World Bank’s Inspection Panel: Promoting True Accountability through Arbitration

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The World Bank's Inspection Panel: Promoting True Accountability Through Arbitration

Enrique R. Carrasco†† & Alison K. Guernsey†††

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Introduction

In September 1993, the World Bank (the Bank) created the Inspection Panel (the Panel). The creation of the Panel was, at the time, an unprecedented effort to increase the Bank's accountability. Prior to the establishment of the Panel, the Bank had engaged in a number of projects that devastated local populations and caused significant environmental damage. One highly visible project involved the Sardar Sarovar Dam on the Narmada River in India. In the late 1980s, the Bank advanced India a loan to build a dam that would supply water to 30 million people and irrigate crops to feed another 20 million. The project was deeply flawed, however, requiring the unanticipated relocation of thousands of people and threatening to cause widespread soil erosion.

Lewis Preston, then President of the World Bank, commissioned an independent review of the project, known as the Morse Commission (the Commission). The Commission's report revealed that the Bank had perversely failed to follow its own social and environmental policies in project lending. Another internal review of the Bank, known as the

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3. Id. at 5.
8. Rajagopal, supra note 7, at 568. The Commission recommended the Bank withdraw from the project. Id. Nevertheless, the Bank Management decided to press forward, and Preston personally advocated action to remedy the project's shortcomings. Steven A. Holmes, India Cancels Dam Loan From World Bank, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1993, at A5. Given the significant public sentiment against the dam project and the frequent
Wapenhans Report, described a "culture of approval" at the Bank—an attitude that emphasized increasing the Bank's loan portfolio without adequately taking into account the social and environmental consequences of the project lending. After unrelenting pressure from environmental and human rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the World Bank established the Inspection Panel with the hope of bringing transparency to the Bank's project lending.

The Inspection Panel is comprised of three members who are appointed by the World Bank, but the Panel is ostensibly independent from the larger institution. Generally, the Panel is charged with investigating complaints filed by parties in borrower countries who believe that the Bank is violating its policies or procedures in the design, preparation, or implementation of a Bank-funded project. The Panel deals exclusively with claims relating to the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), which focuses on providing loans to "middle income and creditworthy poor countries" and the International Development Association (IDA), which "focuses on the poorest countries in the world." The Panel's jurisdiction does not extend to the risk-mitigation or private-sector investment arms of the World Bank.

To bring a claim to the Panel, the party requesting investigation (Requester) must believe that actual or likely harm will result from the


Hunter, supra note 4, at 438-39, 442.


Id.


Ragazzi, supra note 11, at 503. The Bank's private-sector investment arm is the International Finance Corporation (IFC); the risk mitigation department is the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). See Hunter, supra note 4, at 443. Instead of being subject to the mandate of the Inspection Panel, these institutions are reviewed by the Office of the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (CAO). See Compliance Advisor Ombudsman, http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2008). See generally Compliance Advisor Ombudsman, Operational Guidelines (2007) [hereinafter CAO Guidelines]. The CAO uses mediation and other dispute resolution methods, followed by compliance audits of questioned projects, and ultimately provides advice to the institutions' senior management about the application and effectiveness of the IFC and MIGA's policies. Id. at 5, 17. While it is beyond the scope of this article, members of civil society have called for the creation of an additional accountability mechanism for MIGA and IFC based, in part, on the existing Inspection Panel. See, e.g., CTR. FOR INT'L ENVTL. LAW & FRIENDS OF THE EARTH-U.S., Draft Proposal for an Independent Review Panel for the International Finance Corporation Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (Aug. 15, 1997), http://www.ciel.org/ifi/ifcre.html.
Bank's failure to adhere to its policies and procedures.\textsuperscript{15} Requesters must also bring their concerns to the Bank's attention before filing a claim.\textsuperscript{16} The Panel's functions and procedures are outlined in its Operating Procedures and its founding Resolution.\textsuperscript{17} As of May 2008, there have been fifty-two requests for inspections.\textsuperscript{18}

Despite its novelty when it was established in 1993, there are many critiques of the Panel. Generally, critics question whether the Panel truly increases the accountability of the World Bank on the whole.\textsuperscript{19} Critics often point out that the Panel has a limited substantive mandate and no ability to grant relief.\textsuperscript{20} Furthermore, the Panel fails to give affected people a true voice in the outcome of an investigation. After the Panel receives the claim, the Bank rarely considers the affected communities' desires for resolution. In essence, the Panel is compliance-oriented and problem-solving is not a principal focus.\textsuperscript{21}

This article proposes an alternative to the current Inspection Panel process that would offer real and meaningful accountability. Our proposal envisions a two-stage process that first would require claimant communities to file a Request for Claim Resolution with a newly created Office of Claims Resolution (OCR) at the World Bank. The Director of the OCR would appoint an independent Intermediator who would attempt to solve the problem created by the Bank's alleged noncompliance with its own policies and procedures. We expect that the Intermediator would resolve most claims at the administrative level. If, however, the Intermediator failed to resolve the claim or if the Bank agreed to corrective measures but failed to abide by them, claimant communities would have the option to institute arbitration proceedings against the Bank. The proceedings would be conducted based on a modified version of the Optional Rules for Arbitration between International Organizations and Private Parties which is produced by the Permanent Court of Arbitration. The arbitral tribunal would consist of three arbitrators and could sit in any location that would best facilitate the proceedings. The tribunal's decision would be public, final, and binding upon the parties. Its award could set forth corrective measures that the

\textsuperscript{15} Operating Procedures, supra note 1, at 513.


\textsuperscript{17} See generally Operating Procedures, supra note 1; Panel Process, supra note 16.


\textsuperscript{19} See, e.g., Clark, supra note 9, at 206.

\textsuperscript{20} See id. at 217-19.

\textsuperscript{21} But see Eisuke Suzuki & Suresh Nanwani, Responsibility of International Organizations: The Accountability Mechanisms of Multilateral Development Banks, 27 Mich. J. Int'l L. 177, 220-21 (2005) (stating that while the Inspection Panel is focused on compliance review, the Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman (CAO) is the problem-solving cornerstone).
Bank would be required to follow to bring it into compliance with its poli-
cies and procedures. The tribunal could also award damages to the claim-
ant community.

Our article is structured as follows. Part I discusses the background behind the establishment of the Bank's Inspection Panel. Part II explains the Inspection Panel procedure. Part III sets forth the major criticisms of the Inspection Panel. Part IV reviews the various proposals observers have made to reform the Inspection Panel in light of the criticisms. Part V sets forth our proposal. The article concludes with a discussion of why we believe our proposal improves upon other reform proposals by using an independent arbitration mechanism to bring about effective accountability on the part of the World Bank.

I. Development of the Inspection Panel

The findings of the Morse Commission and the Wapenhans Report were two of the major impetuses for the establishment of an accountability mechanism at the World Bank.22 Charged with evaluating the Bank's role in the Sardar Sarovar Dam and Canal project on the Narmarda River in India,23 the Morse Commission was the entity responsible for the first "independent review of a Bank-supported project under implementa-
tion."24 After its investigation, the Commission published a report in June 1992 illustrating the Bank's major failures—particularly the environmental and human-rights problems resulting from the Bank's refusal to follow its own policies and procedures during the project's execution.25

The Wapenhans Report, the product of a committee of Bank personnel commissioned to review the Bank's operating procedures generally, was issued a few months later in November 1992.26 The report highlighted the Bank's need to change its "approval culture," whereby the Bank often disregarded the "commitment of borrowers and their implementing agencies," as well as "the degree of 'ownership' assumed by borrowers" over such

22. See generally Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, The World Bank Inspection Panel: In Prac-
tice (2d ed. 2000); Daniel D. Bradlow, International Organizations and Private Com-
(1994).

23. Shihata, supra note 22, at 5-8 (highlighting the Bank's project on the Narmada
River as "[t]he most important case to draw public attention to the accountability
issue"). See generally Indep. Evaluation Group, The World Bank Group, Learning
JavaSearch/12A795722EA20F6E852567F5005D8933 (last visited Oct. 31, 2008) [here-
inafter Learning from Narmada] (discussing the problems that the projects posed for
western India).

24. Learning from Narmada, supra note 23.

25. Inspection Panel 10 Years On, supra note 7, at 2. Ultimately, the Commission
recommended that the Bank reconsider the project. Id. Instead, the Bank continued
with the projects under a set of standards that it developed in consultation with Indian
authorities. Learning from Narmada, supra note 23. In March 2003, the Indian govern-
ment decided to continue with the project with other sources of funding, and it
requested that the Bank cancel the remaining portion of its loan for the project. Id.

Given the critical findings of these two studies, the debate within the Bank at that time was not whether the Bank should institute a review mechanism during the implementation stage of Bank projects, but rather what type of entity the Bank should create.

Generally, the proposals for a review mechanism fell into two categories: 1) proposals calling for an independent unit within the Bank and 2) proposals calling for a mechanism wholly independent from the Bank.

In February 1993, four Executive Directors of the Bank submitted a memorandum to Bank President Lewis Preston favoring the in-house review mechanism. As Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, the Bank's Senior Vice President and General Counsel, described in the content of the memorandum, the Directors' proposal "envisaged a small permanent unit, [to which] one to three inspectors selected from among experienced Bank officers 'of the highest caliber with the necessary independence,'" would be appointed.

Conversely, during a U.S. House of Representatives Hearing in May 1993, various NGOs advocated for an independent, out-of-house investigatory body. Furthermore, having decided that a permanent independent body was the only acceptable review mechanism, the U.S. Congress attempted to influence the Bank's decision by tying government funding to institutional reforms. Although the proposal never progressed beyond a

27. Id. at 2-3. The Wapenhans Report stated, in short, that to improve the performance of its portfolio, the Bank needed to change its own policies and practices. See generally THE WORLD BANK, GETTING RESULTS: THE WORLD BANK'S AGENDA FOR IMPROVING DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS (1993) [hereinafter GETTING RESULTS] (summarizing the findings of the Wapenhans Report, submitted to the Executive Directors as THE WORLD BANK'S PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT TASK FORCE, EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION: KEY TO DEVELOPMENT IMPACT (1992)).

28. SHIHATA, supra note 22, at 16-21 (describing the different proposals for review mechanisms).

29. See Bradlow, supra note 22, at 567-68.

30. See id. at 565-67.

31. SHIHATA, supra note 22, at 17-18.


33. SHIHATA, supra note 22, at 17.

34. Id. at 20-21 & n. 43 (citing numerous environmental groups who gave testimony advocating for an "independent appeals commission" and outlining various proposals).

35. Ian A. Bowles & Cyril F. Kormos, The American Campaign for Environmental Reforms at the World Bank, 23 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 211, 219-20 (1999). To emphasize its concern with the Bank's operations, the U.S. government threatened to withhold the tenth replenishment of the Bank's International Development Association (IDA) funds if the Bank did not establish an inspection panel by the end of 1993. Id. The then Chair of the Authorizing Subcommittee in the House of Representatives, Congressman Barney Frank, apparently told the Bank's Managing Director, Ernest Stern, that Congress did not have time to authorize IDA funding as long as the Bank failed to find time to create an inspection panel. Id. at 220. More strikingly, U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy, the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman at the time, wrote to Bank President Preston in June 1993 to outline Congress' concerns over the findings of the Wapenhans Report. Id. at 219. In that letter, Leahy stated that considering the Wapenhans Report
committee draft, that the United States wanted an inspection panel that was wholly independent was not lost on the Bank.36

Other outside institutions also presented proposals for accountability mechanisms. For example, in testimony before the Canadian Parliament and the U.S. House of Representatives, Professor Daniel Bradlow advocated for the appointment of an ombudsperson to handle complaints about the Bank.37 He emphasized that to be effective, the ombudsperson “would be independent of the bank staff [and] should not be drawn from the bank staff.”38 Under this proposal, the ombudsperson would receive and investigate complaints from the public about the Bank’s failure to comply with its own policies and procedures and, in a purely advisory role, would make recommendations to the Bank’s Executive Directors on which complaints to investigate and how to respond to the findings of past investigations.39 Bradlow engaged in various discussions about his proposal with Bank Management, but it ultimately was abandoned for a panel, rather than a single-person, approach.40

II. Inspection Panel Procedure and Evolution

Since its inception, the Inspection Panel’s role has been to address the concerns of those who are “affected by Bank projects and to ensure that the Bank adheres to its operational policies and procedures in the design, preparation, and implementation of such projects.”41 In theory, the Panel ful-

and the findings of the Morse Commission, “serious consideration should be given to establishing a permanent, independent commission for investigating public concerns about Bank-financed projects.” Id. (citing Letter from Patrick Leahy, Senator, U.S. Congress, to Lewis Preston, President, World Bank (June 7, 1993)).

36. SHIHATA, supra note 22, at 22-23. A substantially modified conditional IDA proposal was incorporated into appropriation legislation after the establishment of the Panel in October 1993. Id.


38. Daniel Bradlow, Why the World Bank Needs an Ombudsman, FIN. TIMES, July 14, 1993, at 13. In his article, Bradlow provides more information about the specific duties and functions that should be associated with the ombudsperson position. See id.


40. SHIHATA, supra note 22, at 19.

41. INSPECTION PANEL 10 YEARS ON, supra note 7, at 3. See generally SHIHATA, supra note 22, at 88-93 (discussing the history of decisions relating to the Panel’s composition). The World Bank annually lends between U.S. $15 to $20 billion “for projects in the more than 100 countries it works with”). The World Bank, Projects and Operations, The Project Cycle, http://web.worldbank.org/WSBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/0,,contentMDK:20120731-menuPK:41390-pagePK:41367-piPK:51533-theSitePK:40941,00.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2008). The Bank has identified seven phases of the project cycle. First, the Bank “works with a borrowing country’s government . . . to determine how financial and other assistance can . . . have the largest impact.” Id. During this stage, the Bank focuses on strategies for reducing poverty and raising the standard of living. Id. Second, the Bank takes an advisory role in the project preparation and
fills its role by providing an independent forum where those harmed by a World Bank-financed project can complain. Panel-member Werner Kiene has stated that the Inspection Panel differs from many accountability and recourse mechanisms. In his view, the Panel represents a shift in development paradigms—it is a mechanism of “development-by-below,” whereby beneficiaries of Bank policies are able to demand responses to problems themselves. Although the Inspection Panel has increased the World Bank’s accountability, critics have pointed to various flaws that limit the Panel’s effectiveness.

