Post-Materialism and Foreign Policy – a First Cut

Edelgard E. Mahant
York University and University of Botswana

Post-Materialism and Foreign Policy – a First Cut

Edelgard E. Mahant

(York University and University of Botswana)

The influence of political culture on foreign policy is a much-neglected topic. This article focuses on one aspect of political culture: the concept of post-materialism as developed by Inglehart. Using Canada and South Africa as case studies, the article determines the degree of post-materialism of these two countries' political culture and then attempts to assess the extent to which the ideas of post-materialism have influenced the foreign policy of the two countries. The methodology is that of examining the ratifications of relevant UN conventions and the press releases of the foreign ministries of the two governments dealing with the subjects of gender equality, environmentalism and the goal of nuclear disarmament, three typical post-materialist causes. The article does not find a relationship between post-materialism and the foreign policy of Canada and South Africa.

---

1. Introduction

Most students of foreign policy take note of the fact that foreign policy studies stand at the intersection of international relations and comparative politics (Hudson, 2007, pp. 9, 28). Yet when it comes to detailed studies or in depth analyses of foreign policy, they return to the familiar theories of international relations, realism, constructivism, liberalism and so on. There are, of course, some notable exceptions. The studies of the influence of interest groups on American foreign policy; a number of studies of individual foreign policy decisions, though many of these are related only to the US or Israel; or the outbreak of various twentieth century wars. Smith, Hadfield and Dunne (2012) provide a good example of the state of the discipline in that respect. There is also the democratic peace theorem, which relates domestic politics to just one aspect of foreign policy, the decision not to use military means of implementation (Hudson, 2007, p. 26).

One especially neglected aspect of the study of comparative politics as it relates to foreign policy, is that of the degree to which a state's political culture may mould its foreign policy (Hudson, 2007, p. 104; Geldenhuys, 2012). Though its origins can be traced back to Montesquieu and beyond, political culture as an established part of the discipline of political science began with Almond and Verba's path-breaking study, *The Civic Culture* (1963). Political culture now forms an accepted aspect of the study of comparative politics, but the number of studies of its influence on foreign policy can literally be counted on the fingers of one's hands (Hudson, 2007, p. 104). Stairs (1982) on Canadian foreign policy, Ebel, Taras and Cochrane (1991) on Latin America and Tsygankov and Tarver-Wahlquist (2009) on Georgia are three notable examples of such studies. Grenstadt (2001) tries to

relate domestic political culture and institutions to the European policies of the five Scandinavian countries. He finds that more egalitarian countries are less likely to be pro-European, but that other aspects of national political culture do not affect European policy.

This article uses one aspect of political culture, the idea of post-materialism as developed by Ronald Inglehart and his collaborators, and attempts to trace the influence of these ideas on the foreign policy of two states, South Africa and Canada. The hypothesis is that states whose people display a high degree of post-materialism, as evidenced by the World Values Surveys, will develop foreign objectives which reflect post-materialist attitudes on the environment, gender issues, multilateralism and arms control, in short, that political culture will be reflected in a state's foreign policy (Hudson, 2007, p. 112). The empirical evidence which will support or refute this hypothesis consists of the policies of the two governments as evidenced by (1) their ratification or otherwise of the relevant United Nations conventions (2) public statements on relevant foreign policy objectives.

The study of political culture should not be confused with that of public opinion. Political culture is diffuse and long term whereas the study of public opinion and foreign policy usually relates to specific events, such as the American intervention in Afghanistan or Britain's relations with the European Union. Another important distinction is that political leaders and policy-makers are steeped in the political culture of their country; political culture is an ethos that applies to the polity overall whereas the study of public opinion distinguishes between the policy-making elite and the public as two separate entities whose relationship needs to be determined (Nicolás, 1995). In an interesting attempt to relate public opinion to political culture, Goldsmith (2006) examines international public opinion on US foreign policy and the degree of post-materialism in some other countries. He found no correlation. Post-materialist populations were not more likely to be critical of US foreign policy than any others.

