
Clarence Chongo
University of Zambia

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/zssj

Part of the African History Commons, African Studies Commons, and the Political History Commons

Recommended Citation
Available at: https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/zssj/vol6/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Zambia Social Science Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.

Clarence Chongo
University of Zambia

From the early 1960s, and throughout the 1970s, southern African liberation movements successfully waged wars of national liberation, forcing white minority regimes to negotiate independence under black majority rule. This success partly stemmed from extensive diplomatic, military, and material support extended to various liberation movements by regional alliances such as the frontline states and transnational state actors and solidarity movements. This article examines salient aspects of Zambia’s contribution as a prominent regional actor to the liberation wars in southern Africa. In doing so, it underlines the nature and significance of Zambia’s support for the liberation movements. I argue that Zambia’s authorities employed a dual strategy, war and diplomacy, in seeking to secure black majority rule in the region, but for mainly economic reasons, they were more inclined to pursue diplomatic approaches rather than exclusively relying on violence. They backed armed struggle only to the extent that it was a necessary instrument to coerce the white minority regimes to the negotiating table, but this strategy had limited success, and created numerous tensions and contradictions. Some nationalist leaders accused Zambia’s authorities of undermining the liberation wars. Based extensively on new Zambian archival documents and interviews with former Zambian leaders, this article brings fresh evidence about the intricacies of Zambia’s contribution to the liberation wars in southern Africa.

Key words:
Armed struggle, liberation war, southern Africa, liberation movements, Lusaka Manifesto, Zambia’s government

Introduction
There is an extensive array of literature on liberation wars in southern Africa. This scholarship invariably emphasises the importance of diplomatic, military, and financial aid extended to liberation movements by international state

and non-state actors. There is consensus among scholars about the role and significance of Scandinavian countries in southern African liberation struggles (Saunders, 2009). Sellstrom (2002 and 1999), who examines the role of Sweden in the liberation wars, argues that the formation of broad and active political opinion prior to 1969 was vital for parliament’s decision to endorse a policy of direct official humanitarian assistance to liberation movements. While Eriksen (2000) documents the role of Norwegian authorities and solidarity movements such as churches and trade unions in the liberation struggles, Morgensteine (2003) and Peltola (2009) examine the contribution of Denmark to the struggle for black majority rule in the region.

Although this scholarship focuses on the contribution of international state and non-state actors to the liberation wars, there is an appreciable collection of studies that recently emerged underlining the significance of regional actors in the liberation wars. The most prominent is Hashim Mbita’s project on Southern African Liberation Struggles, 1960-1994 sponsored by the Southern African Development Community (SADC). It not only traces the history of liberation struggles as they unfolded in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe, but in a series of volumes also analyses the regional and international dimensions of southern African liberation wars (Temu and Tembe, 2014). Similarly, the volumes of the South African Democracy Education Trust (SADET) project on The Road to Democracy in South Africa examine the history of South Africa’s liberation struggle and its regional and international aspects (SADET, 2014). Other studies focus on the roles of Botswana and Tanzania in the liberation of southern Africa (Morapedi, 2012; Oitsile, 2010; Mgadla, 2008; Osei-Hwedie 1998; and Ishemo 2000). There is certainly a wide collection of historical studies on liberation struggles from regional and international standpoints, but there is conspicuously little that has been written from the Zambian perspective, despite it being a prominent regional actor. Except for Chris Chirwa’s work (2013) which discusses Zambia’s role in South Africa’s liberation struggle, the few available published works examine the role of Zambia in liberation wars only in the context of the frontline states regional alliance (Temu and Tembe, 2014, Thompson, 1985). Yet, Zambia’s contribution to liberation struggles in southern Africa did not begin with the establishment of the frontline states alliance in 1974. It began much earlier, dating to pre-independence days when prominent nationalists in the region regularly collaborated during the anti-colonial struggles in their respective territories (Rotberg, 1966; Hall, 1965; Gann, 1964; and Mulford, 1967). Thus, a deeper appreciation of Zambia’s role can only be yielded when the story is told from 1964. Currently there is growing emphasis to shift focus away from approaches that previously underlined the importance of national governments
in liberation struggles and towards examining exile histories of liberation movements (Sapire, 2009; Macmillan, 2013; Williams, 2015; Alexander, McGregor, and Miles-Tendi, 2017). However, given an array of rich Zambian archival evidence that has emerged, it has become more imperative to revisit and interrogate salient aspects of Zambia’s contribution to the liberation wars, and cast new light on issues previous scholars glossed over and sometimes took for granted. This article seeks to interrogate the nature and significance of Zambia’s contribution to liberation wars in southern Africa.

**Origins of Armed Struggles: A Synopsis**

The origins of armed struggles in southern Africa varied in time and space, but the pattern and processes which spurred armed resistance movements were similar. During the colonial period, Africans were systematically exploited and denied fundamental human rights. They served as tools of exploitation, furthering the economic interests of the ruling elite within the colonial system (Rodney, 1990). The colonial political system also excluded them from participating peacefully in the political processes. Africans were often denied opportunity to promote their political interests and seek changes in the political system by constitutional means (Afigbo, 1990). What hardened the attitudes of Africans was the fact that, whilst their counterparts elsewhere in Africa were being decolonised by metropolitan powers, white minority governments in southern Africa sought to reverse this process by tightening their grip on political power.¹ In May 1948, an Afrikaner nationalist regime led by Dr. D. F. Malan was elected into office in South Africa and shortly afterwards began to introduce apartheid, a system which promoted separate development and social exclusion of races (Nolutshungu, 1975, 98). White supremacy was given further impetus by white minority settlers in Rhodesia when they unilaterally declared independence from Britain in November 1965, effectively rolling back any progress towards black majority rule. Elsewhere, the Portuguese authoritarian administration, led initially by Antonio Salazar and succeeded by Marcello Caetano, tightened the grip over its African empire. In 1951, it incorporated Angola and Mozambique into Portugal as overseas provinces (Oliver and Atmore, 1981, 269). The intransigence of white minority regimes, coupled with many years of social inequalities, ruthless economic exploitation, and intense political repression, fuelled resentment among Africans. Consequently, Africans in Angola, Mozambique, South Africa, Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and South West Africa (now Namibia) organised armed resistance movements in order to overthrow white minority regimes.

Thus, by the mid-1960s, southern Africa was on fire. The brutal and repressive nature of white minority regimes compelled nationalist movements
to seek asylum in countries with independent black governments for purposes of further organising armed struggle. Apart from Tanzania, Zaire, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland in the region, and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), member countries further afield, including among others Ghana under Kwame Nkrumah, and Ethiopia under Haile Selassie, liberation movements also found strong support in Zambia, where authorities allowed them to establish bases. They included the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) and Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) of Zimbabwe, African National Congress (ANC) and Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) of South Africa, South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO) of Namibia, and Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique (FRELIMO) of Mozambique and Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA) of Angola. However, Zambian authorities had to deal with domestic concerns prior to accepting to host liberation movements.