A. The 1993 Resolution Establishing the Inspection Panel

Pursuant to the 1993 Resolution that established the Inspection Panel, the Panel is composed of a group of “three members of different nationalities from Bank member countries.” The President of the World Bank nominates these members, and the Bank’s Executive Directors ultimately appoint them. In an effort to help maintain the Panel’s independence from the larger Bank, anyone who has worked as Bank staff in the two years prior is prohibited from serving on the Panel. Moreover, once hav-
ing served on the Panel, Panel members cannot work for the Bank again. 48

The 1993 Resolution also sets forth the basic criteria by which the Board expects the Panel to operate. 49 Although the method of operation has not changed substantially since the Panel’s foundation in 1993, there have been important changes to the manner in which the Board approves Panel requests to investigate. The Bank’s Board made these changes through the 1996 and 1999 Clarifications, 50 thereby turning the Panel into a more regular, if not yet fully accepted, part of the Bank’s structure.

B. Standing to Bring Request Review Before the Panel

The Panel’s operating procedures explicitly limit access to the Panel via standing requirements. 51 First, the procedures authorize complaints only from a “group” of people, not an individual. 52 The 1996 Clarification defines a group as “any two or more persons who share some common interests or concerns.” 53 Second, the group must claim that “an action or omission of the Bank . . . to follow its own operational policies and procedures during the design, appraisal and/or implementation of a Bank-financed project”—which includes both project lending and development-policy lending 54—will have an “actual or threatened material adverse effect
on the group’s rights or interests.” In other words, there must be a clear connection between the harm that the affected people are suffering, or are about to suffer, and the Bank’s policy.

For example, in the Lesotho Highlands Water Project in South Africa the Inspection Panel refused to recommend remedial measures because of a lack of causation. In that case, the claimants complaint to the Inspection Panel stated that African towns were going to suffer a “dramatic increase in water prices for what was Africa’s largest-ever dam project,” and that the “[Bank’s technical advice to the South African government] resulted in a distortion of water management policies and placed a disproportionate cost on poor townships.” The Inspection Panel did not recommend an investigation, however, because “there [did] not appear to be a connection between these conditions and any observance or not by the Bank of its own policies and procedures. Rather, they appear to be a part of the enormous legacy and odious burden of apartheid.”

Third, even if the Requester can satisfy this requirement, before filing such a claim the Requester is required to take steps “to bring the matter to the attention of [Bank] Management with a result unsatisfactory to the Requester.” The Panel has indicated that “[i]t is useful, if possible, for Requesters to attach copies of any correspondence between affected people and the Bank to demonstrate that steps had been previously taken to try to get complaints resolved.”

Parties other than the affected parties are authorized to file claims with the Inspection Panel as well. For example, any one of the Bank’s Executive

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55. Operating Procedures, supra note 1, at 512.


59. Operating Procedures, supra note 1, at 512; Clark, supra note 9, at 218 (“The Panel is intended to be a forum of last resort, and local people must first exhaust other remedies by raising their concerns with the Bank prior to filing a claim.”).

60. INSPECTION PANEL 10 YEARS ON, supra note 7, at 7.
Directors may request an investigation. The procedures also authorize local or foreign representatives, such as NGOs, acting on the explicit instructions of affected people to bring requests to the Panel. In the case of foreign representation, however, "the Panel will require clear evidence that there is no adequate or appropriate representation in the country where the project is located." According to Panel procedures, the circumstances warranting non-local representation must be "exceptional." This requirement emerged as a compromise between NGOs in developed countries that wanted to represent affected peoples in foreign nations and borrowing-country governments that "feared intervention of foreign parties" in their relationships with their citizens and "the increased politicization and internationalization of their domestic issues."

Notably, the Board is ultimately charged with determining whether exceptional circumstances exist. As one scholar has pointed out, vesting ultimate authority to make this determination with the Board undermines the independent nature of the Panel. The Executive Directors can be "politically motivated" in their role as policymakers for the institution and thus should not be authorized to make an eligibility determination under a system that is purportedly independent from the Bank.

In the history of the Inspection Panel, there has only been one instance in which the Board has permitted wholly non-local representation: the China Western Poverty Reduction Project. When this project was first implemented, people in the affected area feared they would be harmed if they spoke against it and instead sent letters to an NGO in Washington, D.C., the International Campaign for Tibet (ICT), with the aim of "seeking international assistance in raising concerns about the devastating impacts of the project on local peoples." The Tibetan Govern-

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61. Operating Procedures, supra note 1, at 513.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 514.
64. Inspection Panel Resolution, supra note 45, ¶ 12; see also Dana L. Clark, CTR. FOR INT’L ENVT'L. LAW, A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL 10 (2d ed. 1999) (stating that exceptional circumstances “could include countries where local NGOs are not allowed to operate or where there is a risk of retaliation”).
65. Shihata, supra note 22, at 65.
66. Operating Procedures, supra note 1, at 517 (“The Board decides whether or not to accept or reject the Panel’s recommendation; and, if the Requester is a non-local representative, whether exceptional circumstances exist and suitable local representation is not available.”).
67. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 9, at 218-19.
69. For a copy of the request for inspection that the International Campaign for Tibet filed on behalf of the affected persons, see Int’l Campaign for Tibet, China W. Poverty Reduction Project, Request for Inspection, June 18, 1999 [hereinafter ICT Request], available at http://www.elaw.org/node/1571.
70. Clark, supra note 64, at 18.
71. Letter from Jim MacNeill, Chairman, Inspection Panel, to John Ackerly, President, Bhuchung Tsering, Dir., Int’l Campaign for Tibet (June 18, 1999), available at
ment in Exile also sought ICT's help in filing a claim with the Panel.\(^72\)

In its request for inspection on behalf of the affected persons, the ICT included an annex detailing the basis for its representational authority.\(^73\) ICT claimed that the "exceptional" threshold had been met because "local people affected by the . . . [p]roject [were] unlikely to access . . . information about the existence of the Inspection Panel, or to have access to NGOs in their country who would be able to provide documentation about the existence of the Panel or the Bank's policies and procedures." Even assuming the presence of NGOs, however, the ICT argued that no one in Tibet could "safely bring a claim" because of the Chinese's treatment of dissidents.\(^74\) Ultimately, the Board never commented upon ICT's eligibility and the Panel's request for a determination of the issue, but it did authorize an inspection.\(^76\)

The operating procedures outline the precise requirements for what a Requester must include in the request to the Panel. Generally, the Requester must include a description of the project at issue, "an explanation of how Bank policies, procedures or contractual documents were seriously violated," the harm that the party suffered, and what steps the Requester has already taken to resolve the issue with the Bank.\(^77\) If the party is not sure what policies apply, the Panel will identify what policies, if any, are implicated "[o]n the basis of the factual situation and elements of harm presented."\(^78\) The Panel provides a model form for those who wish to request inspection, although a simple letter with all of the relevant information is also sufficient.\(^79\)

\(^72\) http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/Resources/ChinaNOR.pdf (outlining the International Campaign for Tibet's claim that "[g]iven the location of this project and the situation faced by local people, this claim meets the exceptional circumstances requirement for non-local representation").

\(^73\) Id.

\(^74\) Id. (citing a U.S. Department of State report's conclusion that there are "no independent domestic NGO's that publicly monitor or comment on human rights conditions").

\(^75\) Id. at Annex B2 ("The most dangerous consequence to local peoples is of imprisonment and harsh treatment in imprisonment. Less obvious, but more common risks include interference in a complainant's or suspected complainant's ability to maintain housing, livelihood, education and medical services.").


\(^77\) Operating Procedures, supra note 1, at 513.

\(^78\) INSPECTION PANEL 10 YEARS ON, supra note 7, at 7.

\(^79\) Operating Procedures, supra note 1, at 513-14; see also INSPECTION PANEL 10 YEARS ON, supra note 7, at 161-62 (reproducing the Panel's model form). The Office of the Inspection Panel is also available to consult with people interested in making a
C. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

There are limitations on the subject matter jurisdiction of the Inspection Panel. Its procedures only empower the Panel to review Bank compliance with its 1) operational policies, which "establish the parameters for the conduct of operations [and] also describe the circumstances under which exceptions to policies are permissible and . . . who authorizes exceptions;" 2) bank procedures, which "explain how Bank staff carry out the policies set out in the [operating procedures] by spelling out the procedures and documentation required to ensure Bank wide consistency and quality;" and 3) operational directives, which "contain a mixture of policies, procedures, and guidance."\(^80\)

The Panel is not authorized to investigate Bank compliance regarding actions of "other parties (such as the borrowing government, the implementing agency, a corporation, the [International Finance Corporation,] IFC, or the [Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency,] MIGA)."\(^81\) Also precluded from Panel review are "[c]laims by actual or potential suppliers of products or services" and "[c]omplaints filed after the closing date of the loan," or when less than 5% of the loan is outstanding.\(^82\) The claim is also precluded if the Panel has already inquired into a matter on a previous request, unless the Requester is able to show that there is new evidence or new circumstances surrounding the issue.\(^83\) For example, the Panel rejected a request for investigation based on eligibility in the Request for Inspection of the Public Works and Employment Creation Project in Burundi. The Requesters complained about the "lack of due process for procurement of services in a Project-related concession agreement," but the claim was not eligible for inspection because it related to procurement.\(^84\)

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81. INSPECTION PANEL 10 YEARS ON, supra note 7, at 9. See generally CAO GUIDELINES, supra note 14 (describing the IFC and MIGA).

82. INSPECTION PANEL 10 YEARS ON, supra note 7, at 9. In addition to potentially reducing the number of projects that would be subject to the Inspection Panel's jurisdiction, the Bank's directors advocated for a disbursement limitation as a way to ensure that the Panel would not have the power to review matters "falling within the purview of the Banks Operations Evaluation Department," which is now known as the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG). SHIHATA, supra note 22, at 52 n.52. The IEG's purpose is to assess "what works, and what does not; how a borrower plans to run and maintain a project; and the lasting contribution of the Bank to a country's overall development." Indep. Evaluation Group, The World Bank, About IEG, http://www.worldbank.org/oed/about.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2008).

83. INSPECTION PANEL 10 YEARS ON, supra note 7, at 9.

D. The Panel's Action on a Request

Once the Panel receives a request, the "process can be ... divided into three stages: registration, eligibility, and investigation."85 During the registration component, the Panel makes the Bank and the public aware that a Requester has filed a complaint and completes a quick review to ensure that the group has standing and that the Panel has jurisdiction over the claim.86 The Panel's operating procedures do not provide a specific time-line within which this registration review must take place, but they do require that the Panel "promptly register the Request, or ask for additional information, or find the Request outside the Panel's mandate."87 For the most recent requests that the Panel receives, the complaints are registered within a week.88 The Panel views this first step as an "administrative" one, the primary purpose of which is to prevent "complaints that are obviously outside its mandate, that are anonymous, or that are manifestly frivolous."89

Generally, whether or not the Panel can register the request is fairly clear. For example, in 1995, the Inspection Panel refused to register a request filed by a number of Chilean citizens and a Chilean NGO.90 The Requesters claimed that the International Finance Corporation (IFC), a part of the bank that provides loans to private companies,91 "had violated [the Bank's] relevant policies regarding indigenous peoples and environmental assessment and failed to supervise properly the implementation of the project."92 The Inspection Panel concluded, however, that its mandate clearly limited its investigatory powers to projects under the IBRD and the IDA. Because the Panel did not have power over IFC projects, it refused to

85. INSPECTION PANEL 10 YEARS ON, supra note 7, at 8.
86. Operating Procedures, supra note 1, at 514-15; INSPECTION PANEL 10 YEARS ON, supra note 7, at 9.
87. Operating Procedures, supra note 1, at 514.
89. INSPECTION PANEL 10 YEARS ON, supra note 7, at 8.
91. SHIHATA, supra note 22, at 33-34 (stating that in the Board discussion of the draft Resolution, Executive Directors suggested the IFC should be included in the Panel's work but that the question of whether the Resolution's application may be extended to cover the IFC's operation is an issue still under consideration).
investigate.\footnote{Chile Financing, supra note 90 (stating that the Request was not registered because the project was not financed by the IBRD or the IDA). Out of the forty-nine requests for inspection thus far, the Inspection Panel has refused to register five of them. The Inspection Panel, The World Bank, Requests by Request Number, http://web.worldbank.org/WEBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/0,,contentMDK:20221606-menuPK:64129250-pagePK:64129751-piPK:64128378-theSitePK:380794,00.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2008) (listing all of the requests, including the non-registered ones from Burundi, Cameroon, India, Chile, and Ethiopia).}

Once a claim is registered, the eligibility phase begins, and the Panel forwards the complaint to the Bank’s President. The Bank’s Management, through the Bank’s President, must respond to the Panel’s inquiry within twenty-one business days,\footnote{Id.} providing evidence that the Bank “has complied, or intends to comply with the Bank’s relevant polices and procedures.”\footnote{Id.} When the Panel receives Management’s response, it has another twenty-one business days to evaluate whether Management has truly remedied, or intends to remedy, the problem.\footnote{Id.}

One factor that the Panel may consider when deciding whether to recommend an investigation is whether Management “dealt appropriately with the subject matter of the request . . . [and] demonstrated clearly that it has followed the required policies and procedures.”\footnote{Id.} If so, then this may weigh in favor of recommending no further action.\footnote{Id.} Yet, in instances where Management and the Requester cannot easily reconcile their views regarding the Bank’s compliance with its policies and/or the source of the alleged harm, the Panel may choose to recommend an investigation.\footnote{Id.} Additionally, it is expected that if Management admits that it failed to follow the Bank’s policies, in its response to the claim it should propose “remedial actions and a timetable for implementing them.”\footnote{Id.}

However, the decision whether to recommend an investigation is not just based on the request and Management’s response. The Panel also has the power to conduct a preliminary study, which may entail a visit to the

\begin{footnotes}
93. Chile Financing, supra note 90 (stating that the Request was not registered because the project was not financed by the IBRD or the IDA). Out of the forty-nine requests for inspection thus far, the Inspection Panel has refused to register five of them. The Inspection Panel, The World Bank, Requests by Request Number, http://web.worldbank.org/WEBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/0,,contentMDK:20221606-menuPK:64129250-pagePK:64129751-piPK:64128378-theSitePK:380794,00.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2008) (listing all of the requests, including the non-registered ones from Burundi, Cameroon, India, Chile, and Ethiopia).

94. Operating Procedures, supra note 1, at 515.

95. Id.

96. Id. (noting that the Panel may request further information from Management “to make an informed recommendation” regarding whether to investigate). In general, the Panel must “decide whether [the request] is based on an alleged failure by the Bank related to its own policies and procedures, and whether any alleged consequent harm complained of appears material enough to warrant investigation.” \textit{Inspection Panel 10 Years On, supra} note 7, at 9.

