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Enhancing Enforcement of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Using Indicators: A Focus on the Right to Education in the ICESCR

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Enhancing Enforcement of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Using Indicators: A Focus on the Right to Education in the ICESCR

Sital Kalantry, † Jocelyn E. Getgen †† & Steven Arrigg Koh †††

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Abstract

Nearly fifteen years ago, Audrey R. Chapman emphasized the importance of ascertaining violations of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) as a means to enhance its enforcement. Today, the violations approach is even more salient given the recent adoption of the ICESCR’s Optional Protocol, a powerful tool to hold States parties accountable for violations.

Indicators are essential tools for assessing violations of economic, social and cultural rights (ESCRs) because they are often the best way to measure progressive realization. Proposed guidelines on using indicators give guidance on the content of States parties reports to treaty monitoring bodies, but none creates a framework to assess violations of a specific right in a particular treaty.

This article fills this void by providing a framework to assess State compliance that integrates indicators into the project of ascertaining specific violations of economic, social and cultural rights under the ICESCR. The methodology that we propose calls for: 1) analyzing the specific language of the treaty that pertains to the right in question; 2) defining the concept and scope of the right; 3) identifying appropriate indicators that correlate with State obligations; 4) setting benchmarks to measure progressive realization; and 5) clearly identifying violations of the right in question.

We illustrate our approach by focusing on the right to education in the ICESCR. In addition to assessing right to education violations, this methodology can be employed to develop frameworks for ascertaining violations of other ESCRs as well.

INTRODUCTION

On December 10, 2008, the world celebrated the 60th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). This historic milestone also marked another achievement of the universal human rights system: the United Nations General Assembly’s adoption of an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). The Optional Protocol to the ICESCR institutes an individual complaint

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mechanism to address State violations of economic, social and cultural rights (ESCRs). This new mechanism for state accountability underscores the role of ESCRs as integral to a “trend towards a greater recognition of the indivisibility and interrelatedness of all human rights.”

Today, the challenge that human rights scholars, practitioners, and intergovernmental organizations face is how to fulfill the promises of the UDHR and the ICESCR.

In contrast to civil and political rights—which have been more actively recognized and accepted by the world’s nations—economic, social, and cultural rights have been neglected by certain countries who find them to be anathema to their conception of state obligations in society. This practice of distinguishing between these “first” and “second generation” rights, however, is no longer widely accepted. Indeed, the false distinction between ESCRs and CPRs is collapsing: both types of rights require both positive and negative obligations from states responsible for upholding them. For example, the civil and political right to be free from torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment requires states to not only refrain from committing acts of torture against individuals (negative obligation), but also to ensure effective government oversight by establishing, financing and training an independent

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5 Id.
6 Mahon, supra note 3, at 618.
7 See HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 249 (2000) (noting certain governments’ challenges to economic and social rights, as well as some countries’ ambivalence towards them).
9 See Nsongurua J. Udombana, Social Rights are Human Rights: Actualizing the Rights to Work and Social Security in Africa, 39 CORNELL INT’L L.J.185–86 (2006) (“Civil and political rights have demonstrably been shown to demand positive state action and interference for their realization. . . . In practice, this positive obligation has primarily been limited to inhuman treatment and health conditions in prisons under articles 7 and 10 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Among the positive obligations engendered by those two articles is the duty to train appropriate personnel: enforcement personnel, medical personnel, police officers, in short, any other persons involved in the custody or treatment of any individual subjected to any form of arrest, detention, or imprisonment.” (internal citations and footnotes omitted)).
working judicial system (positive obligation). Similarly, the economic, social and cultural right to health obligates states to refrain from promulgating discriminatory policies against individuals in the health care system (negative obligation) while also requiring governments to establish and fund effective public health systems (positive obligation). In fact, ESCRs are now seen by the human rights community and by many states not as aspirational goals, but as essential rights necessary to realize other fundamental human rights and live with dignity.

Despite an increased focus on ESCRs, there are major obstacles impeding their legal application. Some scholars and practitioners have viewed these rights as nonjusticiable. One of the main obstacles to justiciability of ESCRs under the ICESCR, for instance, is the challenge involved in measuring and determining whether or not a State party has satisfied its obligations with respect to the rights enumerated in the treaty. The main reason for this measurement challenge is the concept of progressive realization embedded in the ICESCR. With respect to many of the obligations set forth in the ICESCR, States parties to the treaty are not required to

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11 For example, the right to food, an ESCR, is seen as so essential to the right to participate in a free society that it has even been suggested that it rises to the level of customary international law. See Smita Nrula, The Right to Food: Holding Global Actors Accountable Under International Law, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 691, 780–91 (2006).
12 See, e.g., Randall Peerenboom, Human Rights and Rule of Law: What’s the Relationship?, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 809, 816 (2005) (“There is no accepted understanding of what a right is—whether collective or group rights and nonjusticiable social, economic and cultural rights are really rights; of how rights relate to duties; or whether a discourse of rights is complementary or antithetical to, or better or worse than, a discourse of needs or capabilities.”) (internal citations omitted)). For a discussion of the need to confront the practical difficulties presented by economic and social rights, see Michael J. Dennis & David P. Stewart, Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Should There Be an International Complaints Mechanism to Adjudicate the Rights to Food, Water, Housing and Health? 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 462, 464 (2004) (“The issue that needs to be confronted, instead, is that these rights present genuinely different and, in many respects, far more difficult challenges than do civil and political rights . . . . [I]t is a much more complex undertaking to ascertain what constitutes an adequate standard of living, or whether a state fully respects and implements its population’s right to education or right to work. Vexing questions of content, criteria, and measurement lie at the heart of the debate over “justiciability,” yet are seldom raised or addressed with any degree of precision.”).
13 Progressive realization is a recognition that, while States are under an obligation to move as expeditiously as possible to realize economic, social and cultural rights, the full realization of these rights will take time and resources. See discussion infra, note 86 et seq.
provide them immediately upon ratification of the treaty.\(^{14}\) Instead, the concept of progressive realization permits States parties to incrementally progress over time in realization of the right, although no time period is specified in the Covenant.\(^{15}\) In other words, a State party could be in compliance with the ICESCR even if it was not guaranteeing 100 percent of the people within its jurisdiction the full enjoyment of treaty rights immediately upon ratification. However, States parties may not deliberately halt or retrogress on progress.\(^{16}\) Thus, it is important to know what percentage of the population enjoys the right in question, to what extent individuals enjoy the right, and whether or not those percentages are increasing and enjoyment of the right is improving over time.

Although many obligations under the ICESCR can be realized progressively, other obligations are not subject to the same gradual implementation standards. For example, the obligation that all rights be provided without discrimination is an immediate obligation of States to the extent they are providing the rights in question.\(^{17}\) One way to enhance compliance with the ICESCR is to disaggregate the obligations into those that are progressively realized and those that are immediately realized. Then, in an assessment of violations, one could note that States parties cannot defer nor deviate from immediately realized obligations as of the date of ratification of the treaty.

\(^{14}\) See discussion infra note 86 et seq.

\(^{15}\) Id.

\(^{16}\) General Comment 3, supra note 1613, at para. 9; U.N. Comm. Econ. Soc. & Cultural Rts., General Comment No. 13: The Right to Education, 21st Sess., at ¶ 45, U.N. DOC. E/C.12/1999/10 (1999), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(symbol)/E.C.12.1999.10.En?OpenDocument (last visited Oct. 10, 2008) [hereinafter General Comment 13] (“There is a strong presumption against the permissibility of any retrogressive measures taken in relation to the right to education, as well as other rights enunciated in the Covenant. If any deliberately retrogressive measures are taken, the State party has the burden of proving that they have been introduced after the most careful consideration of all alternatives and that they are fully justified by reference to the totality of the rights provided for in the Covenant and in the context of the full use of the State party’s maximum available resources.”).

\(^{17}\) See General Comment 3, supra note 13, at paras. 83–87. For a complete look at States parties obligations under Article 2 of the ICESCR (including progressive realization obligations), see Philip Alston, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in MANUAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTING 65–169 (1997).
With respect to rights that may be provided incrementally over time, a promising solution is the use of indicators. A human rights indicator is essentially a proxy for determining the level of fulfillment of human rights’ obligations. Indicators may be qualitative or quantitative. Quantitative indicators provide statistical information about the general population of a country or specific State efforts made toward the satisfaction of rights. Examples of quantitative indicators to measure the realization of the right to education include 1) the percentage of GDP a country is spending on secondary education and 2) the ratio of the number of secondary school-aged children enrolled in secondary school as compared to the number of secondary school-aged children in the population.

While social scientists and development professionals have long used indicators in their work, there has been a growing interest among human rights scholars, advocates and jurists

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18 The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) has noted that indicators and benchmarks have “a significant role to play in bringing about positive change in the protection and promotion of economic, social, and cultural rights,” serving as tools for measuring state compliance with human rights norms. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Report of the United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. E/2006/86 (June 21, 2006). The United Nations defines it as “specific information on the state of an event, activity or an outcome that can be related to human rights norms and standards; that address and reflect the human rights concerns and principles; and that are used to assess and monitor promotion and protection of human rights.”Annual Meeting of Chairpersons of the Human Rights Treaty Bodies and the Inter-Committee Meeting, Report on Indicators for Monitoring Compliance with International Human Rights Instruments, ¶¶ 4 & 7, U.N. Doc. HRI/MC/2006/7 (May 11, 2006) [hereinafter UN 2006 Report]. Others use different definitions of indicators. see also Maria Green, What We Talk About When We Talk About Indicators: Current Approaches to Human Rights Measurement 23 Hum. RTS. Q. 1062, 1065 (2001) (“[A] human rights indicator is a piece of information used in measuring the extent to which a legal right is being fulfilled or enjoyed in a given situation”). Additionally, Gauthier de Beco defines human rights indicators as “indicators that are linked to human rights treaty standards, and that measure the extent to which duty bearers are fulfilling their obligations and rights-holders enjoying their rights.” See Gauthier de Beco, Human Rights Indicators for Assessing State Compliance with International Human Rights Instruments, 77 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 23, 24(2008). Rajeev Malhotra and Nicolas Fasel focus largely on a narrower concept of indicator: “the term “quantitative indicator” is used to designate any kind of indicators that are or can be expressed in quantitative form, such as numbers, percentages or indices.” Rajeev Malhotra & Nicolas Fasel, Quantitative Human Rights Indicators–A Survey of Major Initiatives 2 (2005) (paper prepared for the Turku Expert Meeting on Human Rights Indicators, Turku/Abo, Finland, Mar. 1–13, 2005).

20 See, e.g., Maarseveen and Van der Tang who coded constitutions for 157 countries across a multitude of institutions and the rights for the period 1788–1975. See generally HENC VAN MAARSEVEEN & GER VAN DER TANG, WRITTEN CONSTITUTIONS: A COMPUTERIZED COMPARATIVE STUDY (1978). This study compares the degree to which national constitutions contain those rights mentioned in the UNDR by examining the frequency and distributions across different history epochs before at after 1948. Id. Ball and Asher studied patterns of killings and refugee migration of Albanians in Kosovo to determine if the violence and migration were due to activities of the
over the last several decades in employing indicators to measure compliance with human rights obligations. 21 While development professionals typically employ indicators to compare the progress of one country’s development to another, human rights advocates tend to use indicators to determine progress or assess compliance with human rights norms within a specific country.

The human rights community initially began to monitor the status of international human rights through indicators in the 1970s. For instance, Freedom House began to publish a yearly accounting of human rights abuses and the U.S. Congress required the State Department to prepare a yearly report on the status of international human rights. 22 However, much of the early work on human rights indicators focused on measuring civil and political rights, such as the right to freedom of the press or right to be free from torture. 23 As Hertel and Minkler point out, “economic rights remain less well articulated than civil and political rights, less accurately measured, and less consistently implemented in public policy.” 24 Some scholars suggest that economic and social rights should not be monitored at all. 25 Recently, however, intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations (UN) and the Organization of American States (OAS) have shown a heightened interest in enforcing ESCRs and have proposed guidelines for using indicators to measure compliance with ESCRs. 26

Kosovo Liberation Army, NATO attacks, or systematic campaign by Yugoslav forces. Patrick Ball and Jana Asher, Statistics and Slobodan, 15 CHANCE 17 (2002).

21 De Beco, supra note 19, at 25; STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 7, at 316 (“Various commentators . . . have emphasized the importance of developing comprehensive statistical indicators as a means by which to monitor compliance with the ICESCR.”).


23 Id. at 92.

24 Shareen Hertel & Lanse Minkler, Chapter 1, Economic Rights: The Terrain, in ECONOMIC RIGHTS: CONCEPTUAL, MEASUREMENT, AND POLICY ISSUES (Shareen Hertel and Lanse Minkler eds., 2007).

25 McNitt, supra note 22 at 92.

Though essential in furthering the application of indicators in human rights advocacy, none of these proposals has attempted to explain how to ascertain violations of specific treaty obligations. Making determinations about violations of legal documents is typically the project of lawyers, while social scientists are more comfortable with working with indicators. There is relatively little dialogue on this subject between the two groups of academics and professionals in the field of human rights. As Audrey R. Chapman pointed out in her important article developing the “violations approach” to assess treaty compliance, however, “specific enumerated rights need to be adequately conceptualized and developed to measure implementation or to identify potential violations.”

In light of the recent adoption of the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, a framework for assessing violations is particularly important as it provides a framework for complaints that are brought pursuant to the Optional Protocol. Although individuals and NGOs may soon bring complaints directly to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR Committee), there is little guidance offered as to how they can ascertain specific violations of these often complex rights, particularly using indicators. Even outside of the complaints mechanism of the Optional Protocol, NGOs can promote State accountability by using a violations framework in their work. Thus, identifying violations of ESCRs is an essential skill for advocates to learn toward further enhancing State compliance with economic, social and cultural rights obligations.

We hope to meet this need by employing indicators to assess ESCR violations and enhance the enforcement of ICESCR norms. Indicators are powerful tools for ascertaining violations of ESCRs because they can help to measure and evaluate progressive realization. We propose the following methodology for using indicators to measure compliance with ESCRs:

1) analyze the specific language of the treaty that pertains to the right in question;
2) define the concept and scope of the right;
3) identify appropriate indicators that correlate with the obligations;
4) set benchmarks to measure progressive realization; and
5) clearly identify what constitutes a violation of the right in question.