**Domestic Debates and Quest to Support Armed Struggles**

Zambia’s quest to back liberation wars was a highly contentious issue in domestic political discourse. The decision was contested less by Cabinet Ministers within the governing United National Independence Party (UNIP) and more by opposition and independent Members of Parliament (MPs). Sikota Wina insisted that during discussions on foreign policy matters, including the question of supporting liberation struggles in southern Africa, Cabinet Ministers were apprehensive about pursuing such a policy. They often expressed concern about the possible risks that supporting armed conflicts in neighbouring countries might entail for the country’s economy. These concerns were based on the fact that Zambia’s economic survival depended, to a large extent, on supply routes controlled by white minority regimes it was trying to overthrow.

Such anxiety emanated from the dilemma Zambian authorities confronted in the wake of the Rhodesian crisis and the mounting pressure to support armed struggles. Although the Zambian government, in line with OAU decisions, was willing to support armed struggles in Rhodesia, Angola, and Mozambique, its economy was heavily dependent on supply routes controlled by neighbouring white minority regimes. If the Zambian government remained neutral, or at best decided for economic reasons to cooperate rather than oppose white minority regimes by refusing to assist liberation movements, it was bound to lose face among African countries. The magnitude of this dilemma was highlighted during Cabinet meetings in August 1965. One Cabinet Minister said:

*Withdrawing our support from...freedom fighters would be in conflict with...avowed aims of...OAU and other...states in Africa, apart from being in violation of our fundamental principles upon which Zambia was founded. Such action would...make Zambia one of the most sinister*
nations that...ever polluted the pages of the history of...independent movement in Africa. Zambia has the moral duty to help in the historic movement of wiping out colonialism in favour of the democratizing process.3

While Zambia did not want to lose face and appear a weak link in the OAU’s confrontation with white minority regimes, it was deeply concerned about the potential damage to the economy of pursuing a confrontational course. At stake was the country’s economic survival. Here was a case in which the government sought to strike a balance between its economic interests and pursuing a revolutionary course. Thus, as another Cabinet Minister argued:

...the question of keeping the Congo/Angola route open depends...in part on whether or not we provoke the Portuguese in Mozambique. It is necessary for us...to be more cautious in our pronouncements on Rhodesian issues in order not to encourage action of aggression from that country which would lead to the closure of the southern route in the event of UDI, for it is my firm belief that an adverse reaction by Mozambique would [inevitably] have further adverse repercussions on the Angola section of the western route. It is noted that we have a moral duty to help...Rhodesian nationalists, but this should take into account the difficulties of keeping the machinery of our economy running smoothly in the interests of this nation. In this respect I suggest that as little as possible is said about Rhodesia unless we are forced to make a reply.4

Despite apprehension expressed by Cabinet Ministers, it can be argued that there was more consensus than disagreement on policy in the UNIP government regarding the decision to support liberation struggles. In fact, from government and party documents examined by this author, there is no evidence to suggest there was open, intense disagreement within Cabinet or UNIP Central Committee on foreign policy, especially on the question of supporting liberation wars.

If Cabinet Ministers were apprehensive, opposition and independent MPs were more vocal in contesting government policy of supporting liberation movements. Their concerns were often expressed during parliamentary debates on foreign policy. As early as 1965, Harry Nkumbula, president of opposition African National Congress (ANC) and parliamentarian for Monze, described government’s decision to back liberation wars as a “very unwise policy” which amounted to quarrelling with neighbours.5 Another opposition ANC MP, Edward Liso, questioned government policy of allowing liberation movements to open offices in Zambia because it amounted to “provocation” where the safety of citizens would not be guaranteed if neighbouring white minority regimes carried out “retaliatory measures” against Zambia.6 In mid-1966 the Independent MP for Ndola, Cecil Burney expressed concern that government was “taking an
A Good Measure of Sacrifice

open risk” by supporting liberation movements (De Roche, 2009, 77-97). Again Nkumbula feared the prospect of Zambians paying a high price for government’s decision to support liberation struggles. In 1967, Burney wondered whether government’s willingness to back liberation movements was in the best interest of the country and urged it to “defuse this situation so we could get back to a more normal form of life.” Hugh Mitchley, an Independent MP representing the Midlands advised government that “what is needed is a policy for all countries to stop arguing with their neighbours and get on with their development.” In 1968, ANC MP for Mbabala, Edward Nyanga, urged government to negotiate with the white minority regimes in a peaceful manner instead of threatening war. Similarly, Richard Farmer, Independent MP for Copperbelt Central advised government to reassess its foreign policy on southern Africa and see whether “the policy cannot be modified into a more conciliatory one.”

The MPs criticism of government’s policy on southern Africa reflected the general concern of ordinary Zambians about the potential damage to the country’s economic stability as a consequence of supporting liberation struggles. Despite these concerns, Zambia implemented OAU’s policy and backed armed struggles in southern Africa.

Nature of Support for Liberation Movements

Zambian support for liberation movements included offering them recognition, transit and broadcasting facilities, and financial and material aid. The government also accorded diplomatic backing to leaders of liberation movements. These forms of support must be understood within the framework of the Liberation Committee which Zambia joined shortly after independence becoming an active member. African leaders established the Liberation Committee in 1963 with a mission to accelerate the liberation of African countries from white minority rule. Based in Dar-es-Salaam, capital of Tanganyika (from 1964 Tanzania), the Liberation Committee was mandated to i) coordinate material and financial support sent to liberation movements from independent African states and from abroad; ii) give recognition and financial assistance to selected revolutionary movements; iii) reconcile differences among rival insurgent groups so that they may present a united front; iv) facilitate formation of revolutionary alliances across national boundaries; v) publicise the struggle through diplomacy in international circles (El-Khawas, 1977, 25-41).