2. The Concept of Post-Materialism

Beginning with a path-breaking study first published in 1977, Ronald Inglehart developed the idea of post-materialism. He took the idea of progress, which falls squarely within the canon of Western liberalism, and altered it much as Marx stood Hegel on his head – only in reverse fashion. Marx took Hegel's ideas and substituted materialism for ideationality. Inglehart took the ideas of modernisation and progress, which are largely based on the concept of material progress, and foresaw a time when materialism would become less important than a series of other values that he terms "self-expression" values. These values include, but are not limited to, individual autonomy and freedom of choice, gender equality, a concern for the environment, multiple political identities (below and above those of the nation-state), the right to participate in the making of authoritative decisions and more recently, animal rights and the right to express one's sexual orientation (Inglehart, 1998 and 2005, p. 2).

Inglehart's studies show that post-materialism became politically significant in Western Europe in the 1960s and 1970s, at a time when there had been an unprecedented growth in material well-being and a generational change in political attitudes caused at least in part by the coming to political maturity of the "baby-boom" generation. These young people had not experienced the physical hardships of two major wars and the

depression of the 1930s. Moving up the hierarchy of values, they turned their attention to values of self-expression, identity, environmental protection and an attenuation of the concept of national identity. More specifically, many rejected the idea that a government should put its people's lives at risk by using military means to defend the national interest (on the hierarchy of values, see Maslow, 1970, pp. 51-9). In his later work, Inglehart does not make the simplistic claim that post-materialism will inevitably follow material well-being. He admits that material values will continue to form an important part of most political cultures, that the degree of post-materialism will vary from country to country, that national cultures, especially those of a religious nature, matter and that the transnational flow of ideas may lead to the formation of post--material values in countries that have not yet achieved material well-being for most of their people (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005, pp. 18, 225; Nicolás, 1995). Thus, ideas such as environmentalism can influence people in countries, for example China and South Africa, which are still far from achieving the degree of prosperity that exists in most of Europe and North America.

It is ironic that post-materialism, which when it first developed largely expressed itself through opposition to the Vietnam War and to the production and deployment of a glut of super-destructive nuclear weapons, has since been all but ignored as an influence on a country's foreign policy (Inglehart, 1984). It is this lacuna that this article seeks to begin to fill. Starting with a modest objective, I use Inglehart's World Values Survey to determine the extent to which post-materialist attitudes characterise the political cultures of Canada and South Africa. That is the independent variable. I then try to trace the influence of these values on the foreign policies of the two states, using just three aspects of these policies: environmentalism, gender equality and support for multilateralism. So I begin not with a large-scale statistical correlation but with two case studies which should provide a useful basis for further studies.

The dependent variable consists of two elements: (1) the extent to which the two governments have ratified relevant UN conventions on environmental and gender issues and have supported UN efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons; and (2) an analysis of the press releases of the South African (DIRCO) and Canadian (DFAIT) foreign ministries over the last two and half years. The press releases represent an important source of information because they are addressed to the national as well as the international community, and in that way they presumably give some indication of the national political cultures and values.[1]

---

[1] A note on methodology: I consulted the press and media releases issued by the two foreign ministries from 1 January 2009 to 30 June 2012 and searched them for references to the three issues discussed in this article. I also consulted the relevant UN websites to determine which conventions the two governments had ratified. The use of the press releases created an imbalance because the South African foreign ministry (DIRCO) issues many more press releases than the Canadian foreign ministry, which has become very sparing with the information it provides to the public.

Table 1.

Ranking of Countries according to Inglehart's post-materialism index
(various dates 2005-2007)

