The ICSID Under Siege

Leon E. Trakman

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The ICSID Under Siege
Leon E. Trakman†

Rights-based processes, including binding arbitration and traditional court trials, have limited remedies and may not address the full range of interests and needs that the parties may have. Disputes resolved on the basis of power (e.g. through gunboat diplomacy, or at the extreme, violence and war) weight the outcome in favour of the party with the most leverage, status and resources, but this may be costly on the relationships involved and may result in failure to vindicate rights.1

Introduction .................................................... 604
I. Challenges to the ICSID ....................................... 605
A. Ideology ..................................................... 606
B. Impact of Ideology on ICSID Arbitration ................... 611
C. Complexity and Cost ........................................ 616
D. The Public-Private Nature of ICSID Arbitration .......... 620
E. Looking Ahead ................................................ 623
II. A Functional Defense of the ICSID ......................... 626
III. Reforming the ICSID From Within ......................... 630
A. ICSID Secretariat Discussion Paper ....................... 630
B. Secrecy in ICSID Proceedings ............................. 635
C. The Boundaries of Party Autonomy ........................ 638
D. Inconsistent Decisions ...................................... 642
E. Greasing the Squeaky Wheel ................................. 644
IV. Domestic Courts or ICSID Arbitrators? .................... 648
A. The Case for and Against Domestic Courts ............... 649
B. Addressing the Dilemma .................................... 652
C. Limitations in Political Risk Insurance ..................... 655

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Introduction

2009, in the wake of the global financial crisis, was a bad year for the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). In May of that year, the President of Ecuador, Raphael Correa, denounced the ICSID. He proclaimed that his country's withdrawal from the ICSID was necessary for "the liberation of our countries because [it] signifies colonialism, slavery with respect to transnationals, with respect to Washington, with respect to the World Bank." This public representation was followed by a public challenge to the ICSID by the Presidents of Bolivia and Ecuador at a United Nations (UN) conference in June 2009 where they declared that the ICSID should be disbanded. Although those events occurred over three years ago, the debate has continued, with Venezuela recently withdrawing from the ICSID Convention. Is the ICSID ideologically, structurally, procedurally, or functionally deficient? Are those deficiencies ascribed to the ICSID by President Raphael Correa of Ecuador justified and, if so, why? Are there cogent reasons to the contrary? Is the alternative to have resort to another international investment alternative, or to rely on domestic courts to resolve investment disputes previously submitted to the ICSID? Why have major economies and destinations for foreign investment in Asia, varying from Vietnam to India, never acceded to the ICSID?

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3. See ICSID in Crisis, supra note 2.


5. See, e.g., List of Contracting States and Other Signatories of the Convention (as of July 25, 2012), ICSID, http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=
Why has Brazil excluded the ICSID Arbitration Rules entirely? These questions are economically, politically, and socially important. If neither country to an investment treaty is a party to the ICSID Convention, or if their investment treaty provides for investor-state arbitration under the arbitration rules of another organization, such as the UN Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL Rules), domestic courts can review the award if the investor seeks enforcement in a host state. However, if domestic courts have the final word on state-investment arbitration, domestic laws and interests are likely to further dilute international investment law and practice.

This Article evaluates the criticisms leveled at the ICSID in five particular respects. First, it considers the perceived bias of the ICSID towards wealthy Western states and their investors as an ideological and normative proposition. Second, it evaluates the extent to which the processes of the ICSID incorporate this perceived bias into its institutional mechanisms. Third, it considers whether ICSID arbitration is a viable alternative to domestic courts resolving investment disputes between states and foreign investors. Fourth, it proposes ways in which the ICSID can become more transparent as a mechanism for resolving investment disputes in the face of criticism that it suffers from ideological, structural, and functional myopia. Fifth, it reflects on dispute-avoidance alternatives to both arbitration and national courts in resolving investment disputes.\(^6\)

A contrite and diffident defense of the ICSID is that its problems can be ascribed to the complexity of the multiple layers of investment law, that many of these layers are outside of its control, and that the ICSID has attempted to redress those complexities that are within its control.\(^7\) The purpose of this Article is not to identify the heroes and villains in investment law and practice, but to resolve real conflicts with real human, social, and political potency. In this respect, ICSID arbitration is one among multiple means of resolving such conflicts. It is not an end in itself, nor should it be so construed.

I. Challenges to the ICSID

Whether international arbitration jurisprudence in general can evolve into commonly accepted principles of international investment law is open

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7. See, e.g., WAIBEL ET AL., supra note 2 (defending ICSID); see also, EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION (Chester Brown & Kate Miles eds., 2011); MAKING TRANSNATIONAL LAW WORK IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF DETLEV VAGTS (Pieter Bekker et al. eds., 2010); LUCY REED ET AL., GUIDE TO ICSID ARBITRATION IX (2004).
to debate. Arguably, the failure of the global community of states to reach a multilateral investment accord in the past demonstrates the difficulty for states to find common ground on the treatment of foreign investment, including institutions and processes for dispute resolution. In dispute is whether investment rights ought to be determined by general principles of investment law or more truly by geo-political and economic interests that circumscribe those principles. In contention additionally is whether arbitration processes that are \textit{ad hoc} in nature and sometimes closed to public scrutiny are sufficiently transparent to transcend the political context in which ICSID awards are reached.

A. Ideology

An underlying concern among some developing states, most vividly expressed in 2009 by President Raphael Correa of Ecuador, is that the ICSID was established by, and arguably in the interest of, wealthy countries and their investors abroad. A related concern is that ICSID arbitration has done more to protect capital exporter states and the "equitable" interests of their investors than address the economic and social interests of capital importing states in Africa, Asia, and Latin America that historically were economically exploited by colonial powers and their investors. These concerns of developing states are reflected in their collective attempts to protect "their" New International Economic Order through the General Assembly of the UN, through supporting a Charter of Economic


10. By far the most dominant view is that investment law is based on determinative principles. See, e.g., Dolzer & Schreuer, supra note 6, ch. 1; see also M. Sornarajah, \textit{The Case Against an International Investment Regime}, in \textit{Trakman & Ranieri}, supra note 2, ch. 4 (providing a critique of this principled approach).


12. See generally ICSID in Crisis, supra note 2.

Rights and Duties of States and a Declaration on the Permanent Sovereignty of States over Natural Resources.\(^{14}\)

Human rights challenges to international investment law and investor-state arbitration in particular also reflect developing states' attacks on economic exploitation imputed to investors from wealthy developed states. The accusation of developing states is that principles of investment law are espoused through selective privileging under a rule of law regime devised by old world powers at the expense of the new developing world order.\(^{15}\) Proponents of this view argue that, whereas international human rights are based on universal norms of fair treatment, the "fair and equitable" treatment of foreign investors is grounded in self-serving norms directed at the market efficiency of capital flows.\(^{16}\) Underpinning this rationale is the insinuation that the de-politicization of international investment is code for economic rationalism, by which wealthy transnational corporations pontificate profit-maximizing outcomes that ultimately favor them over developing states and their citizenry.\(^{17}\) The alleged enemy is a superpower like the United States with an Alien Tort Claims process by which non-U.S. citizens can be held liable in any United States civil court, transforming the United States into a universal international law jurisdiction. The limit on this power is perceived as minimal at best, as the defendant must merely be in the United States in order to be subject to a subpoena.\(^{18}\)

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Developing states sometimes also decry the shift in the "regime theory," by which powerful countries in the West have invoked customary law and treaty defenses, such as the defense of necessity to foreign investors from developing states, even though those same Western states denounced those defenses when they were capital exporters. Coupled with these concerns is disquiet about developed states crafting reservations and exceptions in investment treaties to service their national security, public health, labor, and environmental safety interests. Furthermore, a countervailing concern is that developing states like South Africa prefer to conclude bilateral investment agreements providing for investor-state arbitration only with capital exporting, rather than capital importing, countries. The signing of bilateral investment agreements incorporating investor-state arbitration is therefore not simply about developed states imposing their will on developing states. Rather, these agreements are strategically important and states elect among them in a calculated manner according to the perceived benefits arising from prospective investment flows.

The fact that the choice of bilateral investment agreements and investor-state arbitration is strategic still does not contradict some developing states' argument that they lack the array of strategic options that are available to powerful developed states. From this perspective, the ICSID is a vehicle by which wealthy developed states have manicured investment law, and through it investor-state arbitration, into a self-serving *ius cogens* to suit themselves and their investors abroad. Here, the inference is not that ICSID arbitrators have acquiesced formally to the power of developed states and their investors, nor that ICSID arbitrators happily do their bid-


21. On such criticism, see Sornarajah, *supra* note 13, chs. 7-8.


23. *See id.*

ding. Instead, it is supposed that, if a capital exporter devises a bilateral investment treaty, ICSID arbitrators who are trained predominantly as civil and common lawyers are likely to construe that treaty textually in favor of that capital exporter.\(^{25}\) Added to this is the concern that ICSID arbitrators, who are usually commercial and not public lawyers, will pay less attention to the public policy consequences of their awards for developing states than to the plain words of treaties devised by dominant treaty parties.\(^{26}\)

Over its forty-year history, the ICSID has acquired many more signatories than the original elite twenty. New members emanate from Africa, Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Asia among others.\(^{27}\) However, the perception is that, in interpreting investment treaties literally, ICSID arbitrators have continued to service developed states by applying regulatory defenses developed states crafted in their particular interests.\(^{28}\) This concern gives rise to the inference that investment arbitrators have devised a self-serving its cogens more through interpretative practice than by design.\(^{29}\) In particular, they have recognized international investment laws, not limited to investment treaties, that protect the property of transnational corporations from expropriation by developing states.\(^{30}\) Furthermore, investment arbitrators allegedly have failed to adequately address the tension between protecting private property and promoting international investment on the uneven investor-state platform of multi-state relations.\(^{31}\)

A related dilemma is that, with new super-economic powers like China extending the scope of dispute resolution by treaty beyond expropriation, ICSID arbitrators are likely to construe those treaties purposively, consistent with China's treaty purpose of protecting its national interests, such as

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30. See McLachlan, supra note 29, at 394.

31. See, e.g., Dolzer & Schreuer, supra note 6, chs. 1-2 (discussing the alleged foundations of investment law in contract and property).
agriculture, from foreign investors while also defending the interests of its investors abroad.32 China is also likely to follow the direction of the Supreme People's Court that commentators perceive, correctly or otherwise, to be protectionist.33 The feared result of these trends is another New International Economic Order, following the recession of 2008, in which economically powerful states, now including China and possibly India, replicate the empowerment previously limited to the United States and Western European states. There is worry about increases in investment awards in favor of states, not limited to developed states, that invoke the defense of necessity, couched as the national interest in a recession, to defend against investor claims of unjust expropriation.34 The related concern is that these defenses will assume ever newer forms. An example of these newer forms is the bilateral investment agreements of some Asian countries that limit investment protection to investments "approved in writing"35 or made in "accordance with the laws and regulations of the Contracting States."36 These stipulations empower signatory countries to deny foreign investor rights by withholding written approval to such investments, or by changing laws and regulations that deny protection previously granted to foreign investors.37

To these concerns, supporters of investor-state arbitration and the ICSID in particular respond that, whatever the ills of arbitration may be, the ICSID is not to blame. Rather, the ICSID merely facilitates the resolution of investment disputes through the ICSID Convention and Rules. Furthermore, independent arbitration panels decide those disputes.38

33. See, e.g., id. at 1003, 1010-11; see also Wei Shen, Case Note, Beyond the Scope of 'Investor' and 'Investment': Who can Make an Arbitration Claim under a Chinese BIT?: Some Implications from a Recent ICSID Case, 6 ASIAN INT'L ARB. J. 164, 183-85 (2010) (discussing limits placed on complainants under bilateral investment agreements with China).
35. On such clauses in BITs, see, e.g., Yang Chi Oo Trading Pte Ltd. v. Gov't of the Union of Myan., ASEAN I.D. Case No. ARB/01/1, Award, ¶ 53 (Mar. 31, 2003), 42 I.L.M. 540 (2003); Gruslin v. Malay., ICSID Case No. ARB/94/1, Award ¶¶ 9.1-9.2 (Nov. 27, 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 483 (2000).
37. See supra, notes 33 and 35.
effect, the ICSID "provides the institutional and procedural framework for independent conciliation commissions and arbitral tribunals constituted in each case to resolve the dispute."39 In fulfilling this facilitative function, the ICSID operates comparably to private arbitration associations like the International Center for Dispute Resolution of the American Arbitration Association (ICDR) and the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC).40 It provides rules of operation to govern the appointment of arbitrators, the conduct of arbitral proceedings, and the rendering of awards; but it does nothing more.41

A further defense of ICSID arbitration is that attacks by countries like Ecuador or Venezuela upon an ICSID process or award reflect an individual net cost-benefit analysis for those states.42 They do not reveal a systemic bias in ICSID proceedings nor awards against developing states and their investors in general. Furthermore, the loss of an ICSID investor-state dispute by one developing state does not translate into a net loss for developing states as a class.43 These defenses do not respond to the underlying assault on the ICSID, based on the perception that institutionalized arbitration, exemplified by the ICSID, protects the interests of developed states and their investors systemically, structurally, and, ultimately, functionally.

B. Impact of Ideology on ICSID Arbitration

The perception that ICSID arbitration empowers both old and new wealthy countries at the expense of poorer countries is supported by the criticism that the ICSID is a witting or unwitting party to a world order dominated by institutions and processes that are directed at wealth enhancement, not wealth sharing. Typifying this criticism is the fact that the ICSID is part of the World Bank Group. As such, it allegedly acts as a proxy for affluent investors from American and prosperous Western European countries and, in the long-term, wealthy countries in general that can

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41. See ICSID Dispute Settlement Facilities, supra note 39.


43. See Susan D. Franck, The ICSID Effect? Considering Potential Variations in Arbitration Awards, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 825 (2011). Franck undertakes a quantitative analysis of awards with Latin American countries as parties, and finds that "on the whole, ... ICSID arbitration awards were not statistically different from other arbitral processes, which is preliminary evidence that ICSID arbitration was not necessarily biased or that investment arbitration operated in reasonably equivalent ways across forums." Id. at 826.
afford its services.\textsuperscript{44} While the ICSID's homepage presents the ICSID as an "autonomous international institution,"\textsuperscript{45} member countries are members of the World Bank.\textsuperscript{46} The Governor of the Bank is an \textit{ex officio} member of the ICSID's governing body, the Administrative Council.\textsuperscript{47} The chair of the Administrative Council is the President of the World Bank.\textsuperscript{48} The annual meeting of the World Bank and its Fund coincides with the annual meeting of the Administrative Council of the ICSID.\textsuperscript{49} Not insignificantly, the World Bank funds the ICSID Secretariat.\textsuperscript{50} The Secretary General of the ICSID has the authority to appoint arbitrators to resolve investment disputes and, given the limited number of qualified candidates, the balance of the appointment process allegedly favors developed countries.\textsuperscript{51} ICSID hearings are often held in Washington, but also in expensive cities like London, and Paris; these locations are convenient for and affordable to wealthy investors, but not the more distant and poorer developing states, their investors, and civic groups in their countries.\textsuperscript{52} A further contention against investor-state arbitration is that international principles of investment law that require developing states to pay "prompt, fair and effective" compensation for expropriation bypass the fact


\textsuperscript{45} \textit{International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), Int’l Centre for Settlement Investment Disps,} http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Index.jsp (last visited June 17, 2012).


