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The November 1990 summit meeting in Paris of the heads of government of the thirty-four countries participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe1 ("the CSCE") is one of the central points of this symposium. It is right to focus on the Paris meeting. It was a landmark event in arms control which took the decisive steps toward establishing a new post-Cold War security system.

The summit participants signed the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe2 ("CFE Treaty"). When implemented, this treaty will eliminate the large numerical superiority in major conventional armaments of the countries of the former Warsaw Pact. The summit leaders approved a series of confidence-building measures which increase the predictability and accessibility to mutual observation of the military activities, the military structures, and the defense budgets of member states. The summit also established several standing CSCE institutions designed for conflict prevention and conflict resolution.

Together with a European Community3 of growing capability, a continuing NATO alliance4, and the Two Plus Four Treaty on German
unification, these summit decisions provide the enduring framework for the new post-Cold War European security system. These components are neither redundant nor overlapping, as some have described them, but they have separate, specialized functions.

In this address, I will describe the principal components of this new security regime and I will evaluate its capacity to meet the challenges with which it may be faced.

To jump ahead, my main conclusion is that the new European security system has good prospects of preventing interstate conflict in Europe over the coming decade, but that the new system in its totality—European Community, NATO, and CSCE acting together—will be needed to meet these challenges. The job cannot be done by any single component alone. Moreover, I doubt the capacity of the new system to cope successfully with internal violence within a European state, like Yugoslavia or the Soviet Union.

Let me begin by describing the components of the new European security system and their functions.

I. The European Community

The widening, step-by-step economic interlinking of the states of Western and Eastern Europe and the promotion of effective democratic systems in all European states, especially in the Soviet Union, are beyond doubt the best long-term guarantees for security in Europe. Consequently, the European Community, as the core of integrative dynamism in Europe, will be the main component and foundation of the new European security system.

A debate is underway over whether functioning democracies can make war on each other, in other words, whether consolidation of effective democracy in the USSR would definitely end all possibility of conflict with Western states. That debate remains unresolved.

But no one disputes that policy-making in democracies is more transparent, and therefore more predictable, than in autocratic systems; that political power in democracies is more dispersed, with barriers against the sudden, arbitrary decisions characteristic of autocratic government; and that the proven capacity of democratic systems to resolve internal conflicts peacefully reduces the likelihood of large-scale domestic violence which may have international consequences. Domestic disturbances will therefore be less threatening under democratic governments than under authoritarian systems. As we have recently seen in the Soviet Union, in autocratic systems, the potential for violence of this kind may grow even while it is repressed.

It is also not contested that democracies are generally readier to participate in international cooperation, including cooperation for

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peacekeeping. Consequently, it is very much in the common Western interest to support democratic institutions in the USSR.

Programs of political and economic integration and cooperation managed by the European Community will therefore provide the main positive component of the new European security system. And measures to deny the economic benefits of the Community will be among the most important armaments in the arsenal of the new security system.

Because we will be evaluating the effectiveness of each of these components as we go along, it is necessary to say here that the capacity of the European Community to cooperate and to reach common decisions on foreign policy and security issues is still weak.

The European Community was able to decide rapidly to suspend emergency economic aid to the Soviet Union after Soviet authorities used violence in Lithuania and Latvia, and the Community also rapidly restored this help once it was satisfied that violence had stopped. But the Community was so widely divided on the Persian Gulf crisis after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 that Great Britain might have seceded from the EC had plans for majority voting on foreign policy issues within the Community already been in effect. This point underlines the fact that the European Community has no armed forces to back its decisions and at this stage probably could not unite on directing these forces if it had them.

A potential weakness of the European Community is that, should the united Germany prove to be diplomatically less skillful than West Germany has been during the past forty years, anti-German and pro-German coalitions could form within the European Community, paralyzing its capacity to act. It is also possible that the European Community will not be able to devote sufficient resources to sustain at least some political and economic headway in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

II. The CFE Treaty

The first achievement of the second component of the new European system, the CFE Treaty, is to eliminate, for both sides, any realistic fear of surprise attack. This will be achieved by cutting the large superiority of the countries of the former Warsaw Pact in major conventional arma-
ments to a new level below that of the numerically weaker NATO allies, by placing remaining arms of the type reduced under no-increase ceilings, and by checking compliance with those ceilings by means of an extensive verification system.