	Post-materialism score in ascending order		Post-materialism score in ascending order
Russia	1.2	Brazil	9.0
Taiwan	1.8	Ethiopia	9.9
Egypt	2.3	Japan	10.7
Serbia	2.2	Cyprus	10.9
Bulgaria	2.7	Turkey	11.9
South Korea	3.2	US	12.1
China	3.3	Rwanda	12.7
Romania	3.6	Argentina	13.4
Jordan	3.6	Peru	14.0
Thailand	3.7	New Zealand	14.0
Ukraine	3.8	Mexico	14.2
Vietnam	3.9	Slovenia	14.2
Indonesia	3.9	Finland	14.3
Georgia	4.0	Chile	15.6
Ghana	4.2	Spain	17.4
Mali	4.3	Great Britain	18.2
South Africa	4.6	Italy	19.5
Burkina Faso	4.7	Uruguay	19.7
Trinidad	5.1	Netherlands	20.0
Poland	5.6	Australia	20.2
Guatemala	5.7	Mexico	20.2
Morocco	6.1	Germany	22.1
India	6.3	Norway	22.4
Moldova	6.3	**Canada**	23.9
Iran	6.5	Sweden	24.6
Zambia	8.2	France	25.7
Malaysia	8.5	Switzerland	30.4

Post-materialism index 12 item - extracted from
http://www.wsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSAanalizeQuestion.jsp

(accessed 18 June 2012)

3. Post-Materialism in Canada and South Africa

Tables 1 and 2 give an overview of the degree of post-materialism in Canada and South Africa. Table 1 ranks the 54 countries included in the latest World Values Surveys according to the degree of post-materialist values, in ascending order of the degree of post-materialism. It is not surprising that Russia is the most materialist of the countries surveyed. Years of materialist propaganda followed by robber capitalism have taken their toll! South Africa ranks 17th out of 54 countries; post-materialism has begun to influence the politics of a developing country which is still struggling with huge economic inequalities (Butler, 2009, pp. 89-91). Canada ranks 51st, again not surprising considering that Canadians pride themselves on their welfare state and their environmentalism. What is surprising is the large gap between Canadian and American attitudes on post-materialism; the US ranks 33rd out of 54. As the data from the World Values Survey indicates, Americans are less environmentalist and more sexist than Canadians, they have a strong sense of national identity and some on the American Right have made multilateralism into a four letter word.

Table 2 consists of a summary of just a few of the kinds of questions the World Values Survey uses to determine post-materialism. The questions and numbers in Table 2 do not give a total summary of the factors used to make up the post-materialism index. They just give a few examples of relevant questions in the hope that they will spark the reader's interest in the concept of post-materialism. The table includes Sweden and India as well as South Africa and Canada, so as to give an overview of the range of answers from developed and developing countries.

On gender issues, Canada is clearly more post-materialist than South Africa (See Table 2). On multilateralism, the two peoples are pretty similar in their views (The identical number of 59.5% for confidence in the UN is not a typo). It is natural that rich Canadians should be me more willing to give foreign aid than are poor South Africans. Canadians and South Africans are almost as proud to be who they are, but when it comes to protecting the jobs of nationals, South Africans are more protectionist.

Issues of national security are of special interest to students of post-materialism. Post-materialists, Inglehart (1984) argues, take national security for granted. Fewer than 40% of both Canadians and South Africans would be willing to fight for their country, a number that might well decrease if their conviction were put to the test. Interestingly, South Africans feel that they have some control over their lives, to a higher degree than the people of the other three countries. This may reflect the recent abolition of apartheid and the lifting of the heavy government controls which that system imposed.

On environmental issues, Canadians are stronger than South Africans on biodiversity, but they are equally impressed by the risk of climate change. The latter views almost certainly reflect widespread international publicity about climate change, showing that the spread of ideas can speed the evolution toward post-materialism. It is possible that South Africans had less understanding than Canadians of the concept of biodiversity, reflecting the lower levels of education in the former country. Nevertheless, an impressive 80% of South Africans considered biodiversity to be a serious problem. However, when the choice is put in stark terms, the environment or economic growth, it is understandable that

South Africans choose economic growth in overwhelming numbers (Table 2). This is not to say that there is necessarily such a trade-off, the environment versus economic growth, but this is the assumption behind the question used by the World Values Survey.