Providing recognition to liberation movements was a vital aspect of Zambia’s contribution to the liberation wars, but such recognition was informed by the Liberation Committee. Zambia’s leaders often accepted liberation movements which had been previously recognised by the Liberation Committee. That they supported nationalist movements that had received formal and prior acceptance
by the Liberation Committee remained a rule rather than a norm. In practice, Zambian authorities sometimes backed nationalist organisations that had never been recognised by the Liberation Committee.\textsuperscript{12} The degree of militancy and level of effectiveness on the battlefield were two important yardsticks which governed the Liberation Committee’s decision whether or not to recognise a particular liberation movement. Recognition was an essential qualification for eligibility to receive other forms of assistance from the Liberation Committee.\textsuperscript{13}

The initial form of support Zambia rendered to liberation movements was to host them in Lusaka.\textsuperscript{14} Towards the end of 1965 government acquired a new office building at Charter Welfare Hall, in Kamwala, Lusaka and placed it at the disposal of liberation movements for use as their headquarters. This followed previous unsuccessful attempts to purchase an office block on Bradford Street in Lusaka from Irving and Johnson for approximately £7,000. The government did not purchase this property because it was not suitable for the accommodation of all the liberation movements.\textsuperscript{16} The Zambian authorities designated the new office building as the African Liberation Centre (ALC) and appointed Mukuka Nkoloso as director. As a personal representative of President Kaunda at the Liberation Centre, Nkoloso was responsible for coordinating the activities of the liberation movements, ensuring that they were provided with office space to conduct day-to-day operations, as well as organising publicity campaigns, and facilitating distribution of aid to the organisations. He reported directly to Kaunda. Nkoloso worked closely with the executive secretary of the Liberation Committee based in Tanzania by screening the cadres to ensure those who went for military training and came back to join the struggle at the battlefront were genuine freedom fighters.\textsuperscript{18}

Since liberation movements were a potential threat to Zambia’s internal security, the Zambian authorities strictly controlled their operations in the country by formulating rules and regulations to govern and regulate their activities.\textsuperscript{19} Due to the security implications, matters involving the operations of liberation movements were handled and coordinated at the highest level. The principal office responsible was the Ministry of Presidential Affairs. It worked closely with the Office of the President (OP), and the ministries of Defence, Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs, and Local Government, as well as the director of the Liberation Centre.

The provision of transit facilities for transportation of cadres, and shipment of war materials, was another vital form of support Zambian authorities accorded to liberation movements.\textsuperscript{20} Throughout the period under review, the cadres were granted the right of passage to undergo military training in East Africa and beyond in socialist countries such as China, the Soviet Union, and North Korea. In the sub-region, major military training camps were located in Tanzania. The earliest
training camp was established in 1961 at Kongwa, situated in the central part of the country. Here, almost all the liberation movements sent cadres for military training. However, as the liberation struggle gained momentum and the number of freedom fighters seeking training increased, it became necessary to open more camps. Consequently, Wami, Nachingwea, Itumbi and Mgagao were set up. The latter two hosted ANC and PAC militants as well as freedom fighters from Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia. Nachingwea was reserved for the FRELIMO fighters because of its proximity to Mozambique, while Tundura and Bagamoyo were established as education training centres; Mtwara was a rearguard hospital. The ANC also secured a training camp at Kingolwira and a residential site at Msanvu, while PAC trained its cadres at Masuguru but later moved to Msungura. Both camps were in the coastal region. In the 1970s, Masuguru became a settlement camp for PAC cadres who migrated in larger numbers into the country in that period. In 1976, more South African refugees flocked to Tanzania following the Soweto uprising in South Africa, so the ANC requested additional settlement and training camps from the government of Tanzania. Through the coordination of the Liberation Committee, the ANC was granted an 100 acre stretch of land at Mazimbu in Morogoro which was later extended to 250 acres. On this site in 1978, the ANC built its first educational institution, to teach the young cadres who had fled South Africa in the aftermath of the Soweto killings. Conducted by Chinese military instructors recruited by the Liberation Committee, military training for the cadres lasted between four and six months. The recruits were trained in elementary knowledge of regular army tactics, modern guerilla warfare, and combat operations. Other forms of training included physical fitness, use of small arms, rocket launchers, light mortars, and plastic explosives. They were also taught field engineering, sabotage, ambushes and patrols, defence and attack up to platoon level, principles of guerilla formations, situation of guerilla actions, and general tactics. After completing training, cadres were granted safe passage and deployed for military action at the battlefront. Both Zambia and Tanzania worked closely with the Liberation Committee in transiting and training cadres. They established rules and procedures to govern transportation of cadres through Zambia to Tanzania and back. For example in 1967, G. S Magombe, the executive secretary of the Liberation Committee addressed a letter to Vernon Mwaanga, the permanent secretary in the Office of the President. He noted that:

I have informed all leaders of liberation movements that with immediate effect all their requests for allowing their cadres to come to Tanzania for military training should be routed to the Minister for Presidential Affairs [in Zambia] who will give them a “Recruitment Form” to sign and that it is only after completing this form that their trainees would be allowed to come to Tanzania.
By signing the recruitment forms, the cadres agreed to undergo voluntary military training and pledged, upon completion of training, to return to their home country and participate in the struggle against the colonialists. In the initial stages, trained cadres earmarked for deployment to the battlefront were allowed to transit Zambia only in small units of six people per group. Until such a group was infiltrated into the enemy territory, no other group of trained cadres was allowed to cross. These procedures were important because they served various purposes. Firstly, they allowed both Zambia and Tanzania to maintain strict control over transportation of the militants in and between the two countries. Secondly, they helped cadres uphold a sense of discipline and dedication to the struggle. Thirdly, it was vital to maintain secrecy, speed, and security while transiting the guerrillas.

Another key feature of Zambia’s contribution to the liberation wars was that it allowed safe transmission and storage of military materials, including arms, ammunition, and other logistics for the liberation movements in the region. Military weapons mainly came from two sources, namely, the stockpile purchased by the Liberation Committee, and donations by countries from within Africa and abroad. Shipment of military weapons was a highly sensitive issue because of the security nature of the exercise. For instance, as early as September 1965, Zambia Police at Kapiri Mposhi in Central Province impounded a vehicle carrying a large quantity of arms destined for the FRELIMO depot in Lusaka (Morris, 1974, 249). The reason for impounding the vehicle was that it was transporting arms without police escort, raising fears about the possibility of weapons finding their way into the hands of unauthorised persons, consequently posing a serious security threat to local communities. However, once police established the source and destination of the arms, and security guarantees for their transportation, they released the vehicle.

