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Zoning For Families

SARA C. BRONIN*

Is a group of eight unrelated adults and three children living together and sharing meals, household expenses, and responsibilities—and holding themselves out to the world to have long-term commitments to each other—a family? Not according to most zoning codes—including that of Hartford, Connecticut, where the preceding scenario presented itself a few years ago. Zoning, which is the local regulation of land use, almost always defines family, limiting those who may live in a dwelling unit to those who satisfy the zoning code’s definition. Often times, this definition is drafted in a way that excludes many modern living arrangements and preferences.

This Article begins by exploring how zoning codes define both the family and the “functional family,” namely, a group of individuals living together like the Hartford group described above. The Article then carefully tracks judicial decisions that have rejected restrictive definitions of family and analyzes sociological and anthropological literature demonstrating that definitions excluding functional families are unreasonable as a matter of law. Based on the law as it has developed and demographic trends, my view is that governments must allow, but may regulate, functional families.

The Article concludes with suggestions for local governments to revise their zoning codes to allow for functional families. In making these revisions, communities must weigh the real need to control density, the desire of functional families for privacy, and the urge to manage community character. Local governments who choose to regulate functional families may choose between three models of regulation: the density model, the privacy model, and the character model. Once decision-makers recognize these choices, they may more appropriately consider fellow community members’ increasingly diverse living arrangements and preferences—and better zone for families, whatever their modern form may entail.

INTRODUCTION

Consider the “Scarborough 11,” a group of eight adults and three children who live together in a nine-bedroom mansion, situated on just over two acres of wooded riverside property in an affluent part of the West End neighborhood of Hartford, Connecticut. While six of the adults are married to each other, forming three separate marital units, the other two are single. None of the adults in the three marital units has a relationship based on blood, adoption, custodianship, or guardianship to

* Sara C. Bronin is Thomas F. Gallivan Chair of Real Property Law at the University of Connecticut and the faculty director of its Center for Energy & Environmental Law. She is also an architect and the Chair of the City of Hartford’s Planning & Zoning Commission. She would like to thank Robert Cane, Shaun McGann, Zachary Kohl, Christopher Finch, and Brian Lampert in their assistance with research for this Article, and to Yale, UConn, Fordham, and the University of Kentucky for hosting presentations of this paper.

any member of any of the other marital units. Two of the children are related to one marital unit, and the other child is related to another marital unit. The eight adults share a household budget and are purported to share an ownership interest in the property. They have intentionally chosen to live together, they consider themselves to be a family, and they present themselves to the outside world as a family.

Are they a family? Can they live where they choose? Not according to most local zoning codes in the United States. Zoning, which is the local regulation of land use, almost always defines family, limiting those who may live in a dwelling unit to those who satisfy the zoning code’s definition of family. Yet often times, this definition is drafted in a way that excludes many modern living arrangements and preferences. This Article explores how zoning codes can better zone for families, whatever their modern form may entail.

At the time the Scarborough 11 moved into their mansion, the Hartford zoning code stated that only one “family,” plus up to three domestic employees of the family, could live in a home in that part of the West End. The zoning code further defined family to include any number of individuals related to each other by blood, marriage, adoption, custodianship, or guardianship, but only two adults who were not so related. The ostensible justification for this restrictive definition of family was to control density, while also minimizing the possibility that boardinghouses, rooming houses, dormitories, or fraternity or sorority houses—defined separately elsewhere in the zoning code—would locate in the neighborhood. Although the Scarborough 11 did not constitute any of these undesirable uses, the terms of the zoning code made their residency illegal.

Whether the Scarborough 11 intentionally violated the zoning code—an issue hotly debated in Hartford—is irrelevant to this discussion. Instead, I focus on how living arrangements such as the Scarborough 11—sometimes called “functional families” or “intentional communities”—challenge conventional definitions of

2. The term “ownership interest” is used loosely here. Only two of the members of the Scarborough 11 (one member of a marital unit and one single person) are on the deed to the property. The others have entered into some contractual arrangement, not available to the author, to share responsibility for the mortgage, upkeep, and maintenance of the property and to otherwise act as co-owners.

3. See Vanessa De La Torre, “Scarborough 11” File Federal Complaint Against Hartford, HARTFORD COURANT (Mar. 25, 2015, 10:01 PM), http://www.courant.com/community/hartford/hc-hartford-scarborough-zoning-0326 -20150325-story.html [https://perma.cc/9RU9-CMQR] (quoting the lawyer for the Scarborough 11 as saying, “[t]his is an important right that is part of a long American tradition of extended families, part of a long American tradition of cooperative and collective living arrangements, something that goes all the way back to the Iroquois Nation, even before there was a United States”).


5. Id.

6. The term “functional family” is more commonly used than “intentional community,” for all areas of law (including zoning), so I use that term in this Article. Four hundred and sixty-one law reviews and articles using the term “functional family” appear in Westlaw as of January 28, 2019. A search of “intentional community” on Westlaw on October 4, 2018, however, yielded just 131 results. None of the 131 results containing the term “intentional community” from secondary sources discussed/analyzed local zoning ordinance definitions of
family in American zoning codes. These arrangements involve individuals living together who do not satisfy the traditional zoning code definition of family, but who otherwise demonstrate behaviors and characteristics of a family.

We start with definitions, which, after all, are the primary subject of this Article. Part I first characterizes the most common zoning code definition of family, which focuses on whether people are “related” to each other. It then goes on to highlight some jurisdictions’ attempts to define the “unrelated” functional family.

Part II turns to the courts, analyzing judicial treatment of functional families. It starts with a discussion of federal court decisions, highlighting among other cases the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1974 decision in *Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas*, which upheld the application of a restrictive definition of family to exclude a group of six college students displaying no familial characteristics. It then tracks the more recent and growing trend in state supreme courts to reject restrictive definitions of family. Part II concludes by suggesting that more courts will reject definitions of family that exclude functional families, primarily pursuant to rational basis review required by challenges rooted in due process.

Part III then gives support to the argument that zoning codes that exclude functional families will fail the rational basis test. It introduces sociological and anthropological literature, not yet cited by courts, that demonstrate that traditional familial arrangements are falling out of favor, and that cohabitation among unrelated people is on the rise. Given these clear trends over the course of several decades, strict adherence to traditional definitions of family seems irrational.

Based on the law as it has developed and demographic trends, this Article contends that governments must allow, but may regulate, functional families. In light of these findings, Part IV offers suggestions to local governments. If functional families must be allowed, then decision-makers must decide how to balance the need to control density on the one hand with privacy concerns and desire to maintain community character on the other. No rule can achieve all three goals. Rather, a local government must choose which to prioritize. In doing so, they may consider three models: the privacy model, the density model, and the character model. A density model would regulate based only on the number of adults living in a particular type or size of dwelling. A privacy model would prioritize privacy: it would allow for a broad, loose definition of a household without requiring a functional family to submit an application to be considered as such. A character model would set forth regulatory requirements for the functional family focusing on the nature, length, and depth of their relationships. Each of the options has trade-offs.

