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## United Nations Peace Operations and Prospects for a Standby Force

One of the most challenging and vexing issues facing U.N. peace operations today is the proposal for the creation of a permanent, standby, rapid reaction, or on-call military force acting under U.N. authority. No such U.N. force has ever existed, and the prospects for one in the near future remain dim. Nonetheless, renewed examination of such a proposal after the Cold War and in the wake of the dramatic growth in U.N. peace operations during the post-Cold War era is both understandable and useful.

This article addresses five areas of inquiry: 1) the original intent behind Article 43 of the U.N. Charter and its fate immediately after World War II; 2) recent efforts to improve standby or rapid reaction capabilities; 3) the Secretary-General's 1995 proposal for a rapid reaction force; 4) government proposals; and 5) pragmatic next steps.

### I. Beginnings: Article 43 and Original Intent

Article 43 of the U.N. Charter is the legal mechanism by which the United Nations could have created an on-call military force after World War II. The diplomatic negotiations on what became Article 43 unfolded at Dumbarton Oaks in 1944.<sup>1</sup> The major Allied powers—the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and China—undertook a detailed examination of whether or not there should be a permanent military force for the United Nations. They concluded that there should not be a permanent force,<sup>2</sup> but opted instead for an on-call force as described in Article 43.

Under Article 43, governments of U.N. Member States are to negotiate “special agreements” with the Security Council. These Article 43 special agreements would comprise the collective capabilities of Member States that would be on call to the Security Council and ready for deployment if and when the Security Council reaches an Article 42 decision to

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1. See ROBERT C. HILDERBRAND, *DUMBARTON OAKS 140-42* (1990); RUTH B. RUSSELL, *A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER 467-72* (1958).

2. See David J. Scheffer, *Commentary on Collective Security*, in *LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 106-07* (L. Damrosch & D. Scheffer eds., 1991).

use military forces for enforcement purposes.<sup>3</sup>

The special agreement negotiated by a government would establish what would be made available to the United Nations and under what conditions. For example, if a government decided that it would provide troops or equipment or rights of passage to the United Nations, details would be settled in negotiations between that government and the United Nations.

It was entirely possible that a uniform special agreement would evolve to provide consistency in how governments would negotiate the basic process for providing troops and equipment to the United Nations. One could envisage several governments signing a collective special agreement with the United Nations. In reality, the terms of a particular bargain always turned on the negotiating process between a particular government and the United Nations.<sup>4</sup>

However, the special agreements, and thus Article 43, were stillborn. This occurred despite the fact that serious efforts were made to implement Article 43 in the late 1940s. The Big Five (United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union, France, and China) negotiated a model special agreement which would resolve the detailed arrangements for the on-call capabilities among their large military forces. The Big Five produced a text with certain key provisions still bracketed and requiring further negotiation.<sup>5</sup>

The Cold War and the realities of superpower politics intervened. The grand bargain, which appeared promising in the draft model special agreement, fell apart.<sup>6</sup> The United States and the Soviet Union in particular could not agree on the number and character of forces that Member States would provide to the United Nations. With the start of the Korean War and the resulting rift between Washington and both Moscow and Beijing over the role of the United Nations in that war, the concept of a

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3. For general discussion on the original intent behind Article 43, see GOODRICH ET AL., *CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS* 316-26 (3d ed., 1969); RUSSELL, *supra* note 1, at 678-80; HANS KELSEN, *THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS* 767-68 (4th prtng. 1964); Oscar Schachter, *Authorized Uses of Force by the United Nations and Regional Organizations*, in *LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER* 68-69 (L. Damrosch & D. Scheffer eds., 1991); D.W. BOWETT, *UNITED NATIONS FORCES* 12-18, 313-78 (1964).