During the early years of the struggle, liberation movements lacked adequate arms. Out of desperation, they sometimes used unorthodox methods to obtain and transport weapons. In April 1966, Zambia Police again impounded a vehicle carrying a large number of weapons from Tanzania and destined for a dispersal base in Zambia. One of its occupants was sentenced to one year imprisonment for illegally possessing 200 grenades, 200 detonators, rifles and a revolver (Morris 1974, 249). Evidence suggests that, as liberation wars in the region raged, the presence of freedom fighters in the country increased and the cases of unauthorised movements of weapons became more frequent, posing a serious security threat to local communities. For instance in July 1966, the Zambian government was forced to revoke recognition of Noel Gabriel Mukono as a ZANU representative after, for reasons unknown, he shot a local Zambian man with a pistol in Chieftainess Waitwika’s area in Isoka District. Zambia’s
decision to establish weapons’ dumps in specific areas of the country’s Eastern, Northwestern, Southern and Western provinces was partly a response to, and an expression of concern with, unauthorised proliferation of weapons in the country. It was also partly a decision taken in response to recommendations adopted by the OAU in July 1969 regarding the establishment of depots and storage of war materials in member countries.\textsuperscript{28}

It is important to emphasise the significance of providing transit facilities to liberation movements. The border between Zambia and Rhodesia became highly militarised after white settlers declared UDI. It was policed on a regular basis by both Zambian and Rhodesian security forces. Consequently, many ZAPU, ZANU, ANC and PAC militants could only be recruited and transported for military training in East Africa and abroad through Zambia via an independent country, Botswana. However, the militants frequently experienced difficulties transiting through Botswana mainly because, during the early days of independence, the authorities refused to grant them transit rights for fear of provoking white minority regimes in neighbouring countries (Mutambara, 2014, 99, and Morapedi, 2012, 73-90). Similarly, and perhaps for economic reasons, the governments of Malawi and Lesotho were reluctant to allow freedom fighters to transit through their territories. They refused to implement the OAU’s long-standing policy calling on member states to assist African liberation movements. Rather, the two countries chose to collaborate with the white minority regimes. The Congo Kinshasa government also for some time prevented MPLA from using its territory to transmit weapons and cadres to the battlefront essentially because it supported a rival nationalist movement, the Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola (FNLA).\textsuperscript{29} Given the above scenario, the nationalists mainly depended on Zambia for transmitting weapons and cadres and later, establishing guerrilla training camps. The deliberate policy of providing unrestricted transit facilities to the military cadres by Zambian authorities significantly helped liberation movements to successfully prosecute the liberation wars.

Support for liberation movements was not confined to providing transit rights and operational bases. It extended to provision of broadcasting facilities. As in other matters concerning liberation movements, Zambia sought to provide these facilities as a response to the OAU’s appeal that:

\textit{independent African countries in whose territories freedom fighters operate...should place at the disposal of such movements facilities for informing and stirring nationalist opinion...and make available an allocated time per week for the dissemination of propaganda on their radio and information media into occupied territories.}\textsuperscript{30}
Zambia realised that armed struggle could not be prosecuted only on the battle field but that it also needed an effective propaganda machinery, a crucial tool for conducting psychological warfare. Zambia allowed use of its broadcasting facilities by the liberation movements. In May 1966, the Zambian Cabinet endorsed UNIP Central Committee’s decision to allow ZAPU to make broadcasts on Zambia Broadcasting Services (ZBS), subject to vetting by the Minister of Information and Postal Services. By December 1966, Zambian authorities approved ZANU’s request to use broadcasting facilities on Radio Zambia on condition that broadcasts would be scrutinised by the Minister of Home Affairs. In January 1971, MPLA was allowed to begin a daily 45-minute programme on ZBS called “Angola Combatente.” It quickly acquired a wide audience. By May 1973, Zambia formally inaugurated its new external services, “The War of Words Channel”, with the aid of powerful Chinese transmitters. FRELIMO, ZAPU, ZANU, MPLA, ANC and SWAPO were each allocated one hour a day. Consequently, as Anglin and Shaw (1979, 243) noted, Radio Zambia blanketed the sub-continent for more than forty hours a week in twenty-two languages with the liberation movements accepting responsibility for all the content. This constituted assistance on a massive scale and undoubtedly had a significant impact on African opinion throughout southern Africa.

Zambian authorities also supported the liberation wars in the region by providing material and financial aid to the liberation movements through the OAU. On a bilateral basis, they accorded freedom fighters medical facilities, food, and accommodation. For instance in 1969, the MPLA expressed gratitude to Zambia “for the important role which they did not cease to play in the struggle to liberate Angola”, adding that “at present MPLA sends to the Zambian hospitals sick and wounded persons who do not find medical care inside Angola.” Similarly, SWAPO emphasised that wounded militants on the battlefront were often brought to Zambia for medical treatment. Providing financial and other forms of material aid was crucial for the day-to-day operations of the liberation movements and maintenance of cadres in Zambia. Bilateral aid was usually drawn from Zambia’s own resources. Given the limited resources at the disposal of the Zambian government at a time when it was consolidating its own independence, drawing upon its coffers to finance activities of the liberation movements placed an extra burden on state resources. For this reason, in 1968, the government was compelled to seek financial relief from the Liberation Committee to meet ever increasing emergency needs of the liberation movements based in Lusaka. The request was approved. It was, in fact, in this context that in March 1969, the Liberation Committee decided to open a sub-office in Lusaka. The sub-office was required to manage contingency funds to meet emergency needs such as the supply of medicines for freedom
fighters, transportation of food and arms to the war front, infiltration of freedom fighters, and management of vehicles at the war front. Apart from making payments of fixed amounts to liberation movements based in Lusaka, the sub-office also supervised all forms of assistance and weapons given by the Liberation Committee to different liberation movements. It also supervised the infiltration and training of cadres in Lusaka. This office drew its administrative funds from the Liberation Committee Special Fund and worked closely with the African Liberation Centre. Liberation movements also benefitted from Zambia’s bilateral financial aid in the form of tax relief. As early as mid-1965, the Zambian Cabinet approved a recommendation from the Ministry of Finance to waive import duty on all items imported by liberation movements, including motor vehicles and office equipment. The principal object was to grant financial relief to liberation movements and enhance their effective operations.

Zambian authorities also assisted liberation movements indirectly by directing financial aid through the Liberation Committee’s Special Fund. The Liberation Committee derived its revenue for financing liberation movements from three principal sources, namely, contributions by OAU member countries in accordance with the established scale of assessment, subventions from OAU headquarters on a quarterly basis, and donations by institutions and organisations in Africa and abroad. For its operations and budgetary allocations to liberation movements, the Liberation Committee relied almost exclusively on the goodwill contributions made on a regular basis by OAU member states. That the Liberation Committee often experienced financial difficulties, partly as a result of lack of financial contributions, and partly because of possible mismanagement of resources, constitutes an important theme that characterised the period of its existence (Mononi, 1975). The Liberation Committee frequently lacked adequate financial resources partly because of lack of contributions by member countries, but throughout the period under review, Zambia consistently met its financial obligations to the Special Fund. Its financial commitment to the Liberation Committee was clearly visible. Although Zambian authorities pledged in 1966 to continually honour their financial obligations to the Liberation Committee and since then consistently did so, by 1970, they became increasingly disillusioned and frustrated by the failure of OAU members to meet their financial obligations to the Special Fund. In particular, Kaunda accused independent African countries of letting down Zambia by “failing to give financial support to the liberation struggles in southern Africa”. He complained bitterly: “you see our economy is in tatters because of the liberation struggles. We are still able to pay the little that we are asked to the Liberation Committee” (Times of Zambia, 1970). He charged that “those countries which failed to honour their financial obligations to the
Liberation Committee were being unfair because the struggle in southern Africa was for the dignity and emancipation of Africa as a whole” (Times of Zambia, 1979). If consistency and regularity of payments to the Liberation Committee formed part of the criteria of assessing a country’s commitment to the liberation wars in southern Africa, then Zambia fully met the criteria.