In the Conclusion, I will reveal how the Scarborough 11 have fared in Hartford—where, incidentally, I chair the planning and zoning commission, which is empowered with writing the zoning rules, and where my husband is mayor, responsible for enforcing them.

“intentional community.” Another term used by scholars is “family of choice.”

I. DEFINITIONS OF FAMILY

Few terms have proven more contentious than the term “family.” Pressures to extend the legal definition of a family to the functional equivalents of a family have resulted in changes in the law of immigration, health insurance, eviction, and trusts and estates. Perhaps the most significant modern discussions about what makes a family have been in the areas of marriage rights, custody, and divorce law—all of which have evolved in recent years to encompass broad definitions of family.

8. There are too many citations involving these issues to fully enumerate, but I include a few to add flavor. There were extensive discussions in the first part of the twenty-first century about the extensions of the federal Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1) (2002), to domestic partnerships. In the eviction context, the 1989 case of Braschi v. Stahl Associates Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 53–54 (N.Y. 1989) (protecting from eviction a gay couple who lived together as “permanent life partners” and extending its logic to say that “the term family . . . should not be rigidly restricted to those people who have formalized their relationship by obtaining, for instance, a marriage certificate or an adoption order. The intended protection against sudden eviction should not rest on fictitious legal distinctions or genetic history, but instead should find its foundation in the reality of family life. In the context of eviction, a more realistic, and certainly equally valid, view of a family includes two adult lifetime partners whose relationship is long term and characterized by an emotional and financial commitment and interdependence.”) garnered attention for being among the first judicial decisions to recognize a gay couple as a functional family. In the caregiving context, Carol B. Stack suggested that the legal system accept “folk systems” promoting kinship, rather than strict definitions of family. See Carol Stack, All Our Kin (1974). For a summary of issues of the family in immigration cases, see Aubry Holland, Note, The Modern Family Unit: Toward a More Inclusive Vision of the Family in Immigration Law, 96 Cal. L. Rev. 1049 (2008). The issue has come up in bystander emotional distress cases. See Thomas T. Uhl, Bystander Emotional Distress: Missing an Opportunity to Strengthen the Ties that Bind, 61 Brook. L. Rev. 1399 (1995) (observing negative impacts of limiting to immediate family members relief in bystander emotional distress cases). And so on.

Martha Minow is perhaps among the most prominent scholars who have focused on the functional family. In 1991, she pushed for the law to recognize “how people actually live,” expressing a preference for “functional definitions of families that expand beyond reference to biological or formal marriage or adoptive relationship because the people involved have chosen family-like roles.” Generally, this area of inquiry is still evolving, making it fertile scholarly ground.

This Article focuses on how just one area of law—local zoning—defines the family. Since their inception in the early twentieth century, zoning codes have defined who makes a family. This Part considers both the most common zoning definition of family (which includes only “related” people) and additional definitions that include unrelated people acting as the functional equivalent of a family.

A. “Related” Families

Zoning codes almost always define the family to include any number of people who are “related” to each other. Being related always includes relationships based on consanguinity and marriage. Consanguinity and marriage encompass a variety of relationships: parents and children; siblings; grandparents and grandchildren; a married couple and their in-laws, who are related to the married couple by blood, on both sides. In addition, zoning codes often explicitly recognize relationships based on adoption and sometimes recognize relationships based on custodianship (including foster arrangements) and guardianship. In some cases, guests and domestic workers are included.


Minow, supra note 10, at 271, 278. She adds that her support of expansive definitions of family diminishes when the law punishes people: “But I worry when the government assigns family-like status in order to punish people or deny them benefits for which they would otherwise be eligible.” Id. at 278.

Sara C. Bronin & Dwight H. Merriam, Rathkopf’s The Law of Zoning and Planning § 23:8 (4th ed. 2019) (“Municipalities . . . undertook to enact ordinances which restricted households in single-family districts to persons related by blood, marriage, or adoption. Today, many municipalities define ‘family’ by use of this latter ‘relatedness’ requirement along with a further provision allowing occupancy by a limited number of unrelated persons living together as a single-housekeeping unit.”).

Id. § 23:18 (“[S]ome municipalities have undertaken to enact ordinances that restrict households in single-family dwelling districts to persons related by blood, marriage, or adoption.”).

See, e.g., Mansfield, Conn., Zoning Regulations art. IV, § B(24)(1) (2019) (defining family to include “[a]ny number of people related by blood, marriage, civil union,
A single family for the purposes of a zoning code may therefore include individuals related by all of the relationship types—blood, marriage, adoption, custodianship, guardianship, or others—allowed by the zoning code. As a result, a large number of people who are related to each other may nonetheless satisfy this definition of a family. A family may include:

A husband (A) and wife (B), their adult children (C, D, and E), the adopted and natural children of C and D, the siblings of A and B, and an aging friend of E for whom E has assumed legal guardianship.

A grandmother (F) and her adopted adult child (G), along with G’s wife (H) and children, the nieces and nephews of H, the blood-related aunt (I) and uncle (J) of G, along with and spouses and children of I and J.

Twins (K and L), their spouses (M and N), the father and stepmother of K, the mother and stepfather of K, the widowed mother of L (O) and her twin (P), and the children of P.

And so on. One might ask whether any such group of individuals would be ever interested in living in any of the example configurations. The point here is not that many people would live this way, but that they may, because the “related” definition of family is highly permissive with regard to the number of people who may collocate within a single dwelling unit.

In this definition, groups of unrelated people are excluded. Indeed, as Justice Marshall noted in his dissent in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, discussed further below, “related” definitions allow “an extended family of a dozen or more . . . in a small bungalow, [but] three elderly and retired persons could not occupy the large manor house next door.”

B. “Unrelated” Families (Functional Families)

Zoning codes sometimes go farther than the related family to count as families groups who are not legally related to each other, but who demonstrate behaviors and characteristics of a “traditional” family. We will call these groups “functional families.” Often times, a zoning code will provide for a functional family through a provision within the definition of family that allows some (or any) number of unrelated people to live together “as a single housekeeping unit.” The concept of the household unit varies but generally requires sharing meals and a household budget. Many functional families satisfy these broad criteria. Other times, a zoning code will expressly define the functional family (or the intentional community) and establish much more specific criteria. In either case, there are more restrictions imposed on the functional family than on the “traditional” related family. Put differently, the law does not “care” whether A, B, C, D, and E in our example in Section I.A. share meals together, or whether Grandma F and her sprawling clan

adoption, foster care, guardianship or other duly authorized custodial relationship, gratuitous guests, domestic help and not more than one (1) additional unrelated person”). See also the discussion of Mansfield’s functional family definition in Section I.B.


16. Despite exhaustive study, the Author has not encountered a zoning code that does not contain the household/housekeeping unit concept.

17. See, e.g., infra Section I.B.2 (describing ordinances).
share a household budget. Given the myriad of zoning jurisdictions, though, it is important to note that these additional restrictions on functional families fall along a spectrum.