We illustrate how to apply this methodology by focusing on the right to education in the ICESCR. While much work has been done to define the content and to set benchmarks for monitoring States’ duties and individual enjoyment of the right to health, comparatively little work has been done to monitor and enforce compliance with the right to education. In fact, the right to education has been under-theorized as compared to other ESCRs. Additionally, although some treaties list specific indicators, the ICESCR and other treaties protecting the right to education do not list any agreed-upon indicators to monitor fulfillment of the right.

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30 The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) has a provision for the reduction of the “female student drop out rate” and the ICESCR states in article 12 that parties should take steps to reduce the still birth and infant mortality rates. See, e.g., Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women art. 10, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW]; ICESCR, supra note 14 at art. 12.
31 See Chapman, supra note 27, at 23–24. Additionally, even though many treaty monitoring bodies have highlighted the importance of indicators in their general comments as well as concluding observations, the use of
Despite these gaps, the right to education remains one of the most important, universally accepted, yet complex rights in international human rights law.\textsuperscript{32} The right to education is a “multiplier”\textsuperscript{33} or “empowerment” right\textsuperscript{34} as well as an essential means to promote other rights,\textsuperscript{35} the enjoyment of which “enhanc[es] all rights and freedoms” while its violation “jeopardiz[es] them all.”\textsuperscript{36} Conversely, the denial of the right to education leads to “compounds of denials of other human rights and the perpetuation of poverty.”\textsuperscript{37}

Even in the United States, where ESCRs are not universally-accepted, many state constitutions guarantee the right to education,\textsuperscript{38} recognizing that “it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.”\textsuperscript{39} Moreover, according to the U.S. Supreme Court, once a state assumes the duty to provide education, “it is a right which must be available to all on equal terms.”\textsuperscript{40} The Court has found that the right to education “is not only a kind of idealistic goal . . . but a legally binding human right . . . with corresponding obligations of States under international law.”\textsuperscript{41} Several key international instruments mention the right to education, including those relating to specific indicators in the reporting and follow-up procedure of treaty bodies has been limited. \textit{See} UN 2006 Report, \textit{supra} note 19.


\textsuperscript{33} \textit{See} KATARINA TOMASEVSKI, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS IN EDUCATION: THE 4-A SCHEME? (2006).


\textsuperscript{35} General Comment 13, \textit{supra} note 16, at ¶¶ 1 & 31.

\textsuperscript{36} \textit{See} TOMASEVSKI, \textit{supra} note 33.


\textsuperscript{40} \textit{See id}.

\textsuperscript{41} Nowak, \textit{supra} note 32, at 425.
groups such as children, racial minorities, and women, but the ICESCR provides the most comprehensive protections of the right. As such, we focus our study on the ICESCR.

In Section II, we briefly discuss the historical and theoretical foundations for the right to education as it relates to the ICESCR. In Section III, we apply our proposed methodology to the right to education under the ICESCR. Section IV is a conclusion.

I. The Right to Education in the ICESCR: A Brief History and Theory

Competing theoretical perspectives have shaped the right to education guarantee as enumerated in international instruments, including Articles 13 and 14 of the ICESCR. During the last few centuries, the responsibility to educate populations has generally shifted from that of the parents and the church under a liberal model to that of the State. What had before been an

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43 General Comment 13, supra note 16, at ¶ 2; KLAUS DIETER BEITER, THE PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION BY INTERNATIONAL LAW, INCLUDING A SYSTEMATIC ANALYSIS OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 86 (2006) (“Articles 13 and 14 of the ICESCR] are comprehensive provisions. In fact, they feature among the most elaborate rights provisions of the ICESCR. Articles 13 and 14 may be viewed as a codification of the right to education in international law.”) See also Section II infra for a discussion of other international instruments that uphold the right to education.

44 See ICESCR, supra note 14, at arts. 13 & 14. In addition to these main provisions, other articles refer to education. For instance, article 6(2) obligates States parties to create and implement “technical and vocational guidance and training programs” to fully realize the right to work. See id. at art. 6(2). Article 10(1) calls on States parties to protect and assist the family during the time it is responsible for the education of children. See id. at art. 10(1). DIETER BEITER, supra note 29, at 86.

45 ICESCR, supra note 14, at art. 13.

46 DIETER BEITER, supra note 29, at 21; DOUGLAS HODGSON, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO EDUCATION 8 (1998); Nowak, supra note 32, at 191.
upper-class privilege was repositioned as a “means of realising the egalitarian ideals upon which [the French and American Revolutions] were based . . . .”47 Such revolutions exemplified the old axiom that “political and social upheaval is often accompanied by a revolution in education.”48

Even though liberal concepts of education in the nineteenth century still reflected a fear of too much state involvement in the educational system by giving parents the primary duty to provide an education to their children, States began regulating curricula and providing minimal educational standards.49 Under socialist theory, the State was the primary means to ensure the economic and social well-being of communities.50 By the dawn of the 20th century, such ideals underscored the need to respond to the industrialization and urbanisation of rapidly-developing countries such as the United States.51

The right to education provisions in the ICESCR derive from both the socialist and liberal theoretical traditions: 1) as the primary responsibility of the State to provide educational services; and 2) as the duty of the State to respect the rights of parents to establish and direct private schools and to ensure that their children receive an education that is in accordance with their own religious and moral beliefs.52 Thus, the ICESCR enumerates a combination of both negative and positive obligations of States parties to provide education to their citizens. Even with these competing traditions shaping the right to education under the ICESCR, the aims and objectives of education have moved toward a growing consensus in international human rights

47 DIETER BEITER, supra note 29, at 20 (quoting HODGSON, supra note 46, at 8).
49 DIETER BEITER, supra note 29, at 22 (citing Nowak, supra note 32, at 191–92; HODGSON, supra note 46, at 8–10).
50 Id. at 23 (citing Nowak, supra note 32, at 192; HODGSON, supra note 46, at 9, 11). Thus, socialism viewed education as a welfare entitlement of individuals which gave rise to claims of rights to educational services against the state. Id.
51 RURY, supra note 48, at 135–37.
52 See DIETER BEITER, supra note 29, at 24.

Despite its widespread acceptance and fundamental importance, the right to education was not directly nor specifically declared an international human right until the post-World War II era.\footnote{HODGSON, *supra* note 46.} At that time, the international community contemplated the adoption of an International Bill of Human Rights,\footnote{John P. Humphrey, *The International Bill of Rights: Scope and Implementation* 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 527, 527 (1975–1976).} including the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), a document that has become the contemporary foundation of human rights codification and the primary source of internationally recognized human rights standards.\footnote{See Hurst Hannum, *The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and International Law*, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 287, 290 (1995–1996).} In 1946, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)\footnote{UNESCO is a United Nations Specialized Agency whose mission is “to contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among the nations through education, science and culture in order to further universal respect for justice, for the rule of law and for the human rights and fundamental freedoms which are affirmed for the peoples of the world, without distinction of race, sex, language or religion, by the Charter of the United Nations.” See UNESCO, *Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization* (Nov. 16, 1945), available at http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=15244&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html.} employed a committee of leading scholars to find common ground among the various cultural and philosophical foundations of all human rights, including the right to education.\footnote{Mary Ann Glendon, *Knowing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights* 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1153, 1156 (1997–1998). The committee was called the Committee on the Theoretical Bases of Human Rights. *Id.*}

Then, the U.N. Human Rights Commission (HRC) prepared a first draft of the Declaration.\footnote{Glendon, *supra* note 58, at 1157. The drafters borrowed freely from the draft of a transnational rights declaration then being deliberated in Latin America by the predecessor to the Organization of American States and a “Statement of Essential Human Rights” produced by the American Law Institute. See Mary Ann Glendon, *John P. Humphrey and the Drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights* 2 J. HIST. INT’L L. 250, 253 (2000).} The draft circulated among all U.N. member states for comment and went to the
After many revisions and lobbying efforts, the Economic and Social Commission (ECOSOC) approved the final draft of the UDHR and submitted it to the U.N. General Assembly in the fall of 1948.

At the time of its passage, the most ground-breaking part of the UDHR was its fourth section—Articles 22 through 27—which protected ESCRs as fundamental rights. The addition of ESCRs was not viewed as a concession to the Soviet Union’s insistence on enumerating these rights; rather, it was seen as a deliberate inclusion of rights articulated in constitutions across the globe. These guarantees received broad-based support; however, it was much more difficult to find agreement as to the relationship of these “new” economic and social rights to the “old” civil and political rights.

After the adoption of the UDHR, U.N. delegates began the task of codifying these rights to complete the International Bill of Human Rights in one document. Even though all member states agreed that CPRs and ESCRs were interconnected and interdependent, divergent political policy agendas of the Cold War era emerged, leading to the creation of two separate Covenants. The assumptions that CPRs and ESCRs were different—that civil and political rights were immediate, absolute, justiciable and require the abstention of state action while economic and social rights were programmatic, realized gradually, more political in nature and

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60 Glendon, supra note 58, at 1159.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 UDHR, supra note 53, at art. 26. See, e.g., HODGSON, supra note 46, at 7. See DIETER BEITER, supra note 29, at 90.
require substantial resources—drew the debate as to whether there would be one or two separate treaties codifying the rights enumerated in the UDHR. For example, English and other Western delegates saw economic and social rights as entirely different in their implementation procedure and wanted to emphasize this distinction by creating two separate documents. In contrast, the Soviet Union and other supporters of a single instrument contested any attempt to cast economic and social rights as inferior to civil and political rights. Madame Hansa Mehta, a representative from India, argued that poorer nations could only hope to move progressively toward realizing these rights. In the end, these diverging concepts of human rights and arguments centering around the obligations of states arising from these rights led to the drafting of two separate instruments. Those States that did not want to undertake ESCR obligations would ratify only the binding international human rights instrument protecting CPRs while states subscribing to all human rights as equal would ratify two binding instruments protecting both CPRs and ESCRs.

Consequently, the content of the UDHR was codified in two separate binding Covenants—the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in 1954. With

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69 Id. Supporters of one Covenant argued that there was no hierarchy of rights and that “[a]ll rights should be promoted and protected at the same time.” U.N. Doc. A/2929, at 7, ¶ 8.
70 Glendon, supra note 58, at 1167 (citing Eleanor Roosevelt, The Autobiography of Eleanor Roosevelt 318 (1961)).
71 In 1951, the General Assembly decided that Covenants should be prepared for each category of rights. Resolution 543, supra note 99. Supporters of two separate instruments argued that the implementation of civil and political rights would require an international quasi-judicial body, while the implementation of economic, social and cultural rights would be monitored best by a system of periodic state reporting. See Dieter Beiter, supra note 29, at 52.
72 Eide, supra note 67, at 10.
respect to the right to education provisions of the ICESCR, UNESCO played an integral role in the drafting of Articles 13 and 14 and continues to play a central part in the monitoring and implementation of right-to-education guarantees under the Covenant.\textsuperscript{74} Today, for instance, UNESCO receives copies of reports from states parties\textsuperscript{75} to both the ICESCR and UNESCO as per Article 16(2)(b) of the ICESCR in order to provide technical assistance to states where appropriate.\textsuperscript{76} Also, under Article 18 of the ICESCR, UNESCO reports on progress toward realizing Covenant rights, including the right to education.\textsuperscript{77} Moreover, the Covenant permits UNESCO to cooperate with the CESCR in furtherance of ESCRs. In this regard, UNESCO sends representatives to Committee sessions, participates in making recommendations to states parties in the Committee’s Concluding Observations,\textsuperscript{78} and sets international educational standards, giving content to Article 13 of the ICESCR.\textsuperscript{79} As a result of UNESCO’s active role in

\footnotesize{(1995–1996). The General Assembly decided in 1951 that two Covenants would be prepared, one for each category of rights. Resolution 543, supra note 99.}


\textsuperscript{75} State reporting serves as a review function of the CESCR to evaluate whether States parties are in compliance with their obligations under the ICESCR. See DIETER BEITER, supra note 29, at 350. The Committee has stated that: the reporting function ensures a comprehensive review of national legislation, policies and practices; regularly monitors the on-the-ground situation with respect to each right; engages states in a dialogue toward full realization of rights; and encourages civil society participation to ensure progress. See CESCR, General Comment No. 1: Reporting by States parties, 3rd Sess., U.N. Doc. E/1989/22 (1989). For more information on State reporting, see Philip Alston, \textit{The Purposes of Reporting}, in \textit{MANUAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTING} 14–16 (1991).

\textsuperscript{76} DIETER BEITER, supra note 29, at 230; ICESCR, supra note 14.

\textsuperscript{77} DIETER BEITER, supra note 29, at 230; ICESCR, supra note 14.

\textsuperscript{78} Although not legally binding, Concluding Observations are the stated interpretation of the experts who serve on the treaty monitoring body. See U.N. Doc. E/1998.14, para. 367. The Committee has stated that General Comments serve “to make the experience gained so far through the examination of States’ reports available . . . to assist and promote their further implementation of the Covenant . . . .” U.N. Doc. E/2004/22. para. 52.

shaping and codifying the right to education under the ICESCR and other instruments, the right to education remains one of most well-defined and protected of all ESCRs—at least in theory.

II. Measuring Compliance with the Right to Education under the ICESCR

In this Section, we propose a framework for using indicators to ascertain violations of economic, social and cultural rights and apply this framework to a specific right. Under this methodology, we first analyze the language of the right as set forth in the treaty in question, which in this case is the right to education as enumerated in the ICESCR. Second, we elaborate on the concepts and define the scope of the various obligations of the right. Third, we propose appropriate indicators to measure State compliance with the right. Finally, we discuss the importance of setting benchmarks and clearly identifying what constitutes a violation of the right to education in the ICESCR.

