between 1995 and 2000, the Republic of Korea’s trade with Africa averaged US$5.6 billion annually.

Senegal exports US$ 55 million worth of chemicals to India. More than half of Guinea Bissau’s export earnings were from Asia. This is largely through the sale of cashew nuts to India and Thailand (Harsch, 2004). Asia has become Africa’s source of imports for industrial equipment, fertilizer and consumer goods. This is at a lower cost than that of Western imports. However, Africa needs increased access to Asian markets through the removal of high tariffs and subsidies to, for example, the agricultural sector. High tariffs and subsidies prevent Africa’s goods from competing favorably in Asian markets. Asian leaders have promised to further open markets as “the most meaningful way to help Africans” (Harsch, 2004: 9).
6. TICAD and Development in Africa

The analysis of the impact of TICAD on African development is not an easy task given the short period of time since its initiatives became a reality. Radical scholars, such as Neo-Marxists Balaam and Veseth (1996) do not envision any benefits or development accruing to Africa from foreign aid, especially within the context of global capitalism. Donor-recipient ties raise the old question of whether aid facilitates imperialism or neo-colonialism and the resultant negative consequences of exploitation, inequality and dependence for the African continent. National interests are the overriding determinant of the foreign policy of a state. The fact that Japan is a state-led capitalist state suggests that imperialist motives cannot be entirely excluded. What is significant, however, is how SSA, the recipient, appraises the conditions for foreign aid and is able to use aid for its own benefit.

The objectives and core activities of TICAD serve as a good basis to evaluate its achievements in Africa. The most crucial questions are: what is the impact of TICAD on Africa’s development? Has the “Asian miracle” been transferred successfully to Africa? Three themes which form the core of TICAD development activities, namely, consolidation of peace; human-centred development; and poverty reduction through economic growth, are interrelated, and useful to gauge the practical impact of Japanese assistance on Africa’s development.

With respect to peace, TICAD supports a wide range of activities. These include assistance to refugees and internally displaced people; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants into societies; collection and destruction of small arms and light weapons; and de-mining. In 2005, for example, Japan provided US$600 million to 14 African countries in a wide range of peace projects. Assistance for peacebuilding, as prioritized in TICAD III and IV, is a new pillar of Japanese international cooperation and a means to lay the pre-conditions for Africa’s socio-economic development. Japan increased support for peace building in Sudan since the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in January 2005. Sierra Leone is another recipient of Japanese and TICAD’s support for peace building to strengthen democratic governance. This is essential for poverty reduction and improving the quality of life. Furthermore, to deepen democratization in Africa, TICAD has endorsed NEPAD’s initiative, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) (TICAD III, 2009).

TICAD is involved in improving food security in Africa to promote human-centred development. An illustrative example is the introduction of the New Rice for Africa (NERICA), a cross breed of Asian and African rice varieties. Its numerous advantages include increased yields of 25 to 100%. NERICA benefits about 20 million farmers, and contributes to the reduction of West Africa’s high rice import costs. This saves the region an estimated US$88 million a year (TICAD III, 2009).

Another human-centred project supported by TICAD is the production of bed nets. This contributes to the fight against malaria, especially in the reduction of child deaths. The joint venture between Sumitomo Chemical of Japan and A and Z Textile Mills of Tanzania produces about 10 million anti-malaria bed nets a year. This has
created over 3,200 jobs. In Burkina Faso and other countries in West Africa, 19 Multi-Function Platforms, powered by a diesel engine, have made husking of grains profitable. This has enabled local communities to earn more than US$500,000 in a year, thus contributing to the reduction of poverty and increasing access to nutritious food. They also provide electricity for domestic use (TICAD III, 2009).

TICAD has facilitated the promotion of trade and investment, technology transfer, and joint business ventures between Asia and Africa (TICAD III, 2009; TICAD/UNDP, 2009). Japan, through TICAD, relies on the Africa Village Initiative (AVI) and African Millennium Village (AMV) to promote economic growth through community development and community capacity building. The AVI and AMV are designed to help Africa achieve the MDGs to reduce poverty and promote human security. They are a combination of social and physical infrastructural and community capacity building projects to encourage self-help for such projects as schools and water supply (MOFA, 2009a). The Millennium Villages have been developed in 12 poor rural areas of Africa, with a total of 79 villages. In Uganda, a village has been able to organize 11 micro credit groups into a village bank. Women have been trained in income generating activities that earn them an additional US$1.20 a day. Agricultural production has improved with maize production increasing from 43 to 316 tons per annum. Schools have been refurbished and a feeding programme introduced leading to an increase in enrolment from 1,315 to 2,171 in 2008. The Millennium Village projects demonstrate how the poor can be drivers of and contribute to their own development and how properly cultivated leadership, self-confidence and trust in the poor can lead to positive community participation and successful projects (TICAD III, 2009).