\textsuperscript{48} See id.

\textsuperscript{49} See id.

\textsuperscript{50} See id.

\textsuperscript{51} This challenge to the authority of the Secretary General arose in arbitration against Gambia in which the Tribunal upheld his authority. \textit{See Co-arbitrators in Mining Dispute Rule that ICSID Acted Within its Authority When It Nominated an Arbitrator After Gambia Failed to Do So Within Prescribed Time Limit, Investment Arb. Rep.} (May 20, 2011), http://www.iareporter.com/articles/20110520_1; see also \textit{Effort to Disqualify Arbitrator in Venezuelan Oil Case Unsuccessful; Adjudicators Acknowledge that Multiple Arbitral Appointments Can be a Concern, Investment Arb. Rep.} (May 20, 2011), http://www.iareporter.com/articles/20110520.

\textsuperscript{52} For more on the ICSID’s organizational structure and the role of the World Bank, Administrative Council and Secretariat, see \textit{Organizational Structure of ICSID, supra note 47.}
that many developing states lack the resources to compensate foreign investors according to such an international "fair and equitable" standard. As a result, "prompt, fair and effective" compensation for a foreign investor from a developed state may "unfairly" cripple a developing country by perpetuating a history of dominant foreign states and their investors, dispossession of its natural resources. Conversely, new investment treaties devised by developed states that are now capital importers may artfully invoke such defenses as necessity, national security, health, safety, and the protection of the environment to deny "fair and equitable" treatment to investors from developed and developing countries alike. Here, the inference is that successful arbitration awards favoring wealthy investors sometimes undermine the reasonable expectations, not of investors, but of developing states seeking to protect their fledgling economies from a litany of exploitative foreign investors.

A related criticism is that in ICSID and UNCITRAL investor-state arbitration, host state defenses such as necessity may trump foreign investors' benefits.


claims to “fair and equitable” treatment. While expansive defenses of necessity were upheld in LG&E v. Argentine Republic & Continental Casualty Company v. Argentine Republic, this is not necessarily so. In Pope & Talbot v. Canada, administered by the UNCITRAL, even though the arbitral panel concluded that it was not limited under NAFTA Article 1005 to the “international minimum standard of treatment,” Canada nevertheless won the case. However, minimal standards of treatment are applied to a variety of specific defenses, such as under the U.S. and Canadian Model Investment Treaties.

A further criticism leveled against investor-state arbitration is that substantive defenses invoked by developed states in foreign-investor claims have grown exponentially. This is typified in the NAFTA case, Methanex v. United States of America, the U.S. and Canadian Model Treaties, and

the India-Singapore Economic Cooperation Agreement. In particular, each treaty includes defenses to investor claims on such grounds as health, public morality, social welfare, and sustainable development. ICSID tribunals have accommodated these defenses. They have also rejected investor claims that such defenses deny foreign investors “fair and equitable treatment” or that a signatory state has exceeded the limits of the “margin of appreciation” doctrine in protecting its public interests over the investment interests of foreign investors.

These objections are directed at more than treaty exceptions to standards of treatment accorded to investors from wealthy countries. More accurately, the objection is that wealthy countries are able to impose their model codes and treaties on developing states, along with self-serving substantive intellectual property and other laws. The further objection is that investment arbitrators, in construing those treaties literally, are likely to perpetuate an unequal playing field for investors from poor and lower-middle-income states. The result is the protection of the “legitimate expectations” of investors from wealthy states at the expense of the even more legitimate needs of developing states and their subjects.


C. Complexity and Cost

A functional challenge to ICSID arbitration is the sheer cost and complexity of ICSID proceedings.\(^7\) In addition, arbitration proceedings are also perceived to be dilatory, difficult to manage, disruptive, unpredictable, and not subject to appeal.\(^7\) Coupled with these challenges is the observation that low-income countries lack the resources to bear the legal fees and related costs of defending against well-resourced transnational corporations.\(^7\) Moreover, these countries also lack the econometric data to verify the adverse impact of foreign investment upon their local economies, such as upon the environment.\(^7\)

What developing countries require is the capacity to identify, explore, and verify complex socio-economic data to defend against the claims of investors from wealthy states. They need to be able to assess dispassionately the net cost and benefit of investor-state arbitration to them, as well as to discrete sectors of their economies. They also need to ascribe costs and benefits to normative values, such as to the political value of adapting their legal systems to the rule of law expectations of developed states and their investors. However, trying to generate such complex economic data places developing countries at a comparative disadvantage relative to developed countries and their investors who have ready access to such data, including


\(^{71}\) On the absence of an appeal in ICSID arbitration, see ICSID Convention, supra note 38, art. 53(1) (“The award . . . shall not be subject to any appeal or to any other remedy except those provided for in this Convention.”). The most significant remedy under the ICSID is the annulment of an award under Article 53.

\(^{72}\) See Schedule of Fees, supra note 70; see also, Memorandum on the Fees and Expenses of ICSID Arbitrators, INT’L CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT INVESTMENT Disps. (July 6, 2005), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=icsiddocRH&actionVal=Memorandum.

\(^{73}\) See, e.g., Hilary French, Capital Flows and the Environment, 22 FOREIGN POL’Y IN FOCUS 3 (1998) (“As investors search the globe for the highest returns, they are often drawn to places endowed with bountiful natural resources but are handicapped by weak or ineffective environmental laws. Many people and communities are harmed as the environment that sustains them is damaged or destroyed – villages are displaced by the large construction projects, for example, and indigenous people watch their homelands disappear as timber companies level old-growth forests. Foreign investment-fed growth also promotes western-style consumerism, boosting car ownership, paper use, and Big Mac consumption rates towards the untenable levels found in the United States – with grave potential consequences for the health of the natural world, and the stability of the earth’s climate, and the security of food supplies.”); see also Disadvantages of Foreign Direct Investment, ECON. WATCH (30 June 2010), http://www.economywatch.com/foreign-direct-investment/disadvantages.html.
The ICSID Under Siege

from private-sector sources. Developing countries are further disadvantaged in utilizing incomplete econometric measures to weigh up competing policies in regulating direct foreign investment and in order to defend against foreign investor claims. Finally, yet another disadvantage is that investors from developed countries use precisely such deficiencies in considering whether to mount investor-state arbitration against targeted developing countries.74

Concerns about the high costs of investor-state arbitration are not entirely partisan or isolated. The cost hurdles of arbitration are also not limited to developing states and their investors. In fact, studies on conflict resolution in international investor-state arbitration, including by the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), level criticism at both investor-state arbitration and litigation on economic grounds, including the high cost of managing disputes generally:

[The financial amounts at stake in investor-State disputes are often very high. Resulting from these unique attributes, the disadvantages of international trade and investment arbitration are found to be the large costs involved, the increase in the time frame for claims to be settled, the fact that ISDS cases are increasingly difficult to manage, the fears about frivolous and vexatious claims, the general concerns about the legitimacy of the system of investment arbitration as it affects measures of a sovereign State, and the fact that arbitration is focused entirely on the payment of compensation and not on maintaining a working relationship between the parties.75]

However plausible these concerns may be, the actual cost of an ICSID arbitration is sometimes hard to fathom with accuracy. Some costs are known. For example, the ICSID’s memorandum of the fees and expenses of ICSID arbitrators are specified, as of July 6, 2005, on the ICSID website. The new Schedule of ICSID Fees came into effect on January 1, 2012.76 However, the length and complexity of ICSID hearings that have cost implications are usually not known in advance, other than as macro statistics.77 Similarly, the fees of party representatives, primarily lawyers that may include contingency fees, are also often not known.78 In addition, losing parties, including losing states, sometimes resist publicizing both the costs and results of ICSID awards for fear of diminishing their stature in the global


76. See Memorandum on the Fees and Expenses of ICSID Arbitrators, supra note 72 (providing further information on costs and fees).


Added to this is the tendency of some poorer countries that depend on foreign investment to deflect concerns about the social costs of adverse foreign investments on their domestic economies in order to be perceived as being economically and politically stable. Although civic groups from such countries can help to demonstrate the social cost of adverse determinations against their countries, those groups can do so only if they are privy to cost data, only if they can afford to petition to be heard, and only if their petitions are granted.

What are available are rough empirical assertions about the wealth of state parties to ICSID arbitration and foreign investors, albeit with inadequately defined terms and the lack of a detailed and explanatory methodology. For example, 2007 data supposedly evinces that 1.4% of all arbitration cases were filed against G8 countries. However, U.S. investors reportedly filed each of those cases. According to the data, investors brought 74% of all ICSID cases against so-called middle-income states, while low-income states accounted for 17% of ICSID cases.

Evidencing the extent to which large corporations invoked the ICSID was the statement that 20% of investors that brought ICSID cases were Fortune 500 companies globally. Seven of these corporate investors were reported as having revenues exceeding the gross national production of the country against which they proceeded; however, recent ICSID statistics indicate that 48% of ICSID/Additional Facility decisions have favored foreign investors.
One can draw equally broad, albeit not necessarily reliable, inferences from the macro data. For example, one inference is that middle-income and, relative to their economic wealth, poorer countries bear the brunt of ICSID arbitration. Furthermore, investors mounting successful claims include a disproportionate number of wealthy, transnational corporations. However, that data does not take account of developing countries that settle disputes in advance of investor-state arbitration because they cannot afford the cost or publicity of fending off investor attacks. Nor does it adequately recognize that half of the ICSID/Additional Facility decisions favor states over foreign investors.

The perception of developing countries capitulating to investor demands is not peculiar to investor-state arbitration. For instance, developing countries may also succumb to foreign-investor demands because of the cost and reputational damage arising from such arbitration. What is distinctive about investor-state arbitration is that such capitulation can occur in many different ways in investment practice, much of which is difficult to detect in the absence of a public claim or other publicity. All this makes it more difficult to determine the actual extent of costs, including the social costs, of dispute settlement.

In addition, there is no suitable macro data that satisfactorily identifies when third parties are involved in investment arbitration proceedings. What is needed, at the outset, is comprehensive information on: the nature of petitions by third parties to participate in ICSID proceedings; when these parties constitute public interest groups in developing countries; the success or failure of their petitions; the reasons provided for that success or failure; and the transparency of the proceedings in which those determinations are reached. Such information could further assist in allaying concerns about biases in arbitration proceedings against developing countries and the public interests being represented in those countries.

In contrast, the statistics the ICSID supplied on caseload provide more value-neutral inferences about the nature and significance of its caseload. For example, the ICSID website shows the growth of bilateral investment agreements, from the 1959 agreement between West Germany and Pakistan to over 6,000 agreements anticipated by the end of 2012. Foreign direct investment, in turn, has grown geometrically since 1970, exceeding $1,400 billion in 2009. Developing countries account for a disproportionate share of that growth. The ICSID statistics also demonstrate that ICSID cases arising from the consent of the parties include 63% brought under

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9 that foreign investors have won 48% of ICSID/Additional Facility cases and indicating on Chart 12 that ICSID has issued 150 awards in the aggregate).

83. See, e.g., Borzu Saba, Compensation and Restitution in Investor-State Arbitration: Principles and Practice 143 (2011) (discussing arbitration where Turkey alleged damage to its international reputation as a result of the “jurisdictionally baseless claim asserted in bad faith”).

84. See The ICSID Caseload - Statistics, supra note 82.
bilateral investment agreements, with 20% arising from investor-state agreements.85

The ICSID caseload has also grown geometrically, from a single case in 1972 to approximately ten cases in 1990, to thirty-eight new cases filed so far in 2012 alone. However, despite the growth in ICSID cases, the absolute number of ICSID cases is limited compared to international commercial arbitration cases, such as 1,435 claims filed with the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CEITAC), 994 cases filed with the ICDR of the American Arbitration Association (AAA) and 795 cases filed with the ICC.86

Regarding winners and losers in investor-state disputes, the ICSID statistics reveal that 61% of the cases filed with the ICSID are decided by arbitration tribunals, while 39% are settled or otherwise discontinued. In addition, states win ICSID disputes approximately half of the time. ICSID tribunals dismiss 53% of the cases, primarily on jurisdictional grounds. They uphold 46% of investor claims in whole or part.87

These statistics do not clarify the number of investor-claims cases brought by foreign investors from developed countries against less developed or developing states. Nor do the ICSID statistics establish the extent to which claims are successful or not. However, it is not reasonable to expect the ICSID to provide such information, given the somewhat arbitrary classification among the wealth of investors on the one hand, and the distinction among developed, developing, and less developed states on the other hand.

D. The Public-Private Nature of ICSID Arbitration

A further critique is specific to investor-state arbitration. Investment arbitration, not limited to the ICSID, is modeled somewhat on "private" commercial arbitration.88 Investment arbitrators are ad hoc appointees, not domestic judges holding permanent office.89 ICSID hearings are often conducted privately.90 Third parties, including civic interest groups, are permitted to participate in proceedings only if the disputing parties consent or if the applicable investment treaty so provides, such as in U.S. BITs after 2002.91 Arbitration awards are published, again only if the parties agree, although the ICSID Arbitration Rules do state that "the Centre shall, however, promptly include in its publications excerpts of the legal reasoning of the Tribunal."92 A review committee with limited authority, which

85. Id.; see also Andrea M. Steigruber, Consent in International Arbitration (2012).
86. Steigruber, supra note 85.
87. Id.
88. See ICSID Convention, supra note 38.
89. See id. art. 5(3).
90. See id. art. 63(a).
91. See id. art. 34(2); see also, e.g., 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Inv. Treaty, supra note 62, art. 29 ("Transparency of Arbitral Proceedings").
includes no right to overturn an ICSID award on the merits, may review ICSID decisions.93 A less-than-heartening observation is that annulment proceedings are "not designed to bring about consistency in the interpretation and application of international investment law."94

One consequence of private hearings and ad hoc awards is that there is limited public understanding of the processes through which arbitration institutions like the ICSID function.95 There is uncertainty over the limits of investor rights and state powers, and significant variations in the compensation and other remedies that ICSID tribunals award for an expropriation,96 coupled with uncertain enforcement mechanisms.97 A related consequence is that ad hoc arbitration processes, deliberations, and determinations are unlikely to lead to uniform investment jurisprudence. It also follows that, absent full access to the records of investment arbitration case documentation and testimony, it is sometimes difficult to draw conclusions about the issues, how they are presented, and how arbitrators construe them. Nor do the ICSID’s internal procedures adequately address these issues. ICSID procedures require the Secretary General “to make public, information on the registration of all requests for conciliation or arbitration and to indicate in due course the date and method of the termination of each proceeding.”98 However, the procedures only require the

95. For a general discussion, see Lucy Reed et al., Guide to ICSID Arbitration (2010).
97. The lack of enforcement mechanisms under the ICSID has given rise to a renewed interest in diplomatic intervention following ICSID awards. See, e.g., Victorino J. Tejera Pérez, Diplomatic Protection Revival for Failure to Comply with Investment Arbitration Awards, 10 J. Int’l Disp. Settlement 1093 (2012).
Secretary General to publish reports of conciliation commissions or awards rendered by arbitral tribunals in ICSID proceedings "with the consent of both disputing parties."99 Similarly, the ICSID procedural rules provide for the manner in which third parties may apply to file amicus curiae briefs, but whether they are permitted to file them in the first place again rests with the disputing parties.100

Concern over the uncertain public access to ICSID deliberations is typified in the 2002 ICSID arbitration of Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. Republic of Bolivia.101 In that case, three hundred representatives of social organizations across Bolivia sought the right to file amicus curiae briefs, as well as to secure access to prosecution and defense statements.102 They argued that ICSID hearings should be public and that the arbitrators should visit Cochabamba, Bolivia, where the alleged impact of the investment in dispute was most profound.103 Six months later, the ICSID Tribunal responded that it lacked authority to decide such matters, which rested with the parties.104

A comparable result occurred in 2005 when a coalition of organizations from Argentina sought information about, and the right to participate in, the ICSID arbitration in Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. v. Republic of Argentina.105 In responding to that petition, the Tribunal acknowledged that the case "potentially involved matters of public interest and human rights" and that the public access "would have the additional desirable consequence of increasing the transparency of inves-

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99. See ICSID Rules, supra note 92, R. 95–96. On the ICSID’s application of this rule to various awards, see ICSID Cases, supra note 98.