A. Right to Education Language in the ICESCR

To measure a State’s compliance with treaty obligations, we must first carefully analyze the treaty language as it pertains to the rights and duties in question. Malhotra and Fasel stress that in giving meaning to the concept sought to be measured, the concept itself must be grounded in relevant human rights treaties. In addition to focusing on the specific treaty language, it is also important to analyze how that language has been interpreted by relevant authoritative bodies. To interpret the meaning of the right to education in the ICESCR, for example, we

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81 See DIETER BETER, supra note 29, at 233 (citing Nartowski, 1974, p. 290).
82 Malhotra and Fasel, supra note 19, at 26. The UN 2006 Report also notes that it is important to anchor indicators in a conceptual framework. UN 2006 Report, supra note 19, at para 4.
83 This is similar to the first step suggested by Todd Landman who suggests that the background concept to the measured should be defined at the outset. See generally TODD LANDMAN, STUDYING HUMAN RIGHTS (2006).
look to relevant language of the ICESCR and General Comments of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR or Committee). The CESCR is the treaty body responsible for monitoring and evaluating States parties’ compliance with the ICESCR, including the right to education.\textsuperscript{84}

General Comments are relevant to our analysis because they carry considerable weight and serve an important function: to define and clarify ICESCR provisions or other related topics in order “to assist and promote . . . further implementation of the Covenant . . . and to stimulate the activities of the States parties, international organizations and the specialized agencies concerned in achieving progressively and effectively the full realization of the rights recognized in the Covenant.”\textsuperscript{85} Although not legally binding, General Comments serve an important jurisprudential function in relation to the meaning of rights and duties under the ICESCR: they provide guidance and explicit language toward effective implementation and compliance with treaty norms. Following General Comments is akin to the common law practice of following judicial precedent to define and apply the legal standards governing issues before a domestic court. Therefore, when assessing the State obligations of a particular State party to the ICESCR, it is important to consult the General Comments that elaborate on the particular right in question. Below we discuss provisions of the ICESCR that are relevant to the right to education as interpreted by the CESCR in its General Comments.

\begin{itemize}
  \item[i.] Progressive Realization & Maximum Available Resources
\end{itemize}


\textsuperscript{85} U.N. DOC. E/2004/22, para. 52. \textit{(quoted in Dieter Beiter, supra note 29, at 364–65).}
Unless specified otherwise, the rights in the ICESCR are subject to the concept of progressive realization enumerated in Article 2(1). Progressive realization means that States parties are not obligated to realize these rights immediately; rather, States may fulfill these rights over time. Additionally, realization of ICESCR rights is subject to States parties’ maximum available resources. Here, the Committee allots States “wide discretion to determine which resources to apply and what to regard as maximum.” Moreover, the CESCR has declared that the concept of progressive realization “imposes an obligation to move as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards the goal” of the full realization of the right in question.

Even though the rights in the ICESCR can be realized progressively over time, States parties are obligated to immediately “take steps” toward the full realization of those rights. According to the Committee’s General Comment No. 3, “while the full realization of the relevant rights may be achieved progressively, steps towards that goal must be taken within a reasonably short time after the Covenant’s entry into force for the States concerned.” Furthermore, “such steps should be deliberate, concrete and targeted as clearly as possible towards meeting the obligations recognized in the Covenant.”

Also under Article 2(1), States parties must use all appropriate means to further the rights under the ICESCR. The CESCR requires States parties to decide what measures are appropriate

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86 Article 2(1) declares:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.

ICESCR, supra note 14, at art. 2(1).

87 ICESCR, supra note 14; General Comment 3, supra note 13. Resources can mean money, natural resources, human resources, technology and information. See DIETER BEITER, supra note 29, at 382.

88 General Comment 3, supra note 13.

89 See General Comment 3, supra note 13, at ¶ 9.

90 See id. For further discussion on the concept of progressive realization, see Steiner & Alston, supra note 7, at 246–49. See DIETER BEITER, supra note 29, at 376–77.

91 General Comment 3, supra note 13, at ¶ 2.

92 Id. at ¶ 2.
and to include their reasons in periodic reports to the Committee.\textsuperscript{93} Ultimately, the CESCR retains the discretion to decide whether or not the State has taken all appropriate measures.\textsuperscript{94} The Committee does not fully clarify what these appropriate means toward full realization should be, but it does articulate that government action should include legislative and judicial measures, especially where existing legislation violates the Covenant.\textsuperscript{95} Because some articles of the Covenant specify steps to take and others do not, the measures that a State is required to take should not be limited to those enumerated in the treaty.\textsuperscript{96}

ii. Immediately Realized Obligations: Nondiscrimination & Equal Treatment

Articles 2(2) and 3 obligate States parties to ensure all rights under the ICESCR, including the right to education, equally and without discrimination.\textsuperscript{97} Article 3 specifically mandates that States “ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights set forth in the present Covenant.”\textsuperscript{98} The obligation of nondiscrimination is of immediate effect.\textsuperscript{99} Specifically, the CESCR states that Article 2(2) is “subject to neither progressive realization nor the availability of resources; it applies fully and immediately to all aspects of education and encompasses all internationally prohibited grounds

\textsuperscript{93} \textit{Id.} at ¶ 4.
\textsuperscript{94} \textit{Id.} at ¶ 4.
\textsuperscript{95} Audrey R. Chapman, \textit{Development of Indicators for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The Rights to Education, Participation in Cultural Life and Access to the Benefits of Science, in Human Rights in Education, Science and Culture: Legal Developments and Challenges} 146 (Yvonne Donders & Vladimir Volodin eds., 2007). Other steps also identified include administrative, financial, educational and social measures. \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{96} DIETER BEITER, \textit{ supra} note 29, at 378.
\textsuperscript{97} ICESCR, \textit{ supra} note 14, at art. 2(2). Specifically, Article 2(2) declares that: “[t]he States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”
\textsuperscript{98} \textit{Id.} at art. 3.
\textsuperscript{99} General Comment 3, \textit{ supra} note 13, at para. 1; General Comment 13, \textit{ supra} note 16, at paras. 31–37.
Thus, States parties must immediately guarantee nondiscrimination and equal treatment in education, particularly with regard to gender and other enumerated grounds in order to fulfill its obligations under the ICESCR.

iii. Scope of the Right to Education

a. Primary Education

Articles 13 and 14 articulate the ICESCR’s specific guarantees of the right to education. These articles impose differing obligations for each level—primary, secondary and tertiary—of education. Article 13 recognizes that “primary education shall be compulsory and available free to all.” States parties that have not secured compulsory, free primary education at the time of treaty ratification must develop a plan within two years and must implement it within a reasonable number of years after ratification. The plain language of the ICESCR suggests that State parties must either provide free and compulsory primary education to all or implement a plan for the provision of free and compulsory education. Unlike with respect to obligations that may be progressively realized where no time period is specified, the ICESCR specifically provides time periods for the realization of free and compulsory primary education: States parties must adopt a plan within two years and this plan must call for the implementation

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100 General Comment 13, supra note 1635, at para. 31 (citing ICESCR, supra note 14, at art. 2(2) (“The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”)).
101 ICESCR, supra note 14, at arts. 13 & 14.
102 Id. at art. 13(2)(a); see also U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, General Comment No. 8, The Relationship between Economic Sanctions and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1997/98, 17th Sess. (Dec. 12, 1997) (stating that governments must respect the right to education and all economic, social and cultural rights when imposing economic sanctions and that primary education should not be considered a humanitarian exemption because of the negative consequences for vulnerable groups) [hereinafter General Comment 8].
103 ICESCR, supra note 14, at art. 14; DIETER BEITNER, supra note 29, at 390.
of free and compulsory primary education within a *reasonable number of years*. The Committee appears to agree that the requirement that States provide compulsory and free education subject to a stronger requirement than progressive realization. The Committee notes that, when read together, Article 13(2) and Article 14 require States parties to “prioritize the introduction of compulsory, free primary education.” The Committee further points out that the requirement that primary education be free of charge is “unequivocal” and [t]he right is expressly formulated so as to ensure the availability of primary education without charge to the child, parents or guardians.” Thus, the requirement to provide free and compulsory education is not subject to the progressive realization but rather immediate action must be taken with regard to it.

### b. Secondary & Tertiary Education

Secondary education must be made generally available and accessible to all, and tertiary education must be made “equally accessible to all [] on the basis of capacity.” In addition, States parties must progressively achieve free secondary and tertiary education.

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104 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, *General Comment No. 11: Plans of Action for Primary Education (art. 14 ICESCR)*, 20th Sess., ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. E/2000/22 (2000) [hereinafter General Comment 11] (“The plan of action must be aimed at securing the progressive implementation of the right to compulsory primary education, free of charge, under article 14. Unlike the provision in article 2.1, however, article 14 specifies that the target date must be "within a reasonable number of years" and moreover, that the time-frame must "be fixed in the plan". In other words, the plan must specifically set out a series of targeted implementation dates for each stage of the progressive implementation of the plan. This underscores both the importance and the relative inflexibility of the obligation in question.”).

105 General Comment 13, *supra* note 16, at para. 51. Furthermore, the former Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education Katarina Tomasevski has explained that States are “obliged to ensure with immediate effect that primary education is compulsory and free of charge to everyone, or to formulate a plan and seek international assistance to fulfill this obligation as speedily as possible.” Tomasevski 2004 Report, *supra* note 37, at para. 23.


108 *Id.* at art. 13(2)(c).

109 *Id.* at art. 13(2)(b) (“Secondary education in its different forms, including technical and vocational secondary education, shall be made generally available and accessible to all by every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free education”).
With regard to secondary, tertiary and fundamental education, States must immediately take steps toward full realization under Article 13(2)(b)–(d). These steps must include adopting and implementing a national education strategy, which should provide mechanisms, such as indicators and benchmarks, to measure progress toward the full realization of the right to education. The Committee also affirms obligations under Article 13(2)(e), noting that States must provide educational fellowships to assist disadvantaged groups.

c. Minimum Core Obligations

To advance the nature of all human rights as fundamental and interdependent, and to reconcile the differences among States parties’ political, economic and social systems, Philip Alston proposed the concept of a “core content” of rights. He argued that elevating “claims” to rights status is meaningless “if its normative content could be so indeterminate as to allow for the possibility that the rightholders possess no particular entitlement to anything.” Each of the ICESCR rights, he concluded, must “give rise to a minimum entitlement, in the absence of which a state party is to be considered to be in violation of it [sic] obligations.” Thus, the core content concept responds to define and elaborate upon the normative content of ICESCR rights.

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110 General Comment 13, supra note 16, at para. 21–22 (“Fundamental education includes the elements of availability, accessibility, acceptability and adaptability which are common to education in all its forms and at all levels. . . . [F]undamental education corresponds to basic education as set out in the World Declaration on Education For All. By virtue of [ICESCR] article 13(2)(d), individuals ‘who have not received or completed the whole period of their primary education’ have a right to fundamental education, or basic education as defined in the World Declaration on Education For All.”)
111 Id. at para. 52.
112 Id.
113 Id. at para. 53.
114 Kitty Arambulo, supra note 66, at 119.
116 Id. at 352–53.
117 Id. at 353. Alston quotes Tom Campbell as outlining the task to define the core concept of rights: “the implementation of human rights, which requires the stimulation of governments to legislate and courts to develop appropriate methods of interpretation, is crucially dependent on the task of spelling out the force of human rights in terms of specific freedoms and, where relevant, clearly located duties, correlative to the rights in question.
To implement this concept, Alston called upon the newly-established CESCR to prepare outlines enumerating the core content of each right under the ICESCR.\textsuperscript{118} Responding in order to address the difficulty in enforcing ESCRs due to the lack of conceptual clarity and specific implementation guidelines for States parties, the Committee adopted the concept of “minimum core obligations” in its General Comment No. 3.\textsuperscript{119} The term “minimum core obligations” means that each State party must “ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights . . . [including] the most basic forms of education . . . .”\textsuperscript{120} The Committee also outlines the minimum core obligations of several other rights in its subsequent general comments.\textsuperscript{121}

This concept of minimum core obligations has been subject to considerable confusion. For instance, the Committee is not clear as to whether the minimum core itself is determined by each State’s available resources or whether the concept is absolute and equal for all states.\textsuperscript{122} If the minimum core is relative, then it would be a changing, evolving concept based on the resources of each State. In contrast, an absolute minimum core of obligations would mean that

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Procedures and formulae are in themselves inadequate for this objective and require supplementation by a living sense of the purposes of the rights in question and the nature of the harms which it is sought to eliminate.” Tom Campbell, \textit{Introduction: Realizing Human Rights, in Human Rights: From Rhetoric to Reality} 1, 7 (Tom Campbell et al. eds., 1986).

\textsuperscript{118} \textit{Id.} at 354–55 (1996). In addition to Alston’s core content concept, Fried van Hoof has argued that it is reasonable to find at least some elements of rights enumerated in the ICESCR as justiciable. \textit{See} Fried van Hoof, \textit{Explanatory Note on the Utrecht Draft Optional Protocol, in The Right to Complain about Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights} 147, 153 (1995).

\textsuperscript{119} General Comment 3, supra note 13.; General Comment 13, supra note 16, at para. 57.

\textsuperscript{120} General Comment 3, supra note 13.; General Comment 13, supra note 16, at para. 57.


\textsuperscript{122} \textit{See} Karin Lehmann, \textit{In Defense of the Constitutional Court: Litigating Socio-Economic Rights and the Myth of the Minimum Core}, Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 163, 183 (2006–2007). General Comment 3 and 13 suggest that the minimum core is absolute. However, General Comment 3 explicitly looks toward resource constraints to excuse a failure to meet minimum core obligations. General Comment 13, however, does suggest that failing to meet the minimum core obligations under the right to education is a violation of article 13 of the Covenant. General Comment 13, supra note 16, at para. 57. Another related issue centers around the idea that minimum core obligations are a way to prioritize urgent interests. The confusion lies in determining on what basis these interests are to be ranked. \textit{See id.} at 185–86.
each right contains a set of entitlements that a State must provide irrespective of its available resources.\textsuperscript{123} Some critics find that such a “minimalist” strategy thwarts the broader, long-term goals of realizing ESCRs by creating a ceiling on rights and corresponding obligations, or at least attempts to create definiteness where there is none.\textsuperscript{124} Others argue that attention is diverted away from middle- or high-income country violations of ESCRs toward examining only low-income, developing States’ violations of ESCRs.\textsuperscript{125} Still others assert that certain claimants become more deserving of attention as victims of ESCR violations or even that related, structural issues, such as macroeconomic policies or defense spending, are ignored.\textsuperscript{126}

Recognizing these criticisms and possible limitations of the minimum core obligations concept, we believe that it is useful to use the use minimum core obligations of the right to education because it has been adopted by the CESCR. The Committee will also be the same body that is receiving complaints under the Optional Protocol and will presumably use the “minimum core” obligations to assess violations of the ICESCR.

