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Recommended Citation

Lee, Roy S. (1995) "United Nations Peacekeeping: Development and Prospects," *Cornell International Law Journal*: Vol. 28: Iss. 3, Article 2.

Available at: <http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj/vol28/iss3/2>

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United Nations Peacekeeping: Development and Prospects

I. The Circumstances in which Peacekeeping Operations Were Created

It is necessary to understand the nature and decision-making process of the United Nations in order to appreciate the issues involved in today's U.N. peacekeeping operations.

The United Nations is a political institution and an inter-governmental organization composed of 185 sovereign states, and its competence is governed by the U.N. Charter. Only Member States are competent to make proposals, and the Organization can only act in pursuance of decisions which are collectively taken by those states.

The Security Council is principally responsible for carrying out the Organization's fundamental objective of maintaining international peace and security. However, neither the Security Council nor any other organs have the power to impose their decisions on the Member States.¹ The only exception occurs when the Council decides to act under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, in which case the decisions are binding and enforceable in the territories of Member States.

Chapter VII of the Charter provides for a collective security system under which the Security Council is empowered to take a range of measures when international peace and security is endangered. For example, the Council may require the parties concerned to comply with provisional measures that it deems necessary,² order complete or partial interruption of economic relations and means of communication, and/or sever diplomatic relations.³ In addition, the Council has the power to apply air, sea, or land forces, which ideally would be under the command of the Military Staff Committee composed of the representatives of the five permanent members of the Council.⁴ The Charter envisioned an arrangement whereby States would make their forces available by concluding agreements with the Security Council. However, thus far such arrangements under these Articles have not taken place.

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1. This does not include decisions pertaining to matters concerning finance and administration of the Organization.

2. U.N. CHARTER, art. 40.

3. U.N. CHARTER, art. 41.

4. U.N. CHARTER, arts. 42, 45-47.

Decisions under Chapter VII are substantive in nature, requiring a majority of at least nine votes (out of a total of fifteen); this majority must include the "concurring" votes of the five permanent members. According to the Provisional Rules of the Council, even though absence and abstentions are not regarded as voting, a negative vote from any of the five permanent members can still block the Council's decision. During the Cold War period, which emerged almost immediately after the birth of the United Nations and did not end until recently, the lack of agreement among members of the Security Council, particularly among its permanent members, made it impossible for the Security Council to carry out its functions fully in the manner originally contemplated under Chapter VII.

The U.N. Charter did not envisage peacekeeping. Rather, this concept emerged out of necessity and became the only practical method acceptable to the Council members for dealing with conflicts during the Cold War period. Only recently has the Council been able to implement decisions under Chapter VII authorizing Member States or ad hoc multinational forces to intervene with military force in emergency conflict situations.

The first U.N. peacekeeping operation in 1948 in the Middle East best illustrates the circumstances in which this instrument was created.⁵ In 1947, Palestine was a territory administered by the United Kingdom under mandate from the League of Nations. It had a population of approximately two million, two-thirds of whom were Arabs and one-third of whom were Jews. Both communities claimed control of the entire territory. Unable to find a solution acceptable to both communities, the British Government presented the matter to the General Assembly in April 1947. The Assembly adopted a partition plan in November, which divided the territory into an Arab State and a Jewish State, with an international regime for Jerusalem. The plan, however, was not acceptable to the Palestinian Arabs or the Arab States, and violent fighting broke out in Palestine. When Jewish leaders proclaimed the State of Israel, hostilities intensified. Eventually, the Security Council called for a cease-fire, which was accepted by both parties. Although the superpowers saw the need to contain the fighting, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union was willing to allow the other to intervene. When it became evident that a third party was needed to supervise the implementation of the cease-fire, the first U.N. peacekeeping operation was created: the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), a group of unarmed military observers.

Following the wars of 1956, 1967, and 1973, the United Nations expanded the original functions of the military observers. Despite these changes, UNTSO remained in the area in order to contain incidents and prevent them from escalating into larger conflicts.