All that said, the salient distinction between jurisdictions for our purposes is not necessarily whether they have broad criteria like the housekeeping unit or have more specific and prescriptive criteria. Rather, this Article distinguishes jurisdictions based on the way their zoning codes achieve the three values—privacy, character, and density—identified as values in tension. Some zoning codes may allow the functional family (whether through the definition of household unit or otherwise) without any special approvals—the privacy model of regulation, discussed further in Part IV. Other zoning codes may allow the functional family but only with an advance approval—establishing what Part IV terms the character model of regulation, which requires local governments to delve into the nature of the relationships between unrelated persons. Part IV will add a third approach, the pure density model, not discussed in this Section.

1. Privacy Model Definitions

In privacy model jurisdictions, members of a functional family may occupy a dwelling without having to undergo a formal review by zoning officials. These jurisdictions typically allow functional families through the broad concept of the housekeeping unit. Individuals operating as a household unit may locate wherever any other type of family may locate. In these jurisdictions, these individuals need not tender proof of their bonds in advance, nor must they satisfy ongoing burdens of proof. Inspectors will respond only to complaints about possible violations but will not conduct raids to determine whether the functional family meets the applicable criteria. The broad conduct guidelines are often unenforced, allowing functional families to largely escape government scrutiny. Local governments adopting the privacy model are, in effect, prioritizing the privacy of residents.

The town of Wethersfield, Connecticut, exemplifies this approach. Its zoning code defines a family to include:

“Any number of individuals living and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit, whether related to each other legally or not, and shall be deemed to include domestic help but not to include paying guests.”\(^{18}\)

Notice that this definition does not limit the number of persons who may constitute a housekeeping unit. However, there are limitations on the behaviors and characteristics of the unrelated persons claiming to constitute a family: they must live and cook together as a single unit. Such limitations are intended to capture the essential behaviors and characteristics of the so-called “traditional” family. As long as the unrelated persons living in a dwelling unit satisfy the housekeeping unit definition, they will be considered a family for the purposes of the zoning code.

Mansfield, Connecticut, the home of the University of Connecticut, has also adopted a version of the privacy model. Its zoning code defines family to include “[p]ersons living together as a functional family.”\(^{19}\) The code states a presumption

\(^{18}\) WETHERSFIELD, CONN., ZONING REGULATIONS art. II, § 2.3 (2004).

\(^{19}\) MANSFIELD, CONN., ZONING REGULATIONS art. IV, § B(24)(4) (2019)
that college students, or four or more persons, living together do not constitute a functional family.\textsuperscript{20} The regulations go on to require that a “functional family” of any number of persons demonstrate the following:

A. The occupants must share the entire dwelling unit and live and cook together as a single housekeeping unit. A unit in which the various occupants act as separate roomers may not be deemed to be occupied by a functional family;

B. The group shares expenses for food, rent or ownership costs, utilities and other household expenses;

C. The group is permanent and stable and not temporary or transient in nature. Evidence of such permanency and stability may include:

1. The presence of minor dependent children regularly residing in the household who are enrolled in local schools;

2. Members of the household have the same address for purposes of voter’s registration, driver’s license, motor vehicle registration and filing of taxes;

3. Members of the household are employed in the area;

4. The household has been living together as a unit for a year or more whether in the current dwelling unit or other dwelling units;

5. There is common ownership of furniture and appliances among the members of the household; and

6. Any other factor reasonably related to whether or not the group is the functional equivalent of a family.\textsuperscript{21}

Mansfield’s definition of the functional family is more specific than Wethersfield’s. It requires that the group operate as a single housekeeping unit. But it also requires that the group be able to prove its stability and permanence through voter registrations, shared furniture ownership, and the presence of children.\textsuperscript{22} This proof may be required to overcome the presumptions about college students or four-plus people living together, but it does appear to need to be tendered in advance. Rather, an alleged functional family may be requested to provide proof of their relationships to town officials only during a zoning enforcement action. Before town

\textsuperscript{20} Id. § B(24).
\textsuperscript{21} Id. § B(24)(4).
\textsuperscript{22} This definition represents what Part IV calls the character model of regulating the functional family.
officials get a complaint, the privacy of the members of the functional family is prioritized. Although Mansfield has a presumption against households with four or more people, it does not have an absolute cap on the number of people who can be a functional family.23 Unlike Mansfield and Wethersfield, many communities institute a cap on the number of unrelated persons constituting a household unit. In Connecticut,24 at least thirty municipalities (out of a total of 169) allow an unlimited number of unrelated individuals to cohabitate as a family.25 But most localities in the state set a cap on the number of unrelated individuals: fifty-nine percent have a limit of three, four, or five; fourteen percent have a limit of six; two percent have a limit of seven or eight.26 Just five communities (three percent) cap the number of unrelated persons at two.27 Hartford, where the Scarborough 11 live, was a member of this last group until January 2016, when otherwise sweeping changes to the zoning code modestly lifted the cap of two to three. (Since that change, the code uses the term “household” instead of “family” and refers to housing that other communities call “single-family” dwellings as “single-unit” dwellings.) While the number of unrelated adults who may operate in a functional family is often capped, the same is not true for the number of related persons who may constitute a family, beyond maximum occupancies required by building, housing, and health codes.

Even if there is a cap on the number of unrelated people who can live together, jurisdictions that allow functional families without the need for an extra permit are in effect prioritizing resident privacy. Zoning officials are not delving into internal household matters, nor are they asking members of the functional family to prove their bonds, absent an enforcement action necessitating a review for compliance.

2. Character Model Definitions

In other jurisdictions, members of a functional family are required to tender proof to zoning officials about the nature, length, and depth of their relationships prior to being permitted in the community. This approach prioritizes analysis of the character of the group purporting to be a functional family. It de-emphasizes the privacy of members of the group.

For an example of this approach, we turn to Ames, Iowa. The Ames zoning code states that “[l]arger groups of unrelated persons have frequently shown to have a detrimental affect [sic] on Single Family neighborhoods since larger groups of unrelated persons do not live as a family unit and do not have significant economic or emotional ties to a neighborhood.”28

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24. I root this discussion in the Connecticut experience because most of the state is regulated by zoning and because the varying codes offer a rich diversity of views. Of Connecticut’s 169 towns, only Eastford does not have a zoning code.
25. Joseph Mortelliti, Survey of Maximum Permissible Number of Unrelated Individuals that Qualify as a Family in Connecticut (2016) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Indiana Law Journal). Only 166 of the 169 towns were surveyed in this study.
26. Id.
27. Id.
Ames requires that a functional family obtain a special use permit from zoning officials by submitting an application containing information that demonstrates compliance with established standards. Public hearings and notice to neighbors are part of the special permit process. The functional family application must demonstrate that:

a. The functional family shares a strong bond or commitment to a single purpose (e.g. religious orders);

b. Members of the functional family are not legally dependent on others not part of the functional family;

c. Can establish legal domicile as defined by Iowa law;

d. Share a single household budget;

e. Prepare food and eat together regularly;

f. Share in the work to maintain the premises; and

g. Legally share in the ownership or possession of the premises.