The Committee has articulated five minimum core obligations with respect to the right to education:

1. to ensure the right of access to public educational institutions and programmes on a non-discriminatory basis;
2. to ensure education conforms to the objectives set out in article 13(1) [of the Covenant];
3. to provide free and compulsory primary education;

\textsuperscript{123} See Lehmann, supra note 122, at 185.
\textsuperscript{125} \textsc{Matthew Craven}, \textsc{The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Perspective on its Development} 143–44, 152 (1995).
\textsuperscript{126} See Young, supra note 124, at 114; Lehmann, supra note 122.
4. to adopt and implement a national education strategy which includes provision for secondary, higher and fundamental education; and
5. to ensure free choice of education without interference from the State or third parties, subject to conformity with “minimum educational standards” (art. 13(3) and (4)).  

B. Conceptual Framework for the Right to Education

Simply enumerating a right as we have done supra often does little to identify indicators. Indeed, before developing appropriate indicators, it is important to also identify “the major attributes of a right.” Clearly understanding the concepts and scope of the obligations measured is an essential step to properly measuring State party compliance with its international legal duties. As one author points out, the initial stages of the indicator development process for measuring State treaty compliance is to clarify the content of the particular human right in question.

Many existing proposals to measure the right to education, however, fail to define the concept of the right to education that they purport to measure. For instance, Isabel Kempf’s framework involves the creation of an information pyramid. Under Tier 1 of her pyramid, she proposes key measures such as literacy and primary school enrolment levels. Tier 2 contains

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127 General Comment 13, supra note 16, at para. 57, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/10. Scholars assert that additional elements should be included in the minimum core obligations with respect to the right to education. According to Fons Coomans, for example, the minimum core obligation should also include: (1) the provision of special facilities for persons with educational deficits such as girls in rural areas or working children; (2) the quality of education; and (3) the right to receive an education in one’s native language. Coomans, supra note 29, at 230 (although he admits that it may be more difficult to justify including the last addition in core content of the right to education).

128 Id. at para. 14.

129 Id.

130 De Beco, supra note 19, at 27. Landman also suggests specifying the concept that is to be measured. See Landman, supra note 117.

131 De Beco, supra note 19, at 27.

132 Indeed, in their extensive survey of proposals for using indicators to measure human rights, Malhotra and Fasel conclude that there is a near absence of conceptual frameworks to develop such human rights indicators that could be sensitively and effectively used in guiding and monitoring public policy in the protection and promotion of human rights.” Malhotra and Fasel, supra note 19, at 24.


134 Id. at para 20.
expanded indicators such as government expenditure on education, transportation, and lunch programs.\textsuperscript{135} In Tier 3, she evaluates the social, political and environmental context, taking into account a study of the cultural context, the language difficulties in fulfilling rights, a description of functional literacy, and the normal duration of primary school.\textsuperscript{136} Kempf’s framework, however, does not articulate a concept of the right to education that is tied directly to the ICESCR or other legal instrument protecting the right.

The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has also recently proposed comprehensive guidelines for the use of indicators to measure human rights obligations.\textsuperscript{137} Although the OHCHR’s Report is a positive step toward operationalizing ESCRs and evaluating State compliance with these rights, it falls short of providing a concrete tool to monitor and evaluate States parties’ adherence to a particular treaty. The Report rightly recognizes that “there may be a need for further refinement or re-clubbing of the identified attributes of human rights to better reflect the treaty-specific concerns.”\textsuperscript{138} In the case of the right to education, for example, the OHCHR enumerates “characteristics” of the right that are derived from multiple sources, primarily from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{135} \textit{Id.}
  \item \textsuperscript{136} \textit{Id.} (“Coverage is the category most explicitly stated in the Covenant. Indicators for coverage should measure whether all groups in society really have access to different levels of education. . . . In order to measure coverage, . . . it is necessary to look at the outcome, i.e. measure whether different groups of society actually are in primary, secondary and higher education and where they are situated within the system.

The second category, quality of education, is important, given that in order for persons to participate effectively in society, minimum standards of education must be offered and verified. . . . Here indicators will be used to provide information on the quality of education, its relevance for the labour market and on inequality of standards between schools.

The third category, exclusion/inequality, explicitly measures whether a State party recognizes the right of every person to education or whether certain groups are excluded from specific levels of education. Here, not only will the opportunity to access education in its different forms be measured, but also other factors [such as language barriers, family background and hidden curricula constitute examples of important barriers.”].

\item \textsuperscript{138} Id. at ¶ 7.
\end{itemize}
proposes indicators for these attributes as enumerated in the UDHR. Four attributes of the right to education are identified: 1) universal primary education; 2) accessibility to secondary and higher education; 3) curricula and educational resources; and 4) educational opportunity and freedom. Because these characteristics—and resulting proposed indicators—of the right to education are not tied to any particular treaty, however, they would not be the most effective or accurate indications of compliance or noncompliance with specific treaty norms.

The characteristics identified by the OHCHR Report are narrower in scope than the attributes contemplated by the CESCR in interpreting the right to education provisions of the ICESCR. The CESCR, in contrast, has defined the scope and attributes of the right to education broadly under the ICESCR through the “4-A Right to Education Framework”—availability, accessibility, acceptability and adaptability. This framework more comprehensively captures the many facets of the right to education. Consequently, we propose using the 4-A Framework in elaborating on the right to education as set forth in the ICESCR. Although the CESCR has adopted the 4-A Framework, it has not explained how it is linked directly to the language of the ICESCR. In the analysis that follows, we attempt to clearly tie indicators to the ICESCR treaty language.

i. Availability

Availability describes the government’s obligation to ensure that there are educational institutions and programs in sufficient quantity, with the necessary facilities to function

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139 Id. at 28.
141 The scope of other ESCRs have been outlined by the Committee as well. For instance, the CESCR uses a similar “AAAQ Framework”—availability, accessibility, acceptability and quality—to analyze the scope, or “essential elements” of the right to health. See U.N. Comm. Econ. Soc. & Cultural Rts., General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), 22nd Sess., U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (2000). Thus, in applying this methodology to the right to health, the framework of analysis would be the AAAQ Framework.
appropriately in the context in which they operate (e.g., adequate structures, sanitation facilities for both sexes, safe drinking water, trained teachers receiving domestically competitive salaries, teaching materials, and so on; and even facilities such as libraries, computer facilities and information technology). In making education available, the government must permit the establishment of schools and provide the resources necessary to develop the physical institutions. This obligation includes the duty of the government to provide a sufficient number of schools so as to avoid excessive class sizes and resulting decreases in the quality of education provision.

The concept of availability is explicitly protected by the ICESCR, but to a different extent depending on the level of education. Specifically, primary education shall be “available free to all” and secondary education “shall be made generally available.” This suggests that while States must make primary education available to all who are eligible for primary education, the same is not required for secondary education. Higher education must be made “equally accessible to all, on the basis of capacity, by every appropriate means.” This indicates that higher education need only be made available to those who qualify by some uniform standard—presumably set by the State or institution—that measures whether individuals are adequately prepared to study at the tertiary level. At all levels, education must be available to minorities on a basis of equality with other students.

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142 Tomasevski 1999 Report, supra note 140.
143 See id.
144 Id.
145 ICESCR, supra note 14, at arts. 13(2)(a) & (b).
146 Id. at arts. 13(c).
Additionally, under Art. 13(2)(e), States must develop a system of schools at all levels.\textsuperscript{148} This means: 1) that State parties must set up an educational infrastructure to ensure that schools are provided at each education level; 2) that this infrastructure is in good repair; 3) that teaching materials and equipment are of good quality; and 4) that sufficient teachers are available.\textsuperscript{149} The CESC\textit{R} has also noted that “functioning educational institutions and programmes have to be available in sufficient quantity within the jurisdiction of the State party.”\textsuperscript{150} The CESC\textit{R} further states that there must be a sufficient quantity of “trained teachers receiving domestic competitive salaries.”\textsuperscript{151} Finally, the Committee has noted that States must 1) respect availability of education by not closing private schools and 2) fulfill availability of education by actively developing school systems—that is, by building schools, developing programs and teaching materials, and adequately training and compensating educators.\textsuperscript{152}

ii. Accessibility

Accessibility refers to the need for education to be accessible and open to everyone.\textsuperscript{153} The CESC\textit{R} considers accessibility to have three components. First, education must be accessible to all without discrimination.\textsuperscript{154} Articles 2(2) and 3 of the ICESC\textit{R} explicitly recognize the importance of accessible education without discrimination.\textsuperscript{155} The Committee

\textsuperscript{148} Id. at art. 13(2)(e).
\textsuperscript{149} DIETER BETTER, \textit{supra} note 29, at 531.
\textsuperscript{150} General Comment 13, \textit{supra} note 16, at para. 6.
\textsuperscript{151} Id. at para. 6(a).
\textsuperscript{152} Id. at para. 50.
\textsuperscript{153} Tomasevski 1999 Report, \textit{supra} note 140, at para. 57.
\textsuperscript{154} General Comment 13, \textit{supra} note 16, at para. 6. (“[E]ducation must be accessible to all, especially the most vulnerable groups, in law and in fact, without discrimination on any prohibited grounds.” GC 13, para 6. In other words state parties must take measures only against static discrimination but active discrimination. 487.
\textsuperscript{155} Art. 2(2) states that “The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” Art. 3 specifies that “The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights set forth in the present Covenant.” \textit{See also} ICCPR, \textit{supra} note 73, at art. 2(1); ICERD, \textit{supra} note 42, at arts. 1 & 5;CRC, \textit{supra} note 42, at arts. 2 & 28; CEDAW, \textit{supra} note 30, at arts. 1 & 10.
specifically obligates States to protect accessibility of education by ensuring that third parties allow girls to attend school.\textsuperscript{156} This means, for example, that States parties must create incentives to increase girls’ school attendance through measures such as the adoption of policies that work around housework schedules, the creation of financial incentives for parents and the raising of the child marriage age.\textsuperscript{157} Additionally, Article 13(e) requires that States parties establish an adequate fellowship system.\textsuperscript{158} The CESCR further points out that the requirement to establish fellowships “should be read with the Covenant’s non-discrimination and equality provisions; the fellowship system should enhance equality of educational access for individuals from disadvantaged groups[,]”\textsuperscript{159} including women and girls.

Second, education must be physically accessible to all.\textsuperscript{160} This means that schools should be located in a manner that enables all individuals to participate, including those living in rural areas and vulnerable populations, such as racial and ethnic minorities.\textsuperscript{161} This may mean building schools in indigenous regions, providing a means of transportation for certain groups or using technology as an alternative means of instruction (\textit{e.g.} online instruction). In the context of emergencies, armed conflicts and natural disasters, the State must pay special attention to education because often the children of minorities or vulnerable populations are especially excluded and cannot access essential services.\textsuperscript{162} Third, and finally, education must be

\textsuperscript{156} General Comment 13, \textit{supra} note 16, at para. 50.
\textsuperscript{157} \textit{DIETER BEITER}, \textit{supra} note 29, at 488–89.
\textsuperscript{158} \textit{ICESCR}, \textit{supra} note 14, at art. 13(e) (“The development of a system of schools at all levels shall be actively pursued, an adequate fellowship system shall be established, and the material conditions of teaching staff shall be continuously improved.”)
\textsuperscript{159} General Comment 13, \textit{supra} note 16, at para. 26.
\textsuperscript{160} \textit{Id.} (“[E]ducation has to be affordable to all. This dimension of accessibility is subject to the differential wording of article 13 (2) in relation to primary, secondary and higher education: whereas primary education shall be available ‘free to all,’ States parties are required to progressively introduce free secondary and higher education.”).
\textsuperscript{161} Tomasevski 1999 Report, \textit{supra} note 140, at para. 57 (“[E]nsuring access to available public schools . . . most importantly [means acting] in accordance with the existing prohibition of discrimination.”).
economically accessible to all.\textsuperscript{163} While all education should be economically accessible to all, the requirement that education be free is subject to the differential wording of article 13(2) in relation to primary, secondary, and higher education.\textsuperscript{164} With respect to primary education obligations, if States parties have not already made education free to all at the time the treaty enters into force, then they must adopt a plan within two years of ratification to introduce free primary education within a reasonable period of time.\textsuperscript{165} Whereas the ICESCR is clear that primary education must be made free to all, secondary education must be made accessible only “by every appropriate means.”\textsuperscript{166} States parties may decide what the appropriate means are to make secondary education accessible; however, the Committee finds that the most appropriate means is by making education progressively free.\textsuperscript{167} Similarly, the Committee has noted that higher education should also be made progressively free.\textsuperscript{168}

Additionally, the CESCR believes that “indirect costs, such as compulsory levies on parents . . . or the obligation to wear a relatively expensive school uniform” are not permissible.\textsuperscript{169} However, the Committee has noted that other indirect costs may be permissible, subject to examination on a case-by-case basis.\textsuperscript{170} To date, the CESCR has yet to specify exactly which indirect costs may be permissible.

iii. Acceptability

\textsuperscript{163} General Comment 13, \textit{supra} note 16, at para. 6 (“Educational institutions and programmes have to be accessible to everyone, without discrimination, within the jurisdiction of the State party.”).

\textsuperscript{164} ICESCR, \textit{supra} note 14, at art. 13 (“Primary education shall be compulsory and available free to all . . . Secondary education in its different forms, including technical and vocational secondary education, shall be made generally available and accessible to all by every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free education . . . Higher education shall be made equally accessible to all, on the basis of capacity, by every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free education . . . .”).

\textsuperscript{165} \textit{Id.} at art. 14.

\textsuperscript{166} \textit{Id.} at art. 13(2)(b).

\textsuperscript{167} General Comment 13, \textit{supra} note 16, at paras. 13–14.

\textsuperscript{168} General Comment 13, \textit{supra} note 16, at paras. 13–14, 20.


\textsuperscript{170} \textit{Id.}
Acceptability addresses the form and substance of the education with regard to both quality and appropriateness. This is a duty based on principles of basic human dignity, and it requires that education be of a quality that has meaning to the individual students, to the community, and to society at large. Instruction should involve non-discriminatory subject matter and should incorporate content appropriate to the students’ cultural, language and social backgrounds. More broadly, acceptability describes the government’s duty to ensure that schools have certain minimum standards for teachers, students, building facilities and curricula.