100. See infra notes 105–06.


102. See id. ¶¶ 15–16.

103. See id.


105. See Suez v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Order in Response to a Petition by Five Non-Governmental Organizations for Permission to Make an Amicus Curiae Submission (Feb. 12, 2007), https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRrl&ActionVal=showDoc&docId=DC519_En&caseId=C19 [hereinafter Suez II]. The petition challenged the decision by the Government of Argentina to accede to the ICSID treaty on grounds that it violates the constitutional guarantees of citizens of Argentina to participate in proceedings. While the government of Argentina was willing to hear the petition, the complainant company was not. However, the Attorney General of Argentina published on the internet the information in his possession on the related cases. See generally Carlos E. Alfaro & Pedro M. Lorenti, The Growing Opposition of Argentina to ICSID Arbitral Tribunals: A Conflict between International and Domestic Law? 6 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 417 (2005) (noting a growing opposition in Argentina to ICSID arbitration tribunals).
tor-state arbitration." However, the petition to participate in the proceedings was denied because the corporate complainant refused access, although the Government of Argentina clearly would have allowed it.

One result of the public-private nature of ICSID awards is that, despite an increase in the number of published ICSID awards, the right to deny public access to them still rests significantly with the parties, not with the ICSID or the presiding arbitrators. ICSID parties may have good reason to deny public access to awards, and whether those reasons are in the public interest is open to debate in discrete cases. The winds of change are nevertheless blowing. In October 2003, the NAFTA Free Trade Commission issued an Interpretative Statement saying "no provision of the North American Free Trade Agreement limits a Tribunal's discretion to accept written submissions from a person or entity that is not a disputing party." Given that investor-state arbitration under the NAFTA is sometimes conducted under the ICSID's auspices, this development is of some significance. Furthermore, in 2006, the ICSID adopted a new Rule 37 which provides tribunals with at least some discretion to admit third-party submissions. In addition, the admission of amicus curiae briefs is increasingly endorsed within new bilateral investment agreements. These developments will be discussed in Parts III and IV infra.

E. Looking Ahead

It may be observed that wealthy developed countries are conceivably less directly interested in the transparency of ICSID proceedings and the publicity of awards than poorer countries because wealthy countries are

107. See Suez II, supra note 105 (denying petitioner the opportunity to attend the hearings, but granting the petitioner permission to apply to the court to submit an amicus curiae brief).
108. See, e.g., supra note 91.
109. See infra Part III.B.
111. See ICSID Rules, supra note 92, R. 37 (Visits and Inquiries; Submissions of Non-disputing Parties).
112. See infra Part V.
less frequently the defending parties in ICSID proceedings. An opposing observation is that wealthy countries have credible reasons to support transparent ICSID proceedings, if only to avoid the criticism that they have sought to perpetuate the ICSID in their own image. A mediated proposition is that wealthy countries are likely to adopt double standards in regard to ICSID arbitration. On the one hand, they claim publicly to support arbitration to restrain “interference” by foreign governments with private investment. On the other hand, they strenuously resist ICSID arbitration claims filed against them.

The view of the ICSID as an instrument of prosperous nations of the North exploiting the poorer nations of the South is offset by at least two related developments in the global economic order. First, investors from some developing countries, such as China and India, as growing capital exporters, have increasing economic incentives to mount ICSID claims against developed countries that are now capital importers. The result is that wealthy developed countries that are more dependent on imported capital investments are increasingly likely to be the subject of ICSID claims. Second, investors from developing countries are ever more likely to file investment claims against other developing countries, given the divergence in their economic, political, and social statures and the prospect of adversarial investor-state relationships. Such changes in the new global economic order are likely to evolve slowly. However, it is notable that the first such ICSID arbitration was filed by a Malaysian construction company against China in May 2011 but suspended on July 22.

113. See International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), supra note 45.
114. See Sornarajah, supra note 13, ch. 2 (arguing that the primary interests of wealthy developed states are economic and less about perception of bullying).
116. China is a clear example of a capital importer that is increasingly a capital exporter. See, e.g., Ted Plafker, Doing Business In China: How To Profit In The World’s Fastest Growing Market (2008); Lord Brittan, Doing Business With China (2006)
2011 pursuant to an agreement between the parties. This case is further evidence that only powerful transnational corporations are able to mount investor-state claims against superpowers and of the conviction that investors from developing countries seldom have the economic and political muscle to do the same. However, the strong reaction of China to that claim and the circumstances surrounding the withdrawal of the claim suggest that claims against powerful states like China are likely to encounter strenuous resistance.

A further challenge for the ICSID is that investor-state disputes that are submitted to it will decline due to the consolidation of bilateral investment treaties, possibly leading to a reduction in the number of ICSID disputes. This challenge could result from a recent recommendation by the Commission of the European Union that only the EU, and not individual EU member states, can conclude bilateral treaties with non-EU countries. Given that the EU itself cannot submit disputes to the ICSID because the EU is not a member state, claims against the EU brought by foreign investors cannot be submitted to the ICSID. Given the further fact that Germany, Switzerland, and France have concluded more bilateral investment treaties individually with non-EU states than any other countries, other than China, and that the EU may prohibit such treaties in the future, this could cause a decline in investor-state claims against individual EU member states submitted to the ICSID. A presumed incidental beneficiary of this decline in ICSID cases is likely to be the UNCITRAL since it does not require that respondents in investor-state disputes be states. It is too early to predict with conviction that these results will eventuate in fact. In particular, the EU Commission’s report is a recommendation to the EU Council, which consists of all the members of the EU; and it is apparent that a number of EU Members are opposed to the EU having exclusive authority to negotiate investment treaties with non-EU members. It is also possible that the EU will reach a compromise in which the EU and individual states jointly conclude investment treaties with non-EU states. Finally, these developments do not ordinarily preclude a foreign investor from making a claim against a state party to an enforceable investment treaty, including between EU member states and a non-EU state.

119. See id.
II. A Functional Defense of the ICSID

A defense of investor-state arbitration under the ICSID is that, while not giving rise to judicial precedent, ICSID jurisprudence is nevertheless more certain and more stable than a myriad of national courts applying divergent domestic laws to investor-state disputes. Importantly, investor-state arbitration can help to produce a body of international investment law that is more coherent than the judicial endorsement of investment laws that diverge from one national legal system to the next.122

A further defense is that the ICSID is not the archetype villain that surreptitiously protects investors from wealthy countries at the expense of poorer developing countries with impoverished populations. Developing countries presumably enter into investment agreements that include arbitration by taking the calculated risk that the economic and social benefits of such agreements outweigh their costs. In doing so, they weigh the competing options, such as not entering into investment agreements, or entering into such agreements with dispute prevention and avoidance options, and/or resorting to domestic courts to resolve investor-state disputes.123 However, it is not self-evident whether developing countries, unlike developed countries such as Australia,124 have the political and economic influence to negotiate agreements in which domestic courts resolve investor-state disputes. Indeed, for some developing countries, concluding bilateral investment treaties is a means of economic survival, not a dispensable luxury.125

A countervailing macro argument is that developing states have contributed to their own economic disadvantages. According to this argument, they have concluded bilateral investment treaties ill-advisedly, on terms

122. Kenneth Vandevelde writes that in 1969 there were only 75 BITs. During the seventies, nine BITs were negotiated each year; that rate doubled in the eighties and has been increasing geometrically ever since then. See Kenneth Vandevelde, A Brief History of International Investment Agreements, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 157, 172 (2005); see also U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., Recent Developments in International Investment Agreements, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IIIT/2005/1 (Aug. 30, 2005).

123. See infra Part V (discussing dispute prevention and avoidance options, propagated by the UNCTAD).


125. Such dependence includes the need to attract foreign investment to sustain economic growth in, among other sectors, essential social services and programs. See Leon E. Trakman, Foreign Direct Investment: Hazard or Opportunity?, 41 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 1 (2010).
that privilege their investment partners.\textsuperscript{126} They have also failed to protect
themselves \textit{en masse} against the institutional and structural biases that
inhere in bilateral investment agreements that incorporate investor-state
arbitration. Moreover, they have acted unilaterally when they should have
devised a multilateral strategy to thwart these structural biases. These criti-
cisms are harsh. A willingness to enter into bilateral investment agree-
ments is not in itself cogent evidence of complicity by developing states in
perpetuating their own or their investors' economic disadvantages. Rather,
for many developing countries, succumbing to the demands of a dominant
treaty partner is preferable, on balance, to concluding no treaty at all.

Further, it must be acknowledged that an ever-growing number of
ICSID members are from developing countries.\textsuperscript{127} ICSID members also
conclude second-and-third-generation bilateral investment agreements in
which newly prosperous developing countries, like China, not only include
ICSID arbitration in their bilateral investment agreements, but also affirm
their commitment to the rule of law in relation to the rights of foreign trad-
iers and investors.\textsuperscript{128} Developing countries are also increasingly parties to
bilateral investment treaties: including double taxation treaties, the total
number of international investment agreements has grown to approxi-
mately 6,000 today.\textsuperscript{129} In addition, ICSID has expanded geometrically
from 20 members in 1966 to 158 members today that, again, now include
most developing countries.\textsuperscript{130} Furthermore, ICSID annual revenues aris-
ing in part from disputes between member states and investors have
increased from $2.27 million in 2000 to over $25 million in 2010;\textsuperscript{131} two-
thirds of these revenues derive from investment arbitration disputes that,
again, include developing countries.\textsuperscript{132}

\textsuperscript{126} See, e.g., Latha Jishnu, \textit{Secretive Tribunals, Hidden Damages, DOWN TO EARTH}
(Jan. 31, 2012), http://www.downtoearth.org.in/content/secretive-tribunals-hidden-
damages. Here, Van Harten observes that developing countries sometimes are the target
of treaties directed at enhancing opportunities for foreign investors from other states,
sometimes leading to significant losses for those target countries. See \textsc{VAN HARTEN, supra}
note 26.

see also Stanimir A. Alexandrov, The "Baby Boom" of Treaty-Based Arbitrations and the
Jurisdiction of ICSID Tribunals: Shareholders as "Investors" and Jurisdiction Ratione

\textsuperscript{128} See Randall Peerboom, \textit{China's Long March toward Rule of Law} 450
(2002) (arguing that "[o]ne of the main motivating forces behind China's turn toward
rule of law has been the belief that legal reforms are necessary for economic
development.").

\textsuperscript{129} See \textit{World Investment Report 2010}, supra note 127.

\textsuperscript{130} See \textit{Member States, INT'L CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT INVESTMENT DISPS.},
http://icsid.
worldbank.org/ICSID/_frontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=ShowHome&
pageTitle=MemberStates_Home (last visited June 19, 2012) (current membership).

\textsuperscript{131} See \textit{INT'L CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT INV. DISPUTES, ICSID ANNUAL REPORT, available at}
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID_frontServlet?requestType=ICSIDPublicationsRH
&actionVal=ViewAnnualReports# (last visited Oct. 9, 2012) (reports listing annual reve-
nue for ICSID since 1998).

\textsuperscript{132} See \textit{The ICSID Caseload - Statistics}, supra note 82, at 11 (illustrating the propor-
tion of arbitration disputes that include developing countries).
The problem with these arguments is that the political impetus for entering into bilateral free trade and investment agreements still lies significantly more with developed than developing states. Dissatisfaction among developed states with multilateral trade and investment initiatives, notably expressed in the World Trade Organization (WTO), somewhat fuel that impetus. Developed states discernibly conclude bilateral trade and investment agreements outside the WTO fabric to avoid a multilateral trade and investment regime in which developing states have the numerical superiority, the will, and sometimes the capacity, to exercise their power collectively.\(^\text{133}\)

It is also not fitting to blame the ICSID for the development of bilateral investment treaties between state parties that include both developed and developing countries, as the ICSID is not itself a party to such treaties. It is also not entirely reasonable to accuse foreign investors that proceed against "home" states of unbridled opportunism when they rely on treaties between "home" and developing "host" states in conducting their trade and investment abroad. For one thing, foreign investors from developed countries are not uniformly prosperous any more than investors from developing states are uniformly underprivileged. In addition, "home" states do not ordinarily collude with their investors abroad in order to secure a political or economic advantage for those investors in "host" states. "Home" states often have both a political and an economic incentive not to become unduly embroiled in individual investor claims against "host" states. The political incentive is for states, both developed and developing, to avoid alienating "host" states in general by supporting claims by "home" state investors. The economic incentive for "host" states to avoid intervening on behalf of foreign investors is to limit the political risks as well as the administrative costs of such intervention.\(^\text{134}\)

It is also not reasonable to blame the ICSID for all the ills imputed to the operation of investment arbitration generally. This is because the ICSID's formal function is to provide a process for the resolution of investment disputes between signatory states to the ICSID Convention and foreign investors from other signatory states. The result is that the ICSID operates within the radar of its administrative council, and it does not impose itself on those members.\(^\text{135}\)

The law of the ICSID, arguably, is also not profoundly out of step with the law applied to investment disputes generally. Notwithstanding variations among investment treaties and differences in investment jurisprudence itself, the ICSID has contributed to a body of investment law that includes established standards of treatment that are applied to foreign


\(^{134}\) But see Pérez, supra note 97, on the probable increase in diplomatic intervention by home states on behalf of their foreign investors in dealing with host states.