4. See Russell, *supra* note 1, at 680.

5. The U.N. Military Staff Committee issued a report dated April 30, 1947, proposing general principles for implementing Article 43 that could be used in a model special agreement. For the text of the articles regarding the General Principles Governing the Organization of the Armed Forces Made Available to the Security Council by Member Nations of the United Nations, as amended by the Security Council, along with a series of introductory notes, see *UNITED NATIONS, 2 REPERTORY OF PRACTICE OF UNITED NATIONS ORGANS* 277-80 (Supp. No. 2, 1955). For the documentary record of U.S. participation in the work of the Military Staff Committee on Article 43, see *1 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES* 1946 718-21, 727-28, 759-60, 766, 769-73, 775-76, 779-80, 783-85, 790, 796-801, 802, 873-76, 894-98, 905-06, 914-15, 917-18, 930-32, 949-51 (1972); *1 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES* 1947 356-58, 390-91, 402-04, 433-36, 447-50, 465-70, 477-78, 482-84, 492-97, 632-45, 656-59, 665-70 (1973).

6. See Bowett, *supra* note 3, at 398-405; W.R. FRYE, *A UNITED NATIONS PEACE FORCE* 53-55 (1957); LARRY L. FABIAN, *SOLDIERS WITHOUT ENEMIES* 60-61 (1971).

standby U.N. force was never again seriously discussed by the Permanent Members of the Security Council.

Despite the collapse of the Article 43 negotiations among the major powers, the U.S. Congress and executive branch reached a bargain regarding Article 43, which remains part of the legislative history and federal law of the United States. This bargain was forged during the Senate debate to ratify the U.N. Charter and in the Congressional debate that preceded the passage of the U.N. Participation Act of 1945. Those debates contain a rich and fascinating story of Congress' original intent with respect to the Article 43 concept of an on-call force.<sup>7</sup>

In summary, the bargain was based on the presumption in 1945 that the U.S. Government would negotiate a special agreement with the United Nations and do so fairly soon. Assuming that the United States would commit a certain number of soldiers, officials in Washington engaged in considerable debate as to the appropriate character of an on-call force as negotiated under the special agreement. The on-call force would act in the capacity of an international police force by taking certain police actions on behalf of the U.N. Security Council in conflict areas. But the on-call force was not intended to be a war-fighting machine per se, and the U.S. Government would not be obligated to provide a war-fighting force to the United Nations. If the U.N. Security Council wanted to wage wars in order to enforce its resolutions under Chapter VII to restore international peace and security, Congress intended to play a larger role. One might summarize the Congressional view as follows:

Mr. President, we approve your special agreement with the United Nations. We have provided you with [as an example] 20,000 soldiers that you can use with the United Nations in 'police actions' without having to obtain further Congressional approval. But anything beyond that number and you will need to return to Congress for approval. We still have the power to declare war under our Constitution. Therefore we are striking a bargain. You get a certain number of soldiers for UN police actions, but beyond that you come back to us for approval.<sup>8</sup>

This bargain is reflected in Section 6 of the U.N. Participation Act of 1945,<sup>9</sup> but there has never been any reason to implement it. Neither the United States nor any other government returned to the Article 43 process after the collapse of the negotiations for a model special agreement.

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7. See generally David J. Scheffer, *War Powers and the U.N. Charter: Constraints on the President's Power to Commit U.S. Armed Forces to Combat under the Authority of the U.N. Security Council*, in *THE CONSTITUTIONAL ROLES OF CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT IN DECLARING AND WAGING WAR*, HEARING BEFORE THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 5-27 (1991); Jane E. Stromseth, *Rethinking War Powers: Congress, the President, and the United Nations*, 81 *Geo. L.J.* 597 (1993).

8. This summary is drawn from the author's paper, *supra* note 7, and the official record of Congressional deliberations in 1945. See generally Stromseth, *supra* note 7.