**Zambian Diplomacy**

At global level, Zambia’s leaders used diplomacy to help legitimise liberation movements, routinely urging world leaders to accord nationalists a hearing and extend recognition to nationalist movements. At international fora such as the OAU, United Nations (UN), Commonwealth, Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and Afro-Asian Solidarity Organisation (AASO), Zambia’s representatives implored other leaders to support policies aimed at promoting black majority rule in southern Africa. Despite strong opposition from Western powers, Zambia’s diplomats at the UN often took a leading role in sponsoring resolutions calling on the international community to take effective measures against white minority regimes which denied Africans the right to self-determination. They backed economic sanctions designed to isolate white minority regimes, and consistently applied diplomatic pressure on western governments to exercise influence over white minority regimes to accept the principle of black majority rule. The significance of Zambia’s diplomacy at international level was evident. It helped to legitimate armed struggle in southern Africa thus attracting transnational assistance for liberation movements. It also served to publicise and clarify the problem of white minority rule as one requiring global attention.39

**The Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa**

For Zambia’s leaders, one of the key diplomatic successes in galvanising international solidarity for liberation wars in southern Africa was the hosting of the Fifth Summit Conference of East and Central African States (CECAS) in April 1969, which was attended by fourteen African leaders. The significance of the conference was the adoption of the Lusaka Manifesto on southern Africa.40 The key aspect of the manifesto was that it gave priority to negotiations first, as opposed to violence, as the basis for achieving change. This strategy became the basis of Zambia’s diplomatic efforts in promoting the struggle for black majority rule in southern Africa. The Manifesto was a collective statement of fourteen African leaders, but Anglin (1975, 471-503) claimed the principle authors were Kaunda and Nyerere, reflecting the strategic role of the two leaders in regional affairs. The Manifesto was subsequently adopted by the OAU and endorsed both by the UN and the Non-Aligned Movement in 1970.

Although the manifesto was designed to express solidarity with liberation
movements, on the diplomatic front, Zambian-based nationalist leaders expressed concern with the tone of the manifesto, and questioned some of its provisions. The nationalists were concerned with the perceived lack of pugnaciousness expressed in the manifesto by African leaders. For instance, in paragraph 3, African leaders stressed the importance of, and recognised the inevitability of, "transitional arrangements" in transforming southern Africa from white minority rule to black majority rule. However, the nationalist leaders rejected the notion of transferring power from the whites to the blacks under transitional arrangements. Rather, they underlined the need for immediate, effective transfer of power. A major concern was that it was drawn up by African leaders without consulting the nationalist movements. The nationalist leaders opposed the principle of negotiations accepted by African leaders, insisting it weakened the case for freedom fighters. Although Zambia’s authorities ferociously defended their position by insisting that “Heads of State were under no obligation to consult liberation movements” and that the “manifesto took into account the aspirations of freedom fighters for whose benefit it was declared”, the nationalists refused to accept it because of its explicit emphasis on negotiations. They would later call for its withdrawal by “those who adopted it”.

Although the manifesto was condemned by nationalist leaders, its significance from the diplomatic perspective cannot be underestimated. It enhanced Zambia’s standing in Africa as a strategic player in the struggle against white minority rule in southern Africa (Mwanakatwe 1994, 64, and Anglin 1975, 471-503). This culminated in the election of Kaunda as the OAU Chairman in Addis Ababa in September 1970, where he was mandated by African Heads of State to lead an OAU delegation to countries supplying arms to South Africa to dissuade them from doing so. Prior to undertaking his European mission, Kaunda successfully hosted the Non-Aligned Summit in Lusaka which extended his mission to include members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). The Non-Aligned Summit was attended by more than fifty countries including representatives of liberation movements from around the globe. Addressing the conference, Kaunda stressed that “imperialism, colonialism, and racial oppression” persisted in southern Africa mainly because western countries continued to provide overt political, economic, and military support to white minority regimes. He warned western countries of the inevitability of violence if they delayed in “discharging justice” and “stood in the way of peaceful change towards majority rule”. The conference produced several resolutions which dealt with the pertinent issue of white minority rule in southern Africa. Three important themes were dominant in all the resolutions on southern Africa. Firstly, the Non-Aligned leaders condemned white minority
regimes for perpetrating racist and oppressive policies, but they also called for strengthening of economic sanctions against them. Secondly, they expressed solidarity with oppressed Africans in dependent territories. And, thirdly, they pledged renewed commitment to providing material and moral support to liberation movements. That Zambia successfully hosted the Non-Aligned Conference, attended by a huge number of world leaders, represented a key diplomatic achievement.

Meanwhile, Kaunda visited a number of Western countries in 1970, to dissuade NATO countries from supplying arms to South Africa, and to formally present to the United Nations resolutions and declarations of the OAU and Non-Aligned Summit. During his visits to Italy and West Germany, Kaunda urged the two countries to stop supporting firms participating in the Cabora Bassa hydroelectric scheme because the project was designed to “consolidate Portuguese colonialism” in Africa. In Britain, he advised the British prime minister, Edward Heath, to halt his government’s intention to sell arms to South Africa because it would give the apartheid regime “a badge of respectability” (Times of Zambia, 1970). The theme of arms sales to South Africa dominated Kaunda’s speech at the UN General Assembly in October 1970. He pointed out that to supply arms to South Africa “is to cast a vote for apartheid” because the sales would support “South African expansionism and dominance” and give her “authority to establish her military presence in the rest of southern Africa”. He challenged the Portuguese government to dismantle its African empire, insisting Zambia and the OAU were “prepared to assist” it “in any efforts to prepare the people of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau for self-determination and independence”. Kaunda warned the Portuguese that if they continued with their “inflexible policy”, Zambia and the OAU would be prepared to “continue supporting the freedom fighters in their struggle for freedom, peace and justice” and that Portugal was “bound to lose the war”.