\(^{135}\) See Organizational Structure of ICSID, supra note 47.
However, while these standards are sometimes fragmented and it is difficult to derive cohesive principles from ad hoc and unpublished ICSID awards, an international investment jurisprudence does exist.\textsuperscript{137} Even though the ICSID has had to deal with a plethora of bilateral investment agreements, it has helped to resolve complex investor-state disputes arising from investment treaties.\textsuperscript{138} Nor should the ICSID Secretariat be blamed when ICSID proceedings are not transparent and awards are not published.\textsuperscript{139} After all, ICSID members that are, and represent, nation states approve the rules governing ICSID procedures. It is also unfair to accuse the ICSID of inconsistencies in reasoning and determinations reached by ICSID arbitrators who, while assisted by the ICSID, reach decisions independently of it.\textsuperscript{140}

This is not to suggest that ICSID operations are beyond reproach. Specifically, in not being a party to bilateral investment agreements, the ICSID may nevertheless be an instrument that dominant treaty parties try to utilize to perpetuate their control over investment markets.\textsuperscript{141} However, railing against the ICSID as a prop for capitalist excesses makes it harder to repair those parts of it that are in need of repair, while leaving intact those parts that work fairly and well.

Further, potential divisions among developing states in treaty making and the interpretation of these treaties by ICSID tribunals are not issues to be ignored. A challenge ahead for ICSID tribunals is in reconciling the traditional liberty of states to conclude treaties with their obligation to protect private property in the face of emerging global powers like China, whose full endorsement of those liberties is sometimes questioned. However much China has embarked along the road to the rule of law, investment tribunals may still encounter difficulties in determining the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{140} On consistency in international investment arbitration, see \textit{International Investment Law and General International Law: From Clinical Isolation to Systemic Integration?} (Rainer Hofmann & Christian Tams eds., 2011); Jan Paulsson, \textit{International Arbitration and the Generation of Legal Norms: Treaty Arbitration and International Law}, 5 Transnat’l Disp. Mgmt. (2006). On the critique of allegedly inconsistent ICSID decisions in a series of investment claims against Argentina, commencing with the CMS, Enron, and Sempra cases, see infra Part III.D.
\item \textsuperscript{141} See supra Part I.A.
\end{itemize}
significance of that passage in particular cases. In addition, it is harder to categorize China as a typical developing state in light of its enormous economic resources and global political power. Further, China's defense of social programs, such as protecting its rural sectors from foreign investment, is not wholly distinct from American and European protection of sectors that those countries regard as vulnerable. Comparable issues may well arise in relation to India as it shifts from being a capital importer to a global capital exporter.

III. Reforming the ICSID From Within

Concerns about the ICSID's operations are sporadic, uneven in gravity, and lack a unified voice. Governments are understandably cautious about taking critical positions against institutions like the ICSID, in part because they cannot be sure when they may become embroiled, directly or indirectly, in an investment dispute before the ICSID. Moreover, developed and developing governments, ICSID Administrative Council members, and ICSID officials do not ordinarily retain office sufficiently long to both initiate and effectuate ICSID reform. The nature of reforming the ICSID is also subject to debate including whether the ICSID has the moral authority and collective will to produce those changes.

A. ICSID Secretariat Discussion Paper

Internally generated reforms of the ICSID began in October 2004 with a discussion paper prepared by the ICSID Secretariat, entitled Possible Improvements of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration. The Secretariat then presented its paper for response to the Administrative Council of the ICSID, to investment arbitrators, selected investors, and an undefined number of groups within civil society.

The rationale behind the discussion paper was that the ICSID Secretariat, an expert body, should assume a leadership role in reforming the structure and operation of the ICSID and in rendering it more transparent, consultative, and effective.


143. See generally Peerenboom, supra note 128, chs. 6, 10 (discussing China’s progress toward the rule of law).


145. See id. at 3.

146. For critical but also supportive reflections on how the ICSID Secretariat has framed its proposals, notably in relation to sustainable development, see Howard Mann et al., Comments on ICSID Discussion Paper, Possible Improvements of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration, International Institute for Sustainable Development, Int’l Inst. for Sus-
The ICSID Under Siege

The paper identified two overriding issues: a lack of transparency in ICSID proceedings and a lack of public participation in, and access to, ICSID awards. It also dealt with disclosure requirements for arbitrators and with arbitrators' fees.147 The paper's key proposals included: to encourage the endorsement of amicus curiae briefs being admitted into arbitral proceedings and to promote the publication of arbitral awards.148 These proposals respond to the lack of transparency and publicity ascribed to prior cases like Aguas del Tunari S.A. v. Republic of Bolivia, in which the Tribunal denied third-party participation in ICSID proceedings primarily on public interest grounds.149

The responses to the proposals at the time were uneven at best. Neither developed nor developing countries nor investor constituencies adopted unified positions to address them.150 Notwithstanding the expectation that developed states might oppose the Report, the United States and Canada supported it, as did a Canadian think-tank, the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD).151 In particular, the IISD favored wider public participation in ICSID proceedings through the admission of amicus briefs and argued that doing so would benefit disputing parties in general and would not be cost prohibitive for civic groups of member states.152 It further proposed that the ICSID would benefit from public participation arising from amicus briefs and that this would promote transparent and cost-effective proceedings.153 It also noted that public participation in WTO proceedings had not forced any significant increase in the costs or administrative superstructure of the WTO.154

Furthermore, despite the prospect that developing states would support the Secretariat's proposals favoring more transparent proceedings, the South Centre, an intergovernmental organization of developing states in Geneva, initially argued that the ICSID Secretariat lacked the authority to reach such determinations.155 It observed that transparent ICSID proceed-

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148. See id. at 9, 11.
150. See text immediately below and infra, notes 155-60.
151. See Mann et al., supra note 146 (generally supporting the suggestions).
152. See id. at 8-10.
153. See id. at 8.
154. See id. at 9.
155. See South Centre, South Centre Analytical Note: Developments on Discussions for the Improvement of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration and the Participation of Developing Countries, 5-7 (Feb. 2005), available at http://www.southcentre.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=387%3Adevelopments-on-discussions-for-the
ings would advantage developed states and their investors who had more resources to participate in proceedings than developing states and their investors.\textsuperscript{156} The South Centre also suggested that some developing states would prefer private to public arbitration proceedings, presumably for varied and not necessarily consistent reasons.\textsuperscript{157} Interestingly, the South Centre did not persist in its objections, but the sting of its initial onslaught on the proposed reform of the ICSID remained.\textsuperscript{158} One inference from these reactions to the ICSID Secretariat’s proposals is that it is difficult to please everyone all the time. A more troubling reaction is that the resistance to public interest interventions are not limited to foreign investors that wish to exclude third parties for commercial “in confidence” reasons. Despite strong public interest grounds favoring amicus curiae briefs in support of respondent developing states, those states sometimes have countervailing interests to exclude third-party testimony that bolsters the claims of foreign-investor claimants.\textsuperscript{159}

However seemingly irreconcilable some of these reactions are to the ICSID proposals, they underlie a deeper problem. Specifically, the ICSID Secretariat lacks the legal authority to initiate substantial reform.\textsuperscript{160} First, it cannot promise authoritative timelines and procedures for the implementation of reforms, let alone promise reform.\textsuperscript{161} Second, a practical limitation is that ICSID officials who championed the proposals were not in office sufficiently long to shepherd them to fruition.\textsuperscript{162} A debatable inference perhaps is that the Secretariat did not adequately cultivate the ICSID Council’s support or distribute its report sufficiently widely to public interest groups.\textsuperscript{163}

\textsuperscript{156} Id. at 11–12.
\textsuperscript{157} Id. at 13.
\textsuperscript{159} This objection to third-party interventions is reflected in the initial attack by the South Centre, representing developing countries, to the reforms proposed by the ICSID, including in support of third-party interventions. See infra text accompanying notes 159–63.
\textsuperscript{160} There is no indication of any such legal authority inhering in the ICSID. Rather, its role is supportive and facultative. See Organizational Structure of ICSID, supra note 47. The Secretary General of the ICSID has the authority, however, to decline to register a request for arbitration. See Sergio Puig & Chester W. Brown, The Secretary-General’s Power to Refuse to Register a Request for Arbitration Under the ICSID Convention, ICSID REV.—FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2045645
\textsuperscript{161} At the level of policy, such responsibilities rest with the Administrative Council of the ICSID. Applying such policy rests with ICSID arbitration tribunals. See Organizational Structure of ICSID, supra note 47
\textsuperscript{162} Of note, a particularly vocal supporter of reform of the ICSID, Antonio Parra, vacated his office as Deputy Secretary-General of the ICSID shortly after the Secretariat proposed the reforms.
\textsuperscript{163} See Kantor, supra note 158; see also Organizational Structure of ICSID, supra note 47.
However, the recommendations of the ICSID Secretariat did not go entirely unheeded. In 2006, the ICSID added a new Rule 37 to its Rules of Procedure.\(^{164}\) That Rule provided that a tribunal may admit the brief of a non-disputing party, after consulting the direct parties, that addresses “a matter within the scope of the dispute.”\(^{165}\)

Nevertheless, the discretion the ICSID accorded to a tribunal is decidedly limited. In considering whether to admit the brief of a non-disputing party, Rule 37(2) stipulates that the Tribunal must consider, among other factors, the extent to which:

(a) the non-disputing party submission would assist the Tribunal in the determination of a factual or legal issue related to the proceeding by bringing a perspective, particular knowledge or insight that is different from that of the disputing parties; (b) the non-disputing party submission would address a matter within the scope of the dispute; (c) the non-disputing party has a significant interest in the proceeding.\(^{166}\)

As a further qualification, Rule 37 requires that the Tribunal “shall ensure that the non-disputing party submission does not disrupt the proceeding or unduly burden or unfairly prejudice either party, and that both parties are given an opportunity to present their observations on the non-disputing party submission.”\(^{167}\)

This 2006 Rule 37(2) on the Submissions of Non-disputing Parties is limited in key respects. First, tribunals are likely to construe the need for a non-disputing party to have a “sufficient interest” as requiring it to demonstrate that it has a “public interest.” The alternative that a non-disputing party need only have a “sufficient” interest to participate in ICSID proceedings could lead to a floodgate of interpleader claims by private parties asserting that an investor-state dispute has or will have a direct impact upon their particular commercial or other interests. However, requiring that a non-disputing party to investor-state arbitration have a “public interest” poses its own difficulties. In particular, investor-state arbitration often involves significantly private interests, similar to international commercial arbitration. The fact that one party is a state does not necessarily render that dispute pervasively “public.” Indeed, states are frequently parties to private commercial litigation. Nor are ICSID tribunals likely to conclude that public interests are sufficiently “public” to justify admitting non-disputing parties, unless those interests are both predominant and the non-disputing party can establish them at the outset in order to gain admission to proceedings.\(^{168}\)

\(^{164}\) See ICSID Rules, supra note 92, R. 37.

\(^{165}\) See id. R. 37(2)(a)(c).

\(^{166}\) See id.

\(^{167}\) See id.

\(^{168}\) See, e.g., Methanex Corp. v. United States, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as “Amici Curiae,” ¶ 49 (Jan. 15, 2001), http://naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/Methanex/MethanexDecisionReAuthorityAmicus.pdf (Arbitration under Chapter 11 of the NAFTA and the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules) (“[T]here are of course disputes involving States which are of no greater general public importance than a dispute between private persons.”); see also Suez v. Arg. Republic,
Second, the requirement that a third party must bring "a perspective, particular knowledge[,] or insight that is different from that of the disputing parties" is also likely to discourage tribunals from admitting third parties to proceedings. After all, investor-state arbitration often materially affects employees, suppliers, debtors, creditors, and insurers, among others. That impact does not constitute a principled basis for arbitral tribunals to admit them into proceedings because this would violate the autonomy of the disputing parties.\textsuperscript{169}

Even if an ICSID tribunal allows third parties to participate in proceedings under Rule 37, that still does not render those proceedings "public" in the sense of being transparent. Specifically, a tribunal may limit both the kind and extent of third-party participation, varying from participating at a particular stage during proceedings, to having a limited function such as presenting brief, stipulating arguments and responding to questions. In addition, a tribunal may admit evidence by a third party, but decline to provide the third party with the full record of proceedings. For example, a tribunal can deny requested information on the grounds that the third party has failed to justify why it should receive that information, on the grounds that it is already publicly available, or on the grounds that it is privileged.\textsuperscript{170} Furthermore, even if a tribunal provides a third party with requested information, the tribunal may still place a gag on that party, prohibiting it from making public disclosures through a confidentiality order. The result is that, despite third parties participating in ICSID proceedings, the proceedings may still be shrouded from public gaze.\textsuperscript{171}

Finally, and most lethally, Rule 37's requirement that a third party not "disrupt the proceeding" or "unduly burden or unfairly prejudice either party" is an understandable reason for a tribunal not to admit third parties to proceedings. There are reasonable grounds for a tribunal not to admit such parties, not least of which is to avoid a subsequent annulment procedure. Among other concerns, permitting third-party intervention will inevitably "burden" or "prejudice" at least one of the disputing parties. Requiring a tribunal to decide at the outset whether admitting that third


\textsuperscript{170}\textsuperscript{170}. See Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, Award, ¶¶ 222-23, 253 (June 8, 2009) http://www.state.gov/s/l/c10986.htm (Arbitration under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules); see also Suez I, ¶ 24 (denying third-party access to documentation); Biwater Gauff (Tanz.) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanz., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Procedural Order No. 5, ¶ 66 (Feb. 2, 2007), 46 I.L.M. 576 (2007) [hereinafter Biwater Gauff], https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC516_En&caseId=C19 [hereinafter Suez I].

\textsuperscript{171}\textsuperscript{171}. This is implicit in the fact that tribunals, with the consent of the direct parties to the dispute, may grant third parties intervener status for only limited purposes and, insofar as those parties have access to confidential information, require them to maintain confidentiality. See ICSID Rules, supra note 92, R. 37.
party will cause "undue" prejudice or unfairness to a disputing party is often difficult to determine confidently at that early stage. Whether admitting a third party will disrupt ensuing proceedings is equally speculative.

Given these risks, an investment tribunal has a number of reasons not to admit a third party to proceedings under Rule 37 of the ICSID Rules, if not in the interests of the disputing parties, then in its own interests. The core problem lies in Rule 37 itself. Specifically, in granting qualified arbitral discretion, Rule 37 exposes the tribunal to subsequent attack for failing to comply with those qualifications. Adding to this concern is Rule 37's description of third parties as "non-disputing parties." A practical inference for a tribunal to draw from this description is that if third parties are not "disputing parties," they should not participate in proceedings.

An alternative is for the ICSID to grant intervener standing to third parties based on whether they can demonstrate a material public interest in the proceedings. In particular, third parties may better inform the tribunal and the parties about the investment issues in dispute; they may facilitate greater transparency in proceedings; they may add to rather than disrupt hearings; and they may assist tribunals to reach determinations with greater confidence and erudition.

Certainly investment tribunals could exclude third parties in general from participating in proceedings, something they could not do with respect to disputing parties. Should tribunals admit third parties into proceedings, they would also need to consider the fairness of doing so, particularly given that most third parties seek intervention, not on neutral grounds, but in support of one party, usually the state party, to an investor-state dispute. Such decisions further complicate the ultimate question of whether the public interest in allowing non-disputing parties to participate in proceedings outweighs the procedural efficiency attained by excluding them.