7. TICAD: An Alternative Framework for Africa’s Development?

To determine the extent to which TICAD as an alternative development framework has been implemented in Africa, it is important to undertake an assessment that identifies factors that account for discrepancies between stated aims and their implementation. Japan’s preoccupation with Africa forms part of its global foreign policy as a major economic power. It also reflects its domestic demands for raw materials. While taking cognizance of the competing explanations of economic self-interest, domestic bureaucratic politics, culture and the Asian developmental model to explain Japan-Africa relations manifested through TICAD (Harsch, 2004; Adem, 2006; Lehman, 2008), this article accepts the importance of economic self-interest, but also views international assertiveness to mirror Japan’s status as a global economic power as an equally compelling factor.

In spite of Japan’s declared intention to provide Africa with an alternative development framework in the form of TICAD, national interests and international leadership present powerful explanations. Events prior to the creation of TICAD seem to substantiate this argument. TICAD was initiated at the end of the Cold War after the fall of the USSR as a superpower. This opened up an opportunity for Japan to assert itself as a contending power, capable of providing leadership in shaping the global agenda through a focus on African development problems.
Moreover, when TICAD was formed in 1993, Africa was undergoing political and economic liberalisation spearheaded by the World Bank and the IMF of the Washington Consensus with relatively little success. Japan capitalized on this situation to challenge neo-liberalism. It created TICAD to sell the Asian model to international development agencies, including the World Bank and the UN, and in turn to Africa. TICAD articulated an alternative development model based on the successful development experience of Japan and other Asian countries, particularly the Asian Tigers – Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore – most of which emulated the Japanese development experience. Katada (2005:10) has argued that Japan engages “in the battle of ideas over development to become a respected leader in developmental finance and foreign aid” (Katada, 2005: 10). Thernstrom (2005: 4) emphasizes Japan’s self interest: “Japanese ODA is explicitly linked to Japan’s own national interest in terms of global peace and security”.

The fact that TICAD was initially announced at the UN General Assembly, and not in an Organization of African Unity (OAU) meeting in an African capital, seems to support the argument that Japan is striving for an international status that is commensurate with its economic power and financial contributions to multilateral institutions (Ochiai, 2001). The Japanese desire to influence development agencies has not, however, been very successful. The most visible effect is the World Bank’s retreat from its initial advocacy of rolling back the state and subsequent appreciation of the role of the state in development. Katada (2005: 9) points out that “The World Bank’s 1993 publication was the product of a compromise, concluding that the state’s ‘market-friendly’ intervention worked in favour of economic growth among those Asian countries”. Furthermore, on the diplomatic front, Japan needs Africa’s support to push its agendas in international fora, for example, its bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council (Masaki, 2006). Having failed to secure a seat in 2005, Japan subsequently found it necessary to solicit the support of Africa which constitutes one quarter of the UN membership to increase its chances of success. As Prime Minister Fukuda put it: “Japan would like to work on the UN Security Council reform in cooperation with its African friends” (TICAD, 2009: 4). Japan seeks African support to assert itself in international affairs.

The discrepancy between the stated objectives of TICAD and development outcomes in Africa remains a formidable challenge in that it raises questions about the alternative model. For example, TICAD’s focus on immediate social needs and poverty alleviation as illustrated in the three core activities of peace, human security and poverty reduction, while noble and suited to Africa, seem to neglect other equally important factors critical to sustainable development. Critics, such as Hini and Limi (2006) quoted in Lehman (2008), indicate that the balance has shifted too far in the direction of immediate needs at the expense of long term development objectives, including infrastructure. There is need for a delicate balance in aid projects for the social sectors to complement long term production goals while promoting full ownership and local control of the development process.
While the effects of structural adjustment may have lessened the impact of TICAD activities, there are suggestions that Japan has not fully applied its resources towards Africa’s development as it did in East Asia. For example, King (2007:5) argues that “It would appear that the tight concentration of many different Japanese resources, both public and private, which have been a feature of Japan’s ODA was absent in Africa”.

Furthermore, as a soft power, Japan has increasingly engaged in intense competition for spheres of influence and African resources, especially, in the twenty-first century. This is a new scramble for Africa brought about by the fact that Japan is the second largest consumer of oil in the world (Masaki, 2006) that it sources mostly from the Middle East. However, political instability in the Middle East and the rise of radical Islamic fundamentalism has necessitated the search for alternative sources, resulting in increased competition for energy resources. The competition, involving major economic powers such as China, Japan, India and USA, has propelled Africa to the centre stage of the global struggle for energy resources. Masaki (2006:1) asserts: “The increasingly fierce competition between Japan and China over energy and political influence is spilling over into Africa ... Japan until recently has shunned Africa as an energy-resource supplier”.

Although Japan, through TICAD, promotes itself as a new frontier in Africa’s relationship with donors and development partners, it shares common elements with the Washington Consensus in applying conditionalities. These, undoubtedly, handicap accelerated development in Africa. Japan, like the World Bank and Western donor nations, and unlike China, insists on a good record of democracy and human rights in its dealings with Africa (Masaki, 2006). Political, environmental and human rights considerations run counter to the developmental state model which Asia, including Japan, is famous for and is similar to conditions attached to aid by the West. The East Asian developing state was essentially authoritarian as in the case of South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, with a trend towards democracy in recent times, long after development had been consolidated. The requirement of democracy and human rights means that TICAD has fallen short of applying the East Asian development model to Africa. Similarly, Japan, like the West, accords the private sector a major role in economic development and leaves the government to develop an appropriate investment climate to attract the private sector.