97. Operating Procedures, supra note 1, at 516.

98. Id.

99. \textit{See}, e.g., The Inspection Panel, The World Bank, \textit{Report and Recommendation on Request for Inspection, Pakistan, National Drainage Program Project}, at 24, Report No. 30704 (Nov. 17, 2004) available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/Resources/EligibilityReport.pdf (“[T]he differing views on the issues raised by the Request cannot be easily reconciled and . . . they involve conflicting assertions and interpretations about the issues, the facts, and compliance with Bank policies and procedures. The Panel believes that these important questions . . . as well as the proximate causes of the alleged harm . . . can only be addressed in the context of a Panel investigation.”).

100. \textit{Inspection Panel 10 Years On, supra} note 7, at 10; \textit{see also} Operating Procedures, supra note 1, at 516.
\end{footnotes}
Although this preliminary evaluation is not required, the idea behind such a visit is to ensure that the Panel makes “an informed recommendation about an investigation to the Board.” Even if the Panel chooses to conduct an in-country preliminary study, the eligibility evaluation process must occur completely within the twenty-one days following the receipt of the President’s response to the complaint’s initial registration. Only in “circumstances outside the control of the Panel or Management” is the timeline waived. In addition to a substantive inquiry into the merits of the compliant, during this phase the Panel conducts a more thorough review of the eligibility of the Requesters themselves.

Thus, after reviewing the claimant’s request, Management’s response, information from third parties, and any preliminary findings, the Panel will make a recommendation to the Board indicating “whether the matter should be investigated” more thoroughly. This recommendation is referred to as the Eligibility Report.

Under the Resolution establishing the Panel, only the Board had the power to officially authorize the Panel to proceed with an investigation. After the 1999 Clarifications, which were developed in response to the criticisms of the Working Group on the Second Review of the Inspection Panel, the Board agreed (except for in limited circumstances) to authorize investigations on a no-objection basis.

1. Operating Procedures, supra note 1, at 516.
2. 1999 CLARIFICATIONS, supra note 50, ¶ 11.
3. INSPECTION PANEL 10 YEARS ON, supra note 7, at 10.
4. Id.
5. Id. (“The time limit has not been applied twice for country internal political reasons.”).
6. Id. at 9 (“[T]he Panel needs to establish whether the Requesters are who they say they are, live in the project area in the borrower's territory, and are a community of people sharing some common interests or concerns.”).
7. Operating Procedures, supra note 1, at 516.
8. Id. at 517.
9. Id. at 516 (“The Board decides whether or not to accept or reject the Panel’s recommendation; and, if the Requester is a non-local representative, whether exceptional circumstances exist and suitable local representation is not available.”).
10. 1999 CLARIFICATIONS, supra note 50, ¶¶ 8-9 (“If the Panel so recommends, the Board will authorize an investigation without making a judgment on the merits of the claimants' request, and without discussion except with respect to . . . technical eligibility criteria.”); Treakle et al., supra note 56, at 257 (“In every case since the second review, [the] board members have approved panel recommendations for investigations.”). There were significant problems with the manner in which the Board authorized, and frequently, failed to authorize, investigations prior to the establishment of the no-objection approval. First, “the Panel’s preliminary assessment reports,” upon which the Board based its decision about whether to authorize an investigation, “gave rise to lengthy Board discussions on the substance of the complaints, which were inappropriate before the results of an investigation.” INSPECTION PANEL 10 YEARS ON, supra note 7, at 13. Furthermore, because of the Board’s tendency to engage in in-depth discussions about whether to authorize an investigation, Management often submitted action plans for Board consideration in its investigation decision. Id. at 12. However, “a fundamental problem with having an Action Plan at this stage was that the plan could not be based on the findings of a full, independent investigation.” Id. Because Management’s proposals were often appealing in the absence of countervailing information that could only be obtained through an investigation, the Board often approved these plans and required no
The Panel ostensibly begins investigating soon after the Board's approval of the Panel's investigation request; however, no specific timeline is included in the operating procedures.\textsuperscript{111} Panel investigations typically consist of visits to the project site, interviews with the affected people or their representatives, and conversations with government officials and the authorities in charge of the project.\textsuperscript{112} The Panel also interviews Bank staff and Management.\textsuperscript{113} All of these conversations are supposed to remain confidential, and "the 1999 Clarifications stress the need for the Panel to keep the profile of its in-country activities low and to make it clear that the Panel is investigating the Bank (not the borrower)."\textsuperscript{114} The Panel may also hire outside consultants who are recognized specialists in the subject areas related to the Requesters' claim.\textsuperscript{115}

After ruling on whether the Bank is in compliance with its policies and procedures, the Inspection Panel submits its findings to the Bank's Management and the Board.\textsuperscript{116} The Panel does not propose remedial measures\textsuperscript{117} and "does not have the power to issue an injunction, stop a project, or award financial compensation for harm suffered."\textsuperscript{118} The Bank's Management reviews the Panel's findings and must submit a response to the Board within six weeks.\textsuperscript{119} If it chooses to do so, Management is able to make remedial recommendations in this report.\textsuperscript{120} The Bank officially refers to these reports as "compliance plans"—although they have also been referred further investigatory action by the Panel. \textit{Id.} As a result, the Board failed to recommend investigations in cases where it was likely needed. \textit{Id.} at 12-13. Ensuring that the Panel has more control over what it investigates would help to secure the independence of that body.

111. Operating Procedures, supra note 1, at 517 (indicating that upon approval the Panel's Chair shall move "promptly" to start the investigatory procedures).
112. \textit{Id.} at 517-18; \textit{see also} \textit{Inspection Panel 10 Years On}, supra note 7, at 14.
114. \textit{Id.}; \textit{see also} \textit{1999 Clarifications}, supra note 50, ¶ 12.
116. Operating Procedures, supra note 1, at 518 (outlining the requirements for the Panel's report).
117. \textit{Inspection Panel Resolution}, supra note 45, ¶ 22 ("The report of the Panel shall consider all relevant facts, and shall conclude with the Panel's findings on whether the Bank has complied with all relevant Bank policies and procedures."); \textit{Inspection Panel 10 Years On}, supra note 7, at 14.
118. Treakle et al., supra note 56, at 258.
120. \textit{Inspection Panel 10 Years On}, supra note 7, at 14-15 ("Consistent with normal operating procedures, Bank Management, when it responds to the Panel's Investigation Report, recommends, when relevant, remedial actions to the Board.").
to as “action plans.”\textsuperscript{121} The plans describe “the measures [that Management] intends to adopt to address the problems of non-compliance of the project expressed in the Panel’s report.”\textsuperscript{122}

The Board reviews the Panel’s findings in conjunction with Management’s recommendations.\textsuperscript{123} Although the Board is empowered to “ask the Panel to check whether Management has made appropriate consultations about [any proposed] remedial measures with affected people, . . . the Board has not done so as of 2003.”\textsuperscript{124} The Board is then required to contact the initial Requester within two weeks of considering the Panel’s report and Management’s response, informing him or her of the investigation’s results and “the action decided by the Executive Directors, if any.”\textsuperscript{125}

The length of a Panel investigation varies greatly—from a number of months to over a year—and there is no timeline set forth in the Panel Resolution or its operating procedures.\textsuperscript{126} For example, with respect to the Panel’s investigation into a number of dam projects in Uganda, the Panel registered the request on August 7, 2001,\textsuperscript{127} requested permission to investigate on October 24, 2001,\textsuperscript{128} and finally sent its report to the Board on May 23, 2002.\textsuperscript{129} Management responded to the Panel’s investigation on June 7, 2002, and the Board met to consider both reports on June 17, 2002, approving Management’s findings with regard to the Panel’s investigation.\textsuperscript{130}

III. Criticisms of the Inspection Panel

Each year the demand for the Panel’s attention increases, with July 1, 2006 to June 30, 2007 as the Panel’s busiest year to date.\textsuperscript{131} During that

\textsuperscript{121}. SHIHATA, supra note 22, at 189 (drawing a distinction between remedial “Action Plans,” which are agreements between the Bank and the Borrower, and “Compliance Plans,” which are solely related to the Bank). Although the term “remedial action plan” technically refers to an agreement by both the Bank and the borrower, the academic literature often also refers to compliance plans as “action plans.” See, e.g., Mariarita Circi, The World Bank Inspection Panel: Is it Really Effective?, GLOBAL JURIST ADVANCES, 2006, at 9, available at http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1182&con text=gj.

\textsuperscript{122}. Circi, supra note 121, at 9.

\textsuperscript{123}. INSPECTION PANEL 10 YEARS ON, supra note 7, at 15.

\textsuperscript{124}. Id.

\textsuperscript{125}. Operating Procedures, supra note 1, at 519.

\textsuperscript{126}. Id. at 514; see also SHIHATA, supra note 22, at 82 (“Except for [certain] safeguards outlined below, the Resolution is silent on the matter in which investigation will be carried out, leaving this matter to the discretion of the Panel.”).


\textsuperscript{129}. Uganda Project Request, supra note 127.

\textsuperscript{130}. ANNUAL REPORT 2001–2002, supra note 48, at 16–17. Ultimately, this project was delayed due to corruption scandals. Treakle et al., supra note 56, 265 tbl. 11.5.

time, “the Panel registered six new Requests for Inspection.” It also “completed two investigations” and worked on “three other investigations, one of which [was] nearly complete.” The previous fiscal year was also a busy one, as the Panel approved two out of four investigative requests from affected persons, deferred a third request, investigated five complaints concurrently, and submitted a number of reports to the Bank’s Executive Board determining Bank compliance with its policies and procedures in pending complaints.

Despite the increasing use of the Panel’s procedures, there are numerous criticisms of the Panel’s work, and critics often question whether the Panel truly increases the World Bank’s accountability. According to these critics, the Panel is not an adequate accountability mechanism because it has a limited mandate, a limited ability to grant relief, and generally lacks the independence from the Bank necessary to make it a wholly effective institution.

A. Panel’s Inability to Grant Relief

The inability of the Panel to grant relief is one of the most-cited problems with the Inspection Panel. First, the Panel has very limited authority to recommend any type of remedial measure to the Bank—the Panel is not a problem-solving entity, and under its operating procedures it is expected to opine solely on whether the Bank complied with its own policies. It also follows, then, that the Panel has no authority to provide

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132. Id.
133. Id.
134. ANNUAL REPORT 2005-2006, supra note 42, at 13. The final investigative request was not approved because the Requesters asked the Panel to defer the decision for six months because some of the issues were being addressed. Id.
135. Id. at 13-14.
136. See Treakle et al., supra note 56, at 269-73; see also SHIHATA, supra note 22, at 237-40 (espousing a more optimistic view of the Panel’s effect on the World Bank’s accountability, but noting that the Panel cannot unilaterally provide legal remedies).
137. See Wahi, supra note 80, at 357.
139. Treakle et al., supra note 56, at 258, 266 (“[W]hile the panel’s investigations (or reviews) have often confirmed that the harm was caused by bank policy violations, the solutions (action plans) have been proposed by management, which is also responsible for their implementation. This means the same bank officials—whose actions or omissions may have caused the claimants’ problems—are tasked with resolving the very problems that they have caused.”). But see SHIHATA, supra note 22, at 204-19 (attempting to rebut fears about the Panel’s lack of independence).
140. See discussion supra notes 117-124 and accompanying text.
141. Wahi, supra note 80, at 359-60.
compensation to affected communities.\textsuperscript{142} Furthermore, just as the Panel is generally precluded from proposing and providing remedies,\textsuperscript{143} so are the affected parties who initiated the investigatory process in the first place.\textsuperscript{144}

Because the Panel is unable to provide relief, both the Panel and affected communities often look to Management for aid.\textsuperscript{145} The Bank does have a limited ability to provide injunctive relief, but its power to halt a project depends on the stage of the project.\textsuperscript{146} Board authorization for an inspection of a project that has not yet begun does not automatically mean that the Bank also intends the preparatory work on the project to cease.\textsuperscript{147} If the Bank does so intend, however, Management has the power "to suspend the Bank's preparatory work, or the Board may request it to do so pending the outcome of inspection in cases where the prevailing circumstances require such a measure."\textsuperscript{148} Furthermore, "[t]he Panel . . . may also indicate whether . . . suspension of preparatory work . . . would be needed for the purpose of its inspection (if, for example, the continuation of such work would have the potential of making the alleged harm irreversible)."\textsuperscript{149} This tactic appears to be little used, although Dana Clark has indicated that it could have been invoked in the National Thermal Power Corporation's (NTPC) Power Generation Project in Singrauli, India, to halt the "forced eviction" of villagers from the project area before the inspection could take place.\textsuperscript{150}

The Bank also has the power to grant injunctive-type relief by halting or cancelling loan disbursement.\textsuperscript{151} As a general matter, because the financial demands to complete a project without the Bank's support are prohibitively high, an order to stop disbursement functions as the

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[142.] Treakle et al., supra note 56, at 258.
\item[143.] Inspection Panel Resolution, supra note 45, ¶ 22 ("The report of the Panel shall consider all relevant facts, and shall conclude with the Panel's findings on whether the Bank has complied with all relevant Bank policies and procedures."); Inspection Panel 10 Years On, supra note 7, at 14.
\item[144.] Treakle et al., supra note 56, at 267 (citing Letter from Madhu Kohli to Ernst Günther Bröder, Inspection Panel, The World Bank (Sept. 24, 1997)).
\item[145.] Id. at 258 (stating that it is up to the board to announce whether remedial measures will be undertaken).
\item[146.] Shihata, supra note 22, at 81 ("A decision by the Board authorizing inspection 'normally would not involve cessation of preparatory work on an operation . . .'" (quoting Memorandum from the President to the Board of Directors, Operations Inspection Function: Objectives, Mandate, and Operating Procedures for an Independent Inspection Panel, R93-122/2 (Sept. 10, 1993))).
\item[147.] Id.
\item[148.] Id.
\item[149.] Id.
\item[150.] Dana Clark, Singrauli: An Unfulfilled Struggle for Justice, in Demanding Accountability: Civil-Society Claims and the World Bank, supra note 56, at 176 & 188 n.46.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
equivalent of an order to halt the entire project.152 Only one Inspection Panel case appears to support the notion that countries are free to engage in development projects absent Bank funding.153 Professor Philip Alston has also pointed out that India, which “by the standards of most developing countries . . . is less in hock to the international community than most,” has “rejected unacceptable World Bank loan conditions, and told the Bank in no uncertain terms to keep its money.”154 As recently as 2006, however, the Bank suspended disbursements on the road and resettlement components of the Mumbai Urban Transport Project in India and instead of proceeding on its own, the “State of Maharashtra agreed to a [Bank-imposed] ten condition strategy for lifting the suspension of disbursements.”155

It is not the Bank’s practice, however, to provide compensation for harms that the Inspection Panel identifies. Consequently, an increased ability for the Panel and the Bank to grant relief—both injunctive and compensatory—to parties affected by the Bank’s failure to follow its own policies and procedures would dramatically increase the effectiveness of the Panel and its responsiveness to claimant communities.