Soviet forces are being withdrawn from Central and Eastern Europe by separate agreements reached outside the CFE Treaty. However, the benefit of the Treaty for the NATO states and for their western neighbors is a reduction of the major conventional armaments of Soviet forces west of the Urals by more than sixty-five percent below their 1989 levels. This is far below what could have remained if Soviet forces had merely been withdrawn from Eastern Europe and redeployed in complete units in the western USSR. By its own account, the Soviet Union had over 41,000 tanks west of the Urals in 1989; when CFE is implemented, it will have only about 13,000 tanks. There will be similar reductions of artillery and armored combat vehicles, attack helicopters and combat aircraft.

Because many thousands of Soviet armaments have been moved out of the western USSR to beyond the Urals, outside the CFE reduction area—nearly 60,000 pieces, even by Soviet accounts—far fewer Soviet armaments will be destroyed under CFE than Western governments had foreseen.

The bulk of Soviet equipment withdrawn beyond the Urals, however, will not be in the hands of active duty units; rather, it will be stored, much of it in the open. In practice, the Soviet Union will probably disband a large number of the units which it is withdrawing from Central and Eastern Europe, although it is not required to do so. Therefore, to be used, the equipment withdrawn beyond the Urals would not only have to be rehabilitated, but moved west, and new units would have to be formed to use it, a time-consuming process.

A further benefit of the CFE treaty is its system of verifying residual limits on reduced arms through exchange of detailed information and on-site inspection on the ground. It has been agreed in principle that there will also be a regime of air inspection whose details are to be worked out in the follow-on talks (“CFE IA”), which began early in 1991. The follow-on talks were suspended in the spring of 1991 because of disagreement over resubordination of three Soviet motorized rifle divisions to the Navy, an action which could have placed at risk ratification of the CFE Treaty by the United States, but resumed after the dispute was resolved in June.

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9. CFE Treaty, supra note 2, at Preamble.
10. Id. at arts. IV-VIII.
11. Id. at arts. XIII-XV.
12. Id. at art. VI.
13. Id.
14. Id. at arts. XIII-XV.
15. See id. at art. XVIII.
Assuming that the CFE Treaty will ultimately be ratified and implemented, these residual limits, constraints, and verification measures will together provide reasonable assurance that Soviet forces west of the Urals do not grow. Violation of these measures by some future Soviet government would give the Western countries considerable advance warning that a Soviet military buildup is pending—perhaps up to two years. A breakout like this is improbable under the Gorbachev government, but it cannot be excluded for the future.

The confused, unstable domestic situation in the USSR may continue for many years. Without CFE's objective criteria and standards for measuring Soviet military actions, and verification of those standards, there could be great uncertainty in the Western countries about Soviet military behavior. The Soviet Union receives equal benefits from the CFE Treaty as regards the future strength and behavior of NATO forces. Among other things, these measures, plus the restriction on the size of German armed forces and the prohibition of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons to Germany in the Two Plus Four Treaty,17 as well as Germany's continued membership in NATO will provide ongoing assurance that German armed forces are not a threat.

If uncertainty and doubts about the military posture of the two main European powers, Germany and the Soviet Union, were to continue, these concerns could be highly disruptive of political and economic cooperation in Europe.

Arms control will here perform its classic function of providing the mutual confidence which is the essential foundation for the positive work of promoting economic and political integration.

III. Future Action in CFE

The benefits of the CFE Treaty outweigh its shortcomings, but the CFE Treaty does have a number of defects. Among them are: (1) absence of negotiated manpower reductions and ceilings; (2) no reductions or residual ceilings on force structure—too many weapons are left, even after Treaty cuts, for real stability; (3) no cuts in logistics and force projection equipment; (4) no controls on production within the reduction area of treaty limited armaments; (5) no coverage of Soviet forces beyond the Urals; and (6) a verification regime which could be stronger. As the cumulative result of these defects, there are no effective limitations in the Treaty on reserves and force generation capability.