As explained by its drafter, this carefully scripted definition of “functional family” was intended to limit the number of unrelated college students cohabitating. It achieves this goal by laying out behaviors and characteristics that the typical group of college students would not normally exhibit. Rather, a functional family


32. The Ames code also provides a definition for “family.” Ames, Iowa, Municipal Code § 29.201(72) (2018) (“Family means a person living alone, or any of the following groups living together as a single nonprofit housekeeping unit and sharing common living, sleeping, cooking, and eating facilities: (a) Any number of people related by blood, marriage, adoption, guardianship or other duly-authorized custodial relationship; (b) Three unrelated people; (c) Two unrelated people and any children related to either of them; (d) Not more than eight people who are: (i) Residents of a ‘Family Home’ as defined in Section 414.22 of the Iowa code and this ordinance; or (ii) ‘Handicapped’ as defined in the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 3602 (h) and this ordinance. This definition does not include those persons currently illegally using or addicted to a ‘controlled substance’ as defined in the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. Section 802 (6); (e) Not more than five people who are granted a Special Use Permit as a single nonprofit housekeeping unit (a ‘functional family’) pursuant to Section 29.1503(4)(d) of this ordinance.”). Ames excludes from the definition of family: “a. Any society, club, fraternity, sorority, association, lodge, combine, federation, coterie, or like organization; b. Any group of individuals whose association is temporary or seasonal in nature; and c. Any group of individuals who are in a group living arrangement as a result of criminal offenses.” (emphasis omitted); see also id. § 29.201(194) (“Single, Nonprofit Housekeeping Unit means the functional equivalent of a traditional family, including a non-
sanctioned by the zoning code to live in Ames must act like a traditional family, or at least an idealized version of one.

Minneapolis has also adopted the character model. It includes in the definition of family the “intentional community” (another term for a functional family). The city places no cap on the number of people who can live in an intentional community but requires that members of the community “liv[e] together as a single household, [and] shar[e] in the management of resources and household expenses.” Intentional communities must be registered and must submit an application that provides the name of the community, the community’s official representative, and floor plans, among other things. City officials must be notified if a community dissolves, if members of the community change, or if the named representative of the community ceases to reside in the community. Intentional communities may only be located in certain places. Interestingly, Minneapolis also allows for up to five unrelated people to live together “as a single housekeeping unit” without having to apply for any special permits. Perhaps more interestingly, the city is moving in the direction of more liberal zoning laws, as its comprehensive plan adopted in late 2018 virtually guarantees that “single-family” zoning will be phased out within a decade.

Through prescriptive rules, treatments of the functional family are designed to proactively and intentionally limit groups considered undesirable in strictly residential areas. They bar college friends, fraternity brothers, and sorority sisters because they require sharing household expenses and a single household budget. They bar itinerant travelers, such as roomers and boarders, because they require occupants to show a permanent relationship to the other

transient, interactive group of persons jointly occupying or a non-transient individual person occupying a single dwelling unit, including the joint or individual use of common areas, for the purpose of sharing or conducting household activities and responsibilities such as meals, chores and expenses. ‘Single, Nonprofit Housekeeping Unit’ shall not include occupants of a boarding house, hotel, fraternity, sorority, or club.” (emphasis omitted).

33. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 12, art. VIII, § 244.820(c) (2019) (“[A] family may include a group of two (2) or more unrelated adults living together in a dwelling unit when operating as an intentional community.”).

34. Id. tit. 20, § 520.160 (“An intentional community shall share an entire dwelling unit and may not function as a boarding house.”).

35. Id. tit. 12, art. VIII, § 244.820(c).

36. Id. § 244.820(d).

37. Id. § 244.820(d)(3) (barring intentional communities in rental properties owned by landlords with “Tier II or Tier III” properties).

38. Id. § 244.40.

39. See Minneapolis City Council Agenda: Regular Meeting, MINNEAPOLIS (Dec. 7, 2018), https://lims.minneapolismn.gov/MarkedAgenda/Council/694 [https://perma.cc/C2H9-6X6K] (adopting the Minneapolis 2040 Comprehensive Plan). The comprehensive plan goals may actually be enacted within the year pursuant to state law requirements that the city actively update its zoning code to conform with its comprehensive plan. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 473.858 (West 2008 & Supp. 2019). I am using the term “single-family” here because that is the term most dominant in zoning codes and in the literature. In the Hartford zoning code, we have replaced the term “single-family” with the term “single-unit.”

occupants of the housing unit. They bar recovering alcoholics and others receiving rehabilitation or medical treatment, except to the extent such persons are protected by federal law, for the same reason. As noted above, these uses are typically separately defined and regulated.

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It may be important to reemphasize here that what constitutes a functional family is a tricky question. Consider, for example, nuns, college friends, sorority sisters, itinerant travelers, recovering alcoholics, and similar groups wanting to cohabitate. Zoning codes typically treat convents, dormitories, fraternity and sorority houses, rooming houses, group homes, and rehabilitation homes not as dwelling units (which may be occupied by a family) but as other types of as residential living types, distinctly regulated. Some of these arrangements may be more desirable than others. For example, a group of quiet, elderly nuns may be thought to have fewer negative land use effects than a group of sorority sisters who may be more likely to throw raucous parties. Other uses, including group homes, may not be favored locally, but for policy reasons, may be difficult to restrict.

The distinction between groups of friends and functional families presents special problems. About a decade ago, there was a push among some scholars to prioritize friendship within our legal system. Among this group of scholars, which include

41. See, e.g., MANSFIELD, CONN., ZONING REGULATIONS art. IV, § B(24)(4) (2019) (specifying circumstances that might allow recovering alcoholics or others receiving rehabilitation or medical treatment to be considered a family pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Fair Housing Act). Note, however, that state legislatures often limit local governments’ ability to exclude rehabilitation homes. For example, Iowa requires local governments to consider homes for persons with disabilities as “family homes,” IOWA CODE ANN. § 414.30 (West 2015), a term that allows up to eight people to receive care in one location. Id. § 414.22 (2)(c).

42. BRONIN, supra note 12, at § 23:21 (“The ‘functional family’ test, however, is unlikely to be met in cases involving boarding or rooming houses, large groups of students, such as fraternities or sororities or residential treatment centers or similar institutional uses.”) (citations omitted).

43. It is important to note that the functional family is different from residents of a group home (also called a “family home” or a “residential care facility”). Generally, a group home is a noninstitutional residential facility for individuals with developmental disabilities. Group homes are protected under the law. Thirty-seven states preempt local regulation of group homes, and thirty-five of these require that group homes be subject to the same zoning restrictions as single-family dwelling units. See id. at § 23:24–29; see also, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-3e (West 2010) (“No zoning regulation shall treat the following in a manner different from any single family residence: (1) Any community residence that houses six or fewer persons with intellectual disability and necessary staff persons . . . .”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 393.062 (West 2018) (“[Group homes] shall be considered and treated as a functional equivalent of a family unit and not as an institution, business, or boarding home”). States vary as to how many individuals may reside in a group home in residential districts—though twenty-four states allow up to six or eight developmentally disabled individuals plus staff/guardians.