The acceptability obligation flows directly from the treaty language. Article 13(2) of the ICESCR addresses the concept of acceptability by stating that the material conditions of teaching staff shall be continuously improved. The Committee has also noted that “the form and substance of education, including curricula and teaching methods, have to be acceptable (e.g., relevant, culturally appropriate and of good quality) to students and, in appropriate cases, parents; this is subject to the educational objectives required by article 13(1) and such minimum educational standards that may be approved by the State.” Additionally, the Committee requires States parties to ensure that curricula are directed to meet article 13(1) objectives and to maintain a transparent system to monitor whether State educational objectives comply with article 13(1). Moreover, the Committee specifically obligates States to fulfill the acceptability

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171 Tomasevski 1999 Report, supra note 140 (offering a conceptual framework on the content of the right to education in order to measure State party compliance).

172 Id.


175 ICESCR, supra note 14, at art. 13.

176 General Comment 13, supra note 16, at para. 6.

177 Id. at para. 49.
requirement of education by providing culturally appropriate and good quality education for all.  

iv. Adaptability

Finally, adaptability addresses the need for education to be flexible and able to respond to the needs of students within their diverse social and cultural settings. In achieving adaptability in education, the government should provide resources that enable schools to develop individualized education plans that meet the needs of the communities served by the schools. In addition to customizing the curricula, schools must monitor the performance of both the teacher and the students and make modifications depending on the results. An education system that is not adaptable is likely to have a high drop out rate for students. Article 13(1) of the ICESCR states that:

> ... education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and the sense of its dignity, ... strengthen the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms ... [and] enable all persons to participate effectively in a free society, promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations and all racial, ethnic or religious groups.”

In order for education to achieve these goals, it must be adaptable. Furthermore, in order to know whether a State party is respecting, protecting and fulfilling this right, we must employ indicators to measure this component of the State’s right-to-education obligations. The CESCR has further underscored that education must be flexible on order to adapt to the needs of changing societies and communities and respond to the needs of a diverse student population in

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178 Id. at para. 50.
182 ICESCR, supra note 14, at art. 13.
varied cultural settings. Additionally, the State must allow for free choice of education without interference from State or third parties, subject to conformity with minimum educational standards.

C. Indicators for the Right to Education

Having examined the treaty language and defined the content of the right to education under the ICESCR, it is now possible to propose appropriate indicators to ascertain violations of the right to education. Although there are a few existing proposals for using indicators to measure the right to education, these proposals have not proven useful for ascertaining violations of specific treaty obligations. We propose and categorize indicators into each of accessibility, 

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184 ICESCR, supra note 14, at art. 13; General Comment 13, supra note 16, at para. 57.


186 See, e.g., Katrien Beeckman, Measuring the Implementation of the Right to Education: Educational versus Human Rights Indicators, 12 INT’L J. CHILDREN’S RTS. 71–84 (2004) (offering a general framework of human rights indicators for monitoring compliance with the right to education). One important proposal on using indicators to measure the right to education was conceived at a workshop organized in 1999 by the World University Service-International. Workshop participants included members and staff of the CESCR, along with representatives of some of the specialized agencies and non-governmental organizations, along with a few academics knowledgeable about this subject matter. This workshop focused on statistical indicators of fulfillment. See Chapman 2007, supra note . During the workshop, participants proposed several key indicators that all treaty bodies and specialized U.N. agencies should agree to use to monitor the right to education, including: 1) literacy rates disaggregated by gender, urban/rural breakdown, ethnic group and age, and 2) net enrolment rates disaggregated by gender, urban/rural breakdown and ethnic group, with separate data for primary, secondary, and tertiary levels of education. Although these indicators are important, they are very limited and do not measure the broad concept of the right to education as described in this subsection, supra. Additionally, this particular proposal requires that the same set of indicators be utilized in all countries. For the reasons discussed infra, however, we believe indicators should be specifically tailored to the particular context and circumstances of the State party in question. Other proposals to use a specified set of indicators have not been motivated at measuring treaty compliance. For example, even though Katrien Beeckman’s proposal adopts the conceptual “4-A Framework” outlined by Tomasevski, Beeckman proposes a process that allows her to formulate one comparable score for education in each country. Beeckman suggests that availability could be measured by absorption capacity of the public and private education system and competence
availability, acceptability, and adaptability. Even though Tomasevski noted the importance of using indicators and identified the topics for which indicators should be formulated, she did not propose specific indicators to measure compliance with the 4-A framework. Furthermore, we believe that for each of accessibility, availability, acceptability and adaptability, indicators should be categorized into structure, process and outcome. Utilizing the structure-process-outcome typology ensures that all aspects of State obligations will be measured—whether the laws of the country are in line with treaty obligations, whether the country has processes in place to implement the treaty obligations, and the actual status of the rights in the country. More importantly, it allows for a better assessment of violations by isolating the specific strengths and weaknesses of a country’s fulfillments (or lack thereof) of its education obligations under each of the 4 A’s.

Initially, Paul Hunt suggested using structural, process and outcome categories to measure the right to health. The U.N. 2006 Report on Indicators for Monitoring Compliance with International Human Rights Instruments adopted Hunt’s categorization for indicators and applied it for purposes of measuring the fulfillment of all human rights. Following its lead, the Inter-American Commission has adopted Hunt’s terminology for purposes of monitoring ESCRs as well. Most recently, the OHCHR 2008 Report reaffirms the relevance of the “structural—process—outcome” indicators framework, which “reflects the need to capture the duty-bearer’s

and salaries along relevant lines such as public/private, urban/rural. Beeckman, supra note 186, at 71. Accessibility could be measured by availability of free public education and gender parity index with regard to enrolment and drop out. Id. Other than these indicators, however, she does not propose indicators to measure adaptability or acceptability. Id Thus, Beeckman’s proposal is geared toward allowing for cross-country comparisons rather than toward evaluating the extent to which a particular State is complying with or in violation of its treaty obligations under the ICESCR. Id.

187 Chapman 2007, supra note 95, at 126, 128 tbl. 3.1.
190 Malhotra and Fasel, supra note 19, at 28 (advancing this typology in their conceptual model).
commitments, efforts and results, respectively[,]” to select indicators for various human rights measurement.\footnote{OHCHR, Report on Indicators for Promoting and Monitoring the Implementation of Human Rights, ¶ 8 U.N. Doc. HRI/MC/2008/3 (June 6, 2008) [hereinafter 2008 Report on Indicators].}

According to the U.N. 2006 Report, “[s]tructural indicators reflect the ratification/adoption of legal instruments and existence of basic institutional mechanisms deemed necessary for facilitating realization of the human right concerned.”\footnote{UN 2006 Report, supra note 19, at para. 17.} Similarly, the Inter-American Commission’s Guidelines suggest that structural indicators should determine whether the “law on the books” complies with the State’s treaty obligations but should also measure whether the State institutions are structured to incorporate international legal obligations.\footnote{INTER-AERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, GUIDELINES FOR PREPARATION OF PROGRESS INDICATORS IN THE AREA OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS, OEA/Ser/L/V/II.129 (Doc. 5) (Oct. 5, 2007), available at https://www.cidh.oas.org/pdf%20files/Guidelines%20final.pdf.} However, we believe a clearer delineation between structural and process indicators would be to limit structural indicators to monitoring whether the State’s laws reflect, incorporate and implement its international treaty obligations.\footnote{Similarly, De Beco points out that structural indicators measure \textit{de jure} compliance rather than \textit{de facto} compliance with human rights treaties. De Beco, supra note 19, at 42. The UN 2008 Report suggests that the number of human rights treaties that a State has signed that incorporates the right in question is a structural indicator. 2008 Report on Indicators, supra note 191, at para. 18. However, at least for the purposes of evaluating compliance with one single treaty, such an indicator is not necessary.} On the other hand, process indicators, as discussed below, would account for whether or not the State has created appropriate institutions and taken additional implementation measures to fulfill its obligations.

Process indicators measure the extent to which the laws and policies of the State are effectively designed to implement the realization of the right. The U.N. 2006 Report defines process indicators as relating to “State policy instruments to milestones that become outcome indicators, which in turn can be more directly related to the realization of human rights.”\footnote{UN 2006 Report, supra note 19, at para. 18.} These indicators “measure the quality and extent of State efforts to implement rights by
measuring the scope, coverage, and content of strategies, plans, programs or policies, or other specific activities or interventions designed to accomplish the goals necessary for the realization of [the right].” 196 Although the Inter-American Commission Guidelines suggest that whether or not the State has policies and procedures in place to implement the international and domestic laws are structural indicators, we believe that those indicators fit more neatly into the category of process indicators. 197 Therefore, while structural indicators answer the question of whether or not laws that comply with international treaty obligations exist “on the books” at the domestic level, process indicators answer the question of what mechanisms the State has put in place to implement its existing laws toward the realization of the right.

Outcome indicators measure the reality on the ground—that is, to what extent the State is implementing the right in question. De Beco points out that both process and outcome indicators measure de facto treaty compliance. 198 He further points out that, while process indicators focus on the actual efforts of States, outcome indicators focus on the results of those efforts. 199 Moreover, the U.N. 2006 Report notes that outcome indicators are “not only a more direct measure of the realization of a human right but it also reflects the importance of the indicator in assessing the enjoyment of the right.” 200 In other words, these indicators “measure the actual impact of government strategies,” whereas process indicators measure the “quality and extent” of these strategies. 201

196 GUIDELINES, supra note 193, at para. 31.
197 Id.
198 De Beco, supra note 19, at 43.
199 Id. at 44.
200 UN 2006 Report, supra note 19, at para. 19.
201 GUIDELINES, supra note 193, at paras. 31–32.
Although other accepted typologies, such as the States’ duties to respect, protect and fulfill human rights,\textsuperscript{202} are also useful in identifying States parties’ international treaty obligations, we find the structure-process-outcome framework most useful to further a violations approach to enforce ESCRs using indicators. The structure-process-outcome framework divides State duties into \textit{obligations of conduct} and \textit{obligations of result},\textsuperscript{203} while the respect, protect, and fulfill framework identifies positive and negative obligations of States for all rights, including ESCRs.

For example, to respect the right to education, a negative obligation, is to refrain from interfering in parents’ decision-making as to which school they send their child. To protect the right to education, in contrast, requires positive obligations because the state must act, including taking steps to ensure that girls are not expelled from school by third parties because they are pregnant. Similarly, the duty to fulfill the right to education is positive because States must act to take steps, such as to progressively introduce free secondary education. Categorizing obligations within the respect, protect, and fulfill framework assesses whether or not the State has complied with both positive and negative obligations with respect to the right in question.

In contrast, the structure-process-outcome framework clarifies the amount of State control over particular treaty obligations. In other words, it separates indicators that measure \textit{obligations of conduct} and \textit{obligations of result}.	extsuperscript{204} While presumably the State has the same level of control over its acts or omissions in its compliance with negative and positive obligations, it has decidedly higher levels of control over obligations of conduct—measured by structure and process indicators—than obligations of result—measured by outcome indicators.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{203} General Comment 3, \textit{supra} note 13, at para. 1 (citing the work of the International Law Commission).
\item \textsuperscript{204} General Comment 3, \textit{supra} note 13, at para. 1 (citing the work of the International Law Commission).
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Therefore, States have a higher level of control over the obligations that structural and process indicators measure. As a result, violations are much more clearly attributable directly to State failures when looking at structure and process indicators. On the other hand, States have a lower level of control over obligations that outcome indicators measure, which gives rise to possible justifications or mitigating factors that may suggest the State is fulfilling its obligations to its maximum available resources. In the end, taking into account the level of State control in assessing violations is important because it adds legitimacy, reasonableness and fairness to the evaluation process, which can serve to enhance compliance with treaty norms and ultimately improve State cooperation toward the fulfillment of ESCRs.

In Appendix 1, we have identified chosen and categorized indicators to measure compliance with the right to education as seen through the 4-A Framework: availability, accessibility, acceptability and adaptability. For each of these concepts, indicators are categorized into structural, process or outcome.205 These indicators are derived directly from the language and interpretations of the ICESCR and that appropriately reflect the major attributes of the right to education as contemplated by the treaty language and its monitoring body, the CESC.

Notes on applying the indicators set forth in Appendix 1

1. Use a toolbox approach.

These indicators should be considered “candidate” indicators from which appropriate ones can be chosen.206 The same pre-defined set of indicators (i.e., universal indicators) should not be applied to all countries. Instead, indicators used to measure treaty compliance with regard

205 Chapman divides the indicators she proposed to measure education into structure, process and outcome. However, she does not tie these indicators to a conceptual framework defining education. See Chapman, supra note 95.
206 The concept of a “toolbox” of indicators advanced by the vice-chair of the CESC. Green, supra note 19 (quoting Eibe Riedel, vice-chair of the ESC Committee).
to a particular country should be carefully chosen for and tailored to the context of that State. Tomasevski asserts that “[a]pplying the same standard of performance to all countries as if all had identical infrastructures, institutions and resources is not only unfair . . . but also disregards one of the main targets of international cooperation in the area of human rights, namely to promote human rights.”

Moreover, universal indicators do not comprehensively measure compliance or noncompliance of the State, and they may not provide useful insight as to the reasons behind the violations or the solutions to address human rights abuses.

Universal indicators are more suitable for studies that aim at providing a picture of the degree of enjoyment of a right across several countries than for measuring whether and to what degree a State is complying with its treaty obligations. Development professionals tend to use universal indicators when their goal is to compare the degree of enjoyment of rights for the purpose of drawing attention to unacceptable disparities between and among countries, and to decide directions for program development and implementation. As a result, some economic development studies present indicators in the form of indexes such as the Human Development Index or the Physical Quality of Life Index, which combines life expectancy, infant mortality and literacy into one indicator on a scale of 1 to 100 to allow for cross-country comparisons and analyses of countries’ development or quality of life.

Indicators aimed at providing information about the level of treaty compliance of a particular State need not be universal. Although context-specific indicators may make cross-

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country comparisons difficult, the ultimate goal of treaty monitoring bodies and others measuring compliance is to determine whether or not a State is fulfilling its particular obligations, not whether it is complying with a treaty to a greater or lesser extent than other States parties. Therefore, applying a context-specific approach is superior to applying a universal approach when assessing human rights treaty compliance because it leads to a selection of indicators that is likely to be most appropriate for the situation of each particular State and most relevant to the treaty provisions in question.211

2. Use both qualitative and quantitative indicators.

Some advocates and scholars in the human rights community believe that indicators can only be quantitative in nature.212 Proponents of quantitative measurement define indicators to mean statistics that “serve as a proxy or metaphor for phenomena that are not directly measurable.”213 In contrast, proponents of a mixed quantitative and qualitative approach use indicators to refer to more thematic measurements, which can be based on either or both qualitative or quantitative data.214 In order to understand the causes of some of the outcomes in a particular country and to capture the complexity of human rights monitoring, it is important to employ both qualitative and quantitative indicators to measure State treaty compliance.