4. Gender Issues and Foreign Policy

The United Nations' listing of conventions on the rights of women consists of nine items, including conventions adopted by the UN General Assembly, UNESCO and the ILO (Women Watch, 2010). South Africa has ratified eight of the nine conventions, the only exception being that on the political rights of women, which may be a reflection of the remnants of traditional governing structures which still exist in that country. Canada has ratified only six of the conventions. It has not ratified the convention on the minimum age of marriage, no doubt because marriage is a provincial responsibility, nor has it ratified the convention against discrimination in education. Education is also a provincial responsibility, but since the 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms specifically protects the rights of women, giving them a greater protection than that accorded any other group which might claim discrimination, it is truly surprising that Canada has not ratified this convention. The third convention which Canada has not ratified is that which is intended to suppress trafficking for the purposes of prostitution. South Africa ratified that convention in 1951.

When it comes to taking a position on women's issues at the UN and in other international fora, South Africa has taken a much stronger position than has Canada. Women's issues are mentioned in many of the statements of South African foreign policy as an important aspect of that policy. For example, when, on 2 January 2009, Minister Nkoane-Mashabane summarised the achievements of South Africa's first term on the Security Council, she mentioned "gender mainstreaming" as one of those accomplishments. On 7 March 2009, the minister emphasised South Africa's support for Security Council resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, and for good measure she later (27 June 2011) linked South Africa's concern about climate change to the fact that women would be the worst affected by climate change. In short, women's issues form an important part of South Africa's foreign policy.

Paradoxically, South Africa's strong stand on gender issues in its foreign policy is *not* a reflection of its domestic political culture. As the data in Table 2 indicate, South Africans have a low rating on gender issues. What is more, South Africa is believed to have one of the highest incidences of rape and domestic violence of any country in the world. In the pithy statement of the United Nations Office on Crimes and Drugs, a woman in South Africa is more likely to be raped than to be educated (Sexual Violence, 2012; South Africa, 2012). In 2008, Afrobarometer found that gender issues were not something South Africans considered important. Less than one per cent of respondents mentioned gender issues as either a first or a second choice when it came to naming critical national issues, and just one per cent chose them as a third choice (www.afrobarometer.org, accessed 25 November 2012).

Women did play an important role in the liberation struggle against apartheid, but South Africans have not given that role much credit. Despite all the naming and renaming of monuments to heroes of the liberation struggle, the contribution of women has received but little attention (Miller, 2011). As for discussion of the possible revisions to the 1996

constitution, the media have said very little about gender issues. Discussion has focussed on issues such as judicial review, parliamentary supremacy, economic and social rights, and the role of traditional law.

While gender issues form such a prominent part of South Africa's foreign policy, this would not appear to be the case for Canada. Only four of the documents or press releases on the website of Canada's ministry of foreign affairs (DFAIT) over the period 1 January 2009 to 30 June 2012 refer to women's issues, and two of those, on 1 May 2010 and 26 September 2011, are devoted to statements of protest against Iran's election to the Commission on the Status of Women. That leaves only two statements on gender issues, neither of which refers to Security Council resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, which the department's press releases ignore. One is a bland statement of principles, the other an announcement that a Canadian will chair a Francophone committee on issues of violence against women.

It is, therefore, quite clear that South Africa's foreign policy accords a much larger role to gender issues than does Canada's, even though Canada's political culture is clearly more post-materialist than that of South Africa. It would be facile to ascribe this circumstance to Canada's current Conservative government which is hardly an advocate of women's issues. Some of the UN conventions that Canada has not ratified have been open for signature for decades, when Canada had Liberal governments. Canadians' strong post-materialist position on gender issues is not reflected in its foreign policy. South Africans, on the other hand, may want to show the world that their new democracy wants to emphasise at least some aspects of human rights in its foreign policy.

5. The Environment – Climate Change

During the time period studied here, the two governments' foreign policy pronouncements produced a significant amount of information on only one environmental issue, namely climate change. The South African government was especially fulsome in its commentary, producing many statements on climate change and including climate change as a priority in general statements of foreign policy. This may in part be due to the fact that the effects of climate change are expected to be severe in poor countries. There was also the coincidental fact that South Africa hosted a major UN conference on climate change in Durban in March 2012, a conference which took the decision to replace the Kyoto Protocol with a new international instrument on climate change. The agreement, mediated by South Africa's foreign minister Ms Nkoane-Mashabane, focussed attention on the issue.