9. U.N. Participation Act of 1945, § 6, 59 Stat. 619 (1945) (current version at 22 U.S.C. § 28).

## II. Recent Initiatives to Improve Rapid Response Capabilities

Since U.N. peace operations grew dramatically both in number and complexity in the early 1990s, there have been several instances where the lack of a rapid deployment capability on the part of the United Nations has created great difficulties in the field. For example, the peacekeeping operation in Cambodia suffered from slow deployment of infantry battalions, civil administration units, and civilian police units, and some elements were never fully deployed. Delayed deployment of UNPROFOR infantry components posed a significant risk to the cease-fire in Croatia in early 1992. In Somalia, the delayed deployment of UNOSOM I (authorized in August of 1992 for full deployment by October of that year<sup>10</sup>) handicapped U.N. efforts to prevent deterioration of the security situation. By December 1992, with starvation taking thousands of Somali lives, the United States was compelled to obtain Security Council authorization for UNITAF, the large multinational force led by the United States.<sup>11</sup> Most dramatically, the lack of an appropriately staffed and equipped force contributed to the United Nations' inability to deter or halt the genocide which occurred throughout Rwanda in the spring of 1994.

Some deployments in the past were comparatively rapid. In 1973, the emergency force in the Middle East deployed 600 men within forty-eight hours. In 1960, several U.N. peacekeeping companies were deployed to the Congo in two days. In 1988, the U.N. observer force of 307 personnel for the border between Iran and Iraq was deployed within eleven days. These deployments occurred without a permanent force but with a political will and an ability under those circumstances to deploy quickly.<sup>12</sup>

The genocide in Rwanda in 1994 pressured the Secretary-General and intensified interest among Member States to develop means for rapid and effective responses to emergencies requiring peace operation forces.

From its inception, the Clinton Administration has been deeply involved in the development and implementation of a new policy on multilateral peace operations. This process was launched pursuant to Presidential Review Directive 13 (PRD-13), which directed relevant federal agencies to examine a wide range of reform issues for peacekeeping. In May 1994, the PRD-13 study was finalized with policy directives in Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25).<sup>13</sup>

During the PRD-13 process, Executive Branch officials deliberated on the feasibility of implementing Article 43. They decided not to pursue an Article 43 special agreement with the United Nations, especially since the U.N. Security Council had not yet initiated such agreements with Member

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10. S.C. Res. 775, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3110th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/775 (1992).

11. S.C. Res. 794, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3145th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (1992).

12. For descriptions of these operations, see UNITED NATIONS, *THE BLUE HELMETS: A REVIEW OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING* (2d ed. 1990).

13. See *United States: Administration Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations*, 33 I.L.M. 795 (1994).

States as envisaged by the Charter.<sup>14</sup> U.S. officials also determined that the PDD-25 recommendations, for a variety of reasons, were workable, pragmatic, and preferable to an Article 43 special agreement under the circumstances.

The Administration's bottom-up review of peacekeeping revealed that the infrastructure for peacekeeping remained inadequate. Officials concluded that the United States should approach a greater U.N. role in peacekeeping in an incremental fashion. The guiding principle was "to get peacekeeping right first" before further considering Article 43. Understandably, there is a natural tendency on the part of U.S. military authorities (and the militaries of other nations) to resist Article 43 because of its potential for placing national troops under U.N. command. Further, during the 1992 presidential campaign, then-Governor Bill Clinton did not pledge to sign Article 43 agreements. He spoke instead about the need for a rapid-deployment force.<sup>15</sup>

The factors for U.S. approval of and participation in U.N. peace operations set forth in PDD-25 established standards that would have to be mirrored in any special agreement negotiated under Article 43. The reform measures in PDD-25 were designed partly to enhance the standby capabilities of the United Nations, a prerequisite to Article 43 special agreements.

PDD-25 contains a series of recommendations for making U.N. peace operations more efficient and effective. Implementation of these recommendations has been an on-going Administration priority. In 1994, the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) evolved into a more fully integrated organization with improved management, planning, and logistics capabilities. The Administration has worked with the United Nations and other Member States to improve U.N. ability to respond rapidly to crises.

On September 26, 1994, the United States delivered its first standby capabilities report to the United Nations.<sup>16</sup> It lists U.S. military capabilities, as opposed to specific military units, that might be available under appropriate circumstances for use in peace operations. The U.S. submission helped fulfill the commitment of PDD-25 to make U.S. capabilities available for the full spectrum of peacekeeping and humanitarian operations.

The Administration supported the initiative to create a "United Nations Standby Arrangements System" which now includes a database

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14. U.N. CHARTER art. 43, ¶ 3.