5. For an historical account of U.N. peacekeeping operations, see U.N. DEP'T OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, *THE BLUE HELMETS: A REVIEW OF UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING*, U.N. Doc. DPI/1065, U.N. Sales No. E.90.I.18 (1990).

The second U.N. peacekeeping operation evolved in 1956 during the Suez Crisis and continued until 1967. After Egypt decided to nationalize the Suez Canal, heavy fighting broke out between the troops deployed by France, the United Kingdom, Israel, and Egypt. A dangerous situation developed, compelling the Security Council to assign an outside party, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), to the region. This force consisted of lightly armed military personnel from neutral Member States. Its tasks were to secure and supervise the withdrawal of the armed forces of France, Israel, and the United Kingdom from the Egyptian territory and to serve as a buffer between the Egyptian and Israeli forces.

The UNTSO and UNEF missions were then followed by a series of peacekeeping operations: India and Pakistan (1949); Lebanon (1958); Yemen (1963); Dominican Republic (1965); Afghanistan and Pakistan (1988); Iran and Iraq (1988); Angola (1989); Central America (1991); Iraq and Kuwait (1991); and Tajikistan (1994). In each case, the underlying circumstances required a neutral third party to contain a conflict by supervising a cease-fire already in place and ensuring its continuity. A U.N. peacekeeping operation fulfilled this third-party role.

Thus, traditional U.N. peacekeeping forces were composed of unarmed military observers, lightly-armed peacekeeping forces, or a combination of the two. The United Nations recently introduced civilian police as a third component of these forces. In particular, the multi-dimensional operations in Namibia and Cambodia illustrate the interaction between all three components, including a large civilian contingent to carry out political, humanitarian, and administrative functions.

The United Nations does not have its own military observers or forces. Normally Member States provide personnel at the request of the Secretary-General for the duration of the specific mission. They wear their own national uniforms but with U.N. insignia. Until very recently, the United Nations sought peacekeeping troops only from countries such as Argentina, Bangladesh, Canada, India, Ghana, Nepal, Pakistan, and Scandinavia. As a rule, the Secretary-General tries to include forces from countries politically and geographically separated from the hostilities. This policy has become more difficult to implement in recent years due to limited availability of troops and the need for special training, equipment, and technological capability. Often the Secretary-General has no choice but to accept military personnel from one country and to provide training and the necessary equipment from other countries. Since each mission is a composite of different national contingents, the maintenance of a unified command has been a major problem. The United Nations has often been criticized for this inefficiency even though the causes are essentially beyond its control.

U.N. peacekeeping operations do not include actions which are authorized by the Security Council but carried out by interested Member States or by an ad hoc multinational force. Examples of non-peacekeeping operations include: the international force in Korea; Desert Storm, conducted in Kuwait; Operation Uphold Democracy, by the multinational

forces in Haiti; Operation Turquoise, by the French forces in Rwanda; and the Russian force deployed in Georgia. These are authorized activities but are not conducted by the United Nations. Responsibilities rest with the participating States themselves.

The United Nations usually finances peacekeeping operations from its regular budget. The expenses are apportioned according to a special formula which charges the permanent members of the Security Council and the industrialized countries more for peacekeeping than they normally pay under the regular budget. Thus, the permanent members of the Security Council collectively bear 53.37% of the expenses, which is higher than their shares under the regular budget (41.99%).⁶ The expenses have increased from \$340 million in 1988 to \$3.6 billion in 1995. Half of the amount often remains unpaid.

Since 1948, the United Nations has established a total of thirty-six peacekeeping operations: thirteen in Africa, six in Asia and the Pacific, ten in the Middle East, three in Europe, and four in Latin America (see Appendix A). Half of these operations are still ongoing.