Because I spoke in detail on the CFE Treaty here at Cornell earlier in the week,18 I will comment now only on one of these points. To achieve the second agreed goal of CFE, eliminating the capability for initiating large-scale offensives,19 the scope of negotiated reductions

17. See Two Plus Four Treaty, supra note 5.
19. CFE Treaty, supra note 2, Preamble.
should be expanded in future talks to include deep cuts in equipment essential to long-range forward movement of forces. This equipment, when combined with a high proportion of penetration or outreach weapons, like tanks or aircraft, creates offensive capability. Such support equipment includes mobile, armored anti-aircraft weapons; equipment and units for transporting tanks, munitions, and vehicle fuel; mobile field hospitals; pipe-laying equipment for vehicle fuel; and prefabricated bridging equipment. Substitutes for equipment like this can be found for defensive purposes, for example, anti-aircraft weapons of limited mobility; fixed, buried pipelines; dispersed, small ammunition depots; and fixed medical installations; but there are no substitutes for equipment assisting mobility for offensive use.

It is to be hoped that all of these shortcomings of the CFE Treaty will be taken up in future negotiations, although short-term prospects for doing so are not good.

IV. The Regime of Confidence and Security Building Measures

Participants in the November 1990 Paris summit meeting also approved several Confidence and Security Building Measures ("CSBM's") which greatly extend the regime of prenotification and observation of military activities contained in the Stockholm Document of September 1986.20

The Stockholm regime of confidence-building measures applies not only to the armed forces of all members of NATO and the former Warsaw Pact, but also to the twelve neutral and non-aligned states of Europe. That these measures were negotiated separately from the CFE Treaty is only a political accident of the Cold War. The essence of the confidence-building measures in the Stockholm document, in successful operation since the beginning of 1987, has been to require advance notice in an annual calendar of all scheduled out-of-garrison ground force and associated air force activities over a certain size,21 observation of these activities by military officers of other CSCE countries,22 and a limited number of on-site inspections of undeclared military activities in order to assure that their size is in fact below the required threshold of notification.23

The objective of these measures is to make major ground force activities predictable and open to observation and thus to avoid surprise force concentrations, to make it difficult to use field exercises as a source of political pressure, and to avoid miscalculation of the significance of field activities that could lead to overreaction by commanders of other forces in the area.

22. Id. at ¶¶ 38-54.
23. Id. at ¶¶ 63-104.
The Paris summit approved an important expansion of the existing confidence-building regime. Some of the new measures improve conditions for observation of exercises and for on-site inspections.\textsuperscript{24} However, a major defect of the post-summit CSBM regime is the continued exclusion from prenotification of alert exercises of any size and their exclusion from observation until they have been underway for seventy-two hours.\textsuperscript{25} This frustrates the objective of avoiding sudden force concentrations. At a minimum, any regime of CSBM's based on prenotification should cover alerts by restricting their number to a low annual figure. Further, the summit both failed to lower the numerical levels at which notification and observation would be obligatory and to increase the number of inspections for this pre-announcement regime.

One of the new confidence-building measures approved at Paris provides for large-scale exchange of data on the armed forces of all participants and for evaluation of this data by a limited number of on-site inspections called "evaluation visits." A second measure calls for annual exchange of information on plans for changes in deployment of major weapons and equipment systems. A third establishes a common communications network among CSCE participants.

An especially important new measure provides for exchange of defense budgets, with provision for annual discussions of these budgets by all CSCE participants. If in the future the data exchanged is considerably more detailed than the UN format now prescribed, this measure could, for example, allow early discussion of innovative major weapons systems well in advance of their deployment. The summit meeting also decided on a measure establishing procedures for clarifying the nature of unusual military activities through obligatory written replies to questions, bilateral meetings with the initiating state, or summoning a meeting of officials of all CSCE governments to discuss the activity.

All of these confidence-building measures, as well as the main provisions of the CFE Treaty, have potential application outside of Europe, as in the Persian Gulf. This is one important reason why the decisions of the Paris summit were significant.

V. CSCE Institutions

The Paris summit meeting also decided to establish a number of standing institutions in the security field,\textsuperscript{26} including yearly meetings of foreign ministers, establishment of a permanent secretariat, and establishment of a Conflict Prevention Center. This Center, located in Vienna under general supervision of the confidence-building negotia-


\textsuperscript{25} See Stockholm Document, supra note 20, at ¶ 54 (exclusion of observation until 72 hours).