Nor should one overstate the claim for intervener status. First, amicus curiae briefs are peculiar to common law systems and are virtually unknown in civil law. Second, common law courts generally do not grant intervener status on such expansive "public interest" grounds as are proposed for investor-state arbitration proceedings. Third, if NGOs are granted the right to intervene, it is arguable that direct parties to investor-state arbitration proceedings may require third parties to participate in particular cases.

B. Secrecy in ICSID Proceedings

Redressing the secrecy of ICSID proceedings poses its own challenges. International commercial arbitration, to which investor-state arbitration is related, was traditionally conceived as a confidential process between disputing parties and distinct from a public hearing. A further attribute of

172. Id.
commercial arbitration is that it reflects the autonomy of the disputing parties. Any change in proceedings, such as the admission of public interpleading, traditionally required the parties' consent. However, public interpleading is now subject to ICSID Rule 37, permitting tribunals to admit third parties to proceedings within confined limits. Even though investor-state arbitration takes place between states and private parties under the ICSID, rather than between private parties, it is still arguably arbitration. As such, like commercial arbitration, ICSID arbitration is likely to be praised for preserving confidentiality, however much it is condemned for being secretive.

This is not to claim that investor-state arbitration is inevitably or totally secret. In fact, the conduct of investor-state arbitration proceedings is often public and awards are published, as under Chapter 11 on investment under the NAFTA. Nevertheless, the private attributes of investor-state arbitration are derived somewhat from international commercial arbitration, and the drafters of the ICSID Convention should not be condemned for having adapted that institutional and functional heritage at the outset. What the ICSID Convention did, in part, was take cognizance of different models of arbitration—including international commercial arbitration in the latter half of the twentieth century—in formulating dispute resolution in the ICSID Rules. Principal among its similarities to commercial arbitration is the right of investor-state parties to require proceedings and awards to be private in a manner that judicial proceedings ordinarily are not.

Nevertheless, investor-state arbitration under the ICSID is distinct from private arbitration in key respects. First, it derives from an agreement between or among states that is beyond any contractual or other formal relationship between a signatory state and an investor from another


175. See Trakman, supra note 173 (discussing confidentiality in international commercial arbitration and its relationship to investment arbitration).


177. See generally Van Harten, supra note 26, at 121 (noting the influence of commercial law, as distinct from public international law, on the development of investment law); Leon E. Trakman, Arbitrating Investment Disputes under Chapter 11 of the NAFTA, 18 J. INT'L ARB. 385 (2001) (discussing investment arbitration under Chapter 11 of the NAFTA).

As such, investor-state disputes are subject to the accord of state parties that conclude regional and bilateral investment agreements to which foreign investors are not parties.

Second, ICSID arbitration often involves public interest considerations that transcend the ordinary commercial interests of private parties, such as the public interests of economically fragile developing countries and vulnerable sectors of their economies. This is not to assert that private arbitration outside the ICSID cannot have similar public interest ramifications, such as claims by developing countries in Latin America that transnational corporations exploited them economically. However, modern bilateral investment agreements increasingly imbed these social and economic consequences in the structure of investor-state arbitration provisions, rather than treat them as a coincidental byproduct of such arbitration.

Third, if one accepts that public interest participation in ICSID arbitrations is desirable, there are institutional and practical objections to achieving that result. The institutional objection is the arbitral preference for requiring that disputing parties consent to public participation insofar as protected information may arise during proceedings, notwithstanding the authority of tribunals to admit third-party evidence under Rule 37 after consulting with the disputing parties. This concern over the limits of party consent, however, is endemic to investor-state arbitration in general rather than specific to public interest participation in such arbitration. Arbitrators can impose restrictions on access to and disclosure of such information upon public interest participants as they do upon investor-state parties.

The practical objection to public interest participation in ICSID arbitration are the prohibitive costs—including the cost of travelling from afar to participate at venues such as Washington DC, Paris, and

179. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 6, ch. 1.2–1.3.
180. See id., ch.1.2–1.3 (discussing the tension between the law governing treaties and state-investor disputes); SCHILL, supra note 8, at VI (discussing the tension between the law governing treaties and state-investor disputes); SCHREUER, supra note 6, at 346–48 (discussing the tension between the law governing treaties and state-investor disputes).
181. See supra Part I.A–B.
182. See, e.g., Franck, supra note 92.
183. It is potentially difficult for an investment tribunal to determine, when admitting third-party briefs or testimony, whether, when, and how confidential information may arise subsequently during the course of deliberations. This factor is a significant reason for tribunals to restrain the participation of third parties a priori, or to exclude such participation ex posteriori, if and when the direct parties to the dispute raise confidentiality. See Katia Fach Gómez, Rethinking the Role of Amicus Curiae in International Investment Arbitration: How to Draw the Line Favorably for the Public Interest, 35 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 510, 526 (2012).
London, all of which are high-cost cities. In addition, there are further costs to the ICSID and World Bank in institutionalizing such participation in arbitration proceedings. These costs vary from accommodating third-party participants at arbitration venues, to managing the submission of amicus curiae briefs and ensuing hearings in which civic interest groups participate. Finally, there are also the management and publicity costs associated with third-party representation in ICSID proceedings.

C. The Boundaries of Party Autonomy

The prospect of ICSID parties disagreeing over the nature and extent of public participation in arbitration, which has often been the case historically, may further lead to burdensome consequences for investor-state parties, tribunals, and the ICSID. For example, investment arbitrators whom the ICSID Secretariat advises may be expected to resolve differences between the parties in determining when to admit evidence from third parties and, conceivably, when to permit an award to be published in whole or part.

More controversial still is whether and how arbitrators, acting independently or in consultation with the ICSID Secretariat, should rule on the nature of public participation in particular cases. One issue is whether the exercise of that discretion explicitly or implicitly violates the autonomy ascribed to parties to arbitration in general, as distinct from protected information in particular. Another issue is whether admitting third-party briefs and testimony will lead to annulment proceedings. Yet another issue is whether admitting civic interest groups in principle will prejudice those third parties who cannot afford the direct or indirect costs of such participation.

Robust challenges to investment arbitrators’ appointment or continuance, not least of all arising from a conflict of interest, further complicates the thorny issue of whether investment arbitrators ought to have some latitude in deciding whether and how to admit third parties.

185. The precise extent to which these costs inhibit participation by public interest groups is speculative, except that they seldom have deep pockets comparable to international corporate parties to state-investor disputes. See Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. Republic of Bol., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Objections to Jurisdiction, (Oct. 21, 2005), italaw.com/cases/57; supra notes 101-04.
187. See supra note 72 (discussing such costs).
188. See generally Harrison, supra note 139 (discussing transparency in arbitration).
189. See generally De Brabandere, supra note 184; Gómez, supra note 183.
190. Gómez, supra note 183.
191. Id.
192. Id.
The historical response to third-party participation in investor-state arbitration is not altogether comforting. If ICSID proceedings are to involve greater public participation, ICSID members ought to agree to such a process collectively or through individual bilateral investment agreements. Fortunately, the ICSID Rules already include a foundation for such collective agreement. A tribunal can invoke ICSID Arbitration Rule 37 to invite any person or entity that is not a Disputing Party in arbitration proceedings to make a written application to the tribunal for permission to submit an amicus curiae brief.194 Moreover, a Procedural Order of the ICSID, which was enacted on February 2, 2011, also provides a process by which non-disputing parties can file such briefs.195 The practice of inviting third parties to file amicus briefs is also replicated in arbitration clauses in various free-trade agreements, such as under Article 10.20.3 of the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement, which was applied in a recent case involving third-party participation in investment proceedings.196 Consequently, the ICSID has arguably done enough to facilitate public participation in its proceedings.

The cost of public participation in investor-state proceedings is a further concern. Indeed, the benefit of encouraging public participation in ICSID proceedings, including by civic groups from developing countries, is counterbalanced by the risk of third parties with identifiable public inter-

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ests being unable to fund that participation adequately.\textsuperscript{197} If such groups are to have a voice that is heard, the case for funding their participation is greater.\textsuperscript{198} However, if public participation is to be subsidized, it ought to be based on evenhanded policies such as to redress systemic disadvantage, similar to defense or aid funds for indigent litigants. Moreover, subsidization ought also to be based on verifiable data, such as confirmation of limited funding to participate in proceedings.\textsuperscript{199}

In theory, determining when to admit or deny third-party participation in ICSID proceedings is difficult. A complicating factor is that ICSID arbitration is essentially \textit{ad hoc}.\textsuperscript{200} As such, principles governing the conduct of international investment law are the product not only of an evolving consensus, but also of dissension over the nature and application of those principles to specific cases.\textsuperscript{201} Should ICSID arbitrators have discretion in principle to admit third-party briefs or oral testimony, the difficult question is in determining the authoritative source of that discretion. The most authoritative source is for the ICSID to stipulate that arbitrators are so empowered as a condition of their appointment, to which the ICSID Administrative Council, consisting of member states, is unlikely to agree.\textsuperscript{202} Alternatively, a more cautious approach is for the ICSID to endorse the arbitration provisions contained in the applicable bilateral investment agreement, conceivably based on the model bilateral investment agreements that the United States and Canada adopted.\textsuperscript{203} The problem

\textsuperscript{197} Letter from Marcos A. Orellana, Center for International Environmental Law to V. V. Veeder, Esq., \textit{supra} note 196.

\textsuperscript{198} \textit{Id.} The rationale is that public interest groups may have a voice, but lack the resources to be heard. That lack of resources may vary from the prohibitive costs of securing qualified counsel to represent them at ICSID hearings to being unable to fund ongoing public interest participation at lengthy hearings.


\textsuperscript{200} Investor-State arbitration is \textit{ad hoc} in that each decision binds the parties but does not serve as an arbitral precedent. \textit{See generally} Tony Cole, \textit{Non-Binding Documents and Literature}, in \textit{International Investment Law: Sources of Rights and Obligations} (Tarcisio Gazzini & Eric De Brabandere eds., 2012).


\textsuperscript{202} In the author’s view, the Council is unlikely to so agree due to concerns among member states over the negative impact that the exercise of arbitral discretion could have over the public interest of respondent states in subsequent ICSID proceedings.

here is that even though bilateral investment agreements increasingly
define complex concepts, such an expropriation, and the nature of “most
favored nation treatment” and “national treatment,” the specific nature and
scope of such agreements remain distinctly variable.204

None of this addresses the resistance that investor-state arbitrators
face when deciding in practice whether to allow third-party participation.
A principled objection is the perceived ingrained right of disputing parties
to deny consent to third-party participation.205 The practical difficulty is
in arbitrators ameliorating public and private tensions within investor-state
arbitration. This includes the following: providing public access to the
expropriation practices of states while avoiding public disclosure of sensi-
tive state or investor information; requiring that a state demonstrate that
its expropriation is for a public purpose without publicly victimizing the
state; and complying with the rules of the ICSID and the applicable invest-
ment treaty in reaching such determinations.206

Arbitrators need not make these determinations in a vacuum. Indeed,
investment arbitration may entail consultative expectations, such as arbi-
trators conferring with the ICSID Secretariat and the investor-state parties
in determining whether and how to admit third-party briefs or testimony.
In answering these questions, the ICSID and its arbitrators can also draw
from experience in commercial arbitration, such as the practices used in
ICC and ICDR arbitration.207

What is also evident is that these formal and informal methods of
redressing public-private tensions are already in use in investor-state arbi-
tration, such as the NAFTA, and in more recent regional and bilateral-
investment agreements, such as the Central American Free Trade Agree-
ment (CAFTA).208 The telling issue is in how the ICSID investor-state arbi-
trators can open the door to public participation in otherwise-protected

http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Peru_TPA/Final_Texts/Section_Index.
html; 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Inv. Treaty, supra note 62; Model Canadian Foreign
Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement art. 38(1) (2003) (providing for
“open hearings” but also stating that “the Tribunal may hold portions of hearings in
camera”); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Model Bilateral Investment Treaties: The Way Forward,

204. See, e.g., Clint Peinhardt & Todd Allee, Devil in the Details? The Investment Effects
of Dispute Settlement Variation in BITs, in Y.B. Int’l Investment L. & Pol’y 2010-2011, supra
note 1.

205. This right is preserved in the ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules, includ-
ing in Rules 27, 35-37. See ICSID Rules, supra note 92.

206. On this public-private tension, see generally Alex Mills, The Public-Private Duali-
ties of International Investment Law and Arbitration, in Evolution in Investment Treaty
Law and Arbitration 97-116 (Chester Brown & Kate Miles eds., 2011); Catherine A.
Rogers, International Arbitration’s Public Realm, in Contemporary Issues in Interna-
tional Arbitration and Mediation: The Fordham Papers (Arthur W. Rovine ed., 2010);
Alvarez & Park, supra note 113; Franck, supra note 92.

207. See generally Martin F. Gusy et al., A Guide to the ICDR International Arbitra-
tion Rules (2011); Tony Cole & Anuj Kumar Vaksha, Power-Confering Treaties: The
Meaning of ‘Investment’ in the ICSID Convention, 24 Leiden J. Int’l L. 305 (2011);
Trakman, supra note 40.

208. See, e.g., CAFTA, supra note 203, art. 10.21.
arbitration proceedings in a fluid, and sometimes unstable, investment climate.

D. Inconsistent Decisions

A particular critique of international investment arbitration is that arbitrators will reach different determinations in otherwise comparable cases. Although this criticism can be directed against any form of decision-making involving discretion, if decision-makers do not treat similar cases alike\textsuperscript{209} ICSID arbitrators have the additional burden of interpreting differently worded treaties, applying variable concepts such as direct and indirect expropriation, and treating distinct cases equitably.\textsuperscript{210} Added to these interpretative and substantive difficulties are dissimilar practices among arbitral tribunals regarding how to hear a case, how to address past decisions that are not formally precedents but nevertheless influential, and how to write arbitral awards.\textsuperscript{211}

Six investor claims against the Republic of Argentina illustrate the inconsistent methods of construing international investment law. All of the cases deal with the defense of necessity against an expropriation arising from the alleged severity of Argentina’s economic crisis primarily in late 2001 and early 2002 and its rescue package, which foreign investors alleged was unfair to them.\textsuperscript{212} Three of the cases, CMS, Enron, and Sempra, were all decided by tribunals with the same President; however, they each employed different methods of interpretation and they reached different conclusions.\textsuperscript{213} Specifically, the tribunals in CMS and Sempra rejected Argentina’s pleas under both treaty and customary law and found Argentina responsible for causing damage to foreign investors that required com-

\textsuperscript{209} This criticism is particularly applicable to civil law systems because courts are not bound by judicial precedent, but judicial decisions collectively constitute part of an \textit{opinio juris}. See, e.g., \textit{OPINIO JURIS} (Aug. 2, 2012), http://opiniojuris.org/2012/08/02/why-the-failure-to-provide-sail-with-due-process-is-relevant-to-libyas-admissibility-challenge/.