TICAD’s objective of applying the Asian development model to Africa has proved problematic primarily because of pressure to adhere to international donor standards determined by the West. This has meant that the post Washington Consensus, which is TICAD’s approach, remains unattainable in Africa. The mid-1980s saw enormous pressure, especially, from the US, on Japan to increase its aid to Africa to match its high economic growth and trade surplus, while the US experienced trade deficits and increased debts. Sato (2005) argues that international pressure contributed to Japan’s move to boost its ODA to Africa. Japan agreed to increase aid for five years between 2005 and 2009. More importantly, Japan succumbed to pressure from the OECD’s Development
To conform to donor coordination, alignment, and harmonization. Sato (2005:81) notes that:

International institutions forged a consensus that development assistance would attain better results and should be planned and implemented at sector level rather than each project level separately, and with collaborated donor efforts rather than each donor’s separate attempt, even making a common fund when necessary.

Also, for the sake of conforming to donor practices, Japan and TICAD had to re-orient its position on poverty reduction as an immediate objective of development, support to social development and government or non market mechanism to distribute income to the poor. Instead, it had to adopt the Washington Consensus’ view of promoting economic growth. The DACs and Western agencies have also pressured Japan to untie its concessional loans to focus on sector-wide approaches and direct budget support (King, 2007). Moreover, pressure from Western donor nations on Japan to write off debts contributed to the shift from the original intended objectives of foreign aid. The G8 agreed to cancel debts fully for 18 countries, 14 in Africa, which Japan initially resisted based on the argument that it “would bring about moral hazards among recipient countries” (Sato, 2005: 68). Eventually, it had to compromise and go along with the other G8 countries. This is a shift away from the Japanese traditional position that the loan is superior to the grant because it enables recipients to repay through hard work.

Initially, due to constitutional constraints and international treaties, Japan was reluctant to assist Africa on conflict issues. This is despite the need for political stability and durable peace as pre-conditions for development. Ochiai (2001), quoting Keiko Kokubun, seconded from the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) to provide technical assistance for the preparation of TICAD II, notes that, initially, Japan was non-committal on including conflict issues in the TICAD agenda. Africa requires capacity for conflict resolution, conflict prevention and peace building. It lacks finance and expertise as well as the political will to undertake costly peacekeeping functions. Since the 1990s, Japan has increasingly shown interest and given support to UN peacekeeping operations, regional peace initiatives such as by the African Union (AU), and sub regional conflict responses (Ochiai, 2001). It has prioritized peacebuilding in the 2000s, in conformity with international liberal values (Inada, 2005; Osei-Hwedie, 2011).

There has been a change in Japan’s policy from exporting the Asian development experience to Africa to tackling global problems. This is evident in the revised 2003 ODA Charter which highlights human security issues to combat global problems that affect world peace and security. Thernstrom (2005: 4), quoting Leheny (2005), labels the emphasis on transnational issues of poverty, refugees and HIV/AIDS as “a sea change” for the Japanese government which had long viewed its ODA policies as efforts to replicate some versions of Japan’s “miracle economy” in developing nations. “In the Charter, Japanese ODA is explicitly linked to Japan’s own national interest in terms of global peace and
security” (Thernstrom, 2005: 4). While conceding to this view, it is equally true that Japan remains committed to promoting development in Africa through pursuing human security and peacebuilding. These are all elements of development as defined in the reformed 2003 Charter, the revised 2005 Mid Term Policy on ODA and as conceptualized by the UNDP. Also, since 2008, environmental and climate issues have formed part of Japan’s development agenda in Africa (MOFA, 2009a) as part of the global agenda to assist developing countries to reduce climatic challenges while promoting economic growth.

8. Conclusion

TICAD was created to serve as an alternative foreign aid framework for Africa to that of the Washington Consensus with a promise of spearheading both growth and development based on the practical and historical experience of Asia. It presents a post Washington Consensus approach to Africa’s development. However, the discrepancy between stated objectives and practical reality and shifts in Japanese ODA policy has lessened the possibility of repeating the East Asian development miracle in Africa. The disconnection arises from a combination of Japan’s own economic needs: the desire to assert itself internationally; attempts to adhere to international donor practices of the West; great emphasis on economic growth; and the conditions within Africa. To date, most of TICAD’s resources have been allocated to peace consolidation, poverty reduction through economic growth and human security. These have also been prioritized in the ODA. However, production and infrastructure, basic to sustainable development in Africa, have become secondary to poverty alleviation. Much more problematic, perhaps, is the inability of TICAD to appreciate the unique and complex development problems of Africa, primarily, the inability of governments to initiate change for the benefit of the poor; “govern” the market; create conducive environments for private sector-driven development; formulate and implement pro growth policies; and promote sustainable development. Taken together, these factors have meant that TICAD has not yet contributed to the transformation of Africa’s development process. TICAD could be of great assistance to development if it promoted industrialisation and built infrastructure on the African continent.

Notes

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References


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