44. See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, Longing for Loving, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2685, 2705
Katherine Franke and Ethan Lieb, there is a feeling that friendship has gotten short shrift because friendship is just as important as other privileged relationships, such as marital or professional relationships, yet is not protected in the same way. They are right that the law regulates friendship without expressly acknowledging it is doing so. Indeed, the definitions noted in Part I would exclude mere friends—regulating them, in effect, out of the areas where families (including functional families) are privileged. Perhaps only in privacy model jurisdictions could friendship relationships find a home—not because friends satisfy local zoning definitions of family or functional family, but because looser rules may lead to looser enforcement. This Article does not go so far as to say that friendships must be as privileged as functional families, though I leave the question open for another scholar.

II. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF THE FUNCTIONAL FAMILY

Local zoning code definitions of family and functional family provide important background as we turn to courts. Relevant cases arise when a local government enforces its zoning code against a group of people who do not satisfy the definition of family (or, where it exists, the definition of functional family). The group may challenge the zoning code as applied or as written, on statutory or constitutional grounds. Federal and state courts have dealt differently with these challenges. After reviewing these cases, this Part concludes by articulating the judicial trend of striking down laws that exclude a true functional family but upholding laws challenged by groups of mere friends.

A. The Federal Cases

Over the course of just three years, the Supreme Court decided two key cases relating to how local governments may regulate a family through zoning. In the first case, Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, regulation of unrelated persons was upheld when applied to a group of six college students not functioning as a family. In the second case, Moore v. City of East Cleveland, a prohibition on related members of an extended family was struck down when applied to a grandmother and her grandsons. Although the Supreme Court has never considered how a zoning code applies to a functional family, these two decisions, and a third involving a federal law offering food-related aid to low-income persons, provide important insights about the extent to which the Court may sanction a zoning code’s infringement upon the right to privacy and, further, the related right to assemble a household.


45. E.g., Leib, supra note 44, at 631 (“I offer a normative argument for why the law should promote a public policy of friendship facilitation and for why the law ignores friendships only at its peril. . . . We are regulating friendships without even recognizing that we are doing so. . . . I offer a framework to show how the law could exact certain duties from friends and confer certain privileges upon them as well.”).


1. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas

In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, the Supreme Court considered a challenge by a landlord and six unrelated college students to a zoning regulation that limited a
“family” to:

[o]ne or more persons related by blood, adoption, or marriage, living and
cooking together as a single housekeeping unit, exclusive of household
servants. A number of persons but not exceeding two (2) living and
cooking together as a single housekeeping unit though not related by
blood, adoption, or marriage shall be deemed to constitute a family.49

No application or advance permit was required for occupancy, which means under
our framework, Belle Terre was a privacy model jurisdiction. The landlord had been
cited for violating the ordinance, likely after a complaint. Among other things, the
landlord’s challenge alleged that this language interfered with the right to travel and
the right to privacy.50 The Supreme Court rejected these claims, reasoning that
“every line drawn by a legislature leaves some out that might well have been
included.”51 According to the Court, the line drawn by the zoning ordinance of Belle
Terre fell well within the city’s police power because the police power allows for
localities to deal with “urban problems” like boarding houses and fraternity houses
and to otherwise address the question of density.52 More broadly, the Court noted,
the police power allows localities to “lay out zones where family values, youth
values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary
for people.”53

Justice Marshall, dissenting, agreed that the police power allowed local
governments broad powers but found that the classification between related and
unrelated individuals “burdens the students’ fundamental rights of association and
privacy guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”54 Conflating the right
of privacy with the right to “establish a home,” he reasoned that:

The choice of household companions—of whether a person’s
“intellectual and emotional needs” are best met by living with family,
friends, professional associates, or others—involves deeply personal
considerations as to the kind and quality of intimate relationships within
the home. That decision surely falls within the ambit of the right to
privacy protected by the Constitution.55

49. 416 U.S. at 2 (alteration in original).
50. Id. at 7.
51. Id. at 8. The Court rejected the right to travel argument, because the ordinance “is not
aimed at transients,” and also found that no right of privacy was implicated. Id. at 7 (citing
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
52. Id. at 9.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 13 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 15–16 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973)); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
Because the zoning ordinance impinged on the fundamental right of privacy, Justice Marshall went on to say, strict scrutiny required that the burden imposed on the students be necessary, and narrowly drawn, to protect a compelling and substantial governmental interest. He found that the *Belle Terre* ordinance did not survive constitutional scrutiny because it was not narrowly drawn to achieve the purpose of controlling population density, noise, traffic, and parking problems. Among other things, he noted that “while an extended family of a dozen or more might live in a small bungalow, three elderly and retired persons could not occupy the large manor house next door.” Justice Marshall concluded his dissent by suggesting that the town restrict population density by limiting each household to a specific number of adults, whether related or unrelated, place controls on rent, or limit the number of vehicles per household.

2. *Moore v. City of East Cleveland*

With Justice Marshall’s suggestions in mind, we pivot now to a case decided by a plurality of the Court three years after *Belle Terre: Moore v. City of East Cleveland*. At issue was a challenge to a zoning ordinance’s highly restrictive definition of family, which prohibited a grandmother from living with her son and two grandsons (who were cousins). The *Moore* Court struck down the ordinance because it infringed on the right to privacy and failed to promote the “family values” deemed so important in *Belle Terre*. Observing that the regulation of allowable and prohibited categories of relatives “slic[ed] deeply into the family itself,” the Court took judicial note of the fact that “millions of our citizens” grow up in households }

Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Moreno v. Dep’t of Agric., 345 F. Supp. 310, 315 (D.C. 1972), aff’d, 413 U. S. 528 (1973)).

56. *Id.* at 12–14, 18.
57. *Id.* at 18–20.
58. *Id.* at 19.
59. *Id.* at 19–20.
61. *Id.* at 496 n.2 (citing the city’s ordinance as stating: “‘Family’ means a number of individuals related to the nominal head of the household or to the spouse of the nominal head of the household living as a single housekeeping unit in a single dwelling unit, but limited to the following: (a) Husband or wife of the nominal head of the household. (b) Unmarried children of the nominal head of the household or of the spouse of the nominal head of the household, provided, however, that such unmarried children have no children residing with them. (c) Father or mother of the nominal head of the household or of the spouse of the nominal head of the household. (d) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, a family may include not more than one dependent married or unmarried child of the nominal head of the household or of the spouse of the nominal head of the household and the spouse and dependent children of such dependent child. For the purpose of this subsection, a dependent person is one who has more than fifty percent of his total support furnished for him by the nominal head of the household and the spouse of the nominal head of the household. (e) A family may consist of one individual.”).
62. *Id.* at 498.
63. *Id.* at 498–99.
containing extended family members, stating that “the accumulated wisdom of
civilization, gained over the centuries and honored throughout our history, . . .
supports a larger conception of the family.”64 A concurring opinion written by
Justices Brennan and Marshall underscored this point; it noted that while the nuclear
family was dominant in “white suburbia,” there was a striking “prominence of other
than nuclear families among ethnic and racial minority groups, including our black
citizens.”65 In their view, the Court’s decision properly recognized the need for
sensitivity in respecting diverse preferences.