\textsuperscript{26} Charter of Paris, supra note 24, New Structures and Institutions of the CSCE Process.
tors, has responsibility for coordinating the annual exchange of information on armed forces and the operation of all confidence-building measures,\textsuperscript{27} including the measure on unusual military activities.\textsuperscript{28}

Many European countries wanted considerably wider scope for these new CSCE institutions, for example, placing at the head of the Center for Prevention of Conflict a secretary general with authority to initiate action and giving the Center responsibility for coordinating between East and West verification of all arms control agreements affecting Europe, including the CFE Treaty. It was not possible to reach agreement on these expanded functions at Paris, but it is clear that the CSCE system will to some extent expand over time. Some plausible and desirable areas of CSCE expansion which I see are in fact finding and limiting sales of conventional arms to third world countries.

Some advocates of an expanded CSCE, among them, the Soviet Union and some Eastern European states, would also like the CSCE to develop in the long-term into a supranational security organization assuring European security with forces of its own and integrating both NATO and former Warsaw Pact forces under a single command. That development is far off. Even though a single security organization for Europe would be more efficient than the multiple components of the new security system, the single organization is more likely to be an expanded European Community than anything else, and it will be long before the EC can take over the security function on its own.

Within the framework of the new European security system, the present CSCE institutions can make a valuable contribution to conflict resolution. However, the firmly held CSCE requirement for consensus among all member governments is an important limitation on the capability of the CSCE to act effectively. It means in practice that the CSCE cannot take joint action against an offending member state, even a small one, if the latter disagrees.

\textbf{VI. Continuing Role of NATO}

The NATO alliance will have a vital continuing role in European security.

In the new situation, NATO will have a series of missions: (1) to plan the defense strategy and force structure of member states and to coordinate their arms control activities; (2) to coordinate and evaluate the success of their policies toward the USSR; (3) to provide assurance of the successful integration of a united Germany into the European system; (4) to provide reassurance to the Eastern European states of their continued independence vis-à-vis the USSR—even a changed, less cooperative Soviet leadership would know in advance that aggressive actions toward Eastern European states could ultimately involve NATO; (5) to act as a barrier against the spread or escalation of possible conflict

\textsuperscript{27} Id.
\textsuperscript{28} See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
originating in Eastern Europe or in the USSR itself;' to support the CSCE, coordinating at least loosely the policy of NATO members toward CSCE activities in the security field and, by its existence as a force, lending additional weight to CSCE decisions; and (7) in the long term, to secure its own evolution into a European Defense Community, the military arm of interested members of the European Community. Perhaps this evolution can best be assured through the development of the Western European Union (WEU).

It seems to me, especially given recent unsettling developments in the Soviet Union, that there is broad support in Europe and in the United States for the continuation of NATO and the presence of American forces in Europe, and that earlier doubts about this subject have largely been resolved.

Friction in the evolving relationship among NATO, the WEU, and the European Community is one of the areas of potential weakness in the new European Security System. There does not yet seem to be sufficient consensus on this subject to make these components work together effectively. Nonetheless, the governments concerned have shown themselves sufficiently pragmatic to cooperate adequately even without consensus about the future. NATO also lacks the capability for the disinterested mediation and conciliation that the CSCE has.

VII. Challenges to the New European Security System

Thus far, I have described the components of the new European security system, the agreed measures contained in the CFE Treaty and in the regime of Confidence and Security Building Measures, and the institutions which will play a major role in European security—the European Community, the NATO alliance, and the permanent institutions of the CSCE.

It is appropriate now to take a quick look at the challenges to European security which have emerged or may shortly emerge, and to ask—how successful will the new system be in coping with them?

As Western defense authorities see it, even after the CFE Treaty and the START Treaty on reducing strategic nuclear forces are implemented, the Soviet Union will remain the strongest single military power of Europe and its only nuclear superpower. Accordingly, the USSR retains the very substantial capacity, if not the intention, to use its armed forces for political intimidation or even aggression. The Soviet Union remains an unstable system, where radical change of policy by decision of the rulers or by political coup is possible. Domestic violence in the

29. In my view, this function should include deployment of a limited nuclear force to deter use of nuclear weapons in a potentially chaotic situation in the Soviet Union.


Soviet Union could increase and suddenly turn outward, either in cross-border violence to the West, or in some attempt by a group struggling for domination to gain control over nuclear arms and to threaten their use in support of its own aims.