Kaunda’s mission to NATO countries met with limited success. He failed to dissuade Britain from supplying arms to South Africa and equally failed to secure a meeting with Richard Nixon, the US President. Upon returning to Lusaka, Kaunda, in apparent reference to Edward Heath, called on Zambians not to hate the British people “for the stupidity of one man even if he is their leader” (Times of Zambia, 1970). Notwithstanding his international diplomatic efforts aimed at highlighting the problem of white minority rule in southern Africa, Kaunda felt frustrated by western countries for according low priority to resolving the problem of white minority rule in the region. That he succeeded in clearly articulating the position of the OAU and the Non-Aligned Movement on white minority rule in southern Africa constitutes the most significant outcome of his European mission.
Zambia’s diplomatic efforts to exert pressure on western governments to act in favour of justice for the vast majority of blacks in white minority controlled territories in southern Africa did not end with the mission to NATO countries. It was extended to other international fora, including the Commonwealth. At the Commonwealth Conference in Singapore in 1971, during which the question of arms sales again featured prominently and threatened the very existence of the organisation, Kaunda’s diplomatic skills prevailed. Under his influence and leadership, the Heads of State and Government approved the Declaration of Commonwealth Principles. The large part of the declaration was based on the draft introduced and presented by Kaunda. Part of the text of the declaration criticised white minority governments for promoting racial discrimination and oppression, and called upon all Commonwealth members to support the principles of self-determination in southern Africa. The Commonwealth Conference in Singapore provided a vital platform for Commonwealth leaders to denounce racial discrimination globally, but it also offered another opportunity for African leaders, led by Kaunda, to exert pressure on Britain to resolve white minority rule in Rhodesia and exercise influence on South Africa to dismantle apartheid.

Dialogue with South Africa and African Unity
Throughout the 1970s, Kaunda emerged as the leading critic of white minority regimes and particularly South Africa’s apartheid system. He was well placed to spearhead the OAU’s campaign to dissuade governments in Africa and elsewhere from collaborating with South Africa (Nolutshungu, 1975, 231). However, while addressing parliament in April 1971, South Africa’s prime minister, John Vorster seized the opportunity to “expose” Kaunda as a “double talker”. He explained that it was in the interest of southern Africa that people should realise that Kaunda had been talking to South Africa since 1968 while urging other countries not to hold a dialogue with her. Kaunda had condemned trade with South Africa, while Zambia, itself, traded with South Africa. Zambia’s authorities responded by publishing details of the correspondence that took place between the two leaders. The exchange of letters suggests it was, in fact, Vorster who had been making overtures for a meeting to Kaunda through secret envoys but failed due to “irreconcilable political philosophies” between the two leaders on the “central question of the dignity and equality of man”. Wina dismissed Vorster’s accusations as “an utter fabrication at a very high level” (Times of Zambia, 1971).

Vorster’s systematic attempts to discredit Kaunda, and the subsequent disclosure of his secret diplomacy with the Zambian leader, must be seen in context. During this period, South Africa was implementing what Sam
Nolutshungu (1975, 256) described as new “outward-looking policies”. The concept of dialogue formed a vital element of these policies. South Africa sought, by patient persuasion rather than defiance, to win over African and Asian states to a new attitude towards South Africa. First proposed by Dr. Hendrik F. Verwoerd, and later adopted by Vorster, the concept of “dialogue first” came into South Africa’s political vocabulary in 1969, when it began to be used by South Africa’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Hilgard Muller (Legum, 1972, 66). Vorster hoped to win over Kaunda, especially because Kaunda was not only the Chairman of the OAU, but also a virulent critic of South Africa’s racist policies. Vorster’s failure to change Kaunda’s attitude to South Africa’s policies perhaps produced feelings of frustrations. Thus, his disclosures were calculated to embarrass and discredit Kaunda and plant seeds of discord within the OAU. The timing of his announcement was also critical. It coincided with a press conference held by Ivory Coast President, Felix Houphouet-Boigny, the new victim of the “outward-looking policy”, at which he launched his campaign of dialogue with South Africa. Houphouet-Boigny’s endorsement of dialogue with South Africa set the stage for the struggle which almost divided the OAU between the pro-dialogue club led by Ivory Coast and the rest of Africa. However, the Eighth OAU Summit held in Addis Ababa in June 1971 overwhelmingly rejected dialogue with South Africa. The victory against the pro-dialogue club was consolidated at the Seventh Conference of the East and Central African States in Mogadishu in 1971.

**From Lusaka Manifesto to Mogadishu Declaration**

At the Conference of East and Central African States in Mogadishu in October 1971, African leaders reviewed the decolonisation process and issued the “Mogadishu Declaration” which affirmed the necessity of intensifying armed struggle as the only method of liberating southern Africa. Whereas the Lusaka Manifesto was primarily a statement of principles, the Mogadishu Declaration outlined the strategy of liberating southern Africa. The emphasis on armed struggle impressed liberation movements. For instance, the ANC of South Africa welcomed the declaration as “a revolutionary document” which would serve both as a “call and a rallying point for all revolutionary African States and liberation movements to close their ranks”. Similarly, the PAC described the conference as “the best conference ever held in East Africa”, underlining that “the shift from the Lusaka Manifesto to the Mogadishu Declaration” represented “a qualitative change from the euphemism of the former to the revolutionary rhetoric of the latter”. The revolutionary character of the Mogadishu Declaration had a psychological impact on the liberation movements. The renewed promise by African leaders to provide military and material aid encouraged liberation movements to intensify armed struggle in southern Africa. The collapse of
Portuguese colonialism in Mozambique and Angola in 1975 directly resulted from the escalation of armed struggle waged by FRELIMO and MPLA respectively.

Zambia’s leaders participated in drawing up the Mogadishu Declaration, but the document had limited impact on their own perception of the anti-colonial struggle in southern Africa. At least up to 1974, Zambia’s authorities continued to regard the principle of negotiations enunciated in the Lusaka Manifesto as the basis for dismantling white minority rule in the region. In this context, Zambia did not hesitate to seize every opportunity to mediate between liberation movements and minority regimes, especially when they demonstrated willingness to talk to each other. Zambia’s favourable response to South Africa’s initiative to resolve peacefully white minority rule in Rhodesia was a classic example (Anglin, 1975).