II. Characteristics of Peacekeeping Operations

Peacekeeping operations may be grouped into several categories. First, there are the traditional types of missions which include: (1) the Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), created in 1974 at the Syrian Golan Heights; (2) the Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), created in 1978 in Southern Lebanon; (3) the Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), active since 1949 in the State of Jammu and Kashmir; and (4) the Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) created in 1991. Most traditional operations were created before 1988.⁷

The second category refers to multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations including: (1) the Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL); (2) the Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ); (3) the Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III); and (4) the Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia.

The Security Force in West New Guinea (UNSF) and the Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) belong to the third category, involving operations in which the United Nations acts as an administrator for those territories during a transitional period.

The fourth category consists of good offices missions such as the Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP) and the

6. The industrialized countries also pay more for peacekeeping expenses than their shares under the regular budget. Japan and Germany, for example, pay respectively, 14.009% (13.95%) and 8.979% (8.94%). U.N. Doc. ST/ADM/SER.B/475 (1995). This document is issued periodically containing the status of financial contributions of U.N. Member States.

7. Note, however, that some "traditional type" missions were established after 1988. One such example is the Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), established after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP).

The Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM)⁸ and the Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia belong to yet another group. These forces operate in areas plagued by internal armed conflicts and are frequently subject to attacks.

Traditional peacekeeping operations, which are normally manned by armed or unarmed military and civilian personnel, are established with the consent of the parties concerned. Their main purposes are to supervise or monitor the implementation of a cease-fire or troop withdrawal, or to serve as a buffer between the opposing forces. Thus, for example, UNTSO was created to supervise the implementation of an armistice agreement, the Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM) was established to monitor the implementation of the disengagement of troops, and the Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) was set up to observe and report on a cease-fire. Several operations, such as the Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA), the Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), and the Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) were organized to verify compliance with an agreement. In some operations, U.N. forces were inter-positioned between the warring factions in order to create a buffer zone. The peacekeepers in UNEF I, UNEF II, and the Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) assumed this role. Consent is essential for the presence in the mission area and for exercising freedom of movement in that area. Consequently, if the consent is withdrawn, as was the case with UNEF I in 1967, the United Nations must withdraw its operations.

Setting up such a mission normally presupposes the existence of either a *de jure* or *de facto* cease-fire or a peace arrangement endorsed by the Security Council. The Council will first issue a mandate requesting the Secretary-General to implement the operation. This process provides a basis of legitimacy.

Although non-use of force is a basic principle governing traditional peacekeeping operations, peacekeepers may resort to force in cases of self-defense. Therefore, peacekeepers may use force to defend against armed attacks or to resist any armed attempts to prevent the mission from discharging its duties. Only the minimum force proportional to the attack may be used. These principles are defined in the Rules of Engagement which are issued by the Field Commander and approved by Headquarters.

Impartiality is another requirement of peacekeeping missions. In order to preserve the confidence and cooperation of the parties and to maintain the credibility of the mission, U.N. personnel must not take sides in the conflict.

8. UNOSOM's mandate was terminated on March 31, 1995, pursuant to Security Council Resolution 954. S.C. Res. 954, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3447th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/954 (1994).

Some of the older missions varied from the traditional type. For example, the Operation in the Congo (ONUC) was created to ensure the withdrawal of Belgian forces and to assist the Congolese Government in maintaining law and order. As the situation worsened, its tasks expanded to include maintaining the territorial integrity and the political independence of the Congo, preventing civil war, and securing removal from the Congo of all foreign military, paramilitary, and advisory personnel.

Similarly, in 1962, the General Assembly authorized UNSF to maintain peace and security in West Irian under the U.N. Temporary Executive Authority established by agreement between Indonesia and the Netherlands. Both of these operations went beyond the traditional scope of peacekeeping operations as outlined above.

III. Changing Characteristics

The year 1989 marked the beginning of a new era in peacekeeping. Thirteen peacekeeping operations had been established between 1948 and 1987, while twenty-three additional operations have been established since 1988. More peacekeeping operations have been launched in the past four years than over the course of the previous forty-five. More importantly, the nature and concept of peacekeeping has also changed in order to respond to different situations.