\textsuperscript{210} On differently worded bilateral investment treaties giving rise to different interpretations, see generally Peinhardt & Allee, \textit{supra} note 204; J. Romesh Weeramantry, \textit{TREATY INTERPRETATION IN INVESTMENT ARBITRATION} (Loukas Mistelis ed., 2012).


\textsuperscript{212} See \textit{infra} notes 213–16 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{213} See \textit{infra} note 213 and accompanying text.

pensation.\textsuperscript{214} In comparison, the Tribunals in \textit{Continental Casualty}, \textit{LG&E}, and \textit{Metalpar} decided in favor of the Republic of Argentina, absolving it from the responsibility to compensate foreign investors for any damage suffered.\textsuperscript{215} An Annulment Tribunal following \textit{CMS} held that the investment Tribunal had interpreted the treaty incorrectly because it construed its provision for necessity in the same manner as customary investment law as stated in Article 25 of the International Law Commission (ILC) Code on State Responsibility.\textsuperscript{216} \textit{Enron} and \textit{Sempra} were also annulled.

The problem of arbitrators reaching inconsistent decisions in seemingly similar cases is not entirely one that investor-state arbitrators can resolve. Furthermore, the problem of inconsistency is not limited to investor-state arbitration. Indeed, judicial precedent is a common law, not a civil law concept. Similarly, international law, including the International Court of Justice, does not adhere to case precedent.\textsuperscript{217} Further limiting the potential ambit of precedent in investor-state arbitration is that awards are case specific and bind only the disputing parties.\textsuperscript{218} In addition, the uni-


1. Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding the wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an international obligation of that State unless the act: (a) is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril; and (b) does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States towards which the obligation exists, or of the international community as a whole. 2. In any case, necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding wrongfulness if: (a) the international obligation in question excludes the possibility of invoking necessity; or (b) the State has contributed to the situation of necessity.


\textsuperscript{218} The binding force of arbitral awards, including investor-state arbitration, is a contentious topic. See, e.g., Andrea K. Bjorklund, \textit{Investment Treaty Arbitral Decisions as Jurisprudence Constante}, in \textit{INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: THE STATE AND FUTURE OF THE DISCIPLINE} 265 (Colin B. Picker et al. eds., 2008); Christoph Schreuer \& Matthew Weiniger, \textit{A Doctrine of Precedent?}, in \textit{THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW} 1188 (Peter Muchlinski et al. eds., 2008) (discussing the absence of binding precedents, at least in principle, in international investment law).
form interpretation of investment treaties is likely to be elusive when the wording of treaties differ and when customary investment laws and practices diverge. Further undermining the prospects of investment arbitrators reaching uniform awards is international investment law's focus on the expropriation of property. This is significant because the law of property varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and there is no truly pervasive body of international law of property governing investment. Not only are investment arbitrators under the ICSID called upon to interpret complex property concepts, they also must reach decisions based on divergent conceptions of property in otherwise similar cases. Against such a background, investment arbitrators understandably struggle to reach decisions that, with the benefit of hindsight, appear confusing, or at worst wrong, in subsequent annulment proceedings.

E. Greasing the Squeaky Wheel

The ICSID Secretariat's recommendations relating to public participation in proceedings and the publication of awards are not as intensely under the public microscope today as they were when the Secretariat proposed them. That is partly the consequence of the new Rule 37, which goes some of the way to accommodate the Secretariat's recommendations. Nevertheless, the recommendations have had an incremental political and jurisprudential influence in providing greater transparency and publicity to arbitration hearings, including a shift in political will favoring public proceedings and published results. Indeed, the formal adoption of new Rule 37 evidences this shift. The shift towards greater transparency is also attributable in part to the growth of informed investment reporter services on ICSID developments, including arbitration awards. Particularly,
increasingly easy and inexpensive access to information makes it difficult to shroud ICSID hearings or awards in secrecy. In addition, the Internet provides foreign investors with ready access to databases of arbitration cases and commentaries that demystify complex property concepts, among others, in particular cases. Furthermore, there are, of course, information leaks.

Indeed, in the Argentine case of Aguas Argentinas S.A., Suez Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Republic of Argentina, the Attorney General of the Republic of Argentina published the relevant arbitration proceedings along with the reasons why the Tribunal denied the petition of civic groups in Argentina. Furthermore, the 2006 ICSID case of Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd v. United Republic of Tanzania saw lukewarm support for the publication of investment arbitration awards.

In addition, attitudes, including among ICSID members and foreign investors, have changed to accept that greater openness, or at least the appearance of it in ICSID proceedings, is often appropriate. In particular, a debatable but nevertheless identifiable attitudinal change is the 2006 ICSID Rule 37, which provides for submissions of non-disputing parties subject to limiting guidelines. Added to this change is the wider availability of investor-state awards on the ICSID website, along with references to academic and professional commentaries on ICSID cases. These attitudinal changes do not in themselves simplify the complexity of international investment law and investor-state arbitration in particular. In fact, notwithstanding Arbitration Rules 35 and 36 providing for expert witnesses, expert testimony on the significance of conflicting conceptions of contract and property law can complicate as much as it clarifies such complexities.

223. Online reporting services that are readily accessible through conventional search engines illustrate the public's access to information on developments in international investment law. See, e.g., ICSID.ORG, https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Index.jsp (last visited June 19, 2012).


225. For a classical ICSID case involving such "leaks," see infra note 227 and accompanying text.

226. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.

227. Biwater Gauff (Tanz.) Ltd., v. United Republic of Tanz., ICSID Case No ARB/05/22, Procedural Order No. 3, ¶ 163 (Sept. 29, 2006), 46 I.L.M. 12 (2007) (A party may "engage in general discussion about the case in public, provided that any such public discussion is restricted to what is necessary, and is not used as an instrument to antagonise the parties, exacerbate their differences, unduly pressure one of them, or render the resolution of the dispute potentially more difficult . . . ."); see also Schreuer, supra note 6, at 822 (contending that a party to an ICSID arbitration can publish the award).

228. See supra Part III.A (discussing amended Rule 37 of the ICSID Arbitration Rules).

229. See ICSID Cases, supra note 98.

230. See ICSID Rules, supra note 92, R. 35, 36.
differences. Moreover investor-state parties have uneven access to such evidence, and it is difficult to ensure that such evidence is heard and understood.

The status of investor-state awards is also changing, albeit incrementally. Regional and bilateral agreements sometimes entitle disputing parties to make arbitration awards public, such as Annex 1137.4 of the NAFTA, which stipulates that if the United States or Canada is the disputing party, either party to the arbitration may make the award public. The NAFTA Free Trade Commission has affirmed that practice, and the United States, Canada, and Mexico have all consented to open hearings in their cases under the NAFTA. Regional and bilateral treaties also reflect these changes. In particular, the CAFTA requires public access to arbitration proceedings and does not allow a disputing party to object. Further illustrating the publicity of investor-state proceedings and awards is Commerce Group Corporation and San Sebastian Gold Mines v. Republic of El Salvador, a CAFTA arbitration that the ICSID decided. The Commerce Group proceedings were broadcast live on the Internet, and both the proceedings and award are available on the ICSID website.

What does all this mean for the operation of the ICSID? From a systemic perspective, comprehensive institutional reforms of the ICSID are realistic only if signatory states to the ICSID Convention so agree. It also anticipates signatory states agreeing upon criteria on how the ICSID Secretariat and investment arbitrators ought to direct or guide such participation, including the protection of sensitive information from public disclosure. In the absence of such support, and even with it, much depends on how individual states provide for public participation in bilateral or investor-state agreements, the substantive laws states invoke to gov-

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231. On difficulties arising in interpreting different conceptions of property, see supra notes 220-22 and accompanying text.
232. See supra Part I.C.
235. See CAFTA, arts. i 10.21(2) & (5) (Transparency of Arbitral Proceedings). The CAFTA-DR extends beyond the NAFTA by requiring explicitly that proceedings take place in public.
ern such participation, and the prospect of investor-state arbitration being subject to inconsistent constitutional laws of state parties.

From the perspective of risks, the ICSID, like any other international organization, faces the risk that disenchanted member states will desert it if its structure is not reformed, while others will leave if its structure is reformed. If member states contemplate changes to the transparency and publicity of ICSID arbitration, the World Bank conceivably may establish block grants to subsidize developing countries and particularly civic groups that qualify for subsidization and subscribe to prescribed terms of reference. On the other hand, levies on wealthier countries may also be needed to subsidize the costs of public participation by civic groups, which are not necessarily limited to poorer countries. It is unlikely that wealthier countries would agree to such a grant scheme in the absence of constrained terms of reference governing both the availability and quantum of those grants. However they may agree to subsidize such participation in order to diffuse the hostility of some developing countries towards investment arbitration and the ICSID.

Another prickly issue in the process of ICSID reform is in signatory parties agreeing on a threshold at which parties to ICSID disputes ought not unreasonably resist third-party participation and the publication of investment awards. Agreement by ICSID members on these issues is unlikely unless and until there is a persistent groundswell of support arising from crises of confidence in the delivery of investor-state arbitration, not limited to the ICSID. However, if such a groundswell does not eventuate, the tendency will be to grease the squeaky wheel, not change it.

A more invasive approach is for the ICSID to consider the practice that the NAFTA Free Trade Commission adopted. In October 2003, that Commission issued an interpretative statement specifying that "[n]o provision of the North American Free Trade Agreement[,] limits a Tribunal's discretion to accept written submissions from a person or entity that is not a disputing party." The Free Trade Commission's interpretation is distinctive in two respects. First, the NAFTA is silent on amicus curiae briefs. Second, its interpretation establishes a procedure to which a non-disputing party must adhere in applying for leave to file a submission in arbitration.

The Free Trade Commission's interpretative statement is not isolated. Indeed, the U.S. Trade Act of 2002 already required that trade negotiators establish "a mechanism for acceptance of amicus curiae submissions from businesses, unions, and nongovernmental organizations." Similarly, the U.S. Trade Act of 2002, the NAFTA, and the

CAFTA are also not isolated. This is evident in more recent investment agreements, such as the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement and some model bilateral investment agreements that provide for the admission of amicus briefs. These agreements highlight three criteria: "(a) the appropriateness of the subject matter of the case, (b) the suitability of a given non-party to act as amicus curiae in that case, and (c) the procedure by which the amicus submission is made and considered." These criteria, in the main, provide a reasonable basis upon which investor-state arbitrators can choose whether and how to admit "non-parties" to assume amicus curiae roles. If anything, each of these developments provides some fortitude to the ICSID in deciding how it wishes to progress on the issue of transparency of proceedings, such as under Rule 37.

IV. Domestic Courts or ICSID Arbitrators?

An alternative to investor-state arbitration, not limited to the ICSID, is subjecting foreign investors, like domestic investors, to the territorial sovereignty of the state in which they invest, including to the jurisdiction of domestic courts. Arguably, domestic courts, not ICSID tribunals, are the appropriate bodies to resolve investment disputes between domestic states and foreign investors, in the same manner as domestic courts decide "other" domestic disputes. Here, the inference is that domestic courts can ensure that foreign and domestic investors receive comparable rights and are subject to comparable duties. As the Australian Government contended in its Policy Statement in April 2011, "dispute settlement processes should not afford foreign investors in Australia with access to


244. See Trakman, An Australian Perspective, supra note 243, at 48-49 (discussing these arguments buttressing the dispute resolution mechanisms adopted under the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreements).
litigation options not normally afforded to local investors.\textsuperscript{245} The intention is to ensure that investor-state parties resolve their investment disputes in a transparent, public, and cost-effective manner before duly appointed domestic courts that also consider domestic public policies. Included among the rights of foreign investors is their right to natural justice or due process before domestic courts, offset by the power of that state to restrict private investor rights on public policy grounds, such as ensuring that foreign investors do not receive advantages not availed to local investors and protecting public health, welfare, and the environment.\textsuperscript{246}

This development in Australia is not entirely novel. Specifically, the Calvo Doctrine that was enunciated in Latin America decades before had a comparable focus, albeit reflecting the perspective of developing, not developed, countries.\textsuperscript{247} Under the Australian approach, national law should govern the rights of foreign investors—particularly foreign investors filing claims against the Australian Government; and the authority of domestic courts should prevail over other options, including resort to diplomatic channels.\textsuperscript{248} The jurisdictional rationale for this proposition is that investment disputes ought to be decided by the domestic courts of host states, not international tribunals.\textsuperscript{249} The substantive rationale is that domestic courts ought to confer only national treatment on foreign investors, there being no better treatment than is accorded to local investors.\textsuperscript{250} The equitable inference from these rationales is that, were investor-state arbitration to privilege foreign investors, it would not serve the national interest, and if it fails to service the national interest, domestic courts ought to replace it.

A. The Case for and Against Domestic Courts

There are several related arguments in support of domestic courts deciding investment disputes. First, domestic courts decide cases according to domestic laws that include the interpretation of bilateral investment


\textsuperscript{247} See id. at 59-60.


\textsuperscript{249} See, e.g., Schneiderman, supra note 246, at 59; Cremades, supra note 248, at 59.

\textsuperscript{250} See Schneiderman, supra note 246, at 59.
treaties between "host" and "home" states.\textsuperscript{251} Second, domestic courts are subject to established procedural and evidential constraints in deciding cases. Third, domestic courts are required to protect the rights of foreign investors while also taking account of the applicable public policy of the forum.\textsuperscript{252} Finally, their decisions are subject to appeal.

In contrast, ICSID arbitration is subject to ICSID Rules that are broadly framed and less contestable than domestic law. For example, ICSID awards are subject to annulment procedures that are limited predominantly to jurisdictional grounds.\textsuperscript{253} Either party can request an annulment in which case an annulment committee is set up. The committee has the power to modify or nullify an award on restrictive grounds under Article 75 of the ICSID Convention.\textsuperscript{254} These grounds include: (a) that the ICSID tribunal was not properly constituted; (b) that the tribunal manifestly exceeded its powers; (c) that there was corruption on the part of a tribunal member; (d) that there was a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure; or (e) that the award failed to state the reasons on which it was based.\textsuperscript{255} ICSID Annulment Committees historically have interpreted these grounds expansively. However, resort to a domestic court is not considered an option under the ICSID Rules.\textsuperscript{256}

Support for domestic courts over arbitrators deciding state-investor disputes is also grounded in economic efficiency. For example, Australia's Productivity Commission expressed concern that investor-state arbitration exposes Australia to costly, fractious, and dysfunctional disputes with foreign investors, such as Philip Morris Australia, that have deep pockets.\textsuperscript{257} In criticizing investor-state arbitration, the Commission contended that, "[a]t a minimum, the economic value of Australia's preferential BRTAs has been oversold."\textsuperscript{258} Notwithstanding the contention that litigation is often

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{251} On the jurisdiction of domestic state courts over international investment disputes under Chapter 11 of the NAFTA, see Loewen Grp., Inc. v. U.S., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award, ¶¶ 139–40 (June 26, 2003), 7 ICSID Rep. 442 (2005); Mondev Int'l Ltd. v. U.S., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award, ¶¶ 72–75 (Oct. 11, 2002), 42 I.L.M. 85 (2003).
\item \textsuperscript{252} See Loewen Grp., ¶¶ 72–75, 7 ICSID Rep. at 468–69.
\item \textsuperscript{254} See ICSID Convention, supra note 38, arts. 52(1), (3).
\item \textsuperscript{255} See id. art. 52(1).
\item \textsuperscript{256} See supra note 71; see also ICSID Convention, supra note 38, art. 53(1) (stating that an ICSID award is not binding to an appeal or any other remedy except those provided in the convention). Remedies under the convention consist of Article 51 (revision by the Secretary-General) or Article 52 (annulment). Andrea K. Bjorklund, The Continuing Appeal of Annulment: Lessons from Amco Asia and CME, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION: LEADING CASES FROM THE ICSID, NAFTA, BILATERAL TREATIES AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 471, 479 (Todd Weiler ed., 2005).
\item \textsuperscript{258} Productivity Commission, supra note 245, at xxvii.
\end{itemize}
more fractious and costly than other modes of dispute avoidance, the Commission asserted that Australian courts are more fitting bodies to preside over such investor-state disputes than arbitrators. However, the Commission did not adequately address the often dilatory nature of judicial procedures, foreign investors' lack of familiarity with domestic law, the cost and protraction of proceeding before some domestic courts, and the potential unfairness of applying that law to investor-state disputes.