B. The Bank’s Failure to Follow Through with Remedial Plans

Not only is the Panel unable to propose relief based on its investigatory findings, but the Board has “explicitly prohibited the panel from having an oversight role in [the] management-generated action plans” that the Bank designs as remedial responses to the problems that the Inspection Panel uncovers.156 Unfortunately, at the same time the Bank prevents

152. See Ngaire Woods, The Globalizers: The IMF, the World Bank, and Their Borrowers 70 (2006) ("The IMF and World Bank enjoy considerable bargaining power in their relations with borrowing governments. Countries mostly approach the institutions when they have little access to alternative sources of finance.").


156. Treakle et al., supra note 56, at 266; see 1999 Clarifications, supra note 50, ¶ 15-16 (noting that action plans are “outside the purview” of the founding Resolution, and the Board is unable to "ask the Panel to monitor the implementation of the action plans"); supra notes 121-122 (defining action and compliance plans). But see The Inspection Panel, The World Bank, Annual Report: July 1, 2003 to June 30, 2004 42-48 (2004). When parties filed a request for inspection relating to two projects that partially finance the Yacyreta Hydroelectric Project, the Board requested the Panel to review and assess Management’s action plan and the additional implementation measures on its behalf. After the Board meeting, the Panel returned to the Project area to explain and discuss the Panel’s findings with the Requesters and the people they represent. The Panel noted its continuing role in assessing Management’s actions . . . Thus, for the first time in its ten-year history, the Panel's role in the context of a Request for Inspection has continued after the submission of the investigation report to the Board, to help ensure that Management follows through on its action plan and to carry forward a dialogue with the people affected by a Bank-financed project.
Panel oversight of these remedial plans, the Board itself, has failed to entirely fulfill its responsibility to follow up on the proposed plans.157

For example, in the case of the Yacyretá Hydroelectric Project in Argentina/Paraguay, claimants filed a request for inspection asserting that the Bank had violated its policies relating to the “environment, resettlement, wildlands, information disclosure, indigenous peoples, and project supervision, among others.”158 After an extremely contentious investigation, the Inspection Panel found that the Bank had violated numerous policies and procedures.159 In developing its action plan in response, however, Management did not consult with local communities and failed to publish its action plan in Spanish so that the affected communities could understand the outcome of the investigation.160 Six years after the Board first considered the Panel report, “bank management had done little to follow up to ensure that the action plans were being implemented,” and the Board did not intervene.161

Another example of the Bank’s neglectful attitude toward its action plans is the Cartagena Water Supply, Sewerage, and Environmental Management Project in Colombia.162 There, the Bank was funding an expansion of Cartagena’s water and sewage system.163 The project included the construction of a pipeline that “would carry the untreated wastewater from the city and discharge it into the Caribbean Sea,” which was located some two and one half kilometers from coastal fishing villages.164 The Panel’s investigation found numerous problems with the design and the implementation of the project,165 so, on July 29, 2005, Management prepared an action plan to address the Panel’s report.166 The Board addressed both the

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157. Clark, supra note 9, at 219–20. Ms. Clark refers to these cases as the “lost cases” and attributes the lack of oversight to the fact that the “Board is overwhelmed with information . . . [and] does not have a standing committee to track the implementation of action plans or to evaluate the effectiveness of remedial measures.” Id. at 220.


159. Id. at 77 (citing The Inspection Panel, The World Bank, Review of Problems and Assessment of Action Plans, Argentina/Paraguay: Yacyretá Hydroelectric Project (Sept. 16, 1997)). This investigation was conducted prior to the “no-objection” approval requirement, and the Board was divided about whether to allow the investigation in the first place. Id. at 69–77.

160. Id. at 79–80.

161. Id. at 83–84.


163. Id. at 44.

164. Id.


action plan and the Panel's findings in November 2005 and approved the action plan "with the caveat... that Management would submit a progress report to the Board on the execution of the Project and Action Plan within six months." Management did not submit the progress report until September 4, 2006—almost a full year following the meeting of the Board.

Management's also failed to follow up with its remedial action plans in the Mumbai Urban Transport Project in India. In 2004, the Panel received four separate requests for inspection stemming from this project. The Requesters claimed that forced resettlement to construct two road segments "would destroy their livelihoods, cause them to dismantle their productive sources, and disperse their supporting networks and kin groups." The Requesters also complained, among other things, about the quality of the replacement structures in the relocations sites. Following its investigation, the Panel found numerous errors in the Bank's practices, including flaws in the environmental assessment and the determinations relating to the quality of the resettlement site. The Bank conceded to the findings of the majority of the Panel that it had violated Bank policy and presented an action plan to remedy the project's faults, which the Board approved. On March 28, 2006 "[i]t was agreed that Management would submit a progress report to the Board in no more than six months." Management submitted that progress report almost a year later on March 1, 2007. In addition to the delay, "a number of issues [in the action plan] still needed to be resolved and... many of the target dates listed in Management's Action Plan had not been met."

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171. Id. at 51.
172. Id. at 51-52.
175. Id. at 57.
177. Id. (describing the many ways in which the Bank has failed to comply with the terms of the remedial plan).
C. Limited Panel Independence

An additional criticism of the existing system is that the Panel is not entirely independent from the Bank as a whole. First, in relation to the Panel’s autonomy, critics have claimed that “as an interior body of the Bank itself, its ideas cannot be completely independent of the ideology of that institution.” Because the Panel is an arm of the Bank, it is by definition an institution with a de facto World Bank bias and consequently acts with the interests of the institution in mind and not necessarily with the interests of the affected communities.

In addition, some critics have argued that the Bank’s ability to interfere with the Panel’s work (either at the investigation or the remedy stage), and the lack of the Panel’s ability to prevent such interference, also compromises its status as an independent body. Rather than an autonomy-based argument, this criticism focuses on the Panel’s lack of power. Because the Panel has no power to remedy the problems that it uncovers, any resolution that the Panel ultimately helps a community achieve must have also been within the desires of the Bank. Consequently, if the Bank responds in a overly defensive or adversarial manner to the Panel’s findings, or manipulates information to mislead the Board regarding compliance, it is very clear to the Board that the Bank is not in line with the Panel’s work and that any action that the Board orders will not be happily


179. Suzuki & Nanwani, supra note 21, at 207-08 (noting claims by Richard E. Bissell that independence is only partial). Many concerns with the lack of Bank independence were addressed in the two “Clarifications” to the Panel’s resolution. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. For example, with the institution of the no-objection approval for Panel investigations there was less fear that the Bank would fail to authorize an investigation because it feared a finding of non-compliance. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. Following the second clarification, the Bank also could no longer institute action plans with the intention of preempting a Panel investigation. Understanding the Inspection Panel, supra note 138, at 16.

180. Morgan-Foster, supra note 178, at 641 n.319 (discussing Sigrun Skogly’s belief that the independence of the Panel should be measured with reference to its lack of power to bind the Board of Directors of the Bank (citing SIGRUN SKOGLY, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF THE WORLD BANK AND THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 184-85 (2001))).

181. Treakle et al., supra note 56, at 254 (noting that in the past the Bank has had a tendency “to respond defensively—denying that [it] violated any policies, challenging the claimants’ eligibility, and in some cases, challenging the panel’s findings”).

182. Understanding the Inspection Panel, supra note 138, at 18 (discussing the Lake Victoria Environmental Management Project in Kenya as one egregious example of when Management disputed the Panel’s findings.) In the Lake Victoria case, the Panel concluded that the Bank had violated its public-consultation requirements, but rather than proposing remedies to address the Panel’s findings, Management disputed them and issued “a rebuttal document that gave the impression that consultations had taken place.” Id. In a follow up report, the Panel demonstrated that “management had manipulated information in such a way as to deliberately mislead the board.” Id.
received. Vehement disapproval of the Panel's findings by the Bank is not likely lost on the Board, which is ultimately charged with approving or disapproving a resolution.\footnote{183} If the Panel was responsible for remediating the problems that it uncovered, such an adversarial exchange would not be problematic because the Panel could proceed with a remedial plan even without the Bank's approval.

D. Obstacles to the Access of Panel's Procedures

Critics of the Panel also regularly raise concerns over the equity of the access to Panel procedures and the resulting pro-Management bias. Specifically, once the affected parties (or their agents) have requested an inspection, the parties are not given the opportunity to address the Panel's findings, Management's response, or review any of the information about their claim prior to the Board decision on how to proceed.\footnote{184} Thus, while the Board considers Management's recommendations, the original Requesters are pushed aside, and the Board "ignore[es] the experience, knowledge, and preferences of the people who triggered the process in the first place."\footnote{185}

Coupled with the Management bias inherent in the Bank's relief process, there are a number of structural obstacles to filing complaints, and parties may find that the Panel has excluded their claim on procedural grounds. For example, the Panel does not have the power to investigate projects in cases where "the loan financing the project has been substantially disbursed."\footnote{186} As critics point out, however, "many problems with projects [that the Bank finances] don't show up until years after the funds are disbursed," thus, for these people, "there simply is no official recourse."\footnote{187} For example, in the second request associated with India's NTPC Power Generation Project, the Inspection Panel refused to register the complaint because the "Request was filed after the loan financing the project closed."\footnote{188} Any and all harms emerging thereafter were simply not redressable.

\footnote{183}{Inspection Panel Resolution, supra note 45, ¶ 23.}
\footnote{184}{Treakle et al., supra note 56, at 267.}
\footnote{185}{Id.}
\footnote{186}{Inspection Panel Resolution, supra note 45, ¶ 14(c) & n.1 (defining "substantially disbursed" as when "ninety five percent of the loan proceeds have been disbursed"). The 95% disbursement requirement was instituted "largely because the bank loses its leverage to influence government implementation once it no longer controls the finances." Treakle et al., supra note 56, at 267. Of note, the Asian Development Bank's Accountability Mechanism no longer includes a 95% disbursement limit as a cut off. Suzuki & Nanwani, supra note 21, at 216-17. The inspection mechanisms under the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation also do not have a disbursement limitation. Id. at 217.}
\footnote{187}{Treakle et al., supra note 56, at 267 ("While the bank's policies apply to a project until the loan is repaid, the panel is not an option for those people who learn about the panel and choose to file a claim too late in the project cycle to meet the requirements for eligibility.").}
Similarly, the Panel refused to register a 2007 Request for Inspection associated with Cameroon’s Urban Development Project and Douala Infrastructure Development Project because the projects had closed in June 1988 and June 1994, respectively.\(^{189}\) There, the Requesters complained that the Bank had not provided “any information about the Projects [at the time they were approved] and that they did not learn about World Bank support for the Projects until 2003.”\(^{190}\) The Requesters claimed that “many of the affected people have suffered from depression and have felt traumatized by the Projects,”\(^{191}\) and they urged the Panel to hear the “concerns of ‘the 500 families in distress and in the streets for the past 20 years because of the mismanagement’” of the project.\(^{192}\) The Panel invoked the 95% disbursement policy when it refused to register the complaint, but also “note[d], however, the many significant concerns stated by the Requesters,” which seemingly implied that the Bank should attempt to deal with the problems.\(^{193}\) Thus, any harms associated with the Bank’s projects in Cameroon will never be addressed within the Inspection Panel mechanism, and the affected parties must rely on the goodwill of the Bank and the government to provide redress, which is very unlikely.\(^{194}\) This structural impediment is a major barrier to solving many of the problems that can be directly tied to Bank-funded projects.

IV. Possible Alternatives to the Inspection Panel

Despite several reoccurring problems with the Inspection Panel,\(^ {195}\) academics and practitioners have proposed few alternatives. Those who have addressed the subject have explored the option of fixing the Panel’s shortcomings by working within its present framework. One approach has focused on expanding the Panel’s compliance-oriented mandate by allowing the body to review compliance with policies other than those of the Bank’s.\(^ {196}\) Other proposals have focused on the need for better prob-


\(^{190}\) Id. at 1.

\(^{191}\) Id. at 1–2.

\(^{192}\) Id. at 2 (quoting the Request for Inspection, which is available in French at http://site\resources.worldbank.org/EXTINSPECTIONPANE\/Resources/RequestWith\outMemos.pdf).

\(^{193}\) Id.

\(^{194}\) Id. (“[T]he Bank consistently requested the competent authorities to address the Nylon zone resettlement issue until the Second Urban project closed. Regrettably no satisfactory solution was implemented by the Government . . . . While at this date, the Bank cannot hold any fiduciary responsibility for the Nylon project . . . . and cannot, therefore offer any assistance . . . we will continue to raise the resettlement issue with the authorities . . . .” (quoting Letter from Dir. of Operations for Cameroon, World Bank, to Requesters (Oct. 23, 2006))).

\(^{195}\) See discussion supra Part III.

\(^{196}\) Currently, the Inspection Panel’s mandate is limited to evaluating whether the Bank has complied with its own policies and procedures. Operating Procedures, supra note 1, at 512–13. See generally Roos, supra note 68, at 498–502 (arguing that the Panel
lem-solving by ensuring that the Panel has the ability to monitor any remedial action that is needed based on problems that the Panel uncovered during its investigation.\textsuperscript{197}

As to the Inspection Panel itself (rather than accountability mechanisms generally), there has been no proposal advocating for a replacement. With regard to international financial institutions generally, however, at least one scholar has detailed the need for mechanisms with a more effective combination of problem-solving and compliance review.\textsuperscript{198} Scholars have also indicated that arbitration may be the "most appropriate mode of settlement" to ensure an adequate remedy for parties harmed by multilateral development banks.\textsuperscript{199} These various proposals are outlined below.\textsuperscript{200}

A. Panel Modifications: Better Remedial Structure for Problem-Solving

1. Development Effectiveness Remedy Team (DERT)

One set of proposed modifications to the present Panel focuses on ensuring that the Bank follows through with remedial measures; which would essentially transform the Panel from an entity solely concerned with compliance review to one that also focuses on problem solving. Dana Clark has proposed the development of a problem-solving unit within the existing Inspection Panel framework to address the failure of the Panel to ensure that the Bank takes proper remedial measures after an investigation.\textsuperscript{201} Clark calls the unit the Development Effectiveness Remedy Team (DERT).\textsuperscript{202} The unit would be charged with "remedying the social and environmental policy violations identified by the Inspection Panel and helping to ensure that displaced and aggrieved communities are adequately compensated and assisted to improve their standards of living.\textsuperscript{203}"

\textsuperscript{197} has not followed the approach taken in the Morse-Berger Report of 1992, which took into account international law standards, but that instead the Panel reviews Bank performance against its own internal rules). As Professor James Gathii has noted, the Panel "has no mandate . . . to even consider 'external' criteria such as Bank program compliance with the . . . International Bill of Human Rights or International Environmental Treaties." James Gathii, Professor, Rutgers Univ. Sch. of Mgmt., Remarks at Harvard Law School Roundtable, The Cutting Edge: Roundtable of Current Research by Current HLS Doctoral Students (Apr. 24, 1999).