15. See Governor Bill Clinton, *A New Covenant for American Security*, Address at Georgetown University (Dec. 12, 1991); Governor Bill Clinton, Address Before the Foreign Policy Association, in New York, N.Y. (Apr. 1, 1992); Governor Bill Clinton, Address Before Los Angeles World Affairs Council, in Los Angeles, CA (Aug. 13, 1992).

16. *Listing of Military Capabilities of the Government of the United States of America for the United Nations Standby Forces Data Base Initiative*, in Letter from Madeleine K. Albright, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, to Kofi A. Annan, U.N. Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, app. at 1-3 (Sept. 26, 1994) (on file with the *Cornell International Law Journal*) [hereinafter Albright Letter].

containing the standby capabilities of more than forty Member States. Such an information base should improve U.N. capability to plan for new and ongoing operations and should facilitate a more rapid response when peacekeeping operations are authorized by the Security Council.<sup>17</sup> To summarize the plan:

[T]he Standby Arrangements System is an efficiency enhancement process based on *conditional* offers by Member States of specified resources which could be made available within agreed response times for UN peacekeeping operations. These resources can be military individuals or units, civilian police, specialized personnel (civilian and military), services as well as material and equipment. The agreed-upon resources remain on "standby" which implies that they remain in their home country, where requisite training is conducted to prepare them to fulfill specific tasks or functions in accordance with UN training guidelines. Standby resources are to be used *exclusively* for peacekeeping operations mandated by the Security Council and should not be confused with peace-enforcement units, which are described in the *Agenda for Peace* as forces meant to respond to "outright aggression, imminent or actual". Institutionalisation of the process calls for the Member State[s] to provide the Secretariat with detailed information and data related to probable contributions from their States.<sup>18</sup>

Upon reviewing U.N. missions in which the United States participated, U.S. officials saw a clear pattern of requirements emerge. While the United Nations has a large potential base from which to draw ground troops, it has very few sources for some of the most technical and resource-intensive capabilities. It is in these areas that the United Nations most often approaches the United States, and it is in these areas that the United States believes it can make an important contribution.

In the event that the Security Council approves a U.N. peacekeeping operation and the U.S. Government decides to assist or participate in such an operation, the United Nations may approach the United States to provide the following range of capabilities:

- Strategic airlift and sealift
- Logistics including headquarters logistics support
- Medical support
- Strategic communications support
- Civil affairs and psychological operations support

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17. The mandate for the Standby Arrangements System specifies that it should evolve: "To maintain a system of standby resources, able to be deployed as a whole or in parts, anywhere in the world, at the Secretary-General's request, within agreed response times, for peace-keeping duties, as mandated by the Security Council." United Nations Standby Arrangements Systems, Briefing by U.N. Officials to Member State Representatives, in New York N.Y. (June 16, 1995) (on file with the *Cornell International Law Journal*).

18. *Id.* at 2. As of June 16, 1995, 44 Member States had confirmed their willingness to participate in the Standby Arrangements System. Thirty of the 44 Member States had provided detailed lists of specific capabilities; 10 of these States had provided the requisite volumetric information and technical data that would enable the system to work. Only Jordan and Denmark had signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the United Nations, formalizing the legal details of their contribution to the Standby Arrangements System.

- Coalition support
- Engineer support
- Information (intelligence) support
- Contracting and contract management services
- Personnel services for U.N. Headquarters staff functions<sup>19</sup>

The United States reported that this listing constitutes a basis for planning only and is not intended to indicate any prior commitment or preclude contribution of the full range of other U.S. capabilities.<sup>20</sup> The United States places great significance on the integration of the U.N. Standby Capabilities Initiative Units into the Mission Planning Service of the DPKO. In furtherance of the Standby Capabilities effort, the United States will favorably consider requests for resources that will aid in the planning and operation support of U.N. peacekeeping operations.<sup>21</sup>

### III. U.N. Secretary-General's Proposal of January 1995

In early January 1995, U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali proposed in his position paper, entitled *Supplement to the Agenda for Peace*, that serious thought should be given to creating a U.N. rapid reaction force.<sup>22</sup> The Secretary-General acknowledged the recent progress on standby arrangements but cautioned that these developments did not yet solve the problem. Although there is much interest in enabling the United Nations to respond speedily to future Rwanda-like emergencies, in 1994 none of the nineteen governments that had made standby commitments agreed to contribute to an expanded UNAMIR.