While some operations still fall within the traditional category, most current missions deal with urgent problems in many regions of the world including ethnic strife, civil wars, collapsing economics, natural disasters, and failure of governance. Unlike traditional peacekeeping operations which dealt predominantly with conflicts between nations, post-1988 peacekeeping operations involve domestic disputes such as secessions, partitions, and inter-factional conflicts.

Recent peacekeeping operations have become multi-dimensional in their functions. For example, in addition to monitoring cease-fires, peacekeepers are now responsible for demobilizing military units, assisting in elections, rebuilding infrastructure, temporarily taking over some of the functions of a national government, training and monitoring national civil police, and repatriating and rehabilitating both refugees and displaced persons. The operations in Namibia (UNTAG), Cambodia (UNTAC), El Salvador (ONUSAL), and Mozambique (ONUMOZ) are such examples.

Recent operations also involve the restoration of State sovereignty in countries where the governmental authority has collapsed. Peacekeepers are called upon to provide basic security, service, and administration to the local population and at the same time to restore the capacity of the State. In these instances, the Security Council authorizes the missions to resort to force in carrying out their tasks. These developments give rise to a host of questions: Is there a consistent U.N. policy in this regard? Who is making such a policy? Does the United Nations have the necessary material, financial, logistical, and military means to perform those tasks? Does the Organization have the full support of its Member States, particularly

from those who are able to pay? Unless these questions are adequately resolved, the U.N. peacekeeping role is unlikely to produce a long-lasting effect.

Recent developments also include regional cooperation and preventive deployment. A greater use of regional organizations has facilitated a wide range of cooperative activities. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has decided to provide air support to UNPROFOR in connection with its mandate in the former Yugoslavia. The United Nations has deployed joint field missions with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Liberia and with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in Georgia. The United Nations and the Organization of American States (OAS) participated in a joint operation within the framework of the U.N. Mission in Haiti. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has provided technical input on constitutional issues relating to Abkhazia and the United Nations assisted OSCE in the case of Nagorny Karabakh.

Should these cooperative activities with regional organizations be further improved? If so, in what manner? Do these activities in any way point to a shift of the prime responsibility in maintaining international peace and security from the world organization to regional organizations? Perhaps not. Nevertheless, appropriate methods should now be developed to ensure a coherent development.

The creation of the first preventive deployment of a U.N. peacekeeping force is symbolic of the changing role of U.N. missions in the 1990s. A specific example is the presence of U.N. military, civilian, and administrative personnel in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia along its borders with Albania and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). The purpose of preventive deployment is to discourage and prevent hostilities from breaking out in those areas.

Preventive deployment is a new but effective technique for conflict prevention. It requires early detection of the emerging conflict and early deployment in order to discourage hostilities. Since missions must be deployed in the field, the intervening force must first obtain the consent of at least one of the parties involved. Since preventive deployment can only serve as a holding operation, the root of the dispute must be addressed in order to resolve the situation.

There is an inseparable link between peacekeeping on the one hand and peacemaking and peacebuilding on the other. Peacekeeping was originally envisaged as a temporary operation. Therefore, it is only a means and cannot be an end in and of itself. Operations in Namibia and Cambodia testify to the need for multi-dimensional approaches and activities. An increasing number of situations now call for measures which go beyond the traditional tasks of supervising a cease-fire or creating a buffer zone. While traditional peacekeeping is important, it cannot succeed on its own. It must be applied in concert with conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, and post-conflict re-building. The Secretary-General's Agenda for Peace and its Supplement is a good guide in this

direction.⁹

IV. Application of Humanitarian Law

Protection has become an important function of the more recent peacekeeping operations. Operations in Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda have been called upon to safeguard protected areas or to protect humanitarian supplies and refugee relief. At the same time, they must try to stabilize the situation and work with the concerned parties towards a negotiated settlement. In some cases, the Security Council has authorized U.N. forces to take "all necessary measures" to ensure the implementation of their mandates.