\textsuperscript{198} See infra Part IV.B.

\textsuperscript{199} Suzuki & Nanwani, supra note 21, at 224.

\textsuperscript{200} In a recent article, one practitioner recently proposed opening up the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights to human rights claims against non-state actors such as the Bank. Wahi, supra note 80, at 406-07.

\textsuperscript{201} See generally Clark, supra note 9, at 223-26. Dana Clark is president of the International Accountability Project and the former director of the International Financial Institutions Program at the Center for International Environmental Law. Int'l Accountability Project, Dana Clark, President and Founder, http://accountabilityproject.org/article.php?id=130 (last visited Nov. 11, 2008).

\textsuperscript{202} Clark, supra note 9, at 224.

\textsuperscript{203} Id.
Unlike the Inspection Panel, DERT would be completely independent from the Bank’s Management and would report directly to the Board of Executive Directors.\textsuperscript{204} The unit would provide the Board with “oversight and technical assistance to efforts to bring into compliance projects that have been subject to Inspection Panel investigations.”\textsuperscript{205} It would also work to ensure the execution of Management action plans and oversee the implementation of the plans with the help of the affected community.\textsuperscript{206}

DERT’s findings about the progress of a project under review would be open to the public; community members in an affected area would have the opportunity to participate in the unit’s work, and those not involved directly in the unit’s decision-making process would have the ability to “present and document their grievances and suggest remedial measures.”\textsuperscript{207} Clark believes that this problem-solving unit would force the Bank to “assume greater responsibility for ensuring compliance with its policy framework, as well as for meeting the needs and respecting the rights of local affected communities.”\textsuperscript{208}

2. \textit{Arbitration to Encourage Problem-Solving}

Similar to Ms. Clark, Eisuke Suzuki and Suresh Nanwani, also discuss the need for accountability mechanisms “to monitor the progress of implementation of the recommendations” that multilateral development bank (MDB) boards adopt following an inspection process.\textsuperscript{209} In essence, Suzuki and Nanwani see the benefit in expanding the role of accountability mechanisms from only compliance-oriented to problem-solving entities as well.

To highlight some of the Inspection Panel’s deficiencies in this regard, Suzuki and Nanwani conduct a comparison between the Panel and the Accountability Mechanism (AM) of the Asian Development Bank (ADB).\textsuperscript{210} Generally, the AM has two phases: consultation and compliance review.\textsuperscript{211} The consultation phase occurs prior to the compliance-review phase to address “urgent claims of direct, material harm.”\textsuperscript{212} The consultation phase seeks to reach “consensus and agreement on the complaint from all

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{204} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{205} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{206} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{207} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{208} Id. at 226.
\item \textsuperscript{209} Suzuki & Nanwani, supra note 21, at 222-23. Suzuki and Nanwani are both former employees of the Asian Development Bank. \textit{Id.} at 177.
\item \textsuperscript{210} \textit{Id.} at 189 (noting that the AM replaced the ADB’s “Inspection Function” in 2003). \textit{See generally \textbf{A Handbook on the Asian Development Bank: The ADB and Its Operations in Asia and the Pacific Region} (Dorothy Guerrero ed., 2003) (discussing “important themes and issues that must be known and understood” about the ADB).}
\item \textsuperscript{211} Asian Dev. Bank, Accountability Mechanism: Listening to Communities Affected by ADB-Assisted Projects and Enhancing Developmental Effectiveness, http://www.adb.org/Accountability-Mechanism/default.asp (last visited Nov. 11, 2008).
\item \textsuperscript{212} Suzuki & Nanwani, supra note 21, at 221-22; see also Asian Dev. Bank, Office of the Special Project Facilitator, The Consultation Phase of the ADB’s Accountability Mechanism, http://www.adb.org/SPF/default.asp (last visited Dec. 11, 2008).
\end{itemize}
parties concerned, acceptable methods for resolution, and a timeframe for resolving issues in the complaint." Following consultation, a three-person Compliance Review Panel (CRP) performs compliance review.

Significantly different from the Inspection Panel, the CRP not only has the ability to conduct a review of the project at issue, but also has the authority to recommend remedial actions to the Board and monitor the "implementation of remedial actions." Furthermore, affected persons have a greater participatory role under the Accountability Mechanism—as claimants they have a right to be informed of the progress of both the consultation and the compliance review and are additionally empowered to comment on drafts of the CRP reports. The ADB also helps to ensure that affected communities are afforded a proper remedy for a violation of the Bank's policies by eliminating the 95% disbursement requirement to which the Panel still adheres.

Although Suzuki and Nanwani believe the ADB's Accountability Mechanism is superior to that of the Inspection Panel, they have also highlighted that, similar to other inspection mechanisms, "its competence does not extend to the making of monetary indemnity or compensation for any material harm." To address this lacuna, Suzuki and Nanwani believe that arbitration is the "most appropriate mode of settlement for MDBs," and that it provides a "creative alternative to allow private parties' claims to be settled."

As part of their proposal, Suzuki and Nanwani point out that each MDB has an administrative tribunal. Consequently, they propose mov-
They provide no further details, however, on how such a move would work and caution that the use of arbitration must not "jeopardize[ ] the organizational effectiveness of MDBs" given the "reconfiguration of authority and control over decisions of international organizations [that] inevitably occurs" in such situations.

### 3. Tort Remedies and Arbitration

Highlighting the possibility of another resolution to the problems with the Inspection Panel, Koen de Feyter advocates for the use of tort remedies and international arbitration as a means of ensuring Bank accountability to affected parties. Because only the Bank and the Borrower are parties to a particular project's loan agreement, de Feyter points out that affected parties do not have the right to sue for failure to implement the agreement because there is no privity between the parties. He argues, however, that tort law may provide an alternative avenue for affected parties to cabin their claims because the affected parties can argue that they suffered injury as a consequence of a wrongful act or omission committed by the Borrower and the Bank. With respect to the Bank, the affected persons may argue negligence. The submission then is that the Bank breached its duty to take care by not contemplating the injurious effect on the affected persons, when deciding not to insist on the implementation of the agreement, or on compliance with operation polices.

To prevent the Bank from blaming the Borrower, de Feyter discusses the potential of joint responsibility, "using a concept of complicity between multiple tortfeasors." In conjunction with these tort remedies, de Feyter briefly points out that international arbitration "may offer the best opportunities" for the adjudication of disputes between the World Bank and private parties, and that the Optional Rules for Arbitration between International Organizations and Private Parties developed by the Permanent Court of Arbitration "offer a suitable framework for settling [such] disputes." De Feyter, however, does not elaborate further.

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222. Suzuki & Nanwani, supra note 21, at 224.
223. Id. at 222-25.
224. Id. at 224-25.
226. Id. at 129.
227. Id. at 129-30.
228. Id. at 130 ("Direct complicity requires intentional participation, but not necessarily any intention to do harm, only knowledge of the likely harmful effects of the assistance given.").
229. Id. at 135.
B. Reforming Inspection Mechanisms Generally

Unlike the singular approach of expanding either compliance or problem-solving responsibilities, Professor Daniel Bradlow has developed a proposal for an accountability mechanism that would emphasize both. In developing his proposal, Professor Bradlow conducted a comprehensive survey of existing accountability mechanisms and discussed the three most feasible structures within the context of international financial institutions.230

Bradlow notes that inspection mechanisms can be designed to perform three different, but not mutually exclusive, functions: compliance review, problem-solving, and lessons learned—the third function providing the institution with the ability to improve its performance.231 Accordingly, he proposes a Compliance Review and Problem-Solving Mechanism (CRPSM), an entity that incorporates separate divisions focusing on policy-and-procedure compliance and problem-solving, and that includes the “lessons-learned” function.232 For much of his proposal, Bradlow draws from the African Development Bank’s (AFDB) accountability entity, which also has independent compliance and problem-solving divisions.233

Under Bradlow’s proposal, the CRPSM would consist of a Director as well as a Roster of Experts.234 The organization would appoint the Director who would work solely on compliance and problem-solving matters.235 This would have the effect of ensuring that the mechanism received “all the attention it need[ed]” and that the institution and those outside of the organization recognized its “credibility and prestige.”236 To ensure independence from the larger institution, the Director would be limited in his or her ability to work for the institution both prior and subsequent to his or

230. See Bradlow, supra note 138, at 467-83 (presenting the options as (1) an inspection mechanism, which could include either a committee, full-time panel, or ad hoc panel; (2) an ombudsperson; or (3) a combined compliance review and problem-solving mechanism).

231. Id. at 464-65. Bradlow has cautioned that the institution must consider the weight the organization would like to accord to compliance review verses problem-solving and, if incorporating a level of compliance review, whether the institutions’ “operational policies and procedures are sufficiently well developed” to serve as the basis for such review. Id. at 468.

232. See id. at 479-83, 486-91 (providing the Terms of Reference for the proposed CRPSM).


234. Bradlow, supra note 138, at 479.

235. Id. at 479.

236. Id. at 482 (noting that this feature is not included in any review mechanism currently used by international development institutions).
her appointment and could only be dismissed for cause.\textsuperscript{237}

As an initial matter, the Director would be responsible for receiving complaints from persons affected by one of the institution's projects.\textsuperscript{238} The claimants would have the option of specifying whether they were seeking problem-solving help or compliance review.\textsuperscript{239} The Director would also have the power to determine the type of review most appropriate for the complainants and, in turn, inform the institution of his or her decision and the reason for that decision.\textsuperscript{240}

Assuming that problem-solving was appropriate, the Director would lead the affected parties in a "problem-solving exercise," ultimately issuing a report to the institution regardless of whether the problem-solving was success or failure.\textsuperscript{241} In cases of successful problem-solving, the Director would be responsible for overseeing the implementation of the solution.\textsuperscript{242} If the exercise failed, however, the Director would be empowered to suggest remedial action.\textsuperscript{243} The financial institution would ultimately be responsible for determining whether to accept or reject the Director's proposal.\textsuperscript{244} If the institution decided not to proceed with the suggested remedies, it would have to provide its reasons to the parties involved, including the claimants.\textsuperscript{245}

If claimants request compliance review rather than problem-solving, or if the Director determines that compliance review would be more appropriate either as an initial matter or following a problem-solving exercise, the Roster of Experts then would become involved.\textsuperscript{246} The Roster of Experts would consist of three members appointed by the organization's board.\textsuperscript{247} As with the Director, there would be limits on the experts' ability to work with the institution both prior to and following their term on the roster.\textsuperscript{248} The experts could only be removed from the roster for cause\textsuperscript{249} and would not be able to work for the organization in a capacity outside of the CRPSM during their tenure on the roster.\textsuperscript{250} The experts would also be expected to spend time familiarizing themselves with the operations of the institution—\textsuperscript{251}which is similar to the requirement imposed by the European

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{237} Id. at 479.
\bibitem{238} Id. at 480.
\bibitem{239} Id.
\bibitem{240} Id. at 480-81.
\bibitem{241} Id. at 481; see also African Dev. Bank Group, Mediation (Problem-Solving) Exercise, http://www.afdb.org/portal/page?_pageid=473,5848232&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL (last visited Nov. 11, 2008).
\bibitem{242} Bradlow, \textit{supra} note 138, at 481.
\bibitem{243} Id.
\bibitem{244} Id.
\bibitem{245} Id.
\bibitem{246} Id. at 482.
\bibitem{247} Id. at 479.
\bibitem{248} Id.
\bibitem{249} Id.
\bibitem{250} Id. at 479-80.
\bibitem{251} Id. at 480.
\end{thebibliography}
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The need for compliance-review emerges, the board of the institution would be charged with appointing a compliance-review panel. The panel would include two experts from the Roster, as well as the Director. However, the Director's role on the panel would be limited—he or she would engage in discussions regarding the compliance investigation, but would only vote on whether the institution was in compliance with its polices or procedures if the panel was deadlocked. Following an investigation, the compliance-review panel would be required to present a report to the board detailing its “findings of fact and recommendations for corrective action,” and the board would vote to accept, reject, or modify the findings.

In addition to the problem-solving exercise and the compliance-review panel, Bradlow’s proposal requires that the Director issue an annual report that would include information about the activities of the CRPSM—particularly some of the “trends that have emerged in the year’s problem-solving exercises” and lessons learned from the various issues with which the entity dealt. The report would be made publicly available. Bradlow, however, recognizes the shortcomings of his proposal. For example, he mentions the possibility that claimants may be unmotivated to participate in the problem-solving exercise because they may feel that compliance review would be more fruitful.

Generally, Bradlow envisions the CRPSM as part of the third-generation of accountability mechanisms—those that provide both problem-solving and compliance-review capabilities independently. Three other such examples include the Asian Development Bank’s Accountability Mechanism, the African Development Bank’s Independent Review Mechanism, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development’s Independent Recourse Mechanism.

252. Id. at 480 n.264. But see id. at 482-83 (discussing the differences between the EBRD and this proposed mechanism). See generally European Bank for Reconstruction & Dev., About the Independent Recourse Mechanism, http://www.ebrd.com/about/integrity/irm/about/index.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2008).
253. Bradlow, supra note 138, at 482.
254. Id. (indicating that the Board also has the power to appoint the panel’s chair from the compliance-review panel members).
255. Id. at 482.
256. Id. at 491.
257. Id. at 482.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 483.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 484.
262. See supra notes 209-220 and accompanying text.
263. See supra note 233 (discussing some aspects of the AFDB’s mechanism).
V. Arbitration as an Alternative

Not surprisingly, the Bank’s current Inspection Panel—while cutting edge when it was instituted in 1993—has become antiquated when compared to those mechanisms that have emerged more recently. It is because the present Inspection Panel fails to meet the needs and the expectations of claimant communities that we propose a new arbitration-based accountability mechanism that builds upon the third-generation mechanisms and incorporates some of the reforms proposed by various observers discussed above.

A. Fundamental Principles

Our proposal is based upon several fundamental propositions. First, in today’s era it is axiomatic that international organizations that wield considerable power in the domestic affairs of their member states be held accountable for the way in which their power is exercised. In addition to political, administrative, and financial mechanisms, legal accountability is crucial. Accordingly, an effective remedial mechanism is “essential to any accountability regime for international organisations.”