Citing many of the cases Marshall cited in Belle Terre, the Court affirmed a due
process right of intimate association in family living arrangements and the
consequent need of courts to consider how well a privacy-constraining regulation
achieves the purported governmental interest.66 The Court discredited the purported
governmental interests of the East Cleveland regulation—“preventing overcrowding,
minimizing traffic and parking congestion, and avoiding an undue financial burden
on [the] school system”—by presenting scenarios in which the definition of family
would allow higher numbers of adults and children than allowed in the case of the
grandmother and her relatives at issue.67 In this key argument, the Moore
plurality parroted Justice Marshall’s Belle Terre dissent, which argued that the Belle Terre
ordinance was not narrowly drawn to control density, one of the claimed
governmental interests justifying that regulation, because it allowed an unlimited
number of related persons to live together.68

The most interesting opinion in Moore for our purposes may be the concurrence
of Justice Stevens, new to the Court since the Belle Terre decision. In his view,
zoning could not regulate the identities of those comprising a household, whether
related or unrelated, unless the regulation was aimed at reducing the transiency of a
community.69 Because the Belle Terre ordinance was “primarily concerned with the
prevention of transiency in a small, quiet suburban community,” he explained, it was
justifiably upheld.70 Because the East Cleveland ordinance infringed on the makeup

64. Id. at 504–05. The Court concluded the opinion by saying that “the Constitution
prevents East Cleveland from standardizing its children—and its adults—by forcing all to live
in certain narrowly defined family patterns.” Id. at 506.
65. Id. at 508–10 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan had also issued a dissent in
66. Moore, 431 U.S. at 498–99 (recognizing that living as an extended family falls within
the “freedom of personal choice . . . [that] is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”) (citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S.
632, 639–640 (1974)).
67. Id. at 499–500.
68. See Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 18 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
69. Note that Justice Stevens’s use of the “transiency” concept differed from Justice
Douglas’s use of that word in the Belle Terre majority opinion. In Belle Terre, Justice Douglas
said, “It [the ordinance] is not aimed at transients,” presumably in response to, and as a means
of rejecting, the challenge based on the right to travel. Id. at 7 (majority opinion). By
implication, the right to live in a particular place does not bear legal relation to the right to
travel. In Moore, Justice Stevens sanctions restrictions on transient living arrangements, but
does not opine on individuals’ right to move from one place to another, which is the more
common explanation of the right to travel. Moore, 431 U.S. at 519 (Stevens, J., concurring).
70. Moore, 431 U.S. at 494, 519 n.15.
of the household without addressing the transiency issue, it was justifiably struck down. Justice Stevens’ opinion went beyond this attempt to harmonize Supreme Court cases, taking a perhaps surprising detour into “well-reasoned” state judicial decisions that struck down ordinances “prohibiting, either expressly or implicitly” unrelated persons from cohabitating. Justice Stevens used these cases to underscore the far-reaching intrusion of the East Cleveland ordinance and to demonstrate judicial support for his notion that regulation should only survive judicial scrutiny if it aimed to prevent transiency. If state courts were striking down laws limiting unrelated persons, there seemed to be little justification for the Supreme Court to uphold one preventing blood relatives from cohabitating.

3. **U.S. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno**

A third Supreme Court case, unrelated to zoning and decided just before *Belle Terre* and *Moore*, may add a dimension to this discussion: *U.S. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno*. The case dealt with recent amendments to the federal food stamp law, which declared ineligible for benefits certain people who lived with unrelated individuals. In that case, the Court held that the statutory amendment redefining “household” to include only groups of related individuals denied equal

71. *Id.* at 516–19 nn.7–14 (citing, among other cases, Women’s Kansas City St. Andrew Soc. v. Kansas City, 58 F.2d 593, 594, 606 (8th Cir. 1932) (finding application of a zoning ordinance to block occupancy of a single-family home by “elderly white ladies” “is not an essential of the general zoning plan, and is in its application to plaintiff’s property so arbitrary and unreasonable as to be void”); Brady v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 2d 69, 81 (1962) (allowing two unrelated students to constitute a single housekeeping unit); Neptune Park Ass’n v. Steinberg, 84 A.2d 687, 689 (Conn. 1951) (allowing four related families to rent a summer home because they shared lodging, cooking, and eating facilities); City of Des Plaines v. Trottner, 216 N.E.2d 116 (Ill. 1966) (rejecting a definition of family that allowed only related persons in a challenge by four unrelated young men); Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 281 A.2d 513, 518 (N.J. 1971) (rejecting a definition of family that allowed only related persons as “sweepingly excessive”); City of White Plains v. Ferraioli, 313 N.E.2d 756 (N.Y. 1974) (rejecting a definition of family that allowed only related persons in a challenge by a group home); Missionaries of Our Lady of LaSalette v. Vill. of Whitefish Bay, 66 N.W.2d 627 (Wis. 1954) (finding that six priests and two lay brothers constituted a family for zoning purposes); Carroll v. City of Miami Beach, 198 So. 2d 643, 644 (Fla. App. 1967) (allowing a group of religious novices to occupy a home in a single-family neighborhood because: “Under the terms of the ordinance any number of persons occupying the premises and living as a single housekeeping unit are entitled to the status of a family. There is no requirement that they be related by consanguinity or affinity.”); Robertson v. Western Baptist Hosp., 267 S.W.2d 395, 396 (Ky. App. 1954) (holding that about twenty nurses living together with limited kitchen facilities and centralized housekeeping were a “family” as defined by the zoning ordinance, and stating that “[t]he word ‘family’ is an elastic term and is applied in many ways.”).