The Secretary-General proposed establishment of a "rapid reaction force" to serve as a "strategic reserve" capable of meeting emergency peacekeeping needs. It would be composed of battalion-sized units stationed in home countries and maintained at a high state of readiness. The units of the force would receive the same levels of training, use the same operating procedures, use integrated communications equipment, and exercise together regularly. The Secretary-General reported:

I have come to the conclusion that the United Nations does need to give serious thought to the idea of a rapid reaction force. Such a force would be the Security Council's strategic reserve for deployment when there was an emergency need for peacekeeping troops. It might comprise battalion-sized units from a number of countries. . . . The value of this arrangement would of course depend on how far the Security Council could be sure that the force would actually be available in an emergency. This will be a complicated and expensive arrangement, but I believe that the time has come to undertake it.<sup>23</sup>

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19. Albright Letter, *supra* note 16, at 2.

20. *Id.*

21. *Id.*

22. *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General*, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/50/60, S/1995/1 (1995).

23. *Id.* at 11, ¶ 44.

Opinion among Member States, however, remains divided on whether and how to undertake the creation of such a force. Some governments accept the Secretary-General's view that only a trained, equipped, and dedicated force can guarantee that troops will be available on-call—a condition that current standby arrangements, no matter how efficient and comprehensive, cannot meet.

Other governments are attracted to a standing force idea as a means of promoting their own causes. For instance, nations may want to reinvent an operational and authoritative Military Staff Committee so that they can exercise more control over U.N. operations. Others may want the General Assembly to play a key role in creating such a rapid reaction force and directing its operations.

However, the broader reaction among Member States is more cautious. Most Member States want to observe whether the United Nations has the capability to respond rapidly before they proceed to the next step and authorize a rapid reaction force.

The United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, and Indonesia expressed some doubts during Security Council formal discussions on the Secretary-General's report. All Council members and twenty-three non-members participated in a substantive exchange on January 18 and 19, 1995.<sup>24</sup>

U.S. concerns included whether the command structure for such a rapid reaction force would meet U.S. requirements as stipulated in PDD-25. The United States also emphasized the need to accelerate the response time and capabilities of individual countries. However, the cost of such a force could be prohibitive. Further, one could envisage a standing U.N. force being used only once, remaining in the mission area for an extended period of time, and thus defeating its intended purpose for rapid deployment in any subsequent operations.

U.S. Permanent Representative Madeleine K. Albright argued that setting aside national troops for this exclusive purpose could lead to high costs with low utility. Instead, she argued that the focus should be on accelerating the response time of U.S. support for rapidly deployable headquarters teams and logistics units and in providing a contracted lift capability.<sup>25</sup> Japan and the United Kingdom also focused on more rapid deployment; the United Kingdom offered to send a force planning team to assist the DPKO.<sup>26</sup>

The Security Council as a whole commented on the Secretary-General's report on February 22, 1995. As a permanent member of the Council, the U.S. Government joined in the following collective assessment by Council members:

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24. U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3492d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.3492 (1995).

25. *Id.* at 22-25.

26. For the U.K. position, see U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3492d mtg., at 2-5, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3492 (1995); for the statement of the Japanese representative, see *id.* at 33-36.