Second, international organizations such as the World Bank are no longer immune to the dictates of human rights law. International organizations are bound by customary international law. Therefore, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which is declaratory of customary international law, is binding upon the Bank. Pursuant to the Universal Declaration:

265. Suzuki & Nanwani, supra note 21, at 187-88 (“The establishment of the World Bank’s Inspection Panel in late 1993 was an extraordinary development . . . . Never before had any entity independent of the governing organs of an international organization existed to hear and investigate complaints filed by private individuals . . . .“) (internal citations omitted).

266. Bradlow, supra note 138, at 484-85 (referring to the Bank’s Inspection Panel as part of the first generation of review mechanisms which focused exclusively on compliance even when the Requesters saw the entity as a venue for problem solving as well).


268. KAREL WELLENS, REMEDIES AGAINST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 184 (2002); DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 9 (2d ed. 2005) (“Access to justice implies that the procedures are effective, i.e. capable of redressing the harm that was inflicted.”).

269. See C.F. AMERASINGHE, PRINCIPLES OF THE INSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 399-406 (2d ed. 2005) (stating that under customary international law, international organizations can have obligations towards other international persons arising from particular circumstances or relationships and giving examples of the same); HENRY G. SCHERMERS & NIELS M. BLOKKER, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW: UNITY WITHIN DIVERSITY 822-25 (3d ed. 1995).

Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.\textsuperscript{271}

Moreover, "[e]veryone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized."\textsuperscript{272} Complementing the rights set forth in the Universal Declaration is the "right to development," which the United Nations General Assembly declared to be "an inalienable human right."\textsuperscript{273} Accordingly, "[s]tates have the duty to take steps, individually and collectively, to formulate international development policies with a view to facilitating the full realization of the right to development."\textsuperscript{274} Viewed in a progressive light, the realization of economic and social human rights should be incumbent not only upon states but upon non-state actors, including international organizations such as the Bank.\textsuperscript{275} Indeed, Clark has noted that the Bank considers itself to be in the forefront of efforts to promote economic and social human rights, asserting that "through its support of primary education, health care and nutrition, sanitation, housing, and the environment, the Bank has helped hundreds of millions of people attain crucial economic and social rights.\textsuperscript{276}

The third fundamental proposition relates to compensation. Although member states are "owners" of the Bank's projects and are therefore responsible for any harm the projects may cause their local communities, to the


\textsuperscript{272} Id. art. 28.


\textsuperscript{274} Id. art. 4(1) (emphasis added).


\textsuperscript{276} Clark, supra note 9, at 211 (quoting World Bank, Development and Human Rights: The Role of the World Bank 3 (1998)). Clark further states: "As noted by the former General Counsel of the World Bank, "balanced development can only be achieved if the basic human rights are secured for persons adversely affected by development." Id. at 226 (quoting Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Legal Aspects of Involuntary Population Displacement, in ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO INVOLUNTARY RESETTLEMENT: POLICY, PRACTICE, AND THEORY 27 (Michael M. Cernea & Scott E. Guggenheim eds., 1993)); see also Skogly, supra note 180 (arguing that the World Bank and the IMF are bound by international human rights law). See generally Herbert V. Morais, The Globalization of Human Rights Law and the Role of the International Financial Institutions in Promoting Human Rights, 33 GEO. Wash. INT'L L. REV. 71, 96 (2000) (concluding that the IMF and the multilateral development banks, including the World Bank, "are well-positioned, by virtue of their vast resources and influence, to do even more in the years ahead to further promote human rights in their member countries"); Wahi, supra note 80 (proposing the adoption of a horizontal application of human rights law to the World Bank and the IMF).
extent that the Bank itself causes the harm because of its failure to follow its own policies and procedures, the Bank should be responsible for fully compensating the harmed communities. As stated by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Factory at Chorzow Case,

reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed. Restitution in kind, or, if this is not possible, payment of a sum corresponding to the value which a restitution in kind would bear; the award, if need be, [could be for] damages for loss sustained which would not be covered by restitution in kind or payment in place of it.\textsuperscript{277}

That harmed communities could recover damages is not inconsistent with the doctrine of functional necessity, which provides that “international organizations are entitled to such immunities as will enable them to exercise their functions in the fulfillment of their purposes.”\textsuperscript{278} There is no question that after the advent of the Marshall Plan, the primary purpose of the World Bank has been to promote development. Accordingly, holding the Bank accountable for damages resulting from its failure to follow its own policies and procedures in development projects would promote, rather than detract from, the Bank’s purposes.\textsuperscript{279}

Fourth, when devising a remedial mechanism with respect to claims by individuals or groups of individuals against an international organization, it is important to keep in mind that there is a marked inequality in positions between the former and the latter. As Karel Wellens has argued, international organizations therefore have “the duty to establish appropriate remedial mechanisms to do justice as between [them] and third parties other than officials.”\textsuperscript{280} In doing so, the parties should be treated as equals.\textsuperscript{281} Arbitration would accomplish this goal. Unlike the current

\textsuperscript{277} Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.CJ. 136, 198 (July 9). “The responsible State is under an obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act.” INT’L LAW COMM’N, DRAFT ARTICLES ON RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACTS, WITH COMMENTARIES art. 31(1) (2001), available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf. “Injury includes any damage, whether material or moral, caused by the internationally wrongful act of a State.” Id. art. 31(2); see SHELTON, supra note 268, at 52 (“Notably, the ICJ has indicated that the basic principle of reparation articulated in the Chorzów Factory case applies to reparation for injury to individuals . . . .”)


\textsuperscript{279} See Singer, supra, note 278, at 58 (arguing that “human rights norms impose[ ] a limitation on the jurisdictional immunity of international organizations”); see also de Feyter, supra note 225, at 133–34 (“[I]f claimants would be successful in obtaining appropriate compensation, the court would be assisting the Bank in fulfilling its mission as defined by its Articles of Agreement . . . .”).

\textsuperscript{280} WELLENS, supra note 268, at 25–26.

\textsuperscript{281} Id. at 24; see PHILLIP CAPPER, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: A HANDBOOK 41 (3d ed. 2004) (commenting upon the French case Siemens AG v. Dutco where the Cour de Cassation ruled that the method of appointment of the tribunal breached the principle that the parties should be treated equally in the arbitration”).
Inspection Panel procedure, arbitration would ensure "that the parties are treated with equality and that at any stage of the proceedings each party is given a full opportunity of presenting its case." Moreover, severing the arbitral body completely from the World Bank ensures that claimant communities will receive an independent, impartial hearing.

B. Arbitration Under the Bank's General Conditions for Loans

Arbitration, of course, is not foreign to the World Bank. In addition to arbitration of disputes internal to the Bank, the Bank's General Conditions for Loans stipulate that disputes between the Bank and the borrowing member country are to be settled by arbitration. The existing Arbitral Tribunal consists of three arbitrators. The Bank appoints one arbitrator; the second arbitrator is appointed by the Loan Parties (or, if they do not agree, by the Guarantor). The third arbitrator, the Umpire, is

282. Permanent Court of Arbitration, Optional Rules for Arbitration Between International Organizations and Private Parties, art. 15(1) [hereinafter Optional Rules].


284. Under the World Bank Group's Conflict Resolution System (CRS), staff members can resort to arbitration, via the Appeals Committee, to challenge administrative decisions with respect to employment issues or disciplinary action based on misconduct. See The World Bank, Conflict Resolution System - CRS, http://go.worldbank.org/GA9N4HD110 (last visited Nov. 12, 2008). A panel of three Appeals Committee Panel members is designated to review each appeal. Id. The Panel prepares a Report of its findings and recommendations, which is submitted to the Vice President of Human Resources (HRSVP). The World Bank, The Appeals Process, http://go.worldbank.org/GGCGVClGRO (last visited Nov. 12, 2008). The HRSVP, or designated Senior Official (in the event the HRSVP is disqualified), reviews the recommendation of the Appeals Committee and makes a decision on the Appeal. Id. The Administrative Tribunal, composed of seven judges, is the final stage of the process available to staff who are not satisfied with the resolution of their issues through the appeal process. See id.

285. The General Conditions "set forth certain terms and conditions generally applicable to the Loan Agreement and to any other Legal Agreement." General Conditions, supra note 151, § 1.01. They apply to the extent the Legal Agreement so provides." Id. The General Conditions further state: "If any provision of any Legal Agreement is inconsistent with a provision[,] . . . the provision of the Legal Agreement shall govern." Id. § 1.02.

286. Id. § 8.04(a). The controversy may be between parties to the Loan Agreement or the parties to the Guarantee Agreement. Id. Arbitration is the exclusive forum of dispute resolution:

The provisions for arbitration set forth in this Section shall be in lieu of any other procedure for the settlement of controversies between the parties to the Loan Agreement and Guarantee Agreement or of any claim by any such party against any other such party arising under such Legal Agreements.

Id. § 8.04(j).

287. Id. § 8.04(c).

288. Id.
appointed by agreement of the parties. If they do not agree, however, the President of the International Court of Justice or the Secretary-General of the United Nations appoints the Umpire. If a side fails to appoint an arbitrator, the Umpire will appoint the arbitrator.

An arbitration proceeding is instituted upon notice by the party instituting such proceeding to the other party. The notice must contain a statement setting forth (i) the nature of the controversy or claim, (ii) the nature of the relief sought, and (iii) the name of the arbitrator appointed by the instituting party. Within thirty days of such notice, the other party must notify the instituting party of the name of the arbitrator it has appointed.

The Arbitral Tribunal convenes at such time and place as determined by the Umpire. Thereafter, the Tribunal determines where and when it shall sit. The Tribunal decides "all questions relating to its competence." It also determines its procedure, "except as the parties shall otherwise agree." All decisions of the Arbitral Tribunal are made by majority vote. Although the provisions do not expressly state what law the Tribunal is to apply, former Vice President and General Counsel of the World Bank Aron Broches has argued that—in light of § 10.01 of the General Conditions (now § 8.01)—the Bank's agreement with a member state is governed by public international law; therefore the Tribunal is bound to apply that law.

The Arbitral Tribunal must give all parties a fair hearing and must render its award in writing, signed by a majority of the Tribunal.

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289. Id.
290. The parties have sixty days after the notice instituting the arbitration proceeding to agree upon an Umpire. Id. § 8.04(e).
291. Id. § 8.04(c). If the parties failed to agree during this period, either party would have the power to request the appointment of the Umpire. Id. § 8.04(e).
292. Id. § 8.04(c). If an appointed arbitrator resigns, dies, or becomes unable to act, a successor arbitrator is appointed in the same manner as prescribed for the appointment of the original arbitrator and will have all the powers and duties of the original arbitrator.
293. Id. § 8.04(d).
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id. § 8.04(f).
297. Id.
298. Id. § 8.04(g).
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Section 8.01 of the General Conditions states: "The rights and obligations of the Bank and the Loan Parties under the Legal Agreements shall be valid and enforceable in accordance with their terms notwithstanding the law of any state or political subdivision thereof to the contrary." Id. § 8.01.
303. General Conditions, supra note 151, § 8.04(h).
award may be rendered by default. If the parties have not complied with the award within thirty days after counterparts of the award have been delivered to the parties, a party may

(i) enter judgment upon, or institute a proceeding to enforce, the award in any court of competent jurisdiction against any other party; (ii) enforce such judgment by execution; or (iii) pursue any other appropriate remedy against such other party for the enforcement of the award and the provisions of the Loan Agreement or Guarantee Agreement.

The parties are responsible for fixing the amount of remuneration of the arbitrators and others required for the conduct of the arbitration proceedings. If the parties do not agree upon remuneration before the Arbitral Tribunal convenes, the Tribunal will fix an amount that is reasonable under the circumstances. The parties will defray their own expenses in the arbitration proceedings. The costs of the Arbitral Tribunal "shall be divided between and borne equally by the Bank on the one side and the Loan Parties on the other."

Although the Bank has provided for an arbitration framework to resolve disputes between itself and its member states, the provisions have never been invoked. As Ibrahim Shihata, former Vice President and General Counsel of the World Bank, has written, because there are ongoing relations between the Bank and its member states, there is an incentive to resolve disputes through negotiation. Moreover, negotiated resolutions are facilitated because "the Bank's agreements with its borrowers provides the law governing their relationship which prevails over any conflicting text in the borrower's domestic law or the Bank's Articles."

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304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id. § 8.04(k). The paragraph states further: "Notwithstanding the foregoing, this section shall not authorize any entry of judgment or enforcement of the award against the Member Country except as such procedure may be available otherwise than by reason of the provisions of this Section." Id.
307. Id. § 8.04(i).
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id. "Any question concerning the division of the costs of the Arbitral Tribunal or the procedure for payment of such costs shall be determined by the Arbitral Tribunal." Id.
312. Id. at 92.
313. Id. at 93. Shihata notes: All disputes, including the most difficult ones, such as the partition of the outstanding debt of former Yugoslavia among its successor states, and the insistence of Romania, before its transition, on the prepayment of its outstanding Bank loans without paying the required penalty, were resolved through negotiation over a short period of time.

Id.
C. Administrative Remedy at the World Bank: Office of Claims Resolution

In keeping with well-known principles relating to the exhaustion of administrative remedies and as reflected in the current Inspection Panel procedures, under our proposal, claimant communities could not resort to the type of arbitration set forth in the General Conditions for Loans without first attempting to resolve the dispute directly with the Bank. The Bank would establish an Office of Claims Resolution (OCR), comprised of a Board-appointed Director and support staff. Through the use of a Roster of Claims Resolution Intermediators, the OCR would combine a problem-solving approach with compliance review. In other words, we see no need to have a bifurcated mechanism similar to the ADB's Accountability Mechanism or Professor Bradlow's proposed CRPSM.315

The administrative procedure would begin with the filing of a Request for Claim Resolution either within twelve months after the completion of the project or after the final disbursement of the loan. However, filing outside of this period would be allowed in exceptional circumstances where the claimants could show manifestly compelling reasons for failing to file on a timely basis. The Request would set forth (i) the claimant community's identity as a group of two or more persons who share a common interest or concern; (ii) an explanation of how the Bank is not in compliance with its own policies and procedures; (iii) the material harm that the claimant community has suffered or is likely to suffer as a result of the alleged non-compliance; and (iv) a proposed remedy.

The Bank's Board would appoint a Director of the OCR, who would receive Requests, ensure the Requests set forth the required information, coordinate the appointment of an Intermediator, and produce the OCR's annual report. The Director, who would work independently of the Bank's Management, could serve for an indefinite term. The OCR would maintain a diverse twelve-person Roster of Intermediators. The Board would appoint the Intermediators after consultation with the NGO community. To ensure their independence, the Intermediators would be barred from working for the Bank for two years prior to their appointment. The Intermediators would be chosen on the basis of their knowledge of the Bank's operations and their expertise in development issues. Moreover, the Roster would be globally diverse—i.e., it would not be dominated by persons from one particular culture.

314. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text (Requester of Panel must show steps it has taken to resolve the issue with the Bank).
315. See discussion supra Part IV and accompanying text (outlining these two mechanisms).
In addition to an initial training session on the policies and procedures of the Bank—including past case studies of issues where the Inspection Panel encountered the largest number of problems—the Intermediators would periodically be required to spend some time at the Bank so they may be apprised of any developments relating to the Bank's operations, operating policy, and procedures. After serving a three-year term, resigning from the Roster, or being removed therefrom for cause by the Bank's Board, the Intermediators would not be eligible to work for the Bank for two years.

Upon the submission of the Request for Claim Resolution, the Director would have five business days to determine whether the claim on its face is clearly ineligible. If it is not, the Director would have thirty business days to assist the claimant community and the Bank in selecting an Intermediator from the Roster. If the claimant community and the Bank could not agree on an Intermediator, the Director would make the choice. The Bank or the claimant community could challenge the Director's choice on the grounds that the chosen Intermediator was inappropriate, in which case the Director would make another, final appointment. In urgent cases, the Director could shorten the appointment period to ten days.

Once appointed, the Intermediator would have up to thirty business days to ensure that the claimant community had standing and that the jurisdictional requirement was met. If the Intermediator rejected the Request on either ground, the claimant community would have the right to have another Intermediator—mutually agreed upon or appointed by the Director—review the Request (within a thirty-day period) with respect to these threshold issues. If the second Intermediator rejected the Request, the claimant community's Request would be dismissed with prejudice—i.e., they would be unable to resort to arbitration. The claimant community, however, could resubmit a Request if they could show there was new evidence or new circumstances surrounding the problem or issue in question.

If the Intermediator concluded that both the standing and jurisdictional requirements were met, he or she would first conduct an investigation to determine whether the Bank was in compliance with its own policies and procedures. If the Intermediator determined that the Bank was in compliance with its own policies and procedures, he or she would inform the claimant community and provide a detailed description of the reasons for his or her decision to both the community and the Bank. This description would remain on file in the OCR and be readily accessible by the public. If the claimant community disagreed with the Intermediator's conclusion and still believed that the Bank was not in compliance with its policies and procedures, the claimant community would then have to decide whether to pursue arbitration.

317. Under the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development's Independent Recourse Mechanism, the Chief Compliance Officer must determine whether the complaint is "manifestly ineligible" within five business days of the receipt of the complaint. See id. at 41.
If, however, the Intermediator determined that the Bank was not in compliance with its own policies and procedures, he or she would have the authority to take all appropriate actions to help the parties resolve the matter. The exercise would require the Bank’s Management, in consultation with the Bank’s Board, to (i) respond directly to the allegations set forth in the claimant community’s initial complaint, which the Intermediator confirmed; (ii) directly address the remedy that the claimant community proposed in the initial complaint and, if the Management does not adopt it, present reasons for the failure to adopt the claimant-community’s proposed remedy; (iii) propose a plan of action, which might include financial compensation, to bring the Bank back into compliance with its policies and procedures; and (iv) in the event the project was completed, consider the amount of compensation that would put the claimant community in the position it would have been in before commencement of the project.\(^{318}\)

The claimant community would have an opportunity to comment upon the adequacy of the plan of action or proposed compensation. If the parties agreed on a plan of action or compensation through the efforts of the Intermediator, the Intermediator would produce a public report for the Director setting forth the plan of action, including firm timetables, or the agreed compensation. Because the Board would have already consulted with the Bank’s Management regarding the plan of action or compensation, no further Board approval would be required. If the Bank failed to abide by the plan of action, including the specific timetables therein, the claimant community could institute arbitration proceedings to compel the Bank to abide by its plan of action and otherwise to collect damages resulting from the Bank’s failure to do so.

If the parties could not come to a mutually agreeable resolution either by way of a plan of action or compensation, the Claim Resolution exercise would come to an end. The Intermediator would prepare a public report for the Director setting forth the reasons for the unsuccessful resolution of the claim. At that point, the claimant community could pursue arbitration.

D. Arbitration

Although we could graft the arbitration provisions of the Bank’s General Conditions for Loans described above onto our proposal, we prefer instead to rely upon the Optional Rules for Arbitration between International Organizations and Private Parties (Optional Rules for Private Par-

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\(^{318}\) As noted, under the current Inspection Panel procedure, the claimant community must claim that “an action or omission of the Bank to follow its own operational policies and procedures during the design, appraisal and/or implementation of a Bank-financed project” will have an “actual or threatened material adverse effect on [their] rights or interests.” See supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text. In the 1999 clarifications, the Board stated:

For assessing material adverse effect, the without-project situation should be used as the base case for comparison, taking into account what baseline information may be available. Non-accomplishments and unfulfilled expectations that do not generate a material deterioration compared to the without-project situation will not be considered as a material adverse effect for this purpose.
ties) produced by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), as modified below. The Rules, which closely follow the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) rules of arbitration, are a product of a Steering Committee appointed by the PCA's Secretary-General, which noted the need to include international organizations as parties in the PCA's dispute-settlement proceedings. In addition to producing optional rules for arbitration between international organizations and states, the Steering Committee also drew up rules that would govern disputes between private parties and international organizations.

The Optional Rules for Private Parties, which entered into effect on July 1, 1996, set forth a comprehensive set of arbitration rules ranging from provisions on notice of arbitration, to the composition of the arbitral tribunal, to the arbitral proceedings themselves, and to the award. A number of provisions are worth noting. First, the rules are "subject to such modification as the parties may agree in writing." Second, agreement to the rules "constitutes a waiver of any right of immunity from jurisdiction, in respect of the dispute in question, to which such party might otherwise be entitled." Moreover, "waiver of immunity relating to the execution of an arbitral award must be explicitly addressed." Thus, under our proposal, as already stipulated in the General Conditions for

1999 Clarifications, supra note 50, ¶ 14.

319. The Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes established the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the first Hague Peace Conference of 1899. Tjaco T. Van Den Hout, The Permanent Court of Arbitration: Responding to a Century of Globalization, 2 INT'L L. F. DU DROIT INT'L 235, 235 (2000). The 1899 Convention was revised at the second Hague Peace Conference in 1907. Scott Armstrong Spence, Organizing an Arbitration Involving an International Organization and Multiple Private Parties, 21 J. INT'L ARBITRATION 309, 314 n.43 (2004). In the mid-1930s, the PCA agreed to administer a "mixed" arbitration in which one of the parties was a foreign corporation rather than a State. Van Den Hout, supra, at 235. In 1962, the PCA created the "Rules of Arbitration and Conciliation for settlement of international disputes between two parties of which only one is a State." Id. at 236. In 1976, the PCA became directly tied into the field of international commercial arbitration when the UNCITRAL arbitration rules designated the Secretary-General of the PCA as the "appointing authority." Id. This led the PCA in the 1990s to adopt a number of optional arbitration rules based on the UNCITRAL Rules. Id. at 237.


321. WELLENS, supra note 268, at 221.

322. Id. at 223.

323. Id. Although no arbitrations have been conducted under the Optional Rules for Private Parties, the Rules were used as a starting point for drafting rules of procedure for an arbitration proceeding instituted to settle a dispute between the Bank for International Settlements and three of its private shareholders. See Spence, supra note 319, at 314–15.

324. Optional Rules, supra note 282, art. 3.

325. Id. arts. 5–14.

326. Id. arts. 15–30.

327. Id. arts. 32–41.

328. Id. art. 1(1).

329. Id. art. 1(2).

330. Id.
Loans, the Bank would agree to a waiver of immunity—a waiver of immunity—i.e., a party may "(i) enter judgment upon, or institute a proceeding to enforce, the award in any court of competent jurisdiction against any other party; (ii) enforce such judgment by execution; or (iii) pursue any other appropriate remedy against such other party for the enforcement of the award."  

Third, the International Bureau of the PCA at The Hague is in charge of the archives of the arbitration proceeding. Moreover, "the International Bureau shall, upon written request of all the parties or of the arbitral tribunal, act as a channel of communications between the parties and the arbitral tribunal, and provide secretariat services including, inter alia, arranging for hearing rooms, interpretation, and stenographic or electronic records of hearings." Fourth, "[u]nless the parties have agreed otherwise, the place where the arbitration is to be held shall be The Hague, The Netherlands." Under our proposal, we suspect that the arbitration proceedings would take place in a location other than The Hague, such as in New York, NY, or in the member country in which the project is located. Accordingly, under the rules, "the International Bureau shall inform the parties and the arbitral tribunal whether it is willing to provide the secretariat and registrar services"  

Fifth, "[t]he arbitral tribunal may determine the locale of the arbitration within the country agreed upon by the parties. It may hear witnesses and hold meetings for consultation among its members at any place it deems appropriate, having regard to the circumstances of the arbitration." Finally, "[a]fter inviting the views of the parties, the arbitral tribunal may meet at any place it deems appropriate for the inspection of

331. An explicit waiver would be required despite the wording of Article VII, Section 3 of the Bank's charter. It states:  
Actions may be brought against the Bank only in a court of competent jurisdiction in the territories of a member in which the Bank has an office, has appointed an agent for the purpose of accepting service or notice of process, or has issued or guaranteed securities. No actions shall, however, be brought by members or persons acting for or deriving claims from members. The property and assets of the Bank shall, wheresoever located and by whomsoever held, be immune from all forms of seizure, attachment or execution before the delivery of a final judgment against the Bank.  

Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development art. VII, § 3, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1440, 2 U.N.T.S. 134. This "facially broad waiver" has been construed narrowly: "[i]t is evident that the World Bank's members could only have intended to waive the Bank's immunity from suits by its debtors, creditors, bondholders, and those other potential plaintiffs to whom the Bank would have had to subject itself to suit in order to achieve its chartered objectives." Mendaro v. World Bank, 717 F.2d 610, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding the Bank immune from employee's Title VII suit); accord Morgan v. Int'l Bank for Reconstruction & Dev., 752 F. Supp. 492 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see also SHIHATA, supra note 22, at 251–52 (stating that narrow interpretation of Bank's waiver "is generally consistent with the practice in other [non-U.S.] member countries").
property or documents. The parties shall be given sufficient notice to enable them to be present at such inspection.”

1. **Appointment of the Arbitral Tribunal**

Under our proposal—and according to the arbitration provisions set forth in the Bank's General Conditions for Loans—the arbitral tribunal would consist of three arbitrators. The Bank would appoint one arbitrator, and the claimant community would appoint the second arbitrator. The two arbitrators thus appointed would choose the third arbitrator, who would act as the presiding arbitrator of the tribunal. As noted below, the claimant community would be required to name its arbitrator in the notice of arbitration. The Bank would have thirty days after receipt of the notice to appoint its arbitrator. If the Bank failed to appoint an arbitrator within the allotted time, the claimant community would request the President of the International Court of Justice to appoint the second arbitrator. If the President failed to appoint the second arbitrator within thirty days after the claimant's request, the claimant would request the Secretary-General of the PCA to make the appointment within thirty days of the request. If within thirty days after the appointment of the second arbitrator, the two arbitrators have not agreed on the choice of the presiding arbitrator, the presiding arbitrator would be appointed in the same way the second arbitrator would be chosen if the Bank failed to make a timely appointment.

Members of the arbitral tribunal would be chosen from a Roster of Arbitrators comprised of persons nominated by Bank members and the NGO community. The Arbitrators would have to be persons who have been widely recognized for their knowledge and competence relating to the operations of the World Bank and to development, and who are capable of exercising independent judgment. They would serve five-year renewable terms. The parties would be free to select persons who are not on the Roster, provided they met the requirements of expertise in the field and independence.

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338. Id. art. 16(3).
339. See id. art. 5 (providing that three arbitrators will be appointed if the parties have not previously agreed on the number of arbitrators—one or three).
340. See id. art. 7(1).
341. Id.
342. See infra note 350 and accompanying text.
343. Optional Rules, supra note 282, art. 7(2).
344. Article 7(2)(b) of the Optional Rules stipulates sixty days. See id. art. 7(2)(b).
345. Id.
346. According to Article 8 of the Optional Rules, “in appointing arbitrators pursuant to these Rules, the parties and the appointing authority are free to designate persons who are not Members of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague.” Id. art. 8(3).
347. A party may challenge the selection of an arbitrator on the grounds either that the arbitrator will not be impartial or independent, or that the arbitrator is not qualified. See id. arts. 9-12.
2. The Arbitral Proceedings

The affected community\textsuperscript{348} would commence arbitration proceedings by providing the Bank with a notice of arbitration.\textsuperscript{349} In addition to appointing an arbitrator, the notice would have to include a statement of the claim:\textsuperscript{350}

- A statement indicating that the arbitration is being demanded by "any two or more persons who share some common interests or concerns;"\textsuperscript{351}
- A statement identifying the project and the "action or omission of the Bank to follow its own operational policies and procedures during the design, appraisal and/or implementation of [the] Bank-financed project," whatever the case may be;\textsuperscript{352}
- A statement identifying how the Bank's action or omission will have an "actual or threatened material adverse effect on [the claimants'] rights or interests;"\textsuperscript{353}
- If applicable, a statement, along with the submission of the Intermediator's public report, indicating how the Bank was not in compliance with the agreed upon plan of action;
- If applicable, a statement, along with the submission of the Intermediator's public report, indicating the inadequacies of the Bank's proposed resolution of the complaint at issue;
- If applicable, a statement indicating any Bank-caused damages that arose within one year after the completion of the project or the final disbursement of the loan; and
- A statement indicating the relief or remedy sought.

Within a time period to be determined by the tribunal, the Bank would submit its statement of defense to the arbitral tribunal and the claimant community.\textsuperscript{354} The statement of defense would include:

- A statement identifying any disputes of fact;
- A statement asserting that the Bank was in compliance with its own policies and procedures, as reflected in the Intermediator's public report (submitted along with the statement of defense), or

\textsuperscript{348} The proceeding would be in the nature of a class action. Accordingly, the arbitral tribunal would certify the class by determining common injury. In the notice of arbitration the claimants would be required to show shared interest or concerns. Experience thus far under the Inspection Panel procedure suggests that certifying a class would not be problematic.

\textsuperscript{349} \textit{Optional Rules}, supra note 282, art. 3(1)-(2).

\textsuperscript{350} To expedite the resolution of the dispute, our proposal differs from the Optional Rules. Under the Optional Rules, the notice of arbitration does not need to contain a statement of the claim. \textit{Id.} art. 3(3). If the notice does not contain such a statement, the arbitral tribunal fixes the period of time within which the claimant must communicate the statement. \textit{Id.} art. 18(1).