73. U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 530 (1973) (“As initially enacted, [the law] defined a ‘household’ as ‘a group of related or non-related individuals, who are not residents of an institution or boarding house, but are living as one economic unit sharing common cooking facilities and for whom food is customarily purchased in common.’ In January 1971, however, Congress redefined the term ‘household’ so as to include only groups of related individuals.”).
protection to unrelated individuals based on private matters of free association within the home.74 The definition in question had originally been codified as “a group of related or non-related individuals, who are not residents of an institution or boarding house, but are living as one economic unit sharing common cooking facilities and for whom food is customarily purchased in common.”75 In 1971, however, Congress redefined the term “household” to mean:

a group of related individuals (including legally adopted children and legally assigned foster children) or non-related individuals over age 60 who are not residents of an institution or boarding house, but are living as one economic unit sharing common cooking facilities and for whom food is customarily purchased in common.76

The government attorneys in that case did not deny that the congressional record contained information suggesting that the amendment was intended to prevent “hippie communes” from participating in the food stamp program.77 The Court found that there was no rational reason to discriminate against “hippie communes,” and that the amendment was motivated by animus and did not have any other legitimate purpose, such as combating fraud.78 Rather, the Court found, “mothers who try to raise their standard of living by sharing housing will be affected” and the amendment excludes “only those persons who are so desperately in need of aid that they cannot even afford to alter their living arrangements so as to retain their eligibility.”79

The Supreme Court’s decisions in Belle Terre and Moore acknowledged Moreno, but only in passing. The Moore plurality cited to Moreno in a footnote focused on whether the East Cleveland ordinance was advancing legitimate purposes.80 In another footnote, the Belle Terre Court rejected the applicability of Moreno, saying that the Belle Terre ordinance did not appear to be motivated by animus toward unfavored groups.81 We will revisit the rational basis test used in Moreno in future discussion.

74. Id. at 534.
75. Id. at 530.
76. Id. at 530 n.2 (also including “(1) a single individual living alone who has cooking facilities and who purchases and prepares food for home consumption, or (2) an elderly person who meets the requirements of section 2019(h) of this title”).
77. Id. at 534–35.
78. Id. at 535–38.
79. Id. at 537–38.
81. Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8 n.6 (1974). But see id. at 18 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (using Justice Douglas’s concurrence in Moreno to argue that freedom of association allows anyone to invite others to join a household). Other decisions have also rejected Moreno as applicable. See, e.g., Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 637–39 (1986) (applying rational basis scrutiny to the distinction between parents, children, siblings, and all other groups of individuals and finding that the Food Stamp Act statutory definition of “household” had a rational basis). The Court opined: “Congress could reasonably determine that close relatives sharing a home—almost by definition—tend to purchase and prepare meals together while distant relatives and unrelated individuals might not be so inclined. In that event, even though close relatives are undoubtedly as honest as other food stamp recipients,
B. In State Courts

As Justice Stevens’s concurrence in *Moore* pointed out, a number of state courts had recognized, even before *Belle Terre* and *Moore*, that local governments could not limit the number of unrelated persons occupying single-family residences, unless such limitation prohibited transient occupancy. Since those decisions, state courts have continued to grapple with the extent to which local governments should be allowed to regulate household composition through zoning. Some state courts have rejected strict definitions of family, while others have upheld them.

Often, these decisions are decided on state constitutional grounds. While each state’s body of constitutional law has its own idiosyncrasies, the differences are not great. The constitutional language at issue in each case is nearly identical to that of the Federal Constitution. States whose courts distinguish themselves from the Supreme Court in *Belle Terre* do so because they find that the distinctions made between families as traditionally defined and functional families are not rationally related to the interests advanced. States that reject challenges to zoning codes, as *Belle Terre* did, usually do not have a functional family at bar, and the localities before them rationally justify the restrictive definitions.

As the analysis below will describe in greater detail, so far five states recognize a constitutional right to living as a functional family. Each of these five states considered what we have been calling a “privacy model regulation”—not requiring an advance permit but applied primarily upon request (either a declaratory request by the property owner or a request for enforcement by a disgruntled neighbor).

1. Cases Rejecting Strict Definitions of Family

Since *Belle Terre*, four state high courts—California, Michigan, New York, and New Jersey—have struck down zoning ordinances that limited the number of unrelated individuals who may live together and failed to provide for functional families.82 One lower court in Rhode Island also struck down such limits.83

The factual settings of these cases have several things in common that are important when comparing them to cases upholding restrictive definitions of family. In all but one of the cases, the residents were party to the case.84 Additionally, three

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84. *McMinn* involved only the landlord. *McMinn*, 488 N.E.2d at 1240; see also *Adamson*, 610 P.2d at 436; *Dinolfo*, 351 N.W.2d at 831; *Baker*, 405 A.2d at 368; *Distefano*, 1994 WL 931006, at *1* (contrasting with the cases upholding limits that typically included only the landlord or a landlord association).
of the five cases involved groups that would be considered functional families. The plaintiff families in *Township of Delta v. Dinolfo* each consisted of a household of six unrelated, single individuals and a married couple with children intending to reside together permanently while functioning as a single household unit. In *City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson*, the family was composed of twelve adults in their twenties and thirties who lived together for social, economic, and psychological support. The family “include[d] a business woman, a graduate biochemistry student, a tractor-business operator, a real estate woman, a lawyer, and others.” Finally, the family in *State v. Baker* included the homeowner, his wife, and three daughters, as well as an unrelated woman and her three children living together as one family and contributing to the whole. *Baker* and *Dinolfo* also involved people who came together based, in part, on religious belief.

The parties in all of these cases challenged the zoning ordinances on a range of state constitutional grounds. The courts hearing the challenges primarily made decisions on due process grounds, though two also considered the right to privacy. One of those two cases was determined only on the right to privacy issue: in *City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson*, the California Supreme Court struck down an ordinance limiting the number of unrelated individuals living in a housekeeping unit to five on the ground that it violated the right to privacy contained in the California Constitution. In that case, the occupants claimed to have been “a close group with social, economic, and psychological commitments to each other . . . [who] share expenses, rotate chores, and eat evening meals together.” The court stated that the state constitutional right to privacy protects intrusions to individual privacy, unless they are justified by a compelling public interest. In reviewing the city’s interests in enacting the zoning code, the court reviewed whether the “rule-of-five truly and substantially hel[p] effect” goals of maintaining the character of the district and prohibiting commercial activities, among other goals. Relying on the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1973 decision in *U.S. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno*, the California court noted that the enforcement of a morality standard would not be a legitimate goal. It also observed that there were other, less restrictive means of achieving the stated goals, such as floor space, noise, traffic, and parking limitations. *Adamson* is

85. See *Adamson*, 610 P.2d at 438; *Baker*, 405 A.2d. at 370; *Dinolfo*, 351 N.W.2d at 834. The New York case involved four unrelated men in their early 20s who were childhood friends, *McMinn*, 488 N.E.2d at 1240, and the Rhode Island trial court case involved indeterminate unrelated individuals exceeding the ordinance. *Distefano*, 1994 WL 931006, at *2.

86. *Dinolfo*, 351 N.W.2d at 834.


88. Id.

89. *Baker*, 405 A.2d at 370.

90. See *id.* at 370; *Dinolfo*, 351 N.W.2d at 834.

91. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.”); *Adamson*, 610 P.2d at 439–41.


93. Id. at 441.

94. See supra Section II.A.3.
the only state supreme court case to apply strict scrutiny to the challenged ordinance because a fundamental right was contained in the state constitution.95

Each of the other courts based their decisions on interpretations of the due process clauses of state constitutions that did not vary greatly from the Due Process Clauses in the United States Constitution. In each case, the state court distinguished its holding from that in Belle Terre and analyzed the rational relationship between the ordinance and the municipalities’ stated goals. The courts held, in each case, that the limits on unrelated household members failed to rationally address the harms advanced.