The Security Council shares the Secretary-General's concern regarding the availability of troops and equipment for peacekeeping operations. It recalls earlier statements by the President of the Council on the subject and reiterates the importance of improving the capacity of the United Nations for rapid deployment and reinforcement of operations. To that end, it encourages the Secretary-General to continue his study of options aimed at improving the capacity for such rapid deployment and reinforcement. The Council believes that the first priority in improving the capacity for rapid deployment should be the further enhancement of the existing standby arrangements, covering the full spectrum of resources, including arrangements for lift and headquarters capabilities, required to mount and execute peacekeeping operations. It strongly encourages the Secretary-General to take further steps in this regard, including the establishment of a comprehensive database to cover civilian as well as military resources. In this context, it considers that particular attention should be given to the greatest possible interoperability between elements identified in such arrangements. The Council reiterates its call to Member States not already doing so to participate in the standby arrangements. While affirming the principle that contributing Governments should ensure that their troops arrive with all the equipment needed to be fully operational, the Council also encourages the Secretary-General and Member States to continue to consider means, whether in the context of standby arrangements or more broadly, to address the requirements of contingents which may need additional equipment or training.<sup>27</sup>

#### IV. Government Proposals

In April 1995, the Dutch Government introduced a thirty-three page proposal detailing a plan for a "UN Rapid Deployment Brigade" to be deployable immediately following a Security Council decision to mount an operation.<sup>28</sup> Such a U.N. brigade would have a flexible capacity to undertake several tasks: preventive deployment, peacekeeping during the interval between Security Council authorization and the arrival of a regular U.N. peacekeeping operation, Chapter VII operations, and humanitarian emergency situations.

The proposed U.N. brigade would consist of light infantry with armored vehicles. For air and sea lift, reinforcement, replacement, and evacuation, the U.N. brigade would require the assistance of Member States. Personnel would be individually recruited and either based at one location or distributed, on a battalion basis, over several locations.

The Canadian Government has embarked on a more systematic study with more comprehensive, phased recommendations. The Canadians have recommended creation of a standing "U.N. Vanguard Force." The Canadian Foreign Affairs and Defense Ministries are looking at U.N.

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27. *Statement By the President of the Security Council*, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3503d mtg., at 2-3, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/1995/9 (1995).

28. *Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations in All Their Aspects*, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Agenda Item 79, U.N. Doc. A/49/886, S/1995/276 (1995).

options in the short, medium, and long-term and have solicited views from other governments.

Meanwhile, the United States is uniquely capable of pursuing the following activities, mandated by PDD-25 and critical to any effort to improve U.N. rapid reaction capabilities:

1. Help the United Nations develop a rapidly deployable headquarters team.
2. Help the United Nations develop a composite initial logistics support unit. The United States can assist with developing a surge capability in strategic (wholesale) logistics. The United States remains almost the only source for this capability, which is needed both in the start-up and wind-down of U.N. peace operations. The United States can continue its targeted assistance in management and logistics reforms that will assist the United Nations in focusing requests during these surge periods.
3. Help the United Nations develop an airlift capability available at very short notice through pre-negotiated contracts with commercial carriers and Member States.
4. Help the United Nations develop larger and better qualified civilian resources for peace operations (for example, a civilian reserve corps). The United States can assist the United Nations to acquire the services of specialized support personnel (in technical fields and trades) through commercial contracts.
5. Help the United Nations budget for new operations. This is critical. Once the Security Council approves a mission to address a fast-breaking security problem, the United Nations needs a fast-track means of financing start-up costs so that the mission can deploy immediately. (In March 1994 the Secretary-General proposed that Member States be immediately assessed one-third of the total amount included in the financial implications estimate provided to the Security Council.)<sup>29</sup>

## V. Pragmatic Next Steps

In the near-term, nations should strengthen the standby capabilities of national forces in preparation for potential multinational peace operations. The United Nations must develop as much flexibility as possible in order to respond effectively to emergencies.

In that spirit, there are two pragmatic means available to address the issue of rapid deployment. First, it is necessary to improve the infrastructure of the United Nations, particularly of the DPKO, in order to undertake a wider range of military operations. In this area, guided by PDD-25, the United States has taken the lead to improve the efficiency, staffing, headquarters capabilities, information net, and command responsibilities of the United Nations.