In September 1973, while FRELIMO intensified armed struggle in Mozambique, Kaunda opened secret contacts with the Portuguese colonial administration. The goal was to find a political solution rather than continuation with the armed struggle. Thus, the collapse of the Portuguese colonial administration, partly as a result of a coup d’état staged by General Antonio Spinola in April 1974, was a welcome development to Zambia. Kaunda facilitated talks between the new Portuguese government and liberation movements in Mozambique and Angola which culminated in the installation of transitional governments leading up to independence of the two countries in June and November 1975, respectively. However, Kaunda’s inclination to facilitate a rapid political settlement of the war in Portuguese colonies, and later in Rhodesia, must be read in the correct context. At the time, Zambia’s economy was undergoing enormous strain, aggravated partly by the Rhodesian border closure in 1973, and partly by external forces, including the declining commodity prices of copper and a rise in oil prices on the international market. A rapid end to armed struggle would reduce the country’s economic problems as it was dependent on trade routes via Rhodesia to Mozambican ports, and by Benguela Railway in Angola, for its export and import trade with the outside world.

**Angolan Crisis and Zambia’s Ambiguous Attitude**

While Mozambique proceeded to independence, a new political reality, civil war, emerged in Angola, posing a serious challenge to the OAU and exposing divisions in the organisation. The contest for political power among the three Angolan liberation movements—MPLA, Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola (FNLA) and Uniao Nacional Para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA)—had its immediate roots in transitional arrangements constituted a few months prior to independence. In December 1974, Kaunda facilitated a meeting in Lusaka attended by MPLA leaders Agostinho Neto, and UNITA leader, Jonas Savimbi,
and the Portuguese High Commissioner, Vice-Admiral Rosa Coutinho to discuss transitional arrangements. Neto and Savimbi agreed, with OAU support, to jointly establish, with Holden Roberto’s FNLA, “a common political platform” which would "serve as a basis for the discussion with the Portuguese government on the formation of the transitional government". In January 1975, Portugal and the three liberation movements signed an historic Independence Agreement in Portugal. The salient feature of the agreement was “Portugal’s recognition of all the three liberation movements as sole representatives of the Angolan people” and the “establishment of a Transitional Government composed of the Portuguese High Commissioner and the three liberation movements.” This was a fragile arrangement essentially because, as Shubi Ishemo (2000) has shown, the FNLA and UNITA maintained certain ambitions and sought to utilise their presence in the interim government to prepare to take power. Moreover, the political situation in Portugal was unstable as the conservative forces of General Spinola and the “progressive” Armed Forces Movement in the armed forces contested for state power. Thus, it was not long before the transitional government collapsed.

The ensuing civil war seriously divided the OAU, reflecting new political alignments and a global contest for influence by Cold War arch rivals, the United States and the Soviet Union. At an emergency OAU Summit convened in Addis Ababa, in January 1976, to deliberate on the Angolan situation, unambiguous differences emerged between countries supporting MPLA backed by the Soviet Union and Cuba, on one hand, and those supporting the pro-western alliance of FNLA and UNITA, on the other. The crucial issue was whether to recognise MPLA as a legitimate government representing the Angolan people, or to recognise a government of national unity incorporating all three liberation movements. The Summit reached a deadlock as out of 46 countries, 22 supported recognition of MPLA while an equal number of countries expressed preference for a government of national unity. Two countries remained neutral.

Former UNIP leaders (Zulu, 2007) and government official accounts have long propagated the view that the basis for supporting a government of national unity was to forestall the escalation of the conflict which not only attracted foreign intervention but also threatened to engulf the entire sub-region into super-power conflict. With the benefit of hindsight, Zambia’s attitude on the Angolan crisis was informed by OAU long-standing policy which urged the membership to provide support to liberation movements recognised by the continental body. MPLA, FNLA and UNITA had all been recognised by the OAU. Yet on the challenge presented by the Angolan crisis, the OAU lamentably failed to produce a unified stand, allowing individual countries to interpret and define their approach to the conflict. For Zambia, the position it assumed was politically embarrassing, a
reflection perhaps of its failure to correctly interpret the situation. Yet it may also be argued that underlying its attitude strong economic interests were at stake. The position it adopted was revealing. By supporting an inclusive government in Angola, Zambia assumed a stance consistent with the position adopted by South Africa and the United States. The two countries intervened in support of UNITA and FNLA to counteract what they referred to as “communist threat” in Angola in view of the fact that both Cuba and the Soviet Union had intervened and provided massive military support for MPLA. By aligning itself with the pro-western alliance in the conflict, the Zambian government came under severe criticism from Zambia’s students who accused it of serving western imperialist interests. In retrospect, it can be argued that Kaunda’s real position on the Angolan situation was not merely that of advocating a government of national unity, nor was he neutral. He backed UNITA under the guise of supporting a government of national unity. A transcribed record of Kaunda’s meeting with the United States president, Gerald Ford in Washington, in April 1975, suggests that he desperately backed a “compromise proposal” to ensure Savimbi became President of Angola after independence in November. In this scheme, Kaunda solicited American support. He told Gerald Ford that:

_We almost ignored Jonas Savimbi ...Our colleagues [in the OAU] had ignored Savimbi in the past, but this time he emerged as someone who could save the situation ...The only chance we had of putting someone forward to the OAU with the possibility of acceptance was to suggest that Neto and Roberto should each lead his party and Savimbi would be the compromise leader of all three...Savimbi does not even know of the compromise proposal for having him as President although it may have leaked. We have not yet told Savimbi. We must convince him of the rightness of it...Regardless of the outcome of the elections, Savimbi would be the President...We look for leadership on the question of Southern Africa._

Zambia’s authorities switched their support to Savimbi when they realised that the MPLA, backed by thousands of Cuban troops and Soviet military advisers, was about to capture Luanda, the Angolan capital. Kaunda persuaded the United States to provide military assistance to Savimbi in his fight against the MPLA. For Kaunda, the US military support for UNITA was essential to counteract the MPLA and frustrate Soviet designs in Angola (Zukas, 2002, 144). Kaunda’s intervention in the Angolan crisis had a profound effect in escalating armed tension in the region. It not only led to intensified involvement of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Angola with massive arms deliveries, but also led to the American encouragement of the South African invasion of Angola (Zukas, 2002).
Because the Zambian government was determined to secure Savimbi’s leadership of Angola, it also provided military support to UNITA. There is sufficient evidence that while Zambia’s leaders publicly backed the establishment of a government of national unity in Angola, they secretly allowed Tiny Rowland’s Lonrho jet to fly arms to Savimbi via Lusaka Airport. There was also proof that at the height of the crisis, a Zambia Airways plane laden with ten tons of arms and ammunition from the Zambia Army had taken off for Huambo, UNITA’s headquarters in southern Angola (Chisala, 1994). Embarrassingly for Kaunda and more generally the Zambian government, the pro-western alliance was defeated by the MPLA. It took a while before Zambia’s authorities recognized the MPLA government in Angola.