South Africa's policy on climate change emphasised three aspects of that issue. During the earlier period, in 2009, the government stressed the fact that, in accordance with the Kyoto Protocol, developed countries should bear the burden of reducing the carbon emissions which are believed to cause climate change. President Zuma's statement of 22 September 2009 provides a good example of this approach. As the Durban conference approached, the government's pronouncements took on a somewhat more responsible tone. On 11 September 2011, Deputy Minister Ebrahim spoke of the responsibilities of developed and developing countries, that it 'was important for all of us to be able to produce creative ideas in our respective energy policies'.

Secondly, the South African government spoke not only of the need to prevent further climate change but of the need to mitigate changes that had already occurred, to help people who were already suffering the effects of climate change. Minister Nkoane-Mashabane wanted the Durban conference to adopt a policy of helping countries adapt to climate change, programmes which it was hoped the developed countries would finance.

Thirdly, the government linked climate change to women's issues, as discussed above. It should also be mentioned that after the Durban conference, the South African government put its money where its mouth was by a carbon capture and storage policy.

Canada's policy on climate change takes only a sentence: in December 2011, the Canadian government announced its decision to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol and to repeal the implementing legislation that was already in place, a threat which was duly carried out on 2 July 2012. Apart from the fact that Canada could not possibly meet its Kyoto commitments because it has not taken any concrete measures to do so, a possible explanation for the Canadian government's policy is that it favours the development of the Alberta oil sands, a project which would produce large quantities of greenhouse gases.

6. Nuclear Non-Proliferation

The one issue which traditionally occupies multilateral organisations and that interested both governments over the last three years was nuclear non-proliferation. Canada and South Africa have a common and commendable record in this field. Canada has had the capability of building a nuclear weapon for the last 67 years, but has chosen not to do so. South Africa is the only country which had nuclear weapons and has chosen to give them up.[2]

The government of South Africa has consistently maintained that it favours the abolition of all nuclear weapons and that it seeks the implementation of this policy by means of the creation of a network of expanding nuclear free zones, such as the Pelindaba Treaty which creates a nuclear free zone in Africa. It is also an advocate of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, a source of energy which it sees as useful for developing countries that have limited access to oil and natural gas. Ambassador Minty's statement to the Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on 5 May 2010, provides a clear statement of these policies. The ambassador advocated the 'total elimination' of nuclear weapons, the creation of nuclear free zones and the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. At the same time, he stressed that these treaties must not be used to deny developing countries access to the 'peaceful uses of nuclear energy'.

South Africa's government has been less emphatic when it comes to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to governments which do not now have them. It has taken a strong stance against the government of North Korea, but has been much more conciliatory toward Iran. On 8 March 2012, South Africa's new ambassador to the IAEA, Xolisa Mbongo, spoke of resolving the 'Iran nuclear issue through dialogue and in a constructive spirit'.

---

[2] The case of the ex-Soviet republics where nuclear weapons were stored but which those governments did not control is somewhat different. They ceded these weapons to the government of Russia, which has inherited many of the responsibilities of the former USSR.

Contrast this with a 29 May 2009 statement on North Korea, in which the government calls on the 'Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK) to fully and verifiably terminate any nuclear weapons programme'.

Why the difference? South Africa has commercial interests in Iran, which has just recently gone to some length to assist a South African company to obtain a contract for the provision of cell phone services which the Iranian government had promised to a Turkish firm. According to documents filed in an American court, the value of which have not yet been tested in that court, 'The suit alleges MTN [a major South African cell phone provider] bribed officials, arranged meetings between Iranian and South African leaders, and promised Iran weapons and United Nations votes in exchange for a license to provide mobile-phone service in the Islamic Republic' (Schoenberg, 2012). That said, the South African government's policy does not necessarily mean that it favours the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran. The debate on whether "constructive engagement" or confrontation is the better policy when it comes to influencing another sovereign government has not been settled, and in any case probably does not have a final answer. To cite just two historical examples: what did not work when Prime Minister Chamberlain appeased Chancellor Hitler at Munich worked quite well when Chancellor Kohl persuaded President Gorbachev to agree to the unification of Germany.