We believe that both quantitative and qualitative indicators are necessary in order to fully evaluate a State’s compliance with the right to education. We thus agree with Beeckman, who

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211 See UN 2006 Report, supra note 19, at para. 28 (appearing to advocate a hybrid approach that selects a core set of universal indicators and additional context-specific indicators).


214 Green, supra note 19, at 1077.
explains why, particularly in the context of the right to education, both quantitative and qualitative indicators are necessary.\footnote{Beeckman, supra note 186, at 80.} First, quantitative indicators cannot easily measure important qualitative factors, such as whether books are of good quality or are falling apart and outdated.\footnote{Id. at 72.} Second, quantitative indicators only reveal part of the country’s educational picture—namely, those data that can be expressed numerically, such as school enrollment or educational costs.\footnote{Id. at 73.} Third, quantitative indicators do not explain the reasons behind the figures, which other qualitative indicators, such as findings from key informant interviews might reveal.\footnote{Relately, unless additional surveys are conducted with child laborers or in households, data collected by schools often used for purposes of quantitative indicators only reveal information about children within the educational system and do not uncover the situation for those left outside of the system. Id. at 74.} These reasons become important to pinpoint government failures and suggest legal or policy reform with the ultimate goal to work toward full realization of the particular human right in question.

3. Use appropriate data sources.

Consulting certain types of data sources for indicators in measuring ESCRs is important for human rights treaty monitoring. Data sources for human rights indicators can be divided into the following four categories:

i. **Events-based Data.** Events-based data provide information on single events.\footnote{De Beco, supra note 19, at 35.} They are usually “qualitative data that primarily describe acts of human rights violations and identify victims and perpetrators.”\footnote{Malhotra and Fasel, supra note 19, at 6.} Events-based data answer the question of what happened, when it happened and who was involved, and then they report descriptive and numerical summaries of events.\footnote{LANDMAN, supra note 117, at 82.} Accumulation of data on individual violations over
time can show trends of an improvement or deterioration of the human rights situation in a particular country.\(^{222}\)

ii. *Socio-economic and administrative statistics.* Socio-economic and other administrative statistics are “aggregated data sets and indicators based on objective quantitative or qualitative information (i.e., information that can be observed or verified, such as wage, age, sex and race) related to standards of living and other facets of life.”\(^{223}\) These data are often collected by states through a census.\(^{224}\) Socio-economic and administrative statistics give information about the general state of society. For example, these data would include the literacy levels in a country, net enrolment in schools, infant mortality as well as other indicators that are generally associated with ESCRs.

iii. *Household perception and opinion surveys.* Household perception and opinion surveys involve “polling a representative sample of individuals on their personal views on a given issue.”\(^{225}\) The information is usually qualitative even though it can be turned into quantitative information by evaluating the public opinion at a defined community or population level.\(^{226}\)

iv. *Expert Judgments.* Data based on expert judgments are informed opinions of a limited number of experts that can be translated into quantitative form.\(^{227}\) Experts are asked to evaluate and score the performance of a State using cardinal or ordinal scales and sets of relevant criteria or checklists.\(^{228}\)

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\(^{222}\) De Beco, *supra* note 19, at 35.


\(^{224}\) Id.

\(^{225}\) Id. at 18.

\(^{226}\) Id. at 37.


\(^{228}\) Id. Data based on expert judgments are less relevant for measuring ESCRs than for measuring CPRs. Often, measuring treaty compliance with CPRs requires subjective judgments since it is not possible to obtain socio-economic data for many CPRs. For example, it is difficult to measure the degree to which the press is free in a
Socio-economic statistics are most relevant for measuring the progressive realization component of ESCRs. Socio-economic statistics include data such as the net enrollment in secondary schools. Such trends in the net enrollment in secondary schools over time, for instance, can help determine within a particular context whether or not a State is satisfying its obligations to progressively realize the right to education under Article 13(2)(b) of the ICESCR.

On the other hand, events-based data will not likely assist with measuring progressive realization given that they are typically only associated with one event at one point in time rather than over a specified period of time. Events-based data are useful, however, for measuring the components of ESCRs that States must immediately realize. For example, if a girl who becomes pregnant is expelled from school on account of her pregnancy, then events-based data such as interviews with teachers, children, the girl, and the girls’ parents would be relevant to a claim that may soon be filed under the new ICESCR Optional Protocol involving violations of the non-discrimination and equality provisions of the right to education under the ICESCR.

A United Nations definition of socio-economic statistics is any “quantitative information compiled and disseminated by the State through its administrative records and statistical surveys, usually in collaboration with national statistical agencies and under the guidance of international and specialized organizations.” UN 2006 Report, supra note 19, at para. 24.

The 2006 UN Report also supports the use of socio-economic and administrative statistics for treaty monitoring purposes. UN 2006 Report, supra note 19, at para. 24.

ICESCR, supra note 14, at art. 13(2)(b) (“Secondary education in its different forms, including technical and vocational secondary education, shall be made generally available and accessible to all by every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free education . . . .”)

De Beco underscores this point by noting that the main problem is that is that it is impossible to collect enough information to know the human rights situation of the entire population. De Beco, supra note 19, at 36.
Household and perception surveys are also important in measuring ESCRs because they provide context to explain the reasons behind certain socio-economic statistics. De Beco notes that household and perception surveys complete, confirm, and question other kinds of data. Indeed, the pyramid schematic proposed by Kempf (as discussed in greater detail infra) to measure the right to education suggests that indicators do not tell the entire story; investigators must look at the context surrounding the indicator to understand the cause of the violations.

4. Use disaggregated data.

Several experts have emphasized the need for disaggregated data to measure treaty compliance. Disaggregation (e.g., by sex, race, age, ethnic background, etc.) sheds light on disparities that aggregated data do not reveal, including disparities among groups. Under the ICESCR, as discussed above, States parties are required to immediately ensure that no such disparities in education exist in the population in addition to their progressive duties to improve the overall state of the right across the population. In particular, Article 2(2) of the ICESCR requires States to guarantee all of the rights set forth in that treaty, including the right to education, without discrimination of any kind. Furthermore, Article 3 ensures the equal rights of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights found in the ICESCR. Thus, disaggregated data deserves emphasis in order to demonstrate—with the goal of narrowing—inequalities in the enjoyment of rights among groups, an obligation that is just as

233 De Beco, supra note 19, at 37.
234 See Kempf, infra.
235 Chapman, supra note 27, at 151; see also Malhotra and UN Development Report from 2000. Moreover, De Beco relates the importance of disaggregating indicators in order to evaluate the rights of vulnerable sub-populations, including the rights to non-discrimination and equality. De Beco, supra note 19, at 28. 2008 Report on Indicators, supra note 191.
236 See, e.g., ICESCR, supra note 14, at art. 13(2).
237 Id. at art. 2(2).
238 Id. at art. 3.
important and urgent as the obligation to take steps toward the full realization of the right to education for all.

**Cautionary notes on the use of indicators**

Although the benefits of employing indicators to measure compliance with ESCRs are enormous, there are many challenges associated with using them. First, indicators have a problem known as “slippage”—they do not precisely or entirely measure the concept they are designed to assess.²³⁹ In other words, indicators serve as proxies to measure concepts that are difficult, if not impossible to measure.²⁴⁰ For example, the availability of legal assistance in a country might serve as an indicator to measure whether trials are fair. Legal assistance, however, is only one component of fair trials; thus, legal assistance alone does not completely capture or entirely measure the concept. With regard to the right to education, the education level of teachers can be used to measure the quality of education. This single indicator, however, does not fully capture the entire concept. As a result of slippage, employing indicators to measure the fulfillment of human rights can lead to imperfect or incomplete assessments of State compliance or non-compliance with treaty obligations.

Second, different researchers or organizations may not use the same indicators, or may define the same indicator differently, to measure the same concepts and consequently to achieve very different results.²⁴¹ As a result of varying definitions of the same indicator, each organization or agency may end up reporting a different result. In one particular case, for

²³⁹ De Beco, supra note 19.
²⁴⁰ De Beco, supra note 19, at 39.
example, the Census Bureau found an illiteracy level of 1 percent in the United States, while the Department of Education found an illiteracy level of 13 percent.\textsuperscript{242}

The above example illustrates the need for concepts and indicators to be clearly defined and their units to be clearly bounded and exclusive.\textsuperscript{243} Moreover, it demonstrates the importance of clearly defining and establishing indicators from the outset that will be used universally to measure a particular concept. Otherwise, stakeholders will use different definitions of the same indicator or different indicators altogether to reflect their own political needs. In the end, this practice may create disagreement over the best definition for a particular indicator instead of creating a meaningful dialogue to improve compliance where a statistic accepted by all has demonstrated a rights violation.

Third, there are numerous difficulties associated with developing surveys, collecting information and compiling data that may be needed for indicators. In many cases, historical data for indicators may be difficult to obtain, while, in other cases, up-to-date data may not exist at all.\textsuperscript{244} In many instances, States either do not maintain quality data collection systems or do not make their data available to the public.\textsuperscript{245} As a result, it may be impossible to use a particular indicator without investing resources and time into collecting and analyzing the relevant data.

Even where there are current census results, those data may reflect the situation in the country as it was several years ago. It can take a team of trained professionals to develop an appropriate survey instrument and years to properly and accurately collect, compile, analyze and

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{footnotes}
\item[243] Barsh, \textit{supra} note 241, at 90.
\item[244] Goldstein, \textit{supra} note 242, at 41.
\item[245] For example, when the authors conducted their research in Colombia, the National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE) either did not keep disaggregated statistics or did not release relevant statistics related to education at the primary, secondary, and tertiary levels, nor did they have complete information on regional or ethnic distribution of education.
\end{footnotes}
\end{footnotesize}
disseminate the results of a national census or survey. This means that the data results are actually measuring past events and trends, rather than present conditions or situations. In addition, to the extent a government is responsible for compiling data, it may have an incentive to stall or refuse to release results, or even to produce inaccurate data. Finally, the data may not be disaggregated among relevant sub-groups within society. Relying on government data is many times less than ideal because the State has a particular interest in the data; however, conclusions based on the government’s own statistics can be extremely compelling for drawing conclusions about whether or not the State is complying with its treaty obligations since the government will be less likely to refute the results of its own statistical research.

Additionally, it is difficult to get the data for the same indicator over time. Without data over time, it is difficult to measure progressive realization. Even when data exist for certain indicators, it is necessary to compare the same information collected over a period of time in order to evaluate progress of States parties toward full realization of the right. These data must not only measure the same result; they must also be collected in the same manner in order to accurately draw conclusions from research findings. Possible solutions to overcome the problems of inadequate, unavailable or unreliable statistics may be to advocate for improved government surveillance systems and systematic measurement methods, to involve civil society in the process of formulating the census and other survey instruments and methods, and to exercise the right to access the collected data to formulate indicators and independently analyze results.

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246 Barsh, supra note 241, at 102.
Finally, there are difficulties associated with using indicators to determine whether or not State has breached its obligations under the Covenant. For the same obligation, one indicator may show improvement while another indicator suggest a retrogression or a failure to satisfy immediate obligations. For example, with regard to the quality of education, there may be an increase in the number of poor quality schools; however, test scores in some subjects may increase, which suggests an improvement in education quality.

It is important to point out these limitations to inform other studies attempting to measure compliance with ESCRs. Despite these limitations, however, indicators remain a powerful tool to use to measure treaty compliance, to pinpoint State failures and to provide guidance for future treaty compliance where violations are found.  

D. Benchmarks for Right to Education Indicators

Benchmarks set specific obligations that States must achieve over a period of time with respect to the relevant indicators discussed above. The CESCR has noted the need for benchmarks for monitoring various ESCRs. Similarly, the U.N. 2006 Report advocates for

248 In a forthcoming article, Soga & Satterthwaite articulate several concerns with indicators. Ann Janette Rosga & Margaret L. Satterthwaite, The Trust in Indicators: Measuring Human Rights, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. __ (2009) (publication forthcoming). Id. They note the challenge of quantifying any information pertaining to a right, a process that itself involves policy decisions regarding what may be “counted” and is therefore not objective nor “apolitical.” Id. This problem, they claim, is related to the larger problem of indicators threatening to close the “fruitful gap” that exists between international law and domestic policy. Id. They believe that states may shy away from the most effective national programs and instead opt for those that most easily translate into measurable statistics.

However, these authors fail to ask whether human rights treaty monitoring can include both evidence-based evaluations and experts’ judgements. We believe that monitoring bodies will not substitute judgement with indicators, but will supplement judgement with evidence-based data. In basing decisions on evidence and judgement, experts will retain a sense of credibility without appearing arbitrary and overly political.

In addition, these authors overlook the three tiers of the structure-process-outcome model, which rely not solely on measurable data but also on a holistic assessment of every country’s legal structure and related programs. This approach can account for changes in policy or laws that are not necessarily quantifiable in the short term but are nonetheless effective to demonstrate State compliance with the ICESCR.

249 Green, supra note 19, at 1080.

benchmarks, pointing out that they enhance and give “accountability of the State parties by making them commit to a certain performance standard on the issue under assessment.”\textsuperscript{251} An example of a benchmark for a State with a current literacy rate of 80\% would be that the State must ensure that the rate is 90\% within a period of ten years.