Conclusion
The struggle for black majority rule in southern Africa could not have been successfully prosecuted without the intervention of international and regional actors, who extended vital military, material, financial, and diplomatic assistance to the liberation movements. Yet, as a prominent regional actor, the role of Zambia in liberation struggles is often underestimated and sometimes misinterpreted partly because of the apparent contradictions in its policies towards the liberation movements. The idea of seeking to negotiate with white minority regimes as the basis of securing change in southern Africa was intolerable in the eyes of liberation movements and some radical OAU members who insisted on the primacy of armed struggle. Zambia’s authorities entertained negotiations mainly for national security reasons. Since Zambia’s leaders were more concerned with securing the country’s economic interests, I have argued that they maintained their own approach to resolving the problem of white minority rule in southern Africa. Their approach was not fixed on the employment of a single method. It oscillated between fiery revolutionary rhetoric, plausibly as a response to OAU pressure, and conciliatory offers when the situation dictated. This approach was consistent with the Lusaka Manifesto. While affirming their support for armed struggle, they always demonstrated willingness to secure a negotiated political solution to the problem of white minority rule in the region. They only supported armed struggle to an extent that it was a necessary instrument of coercing white minority regimes to the negotiating table.
A Good Measure of Sacrifice

End Notes


2 Interview with Sikota Wina, Makeni, Lusaka, Zambia, 27 September 2013.


10 NAZMFA1/1/42 Loc. 499 OAU Coordinating Committee on the Liberation of Africa, 1965-1966 Speech by Hon. Mr. R. Sikasula, M.P, Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Liberation Committee, Dar-es-Salaam, January 1966.


13 Ibid


15 NAZMFA1/1/22 Loc. 495 Recognition of Foreign Nationalist Parties in Zambia, 1964-1967, see Memorandum by the President presented to the 18th Cabinet Meeting, 28 April 1965, Extract from Cabinet Minutes signed by the Secretary to the Cabinet, Item 4: Foreign Affairs: Recognition of Foreign Nationalist Parties (CAB(65) 110).

16 Interview with Bautis Frank Kapulu, Makeni, Lusaka, Zambia 10 June 2013.

17 NAZMFA1/1/22 Loc. 495 Recognition of Foreign Nationalist Parties in Zambia, 1964-1967, letter dated 28 June 1966 addressed to the Chief Representatives for ZAPU, MPLA, SWAPO, FRELIMO, ANC (S.A), COREMO, ZANU, PAC(S.A) and AAC and UM by D.C Mulaisho, Permanent Secretary, Office of the President.


22 http://www.swapoparty.org/the_role_of_the_oau_liberation_committee.html accessed on 18/05/2015.


24 NAZMFA1/1/26 Loc. 2427 OAU. Committee of Five, 1967. See letter dated 13 May 1967, addressed to Mr. VJ Mwaanga, Permanent Secretary, Office of the President by G.S Magombe, Executive Secretary, OAU Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa. See also NAZMFA1/1/191 Loc. 521 Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) Political Parties/Rhodesia, 1966-1969, confidential letter dated 23 March 1967 addressed to the Chief Representative, ZANU Office, Lusaka by L.P. Chihota, Chief Representative, ZANU office, Dar-es-Salaam.


26 NAZMFA1/1/300 Loc. 538 OAU Liberation Committee, 1969, Minutes of the First Regular Meeting of the Permanent Representatives to the OAU. Liberation Committee, Dar-es-Salaam, 20 March 1969.


29 NAZMFA1/1/301 Loc. 538 Liberation Committee, 1969 Memorandum dated 15 July 1969, submitted by MPLA to the OAU Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa (Committee of Eleven) 15th Regular Session, Dakar, Senegal; and NAZMFA1/1/301 Loc. 538 Liberation Committee, 1969, Report of the Secretary of the Standing Committee on Defence, 26 June 1969; and NAZMFA1/1/261 Loc. 261 OAU Liberation Committee, Minutes of the Meeting of the Standing Committee on Information, Administration and General Policy, Thursday 20 June, 1968.

30 NAZMFA1/1/42 Loc. 499 OAU Coordinating Committee on the Liberation of Africa, 1965-1966. See letter dated 17 December 1965, addressed to the Administrative Secretary-General of the OAU by the Executive Secretary of the Liberation Committee together with a cover letter dated 5 January 1966, addressed to the Ministers of Foreign/External Affairs of all OAU Member States by the General Secretariat of the OAU in Addis Ababa.


33 NAZMFA1/1/301 Loc. 538 OAU Liberation Committee 1969, Report of the Secretary of the Standing Committee on Defence, 26 June 1969.


A Good Measure of Sacrifice


37 NAZMFA1/1/191 Loc. 521 Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) - Political Parties/Rhodesia 1966-1969, Cabinet Memo No. 26 CAB 3/65, signed by the Secretary to the Cabinet, 14/09/65.

38 NAZMFA1/1/301 Loc. 301 OAU Liberation Committee, 1969, Report of the Executive Secretary to the 14th Session of the OAU Liberation Committee, Dar-es-Salaam, 8 February 1969.

39 NAZMFA1/1/70 Loc. 503 OAU Summit, Accra Conference, 1965. See letter dated 13 November 1965, addressed to Kenneth D. Kaunda, President of the Republic of Zambia by His Excellency M. Leopold Sedar Senghor, President of the Republic of Senegal, Dakar; Senegal.


42 NAZMFA1/1/300 Loc. 538 OAU Liberation Committee 1969. See letter dated 9 December 1969, captioned “the April 1969 Lusaka Manifesto” addressed to the Acting High Commissioner, Zambia’s High Commission, Nairobi, Kenya by A. N Chimuka, Acting Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

43 NAZMFA1/1/300 Loc. 538 OAU Liberation Committee, 1969. See letter dated 28 October 1969, addressed to the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs by R. M. Kapangala, Acting High Commissioner to Kenya.


47 Africa Research Bulletin (1970) 7 no. 9: 1877C-1878A.

48 UNIP 7/19/3 Address by His Excellency the President of the Republic of Zambia, Dr. K. D. Kaunda on the occasion of the opening of Third Summit Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, Mulungushi Hall, Lusaka, 8 September 1970.


52 Ibid.


57 Dear Mr. Vorster … Details of Exchanges between President Kaunda and Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa, University of Zambia Library’s Special Collection, Gov. Zam (02) 1971.


59 Africa Research Bulletin (1971) 8, no.6: 2126C.

60 Africa Research Bulletin (1971) 8, no.10: 2247A.
REFERENCES

Published Sources


De Roche, Andrew J. 2009. “‘You Can’t Fight Guns with Knives’: National Security and Zambian Responses to UDI, 1965-1973.” In One Zambia, Many Histories:
A Good Measure of Sacrifice


Newspapers
Times of Zambia 18 February 1970.
Times of Zambia 23 April 1971.