Canada also officially advocates the elimination of all nuclear weapons, but in recent years this policy has not formed a frequent theme of policy pronouncements (For an example, see the address by Foreign Minister Cannon to the Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 3 May, 2010). Canada, on the other hand, has taken a strong and confrontational stand on Iran's nuclear programme, imposing sanctions and using undiplomatic language such as 'Iran must change its approach of obstruction and obfuscation'. In the case of North Korea, Canada has adopted equally strong language. On 12 June 2009, the government quoted a UN Security Council resolution that condemned North Korea's nuclear weapons policy 'in the strongest terms'. By 2011, the Canadian government's stand appears to have softened somewhat. On 19 August 2011, the government issued a statement, which while maintaining sanctions on North Korea, speaks of a 'controlled engagement policy'.

So on nuclear non-proliferation, both governments maintained an almost equally strong policy. What would appear to be South Africa's soft policy with respect to Iran's possible development of nuclear weapons could well just be a fortuitous development, due to the government's eagerness to obtain the lucrative cell phone contract for its citizens. The government's position is not that Iran has the right to develop nuclear weapons if it chooses to do so; it is rather that talking may do better than sanctions in dissuading Iran from developing such weapons.

7. Discussion and Concluding Comments

Tables 1 and 2 show that Canada is far ahead of South Africa on the post-materialism scale. This distinction relates to nearly every issue under discussion here, with the exception of pride in one's nationality (Could one not be proud of the fact that one's country is liberal on gender issues or is environmentalist in its policies?) This difference is not reflected in the two countries' foreign policies, at least not on the three issues studied here. South African

attitudes on women's issues are traditional in nature, yet South Africa has made gender issues into an important aspect of that nation's foreign policy. There is no easy answer to this discrepancy. It not as if the South African government has made other aspects of human rights a beacon of its foreign policy. In the future, interviews with officials of the South African ministry may help to clarify this issue.

Canada has not been active on women's issues on the world stage. In earlier years, that may have been a reflection of the fact that many such issues fall under provincial jurisdiction. They still do, but the adoption in 1982 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms has given all Canadian women full rights under the law. When Canada first sent troops to Afghanistan in 2002, there was much talk in the media of helping Afghan women and girls. As Canadian involvement is fading, these claims have been negated or have disappeared from the media. The schools Canadian aid built are crumbling or have been converted to another use (Watson, 2012). At the UN, Canada has all but ignored gender issues in recent years. It is difficult to explain this quiescence when Canada has achieved so much on the domestic level. A possible explanation may be that foreign policy in general has, since the decision to withdraw from Afghanistan, not been a priority of the government of Canada. Both the foreign aid budget and that of the Foreign Ministry have recently been cut.

Climate change has been the subject of a successful transnational publicity campaign on the part of environmental groups. Hence no government can ignore the issue. While pointing out that the problem was largely created by wealthy developed countries, South Africa has responded by participating in relevant international conferences, ratifying the Kyoto Protocol and developing its own carbon capture policy. The government of Canada, after ratifying the Protocol, took no steps to implement the commitments it had made. Finally, it chose to withdraw, an admission of the fact that the commitments could not be met.

With respect to nuclear non-proliferation, both governments have taken a strong stand, with Canada's being perhaps a little more firm and consistent. However, South Africa's apparent softness with respect to Iran's possible development of nuclear weapons may be due to fortuitous and temporary circumstances, or it may reflect a feeling of Third World solidarity, which could be interpreted as at least an indirect reflection of materialist values. However, the evidence available to date is not sufficient to support such an interpretation.

It is thus clear that the initial hypothesis of this article fails. The aspect of political culture termed post-materialism has not influenced the foreign policies of the two countries studied here. This is not to say that the hypothesis has no merit. The small study done here is really just a pilot study, one that provides indicators that may become the beginning of further studies which could probe the issue in more depth. Further studies should include countries such as Sweden, which were among the earliest to display a post-materialist political culture. Further studies should also supplement the media releases used here with studies of the background of national policy-makers. Where did they go to school? What is their political background? (See also, Hudson, 2007, pp. 112-5). Presumably, policy-makers represent the core or centrality of national political culture (Nicolás, 1995). Ideally such studies should include in depth interviews with national policy-makers.