A possible motivation behind the support for having domestic courts decide state-investor disputes, albeit not comprehensively addressed in either the Productivity Commission's Research Report or the Australian Government's Policy, is trepidation that foreign investors from other developed states might invoke investor-state arbitration to attack the social and economic policies of Australia. In particular, there is some concern that foreign investors from the United States could mount investment claims against the Australian Government that would erode the autonomy of the Australian Government in devising policies, such as regulating cigarette advertising, on public health, safety, and environmental grounds. Here, a probable inference is that Australian courts are more likely than investment arbitrators to identify the public health risks of cigarette advertising with violations of Australian public policy.

A further assumption in favor of litigation over investor-state arbitration is that a domestic appeals process is more likely to be robust than an ICSID annulment procedure. First, the grounds for an appeal are ordinarily not only jurisdictional, but also on the merits. Second, appellate courts are subject to prescribed rules of procedure on the record. Finally, both trial and appellate courts are bound by the applicable substantive law.

Nevertheless, the choice of domestic litigation over investor-state arbitration is not compelling beyond the concern that investor-state arbitration is more likely than domestic litigation to favor foreign investors over states. The virtue of each method is contingent on the value preferences its proponents ascribe to it. For example, although proponents of domestic

259. See Trakman, supra note 124, at 86–89; see also Jürgen Kurtz, The Australian Trade Policy Statement on Investor-State Dispute Settlement, 15 ASIL INSIGHTS (Am. Soc'y Int'l L., Washington, DC), Aug. 2, 2011 (noting that the Productivity Commission's Report, while offering a rigorous quantitative analysis of the net economic benefits of BITs, fails to take into account the dynamism of international law, as "critical barriers to foreign investment do not usually take the form of simple border measures whose effects are easily quantifiable."). But see Tobacco Company Files Claim against Uruguay over Labelling Laws, INT'L CENTRE TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV. (Mar. 10, 2010), http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/71988/.

260. See Productivity Commission, supra note 245, at xxii.

courts assert that these venues are subject to tried and tested domestic rules of evidence and procedure, ICSID arbitration is guided by rules of procedure that seek to ensure procedural clarity, and an ICSID arbitrator's failure to apply them fairly can lead to annulment for non-compliance.\textsuperscript{262} Further, the rationale that domestic courts accord no more than national treatment to foreign investors is countered by the argument that investment arbitrators are equally capable of subscribing to comparable standards of national treatment.\textsuperscript{263} The supposed insularity of ICSID arbitration from domestic law and procedure is also disputable because ICSID arbitrators cannot summarily disregard domestic law if a bilateral investment agreement that refers disputes to the ICSID chooses that law or that law applied by investor-state agreement to disputes.

Nor will domestic judicial systems invariably resolve investor-state disputes equitably. As of June 2006, approximately 76\% of the cases in which investment treaty awards were rendered involved states that fell at or below number fifty on Transparency International's 2008 Corruption Perception Index. That number increased to 84\% when cases involving the United States and Canada were excluded. Over 69\% of the cases involved states that fell at or below number seventy on that Corruption Perception Index.\textsuperscript{264} The clear inference is that foreign investors are unlikely to trust all domestic courts equally or, indeed, at all.

Ultimately, parties must make a choice. An appeal to a domestic court is desirable if the party seeks a final determination on jurisdictional and substantive grounds and considers that country's domestic court reliable. An annulment procedure on narrow jurisdictional grounds under Article 75 of the ICSID Convention is preferable if the party considers those grounds suitable. Beauty lies in the eyes of the beholder.

B. Addressing the Dilemma

A formal way to resolve the dilemma between domestic courts and ICSID arbitration is to hold that domestic litigation ought to prevail over ICSID arbitration as a principle of state sovereignty. However, that principle alone hardly justifies preferring domestic litigation given that states repeatedly surrender their sovereignty under both customary international and treaty law to international institutions. Nor is it credible to respond

\textsuperscript{262} See supra notes 6, 45 (providing information on the ICSID).

\textsuperscript{263} This proposition is complicated, particularly by the fact that different national legal systems have incorporated investment law differently. See Sornarajah, supra note 10.

that a multilateral investment accord amounts at least to the sum total of sovereignty surrendered by signatory nation states. The contrary may be true. The result may be "sovereignty by subtraction,"265 which arguably is one reason why states failed to arrive at a multilateral investment accord in the first place.266

A notable argument in favor of choosing ICSID arbitration over domestic courts is that ICSID arbitrators are ordinarily experts in international investment law while domestic courts are not. At best, domestic judges sit on courts of general commercial jurisdiction and are not ordinarily experienced in international investment disputes.267 However, the notion that ICSID arbitrators are specialized tribunals as distinct from national judges that operate as courts of general jurisdiction is contestable. Indeed, the ICSID does not ensure that arbitration is delivered expertly. Further, evidence of an expropriation calls for reasonable judgment about the nature and effect of that expropriation. Moreover, full-time national court judges arguably often have as much, if not more, experience in exercising reasonable judgment as part-time and disparately trained and experienced ICSID arbitrators. Finally, elected judges also sometimes have incentives to thoroughly consider applicable public policies governing expropriation, especially if judicious decision-making is a credible basis for judicial re-election.

In contrast, if a judgment about the virtue of ICSID arbitration depends on a study of ICSID jurisprudence, arbitrators have a limited number of ICSID arbitration cases to review.268 If judgment about the virtue of ICSID arbitration is about effectiveness, decisions are likely to vary over the nature and extent of that effectiveness. If the inquiry about imperfections in ICSID arbitration is that its social costs exceed the costs of litiga-

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tion, there is limited experience of investment treaties opting for domestic courts over investor-state arbitration. Therefore, there is limited evidence by which to assess the costs of investment litigation and even less evidence of the comparative social costs of resorting to domestic courts rather than investment arbitration. Only rarely do treaties refer investment disputes to domestic courts, such as under the U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement. The choice of investor-state arbitration by treaty is the pervasive norm, and ICSID jurisprudence also extends beyond investment treaties between states. A further issue is whether principles of international investment law applied by investment arbitrators, such as the "fair and equitable" standard, requires that foreign investors receive a minimum standard of treatment or treatment according to the "reasonable expectations" of those investors. A further issue arises if the "reasonable expectations" of foreign investors are deemed to encompass rights that not available to domestic investors and extend beyond "national treatment." A related concern is in ensuring, as far possible, a conception of "fair and reasonable" treatment that is clear, consistent, and predictable, as well as effectively applied to investors and states.

It may well be that the Australian Government's choice of domestic courts over arbitration in its recent investment policy reflects its expectation that Australian investors abroad will secure their own protection against political and economic risks, such as through the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and the Export Finance and Insurance Corporation (EFIC) for Australian investors abroad; the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) available to U.S. investors; and the

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Export Credits Guarantee Department (ECGD) available to British investors. However, how foreign investors choose among risk insurance options, if at all, is likely to reflect how they arrive at the best risk-reward ratio. The fact that Australian investors may rely on private insurance still does not preclude their residual reliance on the Australian Government to provide de facto insurance against political risks or to intervene diplomatically. Indeed, they may factor in government intervention in calculating the best risk-reward ratio.

C. Limitations in Political Risk Insurance

Political risk insurance (PRI) is also far from a panacea. Far from covering all risks, PRI only covers expropriation, political violence, FX payments/transfers restrictions, and, in some specifically negotiated PRI policies, a state entity’s breach of contract or refusal to honor an arbitral award. Conversely, conduct by a host state constituting a denial of justice; breach of an international minimum standard of treatment; or unfair, inequitable, and improper discrimination under international law is not ordinarily covered, except if the expropriation deprives the investor of the full value of the investment.\(^{271}\)

There are also significant limits on PRI. First, PRI is ordinarily subject to a ceiling above which the investor is self-insured. Second, the rules of the Organization for Economic Development (OECD) for PRI insurance require public insurers to impose 15% risk sharing on the insured. As a result, the investor is a self-insurer for at least 15% of the risk in addition to any excess above the PRI ceiling. Third, most PRI providers pay only the accounting book value (i.e., the net-invested capital), so the insurance does not cover any market value in excess of book value.\(^{272}\)

Finally, a claim under a PRI policy diverges from an investor claim made through investor-state arbitration. A PRI claim derives from a contractual undertaking by a third-party insurer to make a payment in the specified circumstances above to the foreign investor. In effect, the insurer adds its PRI protection to the credit of the primary obligor. In contrast, a claim made through investor-state arbitration provides a foreign investor with an independent forum in which to proceed against a host state and, if that investor wins, obtain an award. An arbitration award in favor of that investor also differs from a successful PRI claim. A foreign investor can only enforce an arbitration award against a state by invoking national court proceedings. That investor is subject to the defenses of sovereign immunity from execution against state assets. The investor faces the further hurdle of states placing their commercial assets into separately incorporated state enterprises that are not parties to arbitration and therefore


\(^{272}\) Id.
are not subject to attachment in enforcing an arbitration award against the state.\textsuperscript{273}

D. Arriving at a Balance

ICSID arbitration is not an elixir of perfection that ought to be perpetuated as of right. Like all institutions, it has its beauty spots and warts. A shift towards domestic courts resolving investment disputes should be viewed as one alternative dispute resolution option, not limited to arbitration under the ICSID. If the choice between these two venues were to be based solely on the perceived quality of decision making, one could attribute particular normative qualities to the effective and fair use of judicial or arbitral processes in discrete cases. However, ascribing normative values to decision-making processes is unavoidably subjective. Specifically, an assessment of the economic rationale favoring domestic litigation over ICSID arbitration reflects self-interested propositions, such as the perceived benefit of one's foreign investors succeeding before a foreign court compared to before an ICSID tribunal. Moreover, the political reality is that, in exercising preferences, countries are more likely to trust the domestic courts of other countries with which they share common social and economic traditions than those with which they do not.\textsuperscript{274} Countries are also readier to endorse a “rule of law” culture with which they identify than a culture with which they do not.\textsuperscript{275}

Given these imponderables, the result may be that the choice between the ICSID or some other form of investor-state arbitration and litigation before domestic courts should be pragmatically determined on the basis of pre-existing experience, including prior cases. However, it is too early to arrive at a pragmatic conclusion about domestic judges deciding investment cases, except to acknowledge a shift to domestic courts deciding investment disputes, which began decades ago in Latin America with the once disavowed and now resurrected Calvo Doctrine.\textsuperscript{276}

\textsuperscript{273} Id.


\textsuperscript{275} The U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement empowers domestic courts in each signatory state to resolve investor-state disputes, rather than rely on investor-state arbitration. One of the rationales for this position was that the United States and Australia share a common “rule of law” tradition. See Trakman, supra note 14, at 1.

\textsuperscript{276} See supra note 248 (citing sources that discuss the Calvo doctrine).
this more recent shift towards domestic courts by a developed state like Australia are complex and potentially contradictory, but that shift could gain momentum in responding to dissatisfaction with investor-state arbitration, including under the ICSID. Whatever the institution adopted to resolve investor-state disputes, not limited to litigation or arbitration, the imponderable is in determining how the rule of law should be defined, applied, and enforced in relation to such disputes.\footnote{277} There are no fixed or infallible answers to these intertwined questions.

V. Dispute Prevention and Avoidance

Neither litigation nor investor-state arbitration is an exclusive means of resolving investor-state disputes. For example, dispute prevention and avoidance options are potentially low cost, informal, expeditious, party friendly, private, and non-disruptive ways in which foreign investors and “host” states can resolve differences while continuing their relationships with minimal disruption. Indeed, the UNCTAD has proposed a series of dispute prevention and avoidance remedies as conceivable alternatives to investor-state arbitration and litigation, namely, conciliation, direct negotiation, and dispute prevention and avoidance.\footnote{278}

None of these “alternatives” to arbitration and litigation is startling in itself. Negotiation and conciliation are invariably options available to states and investors, regardless of whether they are provided for by treaty or contract. In addition, such measures do not preclude parties from resorting to either arbitration or litigation should negotiation or conciliation fail. In addition, bilateral investment agreements and investor-state contracts which provide for, or even mandate, conflict avoidance options, invite lip service to such options as much as the serious pursuit of them by one or both parties. Going through the motions of conflict avoidance while ultimately intending to arbitrate or litigate is costly and dilatory for at least one party to such machinations.

Nevertheless, the institutional adoption of dispute prevention and avoidance mechanisms is a way in which investor-state parties can ameliorate their differences before they grow into conflicts. Should states endorse dispute avoidance measures by treaty, as the UNCTAD proposes, it could lead to the wider endorsement of dispute avoidance options and promotion of innovation in reconciling differences between states and foreign investors. Such adoption could redress the effect of high-cost and often complex


\footnote{278} See generally INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES: PREVENTION AND ALTERNATIVES TO ARBITRATION, supra note 1.
arbitration and litigation proceedings as well as encourage local, regional, and global institutions to adopt innovative processes to prevent or avoid disputes. In particular, states could be relied on to incorporate negotiation or conciliation into their investment treaties as requirements that investors must fulfill before initiating arbitration or litigation proceedings. Furthermore, states could also construct restrictive dispute resolution clauses in their investment agreements including mandatory mediation.279

While it is preferable to avoid investor-state conflicts rather than resort to litigation or arbitration, there is no assurance that negotiation, conciliation, mediation, or some other variant of managed conflict prevention will avoid or resolve conflicts in investment disputes with states.280 Indeed, a systemic problem is that investment disputes often arise between arms-length relationships as distinct from informal investor-state relationships. Specifically, investors interact impersonally with government bureaucracies, and informal methods of dispute avoidance often are ill-suited to resolving disputes that are levered up to legal departments within those bureaucracies. This absence of a pre-existing culture of cooperation between states and foreign investors, especially when investors are ill-attuned to cultural dynamics within the forum, makes dispute avoidance measures harder to implement.281

Nevertheless, there may be distinct advantages in states endorsing mandatory conflict prevention measures that are reinforced by international protocols. For example, states may agree multilaterally or bilaterally to inter-governmental mechanisms by which to redress investor-state disputes. These mechanisms may vary from diplomatic measures, such as under modern treaties of peace, friendship, commerce, and navigation, to formal mechanisms for inter-governmental consultations, such as under Chapter 20 of the NAFTA.282


280. See Mark Kantor, Negotiated Settlement of Public Infrastructure Disputes, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: IN MEMORIAM THOMAS WALDE 199-222 (Todd Weiler & Freya Baetens eds., 2011).