Second, the Secretary-General himself has recognized the difficulties associated with the current state of U.N. enforcement action. In fact, he

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29. See *Improving the Capacity of the United Nations for Peacekeeping: Report of the Secretary-General*, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Agenda Items 87, 138, U.N. Doc. A/48/403, S/26450 (1994). See also U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., 28th mtg., at 23-24, U.N. Doc. A/49/PV.28 (1994).

has acknowledged that, in many respects, it is unrealistic to expect successful enforcement action under Chapter VII at this time.<sup>30</sup> The Secretary-General has discussed the advantages and disadvantages of U.N. authorization of coalition actions.<sup>31</sup> In the past, he has encouraged U.N.-authorized coalition actions in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Haiti.

On July 31, 1994, the Security Council authorized the U.S.-led multinational force that eventually entered Haiti on September 19, 1994.<sup>32</sup> The United States was able to bring its forces together relatively quickly to spearhead the Haiti operation. Similarly, the French volunteered to enter Rwanda and did so, but only with U.N. Security Council authorization.<sup>33</sup> In Bosnia, NATO has acted only under the authorization of the Security Council.<sup>34</sup>

It is clearly possible to obtain rapid reaction capabilities by combining Security Council authorization with multinational coalition action. These coalitions will test the political will of Member States. Governments must find the best way to balance the Secretary-General's willingness to use coalitions as a crutch—a necessary one, particularly for large operations—and the U.S. Government's attraction to such coalitions because they permit the United States to structure command, control, and effectiveness of the force. Despite the considerable cost of coalitions, they enhance flexibility, provided there is political will among the Member States.

We should not completely rule out the possibility of establishing a rapid reaction force. The Rwanda experience was tragically instructive for the Security Council and all Member State governments. The post-genocide experience has been equally instructive. For example, the countries on the U.N. standby list were not willing to send troops to provide refugee camp security in Zaire in late 1994.

Many commentators are attracted to the concept of an all-volunteer

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30. The Secretary-General recently stated that

[o]ne of the achievements of the Charter of the United Nations was to empower the Organization to take enforcement action against those responsible for threats to the peace, breaches of the peace or acts of aggression. However, neither the Security Council nor the Secretary-General at present has the capacity to deploy, direct, command and control operations for this purpose, except perhaps on a very limited scale. I believe that it is desirable in the long term that the United Nations develop such a capacity, but it would be folly to attempt to do so at the present time when the Organization is resource-starved and hard pressed to handle the less demanding peacemaking and peacekeeping responsibilities entrusted to it.

*Supplement to An Agenda For Peace*, *supra* note 22, at 18.

31. *Id.* at 18-19.

32. S.C. Res. 940, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3413th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (1994).

33. S.C. Res. 925, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3388th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/925 (1994).

34. *See* S.C. Res. 781, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3122d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/781 (1992); S.C. Res. 824, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3208th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/824 (1993); S.C. Res. 836, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3228th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/836 (1993); S.C. Res. 844, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3241st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/844 (1993).

force comprised of individuals from different countries.<sup>35</sup> Problems associated with an all-volunteer force, however, include its cost, training, command, and the temptation to use it for ambitious but potentially unworthy aims. Such a force may tempt the United Nations to become the global policeman in a manner that the Security Council ultimately will have a hard time controlling.

One of the fundamental purposes of PDD-25 is to force decision-makers to consider a rigorous set of factors before deploying troops, whether rapidly or otherwise. The United Nations has embraced these factors to a large extent.<sup>36</sup> The purpose is to require the Council members to consider carefully whether or not to send their own troops and those of non-Council members into possible hostilities. The existence of a rapid reaction force comprised of volunteers could compel Council members to act without due regard for the factors.

In the future, we should continue to examine the feasibility of a rapid reaction force. However, the Administration's first priority is to properly build the peacekeeping infrastructure. The United Nations Standby Arrangements System is a critical part of that infrastructure and merits full cooperation by Member States. In addition to traditional peacekeeping operations, U.N.-authorized coalition efforts—admittedly complex operations for which Security Council approval is by no means simple—may have to be the interim solution for Chapter VII operations before the Council and Member States take larger steps toward an actual on-call capability as originally envisaged in the U.N. Charter.

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35. See, e.g., Brian Urquhart, *For a UN Volunteer Military Force*, N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS 3 (1993).

36. See, e.g., U.N. documents described in 33 I.L.M. 795 (1994).