Another aspect of the topic that may be difficult to operationalise but that may be relevant to the study of political culture and foreign policy consists of the source and the

depth of the post-materialist attitudes of people. Attitudes that were formed over decades as a country's material well-being increased may be more relevant with regard to a country's policies than copy-cat attitudes that cause people to tell an interviewer what it is they think they ought to say. In short, this study is just a little toe in an ocean that remains to be explored.

Table 2.

Examples of Results from the World Values Survey, 2006-2008[3]

Gender Issues

University is more important for a boy than for a girl	Canada[4]	South Africa[6]	Sweden[5]	India
- *Disagree or strongly disagree* %	95	79.5	98.9	53.5
It is essential in a democracy that women have the same rights				
as men *Rated 9 or 10 on a scale of 1-10, %*	78.2	55.7	100	71.0

Peace and multilateralism

Willing to pay higher taxes to increase country's foreign aid *Yes %*	64.7	33.4	50.6	not asked
Who should decide about international peacekeeping,				
National governments, regional organizations or UN?				
- *% choosing UN*	69.9	34.4	72.2	20.1
% choosing regional organizations	7.0	14.9	8.0	15.3
Confidence in UN *a great deal or quite a lot %*	59.5	59.5	78.2	64.0

National identity

How proud are you to be .... *% proud or very proud*	97.7	96.2	88.4	95.4

[3] Adapted from: http//www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSAnalizeQuestions.jsp (accessed June 21, 2012)
[4] 2006
[5] 2006
[6] 2007

Willing to fight for country *% answering No*	39.6	36.4	14.2	18.6
When jobs are scarce, employers should give preference to nationals *% who disagree*	46.1	11.0	79.9	6.1

The Environment

Loss of biodiversity, *serious or somewhat serious %*	92.8	80.9	92.9	78.8
Global warming/green house effect, *serious or somewhat serious* %	93.2	80.4	94.8	83.5
Protecting the environment should have priority over economic growth *% agreeing*	72.2	27.9	64.7	52.5

Perceptions of Self

Leisure time, *% important or very important*	88.7	76.6	95.3	61.8
Feeling of control over one's life, *% 9 or 10 on scale of 1 to 10*	32.3	41.7	34.5	27.5

References

Almond, G., and S. Verba. (1965). *The Civic Culture. Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations.* Boston: Little, Brown and Company.

Department of International Relations and Cooperation of the Republic of South Africa. (2009). "South Africa condemns the reported Nuclear Test by the Democratic Republic of Korea's (DPRK)". Retrieved from
  http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/2009/dprk0526.html

Department of International Relations and Cooperation of the Republic of South Africa. (2009). "Statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the Conclusion of South Africa's Term as an Elected Member of the Security Council". Retrieved from
  http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/2009/dzum0102.html

Department of International Relations and Cooperation of the Republic of South Africa. (2009). "South Africa to participate in the International Women's day conference in Monrovia, Liberia, 07- 08 March 2009". Retrieved from
  http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/2009/libe0309.html

Department of International Relations and Cooperation of the Republic of South Africa. (2010). "Statement by Ambassador Abdul S. Minty, Special Representative for Disarmament and NEPAD at the South African Department for International Relations and Cooperation during the General Debate of the 2010 Review Conference of Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New York, 5 May 2010". Retrieved from
  http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/2010/mint0505.html

Department of International Relations and Cooperation of the Republic of South Africa. (2011). "Minister's Remarks at the Women and Climate Change Side-Event on the sidelines of the 17th Ordinary Session of the African Union (Malabo – Equatorial Guinea), 27 June 2011". Retrieved from
  http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/2011/mash0627.html

Department of International Relations and Cooperation of the Republic of South Africa. (2011). "On the Road to Durban: Promoting Sustainable Energy Access in Africa, Speech for Deputy Minister Ebrahim, 15 September 2011". Retrieved from
  http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/2011/ebra0915b.html