Former Special Rapporteur on the Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health Paul Hunt has proposed a process for setting benchmarks.\textsuperscript{252} In his view, States parties would initially set benchmarks and would then report on progress toward those goals, thereby legitimizing their benchmarks through measuring, analyzing and reporting the agreed indicators to the CESCR.\textsuperscript{253} The Committee may then set new appropriate benchmarks with States parties,\textsuperscript{254} and civil society may advocate for more ambitious benchmarks for future reporting cycles. The Committee and States parties must also identify a date for achieving the agreed-upon targets. The CESCR would then observe and evaluate whether and how (or why) these benchmarks have (or have not) been met when reviewing the periodic reports of States parties. Where a benchmark is set and how long the country has to achieve it may vary based on the extent of the fulfillment of the right as well as the resources of the country. Through such collaboration and commitment to prior agreed-upon goals, States parties may be more likely to accept the treaty monitoring body’s observations and may seek to improve their compliance with obligations under the Covenant. Thus, benchmarks create standards, and deviations from those agreed-upon standards can be considered violations.

\begin{flushleft}
\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{251} UN 2006 Report, supra note 19, at para. 12.
\textsuperscript{252} See WHO REPORT, at 5–6; see also Dieter Bieter, supra note 29, at 628–29 (setting national benchmarks for each selected indicator through a dialogue between State and Committee and monitoring setting of national benchmarks through reporting).
\textsuperscript{253} See WHO REPORT, at 5–6.
\textsuperscript{254} De Beco also agrees that the State must develop benchmarks under the supervision of treaty bodies. De Beco, supra note 19, at 47.
\end{flushleft}
E. Ascertaining violations of the Right to Education

Determining whether a country deviates from its obligations under the Covenant will help promote compliance with it. The CESCR has provided some guidance on what constitutes a violation of the ICESCR, and the Limburg Principles and Maastricht Guidelines provide further guidance for ascertaining violations. In this section, we draw from the General Comments, Limburg Principles and Maastricht Guidelines to create a framework for assessing violations using indicators.

As an initial step, it is important to categorize the nature of the obligations set forth in the ICESCR—whether it is an obligation that 1) must be immediately realized, 2) constitutes a minimum core obligation or 3) is an obligation subject to progressive realization. This is relevant in evaluating violations of the Covenant because different standards apply to determining whether or not a violation has occurred based on the type of obligation in question. According to the Committee, a State’s deviations from minimum core and progressive obligations create only a prima facie violation that can be justified by the State. However, there are no justifications available for violations of immediately realized rights.

The chart *infra* categorizes the obligations relating to the right to education as outlined in Sections III A and B *supra*.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Obligations that must be immediately realized</th>
<th>Obligations constituting the minimum core</th>
<th>Obligations that may be progressively realized</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>States must ensure non-discrimination and equality in all</td>
<td>States must ensure the right of access to public educational</td>
<td>States must ensure that secondary education is made</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

256 General Comment 3, *supra* note 13, at para. 10.
257 *Id.* at para. 9.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States must provide primary education that is available, accessible, acceptable and adaptable to all.</th>
<th>States must recognize the right to education as set forth in Article 13(1) of the ICESCR.</th>
<th>States must ensure that tertiary education is made available on the basis of capacity. To the extent made available, it must be accessible, acceptable, and adaptable.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>States must ensure that primary education is compulsory and available free of charge to all or States must “formulate a plan and seek international assistance to fulfill this obligation as speedily as possible.”&lt;sup&gt;258&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>States must provide free and compulsory primary education for all in accordance with Article 13(2)(a).&lt;sup&gt;259&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>States must provide free secondary and tertiary education.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States must “take steps” that are “deliberate, concrete and targeted toward full realization” of rights.</td>
<td>States must adopt and implement a national education strategy which includes the provision of secondary, higher and fundamental education.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States must provide free choice of education subject to “minimum educational standards” as contemplated by Articles 13(3) &amp; (4).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<sup>258</sup> Tomasesvki 2004 Report, *supra* note 37, at para. 23.

<sup>259</sup> The Committee has described this both as a minimum core obligation and an obligation that must be immediately realized.
The categorization above overlaps with but is not entirely consistent with Chapman’s framework. Chapman proposes that violations be divided into the following categories: 1) violations resulting from actions of States, 2) violations related to patterns of discrimination, and 3) violations taking place due to a State’s failure to fulfill the minimum core obligations. Although our framework also includes a separate category for minimum core obligations violations, we broaden Chapman’s category of “patterns of discrimination” to include other immediate obligations of States, including that of non-discrimination. However, violations that result from State action overlap with the other categories. If a state discriminates or fails to meet its minimum core obligations, for example, that type of violation could also be placed in Chapman’s other two categories.

Categorizing the nature of these obligations by their level of State compliance is superior to Chapman’s categorization because the Committee will apply different standards to each of these categories in order to determine whether the State has violated the right to education under the ICESCR. Although Chapman’s categories include certain obligations of the right, our immediate-minimum core-progressive categorization outlined supra is more closely tied to the treaty language and obligations of States parties as interpreted by the CESCR. In fact, Chapman’s categories largely ignore progressive realization obligations of States—admittedly the most difficult obligations to measure—and evaluate mostly immediate and minimum core obligations. Furthermore, Chapman’s categories exclude State omissions, which can be just as detrimental to the advancement of ESCRs as State actions.

The type of indicator is also relevant, because the obligations of the State are tied to the amount of control a State exerts over the result. A State has control over the laws and policies it

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adopts which are measured by structural and process indicators (obligations of conduct), respectively, but may have less control over the reality of the situation in a practical sense, which are generally measured by outcome indicators (obligations of result). Of course, a State party is still responsible for the improvement of outcomes; however, there are circumstances that may be beyond the immediate control of a State, such as a natural disaster that disrupts children’s studies or destroys a school. In these cases, treaty monitoring bodies and civil society groups may not find a violation of the right if the State takes all reasonable steps to minimize the damage and to continue to ensure fulfillment of its right-to-education obligations.

i. Violations as determined by structural indicators

As explained supra, structural indicators assess the extent to which a State’s domestic law complies with its international legal obligations. General principles of international law suggest that States must ensure that they immediately comply with their treaty obligations.\textsuperscript{261} The Maastricht Guidelines\textsuperscript{262} indicate that a State is in violation of the ICESCR if it adopts legislation inconsistent with the ICESCR\textsuperscript{263} or fails to amend or repeal existing laws that are inconsistent with the obligations under the ICESCR.\textsuperscript{264} A State violates the ICESCR if it adopts legislation or fails to either amend or repeal existing legislation that is inconsistent with the

\textsuperscript{261}Paragraph 70 of Limburg Principles and 5 of Maastricht Guidelines recognize that the failure of State party to comply with treaty obligations under international law is a violation of the treaty. Limburg Principles, \textit{supra} note 255, at ¶ 70; Maastricht Guidelines, \textit{supra} note 257, at ¶ 5.

\textsuperscript{262}Both the Maastricht Guidelines and Limburg Principles emerged from conferences that the International Commission of Jurists convened, providing an “authoritative ‘gloss’ on the ICESCR for the benefit of the Committee.” Michael J. Dennis & David P. Stewart, \textit{Justiciability of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: Should There Be an International Complaints Mechanism to Adjudicate the Rights to Food, Water, Housing, and Health?}, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 462, 492 n.219 (2004). The Maastricht Guidelines called for an optional protocol for the ICESCR. \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{263}Maastricht Guidelines, \textit{supra} note 257, at para. 14(d) (“The adoption of legislation or policies which are manifestly incompatible with pre-existing legal obligations relating to these rights, unless it is done with the purpose and effect of increasing equality and improving the realization of economic, social and cultural rights for the most vulnerable groups”).

\textsuperscript{264}Id. at para. 15(b) (“The failure to reform or repeal legislation which is manifestly inconsistent with an obligation of the Covenant”); \textit{see also} Limburg Principles, \textit{supra} note 257, at para. 18 (“It should be noted, however, that article 2(1) would often require legislative action to be taken in cases where existing legislation is in violation of the obligations assumed under the Covenant.”).
obligations that must be immediately realized, the duties that constitute minimum core obligations, or the obligations that may be progressively realized.

ii. Violations as determined by process indicators

Recall that process indicators relate to State party efforts to implement the obligations under the treaty. States parties have a duty to immediately implement, upon ratification of the ICESCR, those right to education obligations that must be immediately realized. According to the Limburg Principles, “a State party will be in violation of the Covenant, inter alia, if: . . . it fails to implement without delay a right which it is required by the Covenant to provide immediately . . . .”265 Additionally, according to the Maastricht Guidelines, a State’s failure to promptly remove obstacles to which a State party is under a duty to remove in order to permit immediate fulfillment of a right violates its treaty obligations.266

Although there are no justifications for a State’s failure to satisfy its immediate obligations under the ICESCR, there are limited justifications for a State’s failure to make efforts to satisfy its minimum core obligations. According to the Committee, a State is considered to be prima facie failing to discharge its obligations if it fails to satisfy its minimum core obligations.267 A State can attribute its failure to satisfy its obligations to a lack of available resources, but only if it can “demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all resources that are at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those minimum obligations.”268

Notably, the Maastricht Guidelines appear to contradict the Committee’s view, because they suggest that limitation of available resources cannot be a justification for a State’s failure to

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265 Limburg Principles, supra note 257, at para. 72 (“[A] State party will be in violation of the Covenant, inter alia, if . . . it fails to implement without delay a right which it is required by the Covenant to provide immediately . . . .”
266 Id.; Maastricht Guidelines, supra note 257, at 14(a).
267 See General Comment 3, supra note 13, at para. 10.
268 General Comment 3, supra note 13, at para.10; see Nowak, supra note 32, at 256.
satisfy minimum core obligations. However, the Maastricht Guidelines do not define the content of the minimum core obligations as extensively as the Committee outlines the concept. The Maastricht Guidelines simply indicate that the minimum core includes the most basic forms of education. On the other hand, for the Committee, the notion of minimum core obligations is much broader. Since, practically speaking, the Committee is charged with interpreting the ICESCR by the terms of the ICESCR, we adopt its broader view of the definition of the minimum core in our analysis.

With respect to progressively realized rights, the Committee affirms that if a State is taking deliberatively retrogressive measures, then it has the burden of proving that 1) such measures were introduced after the most careful consideration of alternatives, 2) such measures were fully justified by reference to the totality of the rights provided for in the Covenant, and 3) such measures were fully justified in the context of the full use of the State party’s maximum available resources. The Maastricht Guidelines and Limburg Principles underscore this principle by noting that if the States’ policies or plans obstruct or halt the progressive realization

269 Maastricht Guidelines, supra note 257, at para 9. Violations of the Covenant occur when a State fails to satisfy what the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has referred to as “a minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights . . . . Thus, for example, a State party in which any significant number of individuals is deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential primary health care, of basic shelter and housing, or of the most basic forms of education is, prima facie, violating the Covenant.” General Comment 3, supra note 13, at para. 10. Such minimum core obligations apply irrespective of the availability of resources of the country concerned or any other factors and difficulties.

270 See General Comment 13, supra note 16, at para. 57 (“[Minimum] core includes an obligation: to ensure the right of access to public educational institutions and programmes on a non-discriminatory basis; to ensure that education conforms to the objectives set out in article 13 (1); to provide primary education for all in accordace with article 13 (2) (a); to adopt and implement a national educational strategy which includes provision for secondary, higher and fundamental education; and to ensure free choice of education without interference from the State or third parties, subject to conformity with ‘minimum educational standards’ (art. 13 (3) and (4)).”).


272 General Comment 13, supra note 16, at para. 45. There is a strong presumption of impermissibility of any retrogressive measures taken in relation to the right to education, as well as other rights enunciated in the Covenant. If any deliberately retrogressive measures are taken, the State party has the burden of proving that they have been introduced after the most careful consideration of all alternatives and that they are fully justified by reference to the totality of the rights provided for in the Covenant and in the context of the full use of the State party’s maximum available resources.
of a right, then it will be deemed to be in violation of the Covenant. In addition to the justifications provided by the Committee, however, the Maastricht Guidelines and Limburg Principles add another justification—that the State is acting due to *force majeure.*

Additionally, even though neither the Committee, the Maastricht Guidelines nor the Limburg Principles provide guidance on the issue, the failure to meet agreed benchmarks for progressive obligations may also constitute a violation of the Covenant. Although such a policy may create a perverse incentive for States parties to either refuse to set benchmarks or to set low benchmarks in order to avoid non-compliance with the ICESCR, sovereign States have adopted the Covenant and presumably aspire to give the impression that they are taking all possible steps to cooperate with the CESCR and fulfill Covenant rights. Refusing to set benchmarks or setting low benchmarks where setting benchmarks is a requirement of all States parties could prove to be a political embarrassment or economic liability to a particular State. In such a case, a State party may also have the opportunity to justify their failures to move forward at the agreed-to levels with the same justifications they are permitted if they halt or retard progressive obligations. Thus, if the State fails to show an improvement in satisfying progressive obligations by achieving benchmarks, then it may have the burden of justifying such failure by proving that: 1) such measures were introduced after the most careful consideration of alternatives, 2) such measures were fully justified by reference to the totality of the rights provided for in the Covenant, and 3) such measures were fully justified in the context of the full use of the State party’s maximum available resources.

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273 See Maastricht Guidelines, *supra* note 261, at para. 14(f) (“The calculated obstruction of, or halt to, the progressive realization of a right protected by the Covenant, unless the State is acting within a limitation permitted by the Covenant or it does so due to a lack of available resources or force majeure.”).

274 General Comment 13, *supra* note 16, at para. 45. There is a strong presumption of impermissibility of any retrogressive measures taken in relation to the right to education, as well as other rights enunciated in the Covenant. If any deliberately retrogressive measures are taken, the State party has the burden of proving that they have been
iii. Violations as determined by outcome indicators

As previously outlined supra, outcome indicators measure to what extent laws are being effectively implemented. With immediately realized rights, the State should have the responsibility of ensuring that the reality on the ground reflects the realization of those rights. For example, the State has the obligation to immediately ensure equality and non-discrimination in all forms of education. Therefore, if statistical evidence suggests that significantly fewer numbers of girls are enrolled in school than boys, the State should be deemed to be in violation of the ICESCR. The State should make all efforts to ensure that outcomes are in line with its immediate treaty obligations. The State should be responsible for the outcomes even if the result cannot be directly linked to State’s policy or practices.

In contrast, if outcome indicators suggest that a State has failed to provide its citizens with the rights that constitute minimum core obligations, then the State is considered to be prima facie failing to discharge its obligations. The language used by the Committee in explaining when a violation of minimum core obligation occurs, suggests that a State not only has to make efforts to ensure the provision of the right, but that the outcome must be that the right is actually being fulfilled. The Committee states that “a State party in which any significant number of individuals is deprived of . . .the most basic forms of education is, prima facie, violating the Covenant.”275 A State can justify the outcome by citing a lack of available resources, but only if it can “demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all resources that are at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those minimum obligations.”276 For example, if outcome indicators suggest that not all children who are of primary school age are enrolled in

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275 General Comment 3, supra note 13, at para. 10.
276 Id.; see Nowak, supra note 32, at 256.
primary schools, then these indicators suggest that education is not free, not compulsory, or both, and the State can justify this outcome if it can prove that the result was due to a lack of resources.