Here in the United States, our dominant interest with regard to the Soviet Union is to assure against the use of nuclear weapons against our country in any circumstances. Aside from these risks, domestic violence inside the Soviet Union could result in acute misery and large numbers of refugees moving West. Especially if the Soviet Union seems to be collapsing, there could be territorial claims against it and tension or even conflict on that subject. Every single neighbor of the Soviet Union in the West and East has such claims. There are minority problems in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria and also in Turkey and Greece. In theory, one or more of these issues could result in interstate conflict.

Economic conditions in Eastern Europe could also create populist, nationalist, authoritarian regimes, adding to tension and prompting large numbers of illegal migrants to move westward. Among the most immediate and serious problems in Europe is the dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation, and its descent into civil war with heavy loss of life.

Thirty miles across from Gibraltar, we find the North African Maghreb, where increasing birthrate, decreasing levels of economic progress, mounting Islamic radicalism, and the accessibility of modern missile technology have convinced the Europeans that they face serious new problems in the future.

How will the European Security System deal with these issues? The mechanisms available to the CSCE states to deal with interstate disputes—mediation, arbitration, conciliation, and even the use of the armed forces of some CSCE states to separate the forces of potential combatants, if both sides agree—are a first line of defense that can help damp down violence in Europe. The CSCE apparatus may also be successful in reducing international frictions over developments inside member states which have the potential to lead to interstate conflict, such as treatment of minority groups, through informally bringing to bear the combined political and economic weight and public opinion of other members against the offending state or states—especially if those states are the smaller member states of the CSCE.

However, the CSCE is unlikely to be able to act effectively if there is no consensus among member states, and it is wholly unable to act if there is disagreement among its larger member states. It is doubtful whether the CSCE as such will be strong enough to cope with the dissolution of Yugoslavia or to intervene to stop large scale bloodshed there if the Yugoslav government does not wish to cooperate. It is most improbable too that CSCE could or would intervene on the side of the

32. "Maghreb" refers generally to Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and sometimes Libya.
central government or of republic governments in the USSR in the event of conflict between Soviet republics and the central government, or between constituent republics, or in the event of anarchic conflict by armed groups. Here, among other things, economic pressures from the European Community and the United States are likely to have more effect.

Conclusion

The most immediate security problems of Europe are not preventing armed conflict between the European states—but in dealing with the potential sources of conflict inside member states. This is a far more difficult task than trying to cope with tensions between European states. Let me emphasize that the defects and weaknesses which I ascribe to the European Community, to the CFE Treaty, and to the institutions of the CSCE are in each case less significant than their positive virtues. But the weaknesses exist. Therefore, it will probably take the combined efforts of all of the components of the new European security system—the European Community, NATO, and the CSCE—to achieve any real damping of organized violence inside European states.

The fact is that none of these components—the European Community, NATO, the CSBM regime, or CSCE institutions—can do this job on its own. Even by pooling their specialized capabilities, they probably can achieve only modest success. This argues for better organized liaison among them than now exists.

At the same time, I believe it is fair to conclude that, despite these uncertainties about its capacity to cope early on with the possible seeds of conflict inside member states, the new European security system is likely to be successful during the coming decade in its main objective of preventing interstate conflict in Europe. But here too, it will take effective cooperation among the component parts: CFE verification and CSCE confidence-building measures supplying information about military activities of all states; active efforts by the CSCE institutions to take the edge off interstate frictions; possible action by the European Community to extend or to withdraw credits, to expand trade, or to threaten to restrict it; member countries using all their bilateral influence; and NATO in the background to deter violence, and in the last instance, acting to assure protection of its member states and to anchor the whole system.

It is clear that this new post-Cold War European security is more complicated and has many more parts than the stark, simple confrontation of the Cold War.

Are we regressing? No. The new security system will be fulfilling its function of preventing conflict in Europe without the same risks of all-out conventional and nuclear war, and without the vast human costs of repression in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe which characterized the old Cold War system.
Moreover, with its combination of armed forces within arms control limits, and with mechanisms for assuring transparency and conflict prevention, the new European security system represents a sensible way of obtaining increased security at lower cost. For this reason and because both the positive and negative aspects of the European experience have much weight elsewhere in the world, the main elements of the European system will in time have a valuable multiplier effect by being applied in many countries throughout the world.