Department of International Relations and Cooperation of the Republic of South Africa. (2011). "Media Statement by Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, incoming President of the 17th Conference of the Parties (COP17) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the 7th Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties (CMP7) to the Kyoto Protocol, 23 November 2011, Cape Town". Retrieved from
  http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/2011/cop17_1124.html

Department of International Relations and Cooperation of the Republic of South Africa. (2012). "Statement on the Cabinet Meeting of 3 May 2012". Retrieved from
http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/2012/cabinet0503.htm

Ebel, R.H., R. Taras and J.D. Cochrane. (1991). *Political Culture and Foreign Policy in Latin America. Case Studies from the Circum-Caribbean*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, Canada. (2009). "Canada Welcomes Security Council Resolution 1874 on North Korea". Retrieved from
http://www.international.gc.ca/media/aff/news-communiques/2009/387260.aspx/lang=eng?lang=eng

Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, Canada. (2011). "Address by the Honourable John Baird, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the United Nations General Assembly". Retrieved from
http://www.international.gc.ca/media/aff/speeches-discours/2011/2011-030.aspx?lang=eng

Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, Canada. (2011). "Canada Resumes Engagement in Conference on Disarmament". Retrieved from
http://www.international.gc.ca/media/aff/news-communiques/2011/240.aspx/lang=eng?lang=eng

Geldenhuys, D. (2012). "Political Culture in South African Foreign Policy." *International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences* 2(18): 29-37.

Goldsmith, B.E. (2006). "Regime Type, Post-Materialism and International Public Opinion about US Foreign Policy: The Afghan and Iraq Wars." *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 7(1): 23-39.

Grendstad, G. (2001). "Nordic Cultural Baselines: Accounting for Domestic Convergence and Foreign Policy Divergence." *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice* 3: 5-29.

Hudson, V. (2007). *Foreign Policy Analysis. Classic and Contemporary Theory*. London: Rowman and Littlefield.

Inglehart, R. (1977). *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Inglehart, R. (1984). "Generational Change and the Future of the Atlantic Alliance." *PS.* Summer: 525-35.

Inglehart, R. and C. Welzel. (2005). *Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy. The Human Development Sequence.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Maslow, A. (1970). *Motivation and Personality*. New York: Harper & Row. 2nd edn.

Miller, K. (2011). "Selective Silence and the Shaping of Memory in Post-Apartheid Visual Culture: The Case of the Monument to the Women of South Africa." *South African Historical Journal* 63(2): 295-317.

Nicolás, J.D. (1995). "Postmaterialism and the Social Ecosystem." In Culture within Nature, ed. B. and B. Sitter-Liver. Basel: Wiese Publishing, 179-89.

Schoenberg, T. (2012, July 3). MTN Asks Judge to Dismiss Turk cell Law Suit over Iran Deal. Retrieved from
    http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-02/mtn-asks-judge-to-dismiss-
    turkcell-lawsuit-over-iran-deal.html

Sexual Violence in South Africa. (2012). Retrieved from
    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sexual_violence_in_South_Africa

South Africa: Multi-Pronged Approach Needed to Reduce Gender-Based Violence. (2011). Retrieved from
    http://allafrica.com/stories/201211260249.html

Stairs, D. (1982). "The Political Culture of Canadian Foreign Policy." *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 4 (Dec.): 667-90.

Smith, S., A. Hadfield and T. Dunne, eds. (2012). *Foreign Policy. Theories, Actors and Cases.* Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2nd edn.

Tsygankov, A.P. and M. Tarver-Wahlquist. (2009). "Duelling Honors: Power, Identity and the Russia–Georgia Divide." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 5: 307-26

Watson, P. (2012). Canada's Afghan Legacy: Shoddy School Buildings and Sagging Morale. *Toronto Star*, July 15.

Women Watch. (2010). *Directory of UN Resources on Gender and Women's Issues*. Retrieved from
    http://www.un.org/womenwatch/directory/instruments_treaties_1003.htm