Although neither the Committee, the Limburg Principles, nor the Maastricht Guidelines provide insight into this issue, States may be considered to be in *prima facie* violation of the ICESCR if outcome indicators measuring progressive obligations suggest a halting or retrogression of progressive obligations. In order to justify the negative outcomes, the State may have the burden of proving it has made all efforts to ensure that such retrogressing or halting does not occur, but such retrogression or halting is occurring due to factors outside of its control. For example, if there are fewer students enrolled in tertiary education who are eligible to enroll now than there were ten years ago, then this outcome suggests a failure to satisfy right-to-education obligations under the ICESCR. The State has the burden of justifying that it has made all efforts to avoid such retrogression that was due to factors outside of its control. Similarly, if the State fails to meet the benchmarks that it has set for outcome indicators, it should have the burden of demonstrating that it has made all efforts to meet the agreed-upon benchmarks and that such failure was due to factors outside of its control.

The chart *infra* illustrates under what circumstances a State would be in violation or possible violation of the ICESCR.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Nature of Right</th>
<th>Violation</th>
<th>Prima Facie Violation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Structural</td>
<td>Immediate, Minimum Core or Progressive</td>
<td>Indicators show that the State adopts laws or fails to amend to repeal laws that are inconsistent with its obligations under the ICESCR.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process</td>
<td>Immediate</td>
<td>Indicators how that polices or plans contravene immediate obligations or fail to further</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator</td>
<td>Nature of Right</td>
<td>Violation</td>
<td>Prima Facie Violation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>immediate obligations.</td>
<td>Minimum Core</td>
<td>Indicators show that policies or plans fail to ensure that minimum core obligations are satisfied unless the State can “demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all resources that are at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those minimum obligations.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Progressive</td>
<td>Indicators show that policies or plans deliberately retard or halts the progressive realization of a right, unless State justifying such failure by proving that 1) such measures were introduced after the most careful consideration of alternatives, 2) such measures were fully justified by reference to the totality of the rights provided for in the Covenant, and 3) such measures were fully justified in the context of the full use of the State party’s maximum available resources. Indicators how a failure to meet agreed to benchmarks unless justifying such failure by proving that 1) such measures were introduced after the most careful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator</td>
<td>Nature of Right</td>
<td>Violation</td>
<td>Prima Facie Violation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Immediate</td>
<td>Indicators show that reality on the ground contravenes immediate obligations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum Core</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Indicators suggest that the reality on the ground suggests that people do not have the minimum core guarantees unless the State can “demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all resources that are at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those minimum obligations.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Indicators suggest that the reality on the ground suggests a retrogression or halting of guarantees that constitute progressive obligations unless such retrogression or halting is occurring due to factors outside of its control.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Indicators suggest that the State fails to meet the benchmarks that it has set for outcome indicators unless it can demonstrate that it has made all efforts to meet the benchmarks,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
III. Conclusion

International scholars, practitioners, and organizations are paying evermore attention to the importance of human rights to international law and development. In addition, scholars and practitioners alike are recognizing the indivisibility and interrelatedness of all human rights and the need to focus on fulfilling economic, social and cultural rights, such as the rights to education and health, to afford all persons the opportunity to live a life with dignity. As these rights are elevated in importance, the international human rights community is searching for mechanisms that rights-bearers can use to hold States parties accountable for their progressive realization obligations under treaties such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).

A violations approach using indicators is one mechanism to enhance treaty compliance. When closely tied to the treaty language, this approach points out the specific failures of a State in its attempt to comply with binding and legally-enforceable treaty obligations. Indicators are a powerful tool for measuring compliance with economic, social and cultural rights because they are the best way to evaluate the progress and failures of individual States parties. Using indicators to measure treaty compliance gives real meaning to economic, social and cultural rights and furthers the ultimate goal of full realization and enjoyment of all human rights. Employing indicators to ascertain violations of ESCRs is the future of human rights advocacy. As the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR moves ever closer to full implementation,
its States parties will allow individuals to petition the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights for alleged ESCR violations. With these emerging mechanisms for enforcement of ECSR violations comes an even more pressing need to apply such frameworks in order to determine with some evidence base and legitimacy the progressive duties of States, rights of individuals and rights of groups under the Covenant. In this article, we have proposed a methodology that demonstrates how indicators can be incorporated into a violations approach for the enforcement of treaty obligations, including progressive realization obligations. Although we have focused on the right to education, our methodology can be applied to other rights in an effort to enhance State compliance with their obligations. It is our hope that this framework will serve as a useful tool to improve State compliance with economic, social and cultural rights obligations toward the fulfillment and enjoyment of human rights for all.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>STRUCTURAL INDICATORS</strong></th>
<th><strong>PROCESS INDICATORS</strong></th>
<th><strong>OUTCOME INDICATORS</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. AVAILABILITY</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existence (or nonexistence) of constitutional provision(s), Case law precedent and/or national legislation requiring an adequate number of schools within a reasonable distance from all school-age students in the population at the primary, secondary and tertiary levels.</td>
<td>State adoption (or not) of a national educational strategy which includes provisions for secondary, higher and fundamental education. The proportion of the State’s GDP that is allocated to education.*</td>
<td>The number and proportion of schools per capita throughout the country broken down by rural/urban and region; number and proportion that are available to all at the primary level; number and proportion that are available to all at the secondary level; number and proportion that are available to all who are capable at the tertiary level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existence (or nonexistence) of a plan of action for a national education strategy.*</td>
<td>Broken down by region and state or province, the proportion of the budget that is allocated to primary education, secondary education, vocational training, higher education, teacher training, special disbursements to improve gender balance, and targeted aid to the poor localities.*</td>
<td>Number and proportion of communities/ schools/classrooms are without teachers broken down by rural/urban and region at the primary level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existence (or nonexistence) of constitutional provision(s), Case law precedent and/or national legislation requiring an adequate number of spaces in primary schools for each eligible primary age student.</td>
<td>The proportion of government expenditure that is spent on education and expenditure per pupil, with data disaggregated by urban/rural location for each level of education.* (at the primary, secondary and tertiary levels)</td>
<td>Number and proportion of teachers in all classrooms (adequate number necessary for availability requirements) at the secondary and tertiary levels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existence (or nonexistence) of constitutional provision(s), Case law precedent and/or national legislation requiring adequate facilities (potable water, sanitation, materials, etc.) and number of teachers in schools at the primary secondary and tertiary levels.</td>
<td>The proportion of funding that is allocated to provide for construction and maintenance of schools. (at the primary, secondary and tertiary levels)</td>
<td>The pupil/teacher ratio for primary, secondary and tertiary education, with breakdowns for public and private education and in urban and rural areas.*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existence (or nonexistence) of constitutional provision(s), Case law precedent and/or national legislation requiring adequate facilities (potable water, sanitation, materials, etc.) and number of teachers in schools at the primary secondary and tertiary levels.</td>
<td></td>
<td>The disaggregated proportion of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. <strong>Education</strong></td>
<td>legislation requiring uninterrupted, adequate government funding for education at the primary, secondary and tertiary levels.</td>
<td>The policies or legislation that are in place regarding recruitment, training, and pay for teachers. (for primary, secondary and tertiary level teachers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Existence (or nonexistence) of constitutional provision(s), Case law precedent and/or national legislation requiring uninterrupted, adequate government funding for teachers’ salaries at the primary, secondary and tertiary levels.</td>
<td>Salaries of teachers as compared to other professions, disaggregated by gender and urban/rural location for each level of educational system and further broken down by public/private education. Existence (or nonexistence) of adequate salary for primary, secondary and tertiary level teachers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Teachers’ pay in certain regions relative to other regions.*</td>
<td>Proportion of teachers paid on time by region.*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. **Accessibility**

| 2. **Accessibility** | Existence (or nonexistence) of constitutional provision(s), Case law precedent and/or national legislation providing free and compulsory primary education for all, free | Whether or not public policy measures have been taken to remove gender bias from primary education primers, remove gender bias from teacher educational strategies, remove gender bias in | In each case below, disaggregated by rural/urban, income, gender, and ethnic groups: The proportion of school age children who are not in school at |
secondary education and free tertiary education. (duration of compulsory education period)

Existence (or nonexistence) and scope of constitutional provision(s), Case law precedent and/or national legislation providing for equal and non-discriminatory access to education.

Existence (or nonexistence) of constitutional provision(s), Case law precedent and/or national legislation recognizing the importance of physical accessibility of education for all at the primary and secondary levels, as well as for all who are capable at the tertiary level.

Existence (or nonexistence) of constitutional provision(s), Case law precedent and/or national legislation recognizing the right of persons with disabilities, of other populations with special needs (IDPs, working children) to education for all at the primary and secondary levels, as well as for all who are capable at the tertiary level.

Existence (or nonexistence) of

terms of male and female roles in school, remove general bias in terms of general-targeted optional subjects.

To what extent the State allocates resources for alternative means of education for extremely isolated geographic localities (e.g., use of plans for satellite learning) at the primary, secondary and tertiary levels.

Whether or not the government collects disaggregated data on the basis of age, sex, urban/rural location, income, language or disabilities.*

Whether or not the government implements effective affirmative action policies to improve enrollment rates and completion rates for minorities.

The existence (or nonexistence) of regulations permitting charges for any of the following in primary and secondary schools: enrollment fees, tuition fees, uniforms, school supplies, school meals, and school transport? At the primary level? enrollment fees, tuition fees, the primary, secondary levels (for all who are capable at the tertiary level) and the trends for these ratios over time (especially for secondary and tertiary education).

The proportion of all students who have to pay for primary education and, for these families, the average expenditure for education (direct costs and some indirect costs, like compulsory levies—even when portrayed as voluntary—on parents and relatively expensive school uniforms).

The proportion of students who have to travel more than a reasonable or safe distance to reach primary school* and secondary school, and the proportion of all capable students who have to travel more than a reasonable or safe distance to reach tertiary school.
| 3. ACCEPTABILITY | Existence (or nonexistence) of constitutional provision(s), Case law precedent and/or national legislation ensure that education conforms to the following objectives: 1) to be directed to the full development of the human personality and the sense of its dignity; 2) to strengthen the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; 3) to enable all persons to participate effectively in a free society, promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations and all racial, ethnic or religious groups; and 4) to further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace. Existence (or nonexistence) and scope of constitutional provision(s), whether or not the State has methods for measuring acceptability (e.g., standardized test scores, inspection of facilities) and, if so, how often they are applied and monitored. Whether or not the State conducts regular assessments of educational needs, and if so, what this entails. Whether or not the required level of teacher training and certification is broken down by region. Whether or not these standards are used and enforced. Whether there have been efforts to train teachers. The expenditure per pupil in | Proportion of children who attend private schools as compared to public schools. Proportion of children attending facilities that do not meet State requirements in terms of quality standards. The repetition and drop out rates at the primary, secondary and tertiary education levels, as well as the trends over time. Average students’ scores on standardized tests and whether or not there exist facilities that do not meet standards. Literacy or illiteracy levels as well |
| Case law precedent and/or national legislation providing for free choice and (minimum standards of) acceptability for all levels of education for public and private institutions. |

Existence (or nonexistence) of constitutional provision(s), Case law precedent and/or national legislation providing for the monitoring and evaluation of teachers and/or qualifications or certification requirements for teachers.

Existence (or nonexistence) of constitutional provision(s), Case law precedent and/or national legislation providing for continuing education or trainings for teachers.

Existence (or nonexistence) of constitutional provision(s), Case law precedent and/or national legislation providing for school accreditation and regular inspection.

Existence (or nonexistence) of constitutional provision(s), Case law precedent and/or national legislation providing for periodic private school v. public school.

Whether the State sets minimum standards relating to education, including health, safety, and quality.

Whether the State has mechanisms in place to investigate complaints on the right to education.*

as the trends over time.*
| 4. **Adaptability** | Existence (or nonexistence) and scope of constitutional provision(s), Case law precedent and/or national legislation providing for adaptability of all education to accommodate individual children’s’ special needs. | Whether or not the official curriculum includes units on human rights education and values such as respect for human dignity, non-discrimination and equal status before the law. | The number and proportion of bilingual, ethno-education, and special education teachers in place per primary school child, and whether this differs according to geographic region (also for secondary and tertiary education) |
| | Existence (or nonexistence) of constitutional provision(s), Case law precedent and/or national legislation ensuring the right to retention in the education system. | The existence and scope of policies that providing for recruitment of and training for bilingual teachers. | Number and proportion of children who work attend school in the population (at the primary, secondary and tertiary levels) |
| | Existence (or nonexistence) of constitutional provision(s), Case law precedent and/or national legislation recognizing the liberty of individuals and groups to establish and direct educational institutions, subject to the requirement that the education given in such institutions shall conform to such minimum standards as may be laid down by the state. | The existence and scope of policies and programs implemented to provide for ethno-education for minorities, special education for children with disabilities, night classes for working students, etc. | The enrolment rates for students with various special needs. |
| | Existence (or nonexistence) of constitutional provision(s), Case law precedent and/or national legislation expressly recognizing the right of parents to choose for | Whether there are teacher trainings or certifications to teach ethno-education, special education, etc. | The dropout rates for students with various special needs. |
their children schools other than those established by public authorities when such schools conform to the minimum requirements of the state.

Existence (or nonexistence) of constitutional provision(s), Case law precedent and/or national legislation recognizing the right of parents to ensure religions and moral education of children in conformity with their own convictions.

Existence (or nonexistence) of constitutional provision(s), Case law precedent and/or national legislation mandating respect in educational system for the culture and religious practices of various groups and communities in the society.

Existence (or nonexistence) of constitutional provision(s), Case law precedent and/or national legislation denying academic freedom to staff and/or students

*Outcome indicators marked with an asterisk may relate to one or more of the categories specified herein—availability, accessibility, acceptability and/or adaptability. For instance, many availability indicators can also measure accessibility or acceptability as well. The specific situation/context of the State being analyzed will help to ascertain to which attribute or attributes of the right these indicators relate.