The applicability of international humanitarian law to peacekeeping operations has become very important in cases where casualties have occurred and persons have been detained or arrested. Are the 1949 Geneva Conventions and its 1977 Protocols applicable in these cases? On what basis? What are the legal issues involved?

U.N. peacekeeping operations certainly must observe humanitarian rules in conducting their activities. However, two sets of problems are involved. First, the United Nations is not and cannot be a party to the existing humanitarian conventions which are open to States only. Another problem is that existing legal instruments are intended for regulating armed conflicts between States or within a State. The rights and obligations are imposed only on States which are parties to them. Because the United Nations is not a State, it does not have the competence necessary to implement the obligations fully even if it were to be accepted as a contracting party. For example, the United Nations could not appoint a protecting power and does not possess the necessary competence to enact penal laws for the punishment of persons who have committed grave breaches. It is therefore not possible for the United Nations *formally* to apply those legal instruments.

For the purpose of ensuring the observance of humanitarian rules, the United Nations, the host country, and the countries contributing troops must enter into a tripartite commitment. Each side is required to observe the basic principles and spirit of existing humanitarian conventions. These instruments include the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the 1977 Geneva Protocols, and the 1954 UNESCO Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict. In order to provide uniform interpretation and application, the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross are preparing a list of the basic principles to be observed. However, these guidelines may not be specific enough for the soldiers on the ground. Since the goal is to provide a uniform legal basis for all U.N. peacekeeping operations, more detailed rules regarding arrests and detention are needed in order to ensure conformity with general human rights standards.

9. BOUTROS BOUTROS-GHALI, AN AGENDA FOR PEACE WITH THE NEW SUPPLEMENT AND RELATED U.N. DOCUMENTS (2d ed. 1995). U.N. Doc. DPI/1623/PKO (1995).

Questions about the applicability of international humanitarian law to U.N. peacekeeping operations are important, but should not be exaggerated. While there have been reported breaches by U.N. forces, the number of instances is very limited. The Member States concerned have intensified their efforts to ensure the observance of humanitarian law by their troops acting on behalf of the United Nations.

We should not be distracted from the most important issue—how best to ensure observance of humanitarian law by the parties in an armed conflict. International humanitarian law is still state-centered. The international community imposes an obligation to observe humanitarian instruments on parties to the Conventions, and they are responsible for taking the necessary measures to ensure the implementation. The law governs inter-State armed conflicts and conflicts within a State when Government forces are involved, but it generally does not apply to domestic conflicts. While the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Geneva Protocols are nearly universally accepted, most current armed conflicts take place in countries where the governments are either too weak to maintain law and order or have totally lost control of the situation. Consequently, international humanitarian law is rarely applied in current armed conflicts taking place within nations. Thus, we face the challenge of how to impose a legal obligation on combatants who are free from legal constraints.

The U.N. Security Council has established two war crimes tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, respectively. These courts are intended for the prosecution and punishment of persons who have committed serious crimes (crimes against humanity, genocide, grave breaches, etc.). Individual criminal responsibility is imposed on persons who have committed such crimes.¹⁰ While these efforts are intended to deter the commission of war crimes by the threat of severe punishment, the effect of such deterrence remains to be seen. The critical issue remains how to make the law applicable to the actual combatants who are in the midst of an armed conflict.

10. For background and the legal basis that led to the creation of the Yugoslav Tribunal, see *Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808*, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993). For information on the Rwanda Tribunal, see S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994). The Statute of the Tribunal is annexed to the resolution.