281. See generally Colin B. Picker, International Investment Law: Some Legal Cultural Insights, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 2, ch.6 (discussing the influence of legal cultures and traditions on investment law); Trakman, supra note 40 (noting the influence of legal traditions on international commercial arbitration).

282. On governmental bureaucracies that foreign investors in Asia, particularly China, and Australia face, see Vivienne Bath, Foreign Investment, the National Interest and National Security - Foreign Direct Investment in Australia and China, 34 SYDNEY L. REV. 5 (2012).
Foreign investors may also benefit from established guidelines and processes governing foreign investment in "host" states, including the following: clear and transparent licensing requirements; methods of securing such licenses; timelines within which to secure regulatory approval; facilitative meetings between investors and "host" states; contacting persons to consult in complying with those regulations; warnings for non-compliance by investors; and procedures for curing such non-compliance. The guidelines may also provide for the appointment of conciliators or mediators, including applicable terms of reference, should investor-state disputes eventuate.

At their best, these dispute prevention and avoidance mechanisms may discourage parties from resorting to fractious, costly, and disruptive arbitration or litigation. At their worst, however, they may protract investor-state conflict, delay dispute resolution, and increase its costs. Institutionalized dispute resolution options that are incorporated into bilateral investment treaties may avert litigation or arbitration, or they may simply delay it. Conciliation may fail because one party objects to the appointment of a facilitator; or, on appointment, that facilitator may fail to secure investor-state cooperation in managing a conflict, such as one party declining to allow consultation with non-governmental agencies.

The inference is not that dispute prevention and avoidance measures are ill-fitted to international investment. Insofar as states and foreign investors have economic and political incentives to prevent and avoid disputes, these measures may well carry the day. Indeed, dispute prevention and avoidance mechanisms may both anticipate and resolve investor-state differences before they regress into costly and dilatory disputes. However, construing such measures as salutary cures to differences between investors and states in general amounts, at best, to wishful thinking.

VI. Recommendations

The recommendations below are made in light of positive and reinforcing developments in ICSID investor-state arbitration in recent years. In particular, investment treaties in its genesis and earlier development included scant detail about dispute resolution including investor-state arbitration. More recent treaties, starting with Chapter 11 of the NAFTA, include reservations and exclusions. They define an "expropriation," "most favored nation," and "national" treatment, which were largely undefined in earlier investment treaties. A greater proportion of investor-state arbitration in recent years are also settled or otherwise discontinued. Investor-state parties are also arguably using dispute avoidance less as an instrument to secure pre-disclosure and increasingly as a genuine attempt resolve disputes. In addition, a body of international investment jurisprudence is developing around such concepts as "most favored nation" and "national" treatment, a regulatory expropriation, "local content" requirements, and
"fair and equitable" treatment. The following are recommendations for the amendment of the ICSID rules and procedures based on the foregoing discussion and in light of the positive developments above.

First, the ICSID needs standing panels to interpret ICSID rules as they apply to often complex investor-state arbitration cases. Standing panels can provide greater consistency in the application of ICSID rules. They can also redress the conflicting interpretations of ICSID rules, including those by ICSID tribunals.

Second, procedural rules are needed to facilitate negotiation and conciliation between disputing parties prior to initiating investor-state arbitration. This recommendation is consistent with the recommendations of the UNCITRAL. It also reaffirms the importance, in principle, of encouraging cooperation between investor-state parties, especially because investor-state arbitration is usually costly and time consuming; sometimes has devastating economic consequences for investors; and can result in drastic social and economic impacts upon "host" states. A key consideration in framing these rules is to avoid costly and protracted negotiations or conciliation proceedings that lead to further costly and protracted investor-state arbitration.

Third, and following from the previous recommendation, rules are needed to require mediation or conciliation proceedings to commence within specified time limits before a foreign investor can initiate an arbitration claim against a "host" state. A key purpose is to limit the risk of premature, opportunistic, and pernicious actions by adventitious investors against "host" states or actions by "host" states in responding to such claims. A means of addressing that purpose is to provide that arbitration tribunals should take account of bad faith in the conduct of negotiations or conciliation by one or both parties prior to arbitration.

Fourth, rules are needed to accommodate public interests beyond the commercial interests of investor claimants. This recommendation is consistent with the public and commercial nature of investor-state arbitration. It also distinguishes investor-state arbitration from the private and commercial character of international commercial arbitration.

Fifth, guidelines are needed to assist investor-state arbitration tribunals in balancing the economic interests of foreign investors against the public interests of "host" states. While bilateral investment treaties ordinarily identify the public interests of "host" states and the standards of treatment to be accorded to foreign investors, they do not usually address the process by which tribunals weigh those interests in investor-state disputes.

Sixth, the ICSID needs rules that define expropriation more clearly, including distinguishing between the regulation of an investment and a direct or indirect expropriation.

Seventh, consistent with the development of Rule 34, the ICSID needs rules to ensure that arbitration proceedings are transparent, subject to preserving confidential information in the public or commercial interests of one or both parties. Efforts at greater transparency should encompass the following: public access to information on the initiation of investor-state arbitration; requiring investors to confirm with their "home" states that they have initiated investor-state arbitration against a "host" state; and requiring publication of reasons for granting or denying third-party admission to proceedings, whether in whole or part. Amici curiae briefs and reports on the social, economic, and environmental impact of foreign investor and "host" state action should also be more readily available. Finally, arbitration awards should be publicly available, subject to the exclusion of the confidential information recommended above.

Eighth, the ICSID needs further guidelines to govern conflicts of interest and duties of disclosure by arbitrators and to redress the perception that a small number of arbitrators are repeatedly subject to challenges. There are well-established conflict of interest and disclosure guidelines upon which to draw, such as the guidelines that the International Bar Association has adopted.

Ninth, the ICSID needs guidelines that regulate the capacity of arbitrators to act as legal counsel and provide expert opinions to parties involved in investor-state disputes, while still encouraging parties to investor-state disputes to secure informed and expert advice that is reasonably available. An issue for the ICSID is in determining when arbitrators engaging in such multiple functions are in a position to unduly influence the functioning of investor-state arbitration on account of their standing, directly or otherwise, as ICSID arbitrators.

Tenth, the ICSID needs more diverse sitting arbitrators who emanate from developing states as well as more women. The nomination of seventy-two arbitrators to the ICSID list in 2011 is limited in light of the number of ICSID cases. Emphasizing the qualifications and backgrounds of a wider pool of arbitrators and applying conflict of interest to the appointment of arbitrators can also help to redress the impression that a small number of arbitrators preside over a growing number of panels. However, given that investor-state parties choose arbitrators significantly in

287. See The ICSID Caseload - Statistics, supra note 82.
light of their prior arbitral awards, expanding the pool of appointed arbitrators will continue to be challenging.

Eleventh, interim measures are needed to inhibit "host" states from initiating regulations that unreasonably interfere with foreign investors' claims and to impede foreign investors from unreasonably interfering with the enactment of public interest regulations in those states. While bilateral investment treaties should ideally provide for such measures, they often do not. They also do not ordinarily provide arbitral tribunals with guidelines for how to apply interim measures. For example, interim measures would be appropriate were the Australian Government to implement fast-track tobacco legislation directed at undermining an arbitration claim initiated against it by Philip Morris. Conversely, interim measures would also be appropriate to discourage claimants, such as Philip Morris, from protracting investment arbitration in order to inhibit the enactment of public health regulations by "host" states, like Australia.

Twelfth, the ICSID needs rules to streamline the mechanics of investment arbitration. In particular, arbitration tribunals should make awards by a majority on all issues, without the Chair enjoying a casting vote.

Thirteenth, a challenge committee appointed under rules that the Administrative Council prescribes should decide any challenges to an arbitrator. Arbitrators sitting on the same tribunal as the challenged arbitrator should not decide the challenge.

Fourteenth, the ICSID needs rules to reduce legal costs and expedite proceedings. Cost-reducing measures should include, among others, regulating the use of contingency fees; placing a cap on the hourly fees that arbitrators charge; and providing guidelines on the award and allocation of arbitral costs. Related cost-reducing measures should include requiring arbitrators to provide the parties with a statement of costs at the outset and regularly throughout the course of proceedings. These should include a budget and record of costs, and the anticipated cost and duration of future proceedings.

Fifteenth, the ICSID rules should require parties to register their claims and counterclaims within prescribed time limits; to clarify their availability in advance of hearings; and to be available prior to and directly after hearings, such as a day before and a day after hearings.

Sixteenth, the ICSID needs guidelines under which arbitrators can enable investor-state parties to settle their disputes during the course of proceedings, without mandating such action.

Seventeenth, the ICSID needs an appellate body with jurisdiction beyond annulment proceedings, including expanded grounds of appeal and remedies. Such an appellate body can also help render ICSID jurisprudence more consistent. Notably, of the eighteen ICSID awards that were given in the 1990s, there was only one annulment; whereas in the 2000s, there were ninety-six awards and eight annulments. Thus, despite an
increase in the number of annulments relative to awards, annulment proceedings are occasional and seldom successful.\footnote{288}

Finally, the ICSID needs a process for the ongoing scrutiny of these and other proposals, including facilitative measures by which to implement them.

In defense of the ICSID and its Secretariat, although the ICSID can regulate investor-state arbitration procedurally, it cannot adopt substantive law requirements. For example, the ICSID cannot determine how the defense of necessity ought to apply in particular cases, nor how to construe intellectual property rights. These are matters for arbitration tribunals to decide.

A further defense of the ICSID is that, even in devising procedural rules to govern investor-state arbitration, the ICSID cannot require states to adopt particular dispute resolution clauses by treaty or require investor-state parties to adopt them by agreement. These are matters to be determined by “host” and “home” states, and by “host” states and foreign investors respectively.

Conclusion

A state that foreign investors consider unattractive may lose not only stature in the global community of states and investors, but also credibility in the eyes of its domestic constituents. As the history of ICSID arbitration has demonstrated, debate about the value of international institutions like the ICSID is significantly about perceived political and economic costs and benefits to social interest groups not limited to states and investors. A state that identifies a benefit in becoming a signatory to an international investment convention such as the ICSID may quickly shift to condemning ICSID arbitration as a consequence of losing a case and, with it, losing stature both domestically and in the international community. Bad experiences that states have with ICSID arbitration is one factor in periodic attacks on it, such as the Latin American government's assertions that ICSID proceedings perpetuate systemic inequalities that favor investors from wealthy Northern countries at the expense of their Southern neighbors.

These criticisms notwithstanding, the ICSID is unlikely to be overhauled institutionally in the absence of widely endorsed motivations for such reform. Simmering resentment about secrecy in investor-state arbitration, explosive challenges to the appointment of ICSID arbitrators, and adverse awards in particular cases will not be enough to incite the radical transformation of international investment law. If a body like the ICSID Secretariat, which is best able to evaluate the efficient operation of ICSID arbitration, is unable to instigate institutional reform leading to greater transparency in proceedings and publicity in awards, the prospects for such reform recede further.

\footnote{288. See id.}
However, the ICSID Secretariat should not be expected to be the center of gravity for reforms to the structure and operation of the ICSID. The Secretariat does not have the authority to reform ICSID rules; it is not the ICSID’s governing body; and it lacks the gravitas among its membership to spearhead change. It is also unfair to blame the ICSID Secretariat for failing to effectuate reforms that, realistically, are beyond its grasp. Indeed, proposals for reform of the ICSID rules require the support of the ICSID signatory states, which is dependent on these states being able to reconcile their often inconsistent political and economic agendas.

On the other hand, it is also unlikely that ICSID member states will agree that domestic courts resolve investor-state disputes as an alternative to investor-state arbitration. Notwithstanding Australia’s standalone commitment to forsake arbitration in favor of domestic courts, few states are likely to follow suit due to concerns about national biases among national courts and confusion over disparate domestic systems of law, among other factors.

States may incorporate dispute prevention and avoidance provisions into investment treaties as plausible ways to dissipate conflict. However, such measures may represent preliminary steps leading to investor-state arbitration or litigation. They may also delay and increase the cost of a conflict.

Therefore, the greatest threat to the ICSID does not concern the availability of alternatives to investor-state arbitration. Rather, the greatest threat is one of perception about how the ICSID ought to operate and who it ought to and does in fact benefit. That threat to the ICSID is most strongly articulated by some developing states, not limited to Latin America. Their perception is that the track record of investor-state arbitration reflects a history of servicing developed states and their investors above developing states and their civic interests. Further negative perceptions about the ICSID among some developing states include: ICSID proceedings lack transparency; ICSID arbitrators sometimes fail to make material disclosures or are otherwise in conflict of interest; ICSID arbitrators reach inconsistent decisions in seemingly similar cases; and the costs of ICSID proceedings are sometimes prohibitive for governments, investors, and civic interest groups from poorer countries.

However, the problem with any assault on the ICSID is in failing to recognize that the ICSID is the supplicant of its signatories. The ICSID did not create itself, but rather member states created it. Blaming the ICSID for a myriad of ills is to forget that, insofar as it is a singer, the song was scripted by member states that now include the vast majority of developed and developing states.

Nor should the sufficiency of the ICSID depend on a tally of states, investors, and public interest groups that favor the ICSID juxtaposed against a tally of those that do not. Indeed, the sufficiency of the ICSID depends on whether competing interests favoring or opposing it can be reconciled. Consequently, mediating among such competing interests will
be a key determinant of the future of investor-state arbitration and the ICSID in particular.

Short of a robust account of the capacity of the ICSID to satisfy a plurality of competing interests, systemic reform of ICSID principles and rules of operation is unlikely to materialize. Conversely, inertia in the face of concerted attacks on the ICSID's credibility is likely to undermine its stature among states, investors, and public interest groups that distrust it, however much they use its services. If investors see that the ICSID takes on these challenges but still fails sufficiently to redress them, they will perceive the ICSID as being in a state of paralysis and preserving the status quo.

The stakes are high for states, foreign investors, and public interest groups. Should stakeholders push for reform now and fail, they may undermine confidence in international investment beyond the perceived failings of investor-state arbitration. On the other hand, should stakeholders wait patiently for the next rampage of crises of confidence in investor-state arbitration to materialize, they may make it harder to declare that these crises were unprecedented and unavoidable. In truth, we have all been warned.