\textsuperscript{351} 1996 \textit{Clarification}, supra note 50, ¶ 9.

\textsuperscript{352} Operating Procedures, supra note 1, at 512.

\textsuperscript{353} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{354} See \textit{Optional Rules}, supra note 282, art. 19(1).
° had complied with the agreed upon plan of action or had excusable grounds for not complying with the plan of action, or
° had proposed a plan of action that would have brought it into full compliance with its own policies and procedures and that plan was unreasonably or in bad faith rejected by the claimant community;

• A statement, if applicable, denying liability for damages.

As to the proceeding itself, the arbitral tribunal could hold hearings at the request of either party. If no such request is made, the tribunal would decide whether to hold such hearings or whether to conduct the proceedings based on the submission of documents alone. With respect to burden, "each party shall have the burden of proving the facts relied on to support its claim or defence." If the arbitral proceeding followed (i) a conclusion by the Intermediator that the Bank had complied with its policies and procedures, or (ii) an unsuccessful resolution of a Request for Claim Resolution, the claimant community would carry a "heavy burden" of showing that (a) the Bank was not in compliance with its policies and procedures, or (b) the claimant community acted reasonably and in good faith when it rejected the Bank's proposed plan of action.

In keeping with current Inspection Panel procedure, and as contemplated by the Optional Rules, testimony by affected community members or their representatives, testimony by government officials and authorities in charge of the project, and nonpublic documents, would all remain confidential. Just as the Inspection Panel has hired consultants in its investigations, so too would the arbitral tribunal be able to appoint experts to report on specific issues. As to interim measures, either party may request the arbitral tribunal to issue interim measures necessary to preserve their respective rights of either party. With respect to the applicable law,

the arbitral tribunal shall have regard both to the rules of the organization concerned and to the law applicable to the agreement or relationship out of or in relation to which the dispute arises and, where appropriate, to the general principles governing the law of international organizations and to the rules of general international law.

3. The Award

Upon closure of the hearings, the arbitral tribunal would issue its final award. The award could be declaratory, indicating whether or not the Bank was in compliance with its own policies and procedures; whether it was abiding by its plan of action or had an excuse for not doing so; or whether the Bank's proposed plan of action was reasonable, made in good
faith, and should have been accepted by the claimant community. With respect to the third issue, if the arbitral tribunal decided that the Bank’s plan of action was unreasonable or made in bad faith, it would issue an award for specific performance which would include a plan of action that it deemed as in compliance with the Bank’s policies and procedures. The tribunal would also award any damages that the claimant community could prove with a reasonable degree of certainty, including damages that were realized within one year after the completion of the project or final disbursement of the loan. All decisions or awards of the arbitral tribunal would be made by a majority of the arbitrators. All awards would be made public and would be final and binding on the parties.

4. Costs

The Optional Rules for Private Parties state that the arbitral tribunal will fix the costs of arbitration in its award. Costs include, among other things, the fees of the arbitral tribunal, travel and other expenses incurred by the arbitrators and any witnesses, the costs of expert advice, and the “costs for legal representation and assistance of the successful party if such costs were claimed during the arbitral proceedings, and only to the extent that the arbitral tribunal determines that the amount of such costs is reasonable.” In principle, the costs of arbitration are borne by the unsuccessful party. “However, the arbitral tribunal may apportion each of such costs between the parties if it determines that apportionment is reasonable, taking into account the circumstances of the case.” Moreover, with respect to the costs of legal representation, “the arbitral tribunal, taking into account the circumstances of the case, shall be free to determine which party shall bear such costs or may apportion such costs between the parties if it determines that apportionment is reasonable.”

We believe the costs of the arbitration should be borne by the unsuccessful party only in the unlikely event where the claimant community brought a manifestly frivolous arbitration claim or when the Bank clearly acted in bad faith. Otherwise, each party should bear its own legal expenses and, like the arbitration provisions under the General Conditions for Loans, the costs should be divided equally between the parties.

361. Id. art. 31(1).
362. Id. art. 32(2)-(5). The Optional Rules state that the “award may be made public only with the consent of both parties.” Id. art. 32(5). Under our proposal, arbitral awards must be made public. We do not refer to “decisions,” because there is a distinction between decisions and awards. “‘Awards’ are decisions of the tribunal which finally dispose of an issue, or issues, between the parties and which will be given recognition and effect by state courts .... Decisions and directions which relate only to procedural matters ... are not properly described as ‘awards’.” CAPPER, supra note 281, at 111.
363. Optional Rules, supra note 282, art. 38.
364. Id.
365. Id. art. 40(1).
366. Id.
367. Id. art. 40(2).
This proposal raises the obvious question of how claimant communities would bear the costs of arbitration. First, with respect to the costs of legal representation—relating to both filing a Request for Claim Resolution and arbitration—we are confident that the major national and international law firms would be eager to represent claimant communities on a pro bono basis. A clearinghouse for such work could be provided by the Advocates for International Development (A4ID)—an organization which coordinates legal pro bono work throughout the world with respect to issues relating to international trade and development. A4ID also works closely with major international NGOs, such as The Centre for African Policy and Peace Strategy, ActionAid, and Oxfam. Second, with respect to the other costs of arbitration, organizations such as A4ID could work with the NGO community and other donors to raise funds to cover such costs. Moreover, the PCA maintains a Financial Assistance Fund, which is intended to help developing countries meet part of the costs involved in international arbitration. The Fund consists of "voluntary financial contributions by States, intergovernmental organizations, national institutions, as well as natural and legal persons." Although the Fund currently provides assistance only to a "Qualifying State," there is no reason why the rules of the Fund could not be amended to provide financial assistance to claimant communities.

5. Enforcement

To demonstrate to the world that it believes in true accountability—and to maintain its legitimacy—the World Bank should willingly comply with the arbitral award. If enforcement were necessary, the claimant community would seek enforcement of the award under domestic law or via international conventions. Here we will limit our commentary to the widely adopted 1958 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New York Convention). The United States has implemented the Convention via the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Under the FAA, U.S. federal district courts have original jurisdiction over actions arising under the New York Convention.

For the present purposes, we raise three issues with respect to application of the New York Convention. First, the Convention requires that an arbitration agreement be “in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not.” Certainly the Bank has no contractual relationship with claimant communities with respect to its obligation to follow its own policies and procedures. The language of the Convention, however, appears to cover non-contractual claims, such as tort claims, as would be the case with respect to affected communities’ claims against the Bank. Second, the Convention provides that member states may declare that the provisions apply only to relationships that are considered “as com-

374. Id. art. III.
376. Id. § 203.
378. SHIHATA, supra note 22, at 258.
380. Because adversely affected community members are not parties to a loan agreement between the Bank and the borrowing country, they would need to bring a claim in tort. De Feyter suggests that claimants would argue negligence. De Feyter, supra note 225, at 129. Claimants would argue that “the Bank breached its duty to take care by not contemplating the injurious effect on the affected persons, when deciding not to insist on the implementation of the [loan] agreement, or on compliance with its operational policies.” Id. at 129–30. He also argues that the Bank could be held liable if the borrower fails to comply with its international human rights obligations. See id. at 130. We disagree with this proposition to the extent it makes the Bank liable for a member’s breach of its human rights obligations in the absence of a link to the Bank’s policies and procedures. Shihata opposes liability based on fault. Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, The World Bank Inspection Panel—Its Historical, Legal and Operational Aspects, in THE INSPECTION PANEL OF THE WORLD BANK: A DIFFERENT COMPLAINTS PROCEDURE 7, 43 (Gudmundur Alfredsson & Rolf Ring eds., 2001). Shihata argues that the Bank’s failure to follow its own policies and procedures does not “amount to a legal obligation vis-à-vis that affected party with whom the Bank has no contractual relationship.” Id. Even if fault liability were possible, “the mere failure by the Bank to observe its policies would rarely amount to a fault under applicable law; these policies typically require high standards beyond what borrowers or their foreign financiers otherwise need to observe under national or international law.” Id. at 42; see SHIHATA, supra note 22, at 254–58 (discussing the limits of lender liability). We believe that the creation of the Inspection Panel and the “case law” it has promulgated since its inception clearly indicate that the Bank and the various stakeholders in the Bank’s projects believe the Bank has a duty to abide by its operational policies and that there should be a remedy for harm caused by its failure to abide by its policies. If the arbitral tribunal holds that the Bank is liable for damages, and if the Bank believes the borrowing country should be ultimately liable for the damages caused by the harm, the Bank can bring an arbitration proceeding against
commercial under the national law of the State making [the] declaration."381
The United States, like other nations, has made this declaration.382
Although U.S. courts have construed the term "commercial" broadly,383
it may be problematic to construe the Bank's compliance with its own poli-
cies and procedures as commercial activities.384 Consequently, enforce-
ment of an arbitral award under our proposal may have to be pursued in a
country that has not made this declaration.385 Finally, under the New
York Convention, a court can refuse to enforce an award that is not "capa-
ble of settlement by arbitration."386 Moreover, Article V, paragraph (2)(a)
states that an arbitration award need not be recognized if "[t]he subject
matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under
the law" of the country where recognition is sought.387 Although this non-
arbitrability doctrine has been narrowed over the years,388 it is conceivable
that a court may invoke this doctrine with respect to ordering the Bank,
pursuant to the arbitral award, to comply with its own policies and
procedures.

Conclusion

Our proposal would bring about real and effective accountability on
the part of the World Bank. Fundamentally, it eliminates the Bank’s patern-
alistic, biased, and politically motivated approach to resolving claims
brought by affected claimant communities. Specifically, a politically moti-
vated Board would no longer determine whether exceptional circum-
stances exist for foreign representation of claimant communities. Given
today’s globalized world, the non-local representation limitation is anach-
ronistic.389 Accordingly, as provided for in the Optional Rules for Arbitra-
tion, there is no reason why an affected community should not be able to
"be represented or assisted by persons of their choice."390 In other words,
there is no compelling reason why a party in an arbitration proceeding—or

the borrowing country pursuant to the Bank’s General Conditions for Loans. See gener-
ally General Conditions, supra note 151.
381. New York Convention, supra note 373, art. I, ¶ 3.
382. BORN, supra note 379, at 149.
383. Id. at 150.
384. See SHIHATA, supra note 22, at 252 (“Neither the Bank’s lending operations, nor,
clearly, the issuance and observance of its policies and procedures are commercial activ-
ities pursued for profit purposes.”).
385. Many of the major European countries have not made this declaration. See CAP-
PER, supra note 281, at 149–52.
386. New York Convention, supra note 373, art. II, ¶ 1.
387. Id. art. V, ¶ 2.
388. See generally BORN, supra note 379, at 243–95.
389. A study of claims brought before the Inspection Panel revealed that a majority of
cases were led by Southern NGOs, with most of the remaining claims being brought by a
coalition of Southern and Northern NGOs. See Jonathan Fox & Kay Treakle, Concluding
Propositions, in DEMANDING ACCOUNTABILITY: CIVIL-SOCIETY CLAIMS AND THE WORLD BANK
INSPECTION PANEL, supra note 56, at 279, 280–81. The study’s authors therefore argue
that “[t]his evidence puts the charge that the ‘Panel process is a tool of Northern NGOs’
to rest.” Id.
390. Optional Rules, supra note 282, art. 4.
at the pre-arbitration stage—should be denied the autonomy to choose its representation from among the global legal and NGO communities. Moreover, under our proposal there would be no issue as to whether the Board would authorize an investigation, even under a “no-objection” basis.

Importantly, our proposal would give claimant communities a true voice and remedy. Our proposed administrative remedy under the OCR would actively involve members of the claimant community in an independent claim resolution mechanism that combines the compliance and problem-solving functions that currently are separate resolution components at multilateral development banks such as the ADB.\textsuperscript{391} If a plan of action were agreed upon at the administrative level, the requirement of Board approval for the plan’s implementation would be eliminated. Compliance with the plan of action would be monitored by the claimant community’s legal or NGO representation in conjunction with the OCR Director. If the Bank failed to abide by the plan of action, the claimant community would have the option of instituting truly independent arbitration proceedings and seeking damages for any harm that might have resulted from the Bank’s breach of the agreement. In the event that the administrative process was unsuccessful and that the arbitral tribunal decided that the Bank’s plan of action was unreasonable or made in bad faith, the arbitral tribunal could order its own plan of action to be implemented without Board approval. Finally, under our proposal communities could bring an arbitration claim for damages realized within one year after the completion of the project or final disbursement of the loan.

While our proposal seeks to bring about real and effective accountability on the part of the Bank, it is also consistent with the doctrine of functional necessity.\textsuperscript{392} First, our proposal does not expand the current mandate of the Inspection Panel. Claimant communities would still be limited to bringing claims alleging noncompliance with the Bank’s own policies and procedures. Second, although under our proposal the Board would no longer have the last word on implementation of a plan of action, the Bank’s Management would still consult with the Board with respect to the resolution of a claim.

Third, although excessive arbitration against the World Bank arguably could impede its ability to function, we foresee that most claims, especially given the possibility of arbitration, would be resolved at the administrative level, and that the Bank would willingly comply with the agreed plan of action. Fourth, in the arbitration proceeding, the Bank would be entitled to present an excuse for failing to abide by the agreed plan of action, and the claimant community would have the “heavy burden” of showing that (i) the

\textsuperscript{391} The third function identified by Professor Bradlow, lessons-learned, would be fulfilled by the OCR Director’s submission of an annual report to the Board. See supra notes 230–233 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{392} See supra note 278 and accompanying text. As Singer has indicated, the doctrine of functional necessity, strictly speaking, is not applicable when an international organization expressly waives immunity. Singer, supra note 278, at 80. In such cases, the tribunal “should determine whether the organization has in fact waived its jurisdictional immunity, regardless of whether this would benefit the organization.” Id.
Bank was not in compliance with its policies and procedures, or (ii) the claimant community acted reasonably and in good faith when it rejected the Bank's proposed plan of action at the administrative level. Finally, claimant communities would bear the costs of arbitration if they brought a manifestly frivolous claim.

We recognize that ultimately our proposal rests on a political decision: the World Bank's willingness to waive its immunity. In this regard, we concur with de Feyter's observation that the Bank should waive its immunity "in recognition of its role as an autonomous international actor, and of the important impact its actions and omissions have on the human rights conditions of people affected by their projects." We also recognize that limiting our proposal to the World Bank might to some extent cause countries to seek funding at other multilateral financial institutions that do not allow adversely affected communities to bring arbitral claims. Ideally, therefore, an arbitration option should be adopted uniformly.

393. De Feyter, supra note 225, at 134-35.