Appendix A
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations¹¹

AFRICA	ACRONYM	LOCATION	CHARACTER	DURATION
* 1. United Nations Operation in the Congo	ONUC	Congo	Military operation	June 58-Dec. 58
* 2. UN Transitional Assistance Group	UNTAG	Namibia	Multi-dimension	Apr. 89-Mar. 90
* 3. UN Angola Verification Mission I	UNAVEM I	Angola	Verification	Jan. 89-June 91
* 4. UN Angola Verification Mission II	UNAVEM II	Angola	Verification	June 91-Feb. 95
5. UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara	MINURSO	Western Sahara	Referendum	Sept. 91-Present
* 6. UN Operation in Somalia I	UNOSOM I	Somalia	Relief	Apr. 92-Apr. 93
* 7. UN Operation in Mozambique	ONUMOZ	Mozambique	Multi-dimension	Dec. 92-Dec. 94
* 8. UN Operation in Somalia II	UNOSOM II	Somalia	Protection & Relief	May 93-Mar. 95
* 9. UN Observer Mission in Uganda and Rwanda	UNOMUR	Uganda/Rwanda	Observation	June 93-Sept. 94
10. UN Observer Mission in Liberia	UNOMIL	Liberia	Observation	Sept. 93-present
11. UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda	UNAMIR	Rwanda	Assistance	Oct. 93-present
*12. UN Aouzou Strip Observer Group	UNASOG	Aouzou Strip, Chad	Observation	May 94-June 94
13. UN Angola Verification Mission III	UNAVEM III	Angola	Multi-dimension	Feb. 95-present
MIDDLE EAST				
14. UN Truce Supervision Organization	UNTSO	Jerusalem	Buffer	June 48-present
*15. UN Emergency Force	UNEF I	Suez	Buffer	Nov. 56-Jun. 67
*16. UN Observation Group in Lebanon	UNOGIL	Lebanon	Observation	June 58-Dec. 58
*17. UN Yemen Observation Mission	UNYOM	Yemen	Observation	July 63-Sept. 64
18. UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus	UNFICYP	Nicosia	Buffer	Mar. 64-present
*19. UN Emergency Force II	UNEF II	Suez	Buffer	Oct. 73-July 79
20. UN Disengagement Observer Force	UNDOF	Damascus	Observation	June 74-present
21. UN Interim Force in Lebanon	UNIFIL	Naquora, Lebanon	Observation	Mar. 78-present
*22. UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group	UNIIMOG	Iran/Iraq	Observation	Aug. 88-Mar. 90
23. UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission	UNIKOM	UMM Qasr	Observation	Apr. 91-present
ASIA/PACIFIC				
24. UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan	UNMOGIP	Rawalpindi/Srinagar	Observation	Jan. 49-present
*25. UN Security Force in West New Guinea	UNSF	West New Guinea (West Irian)	Administration	Oct. 62-Apr. 64
*26. UN India-Pakistan Observation Mission	UNIPOM	India/Pakistan	Observation	Sept. 65-Mar. 66

*27. UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan	UNGOMAP	Afghanistan/ Pakistan	Good Offices	Apr. 88-Mar. 90
*28. UN Advance Mission in Cambodia	UNAMIC	Phnom Penh	Fact-finding	Oct. 91-Mar. 92
*29. UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia	UNTAC	Phnom Penh	Administration	Mar. 92-Sept. 93
EUROPE				
30. UN Protection Force	UNPROFOR	Zagreb, Croatia	Protection & Relief	Mar. 92-present
31. UN Observer Mission in Georgia	UNOMIG	Sykhumi, Georgia	Observation	Aug. 93-present
32. UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan	UNMOT	Dushanbe, Tajikistan	Observation	Dec. 94-present
LATIN AMERICA				
33. Mission of the Representative of the SG in the Dominican Republic	DOMREP	Dominican Republic	Good Offices	May 65-Oct. 66
34. UN Observer Group in Central America	ONUSCA	Five countries	Multi-dimension	Nov. 89-Jan. 92
35. UN Observer Mission in El Salvador	ONUSAL	San Salvador	Multi-dimension	July 91-present
36. UN Mission in Haiti	UNMIH	Port-au-Prince, Haiti	Multi-dimension	Sept. 93-present

* Terminated

¹¹ This chart, which was prepared by the author's assistant, Mrs. H. Pajardo, classifies U.N. peacekeeping missions on a geographical basis. It is based on information contained in *THE BLUE HELMETS*, *supra* note 5.