While holding that the goals of “preserv[ing] . . . traditional family values, maint[aining] . . . property values and population and density control” were legitimate governmental interests, the Michigan Supreme Court held in Township of Delta v. Dinolfo that the court could not assume, as the town argued, that different and undesirable behavior was to be expected of functional families.96 Therefore, the court held that the legitimate governmental interests described were not related to the limits on unrelated family members in the ordinance, and the ordinance was capricious and arbitrary under the due process clause of the state constitution.97 The court also clarified the role of the government’s police power with respect to constitutional rights:

We agree that it would be easier for the plaintiff, with one broad stroke of its legislative brush, to sweep out of its residential neighborhoods a whole class of persons desiring residential accommodations than to have to legislate and enforce against the specific behavior it finds offensive and finds associated with the unrelated class. But protecting the constitutional rights of citizens comes before making life easy for government.98

The court expressed confidence that its ruling would not restrict the municipality’s police power so as to render it ineffective in preserving the desirable qualities of a single-family residential district. The township “need not open its residential borders to transients and others whose lifestyle is not the functional equivalent of ‘family’ life.”99 Going further, the court noted that nothing precluded the government “from distinguishing between the biological family and a functional family when it is rational to do so, such as in limiting the number of persons who may occupy a dwelling for such valid reasons as health, fire safety, or density control.”100 The court went on to state, “one factor which distinguishes families from groups of unrelated persons” is that “[i]f an unrelated household group exceeds the designated density requirement it is by voluntary action of the group. The blood related family by its natural growth may become in excess of the density limit.”101

95. Adamson, 610 P.2d at 440–41.
97. Id. at 844.
98. Id. at 842.
99. Id. at 843.
100. Id. at 843–44.
101. Id. (quoting Town of Durham v. White Enters., Inc., 348 A.2d 706, 709 (N.H. 1975)).
The Supreme Court of New Jersey similarly recognized that zoning regulations prohibiting more than four unrelated people from living together violated the constitutional rights to privacy and due process. The court in *State v. Baker* reasoned that “[r]egulations based upon biological traits or legal relationships necessarily reflect generalized assumptions about the stability and social desirability of households comprised of unrelated individuals—assumptions which in many cases do not reflect the real world[,]”\(^{102}\) and that functional families may fit in, and even fit in better than biological or legal families. In the facts presented, the group of individuals “was of sufficient permanence so as to resemble a more traditional extended family.”\(^{103}\) The court observed:

The fatal flaw in attempting to maintain a stable residential neighborhood through the use of criteria based upon biological or legal relationships is that such classifications operate to prohibit a plethora of uses which pose no threat to the accomplishment of the end sought to be achieved. Moreover, such a classification system legitimizes many uses which defeat that goal.\(^{104}\)

Further, the court acknowledged that the legitimization of unlimited related persons conflicts with the goals of controlling density, traffic, and character of the neighborhood: “Municipal officials remain free to define in a reasonable manner what constitutes such a unit. Moreover, space-related occupancy limitations . . . may be used to preclude the possibility of household groups of ‘unrestricted’ size. Thus, only groups compatible with a residential area will benefit by today’s opinion.”\(^{105}\) Indeed, the *Baker* court confirmed the goals of preserving a family style of living and controlling overcrowding and congestion could more sensibly be achieved through size and area restrictions.\(^{106}\)

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102. 405 A.2d 368, 372 (N.J. 1979). Note that two years prior, a lower New Jersey state court had held that an ordinance was unconstitutionally restrictive, legally unreasonable, and void to the extent that it limited occupancy on the basis of biological relationship or to single, nonprofit household units. See *Holy Name Hosp. v. Montroy*, 189, 379 A.2d 299, 303 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1977) (citations omitted) (“[I]t is bey ond the outer perimeter of permissible municipal control to consider mere habitation by a group of nuns as a zoning violation. If the regulation were to restrict occupancy of single-family dwellings to persons constituting a bona fide housekeeping unit, it would withstand judicial scrutiny and still carry out the legislative purpose. Any numerical limitation would have to be of general application and reasonably related to habitable floor area or sleeping and bathroom facilities.”).
103. *Baker*, 405 A.2d at 375.
104. *Id.* at 371.
105. *Id.* at 372 n.3 (emphasis added). But see Justice Mountain’s dissent, mourning the loss of a homeowner’s “relief” should a group of unrelated persons move in next door:

As of this writing . . . there is no homeowner in New Jersey who can say with any assurance that his next door neighbor's house, or that of his friend down the street, may not at any time and without warning, either be occupied by two or more families or by a group of unrelated persons indefinite in number.

*Id.* at 376 (Mountain, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
106. *Id.* at 372–73 (majority opinion). Such accepted restrictions included restrictions on incompatible uses, limits on floor area per occupant, sleeping and bathrooms facilities per
Similarly, the Court of Appeals of New York held in *McMinn v. Town of Oyster Bay* that the due process clause of the state constitution was violated by a zoning ordinance that was defined to include only two unrelated people who were sixty-two years of age or older. Using the rational basis test, the court reasoned that there was “no reasonable relationship to the goals of reducing parking and traffic problems, controlling population density and preventing noise and disturbance,” and restricting occupancy to biological and legal relationships.\(^{107}\) Since the achievement of such goals depended “generally upon the size of the dwelling and the lot and the number of its occupants,” restrictions on household composition were under- and over-inclusive.\(^{108}\) Moreover, the court held that the legitimate governmental objective of preserving family character of a neighborhood was not achieved by limiting the definition of a family to exclude a “household which in every but a biological sense is a single family.”\(^{109}\) It went on to say:

> Zoning is “intended to control types of housing and living and not the genetic or intimate internal family relations of human beings” and if a household is “the functional and factual equivalent of a natural family” the ordinance may not exclude it from a single-family neighborhood and still serve a valid purpose.\(^{110}\)

Therefore, the court held, the ordinance was facially unconstitutional.\(^{111}\) Since *McMinn* was decided, New York courts have held the line at the functional family, including a 2018 decision that declined to expand the definition of family to include a group of college students.\(^{112}\)

Note that in each case, except *Adamson*, the state’s high court held that the challenged ordinance violated the state’s constitution under the rational basis test. Each of these courts determined that the family definitions were not reasonably related to the interests advanced. In discussing the New York and New Jersey cases, a commentator observed that “these cases demonstrate a judicially imposed limitation on the zoning power: municipalities cannot create classifications distinguishing traditional families from domestic groups that, from a land use point of view, are their functional equivalents.”\(^{113}\)

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\(^{108}\) *Id.*

\(^{109}\) *Id.*

\(^{110}\) *Id.* (citations omitted).

\(^{111}\) *Id.* at 1244.

\(^{112}\) *See*, e.g., Grodinsky v. City of Cortland, 82 N.Y.S.3d 192, 193–95 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018) (upholding as legitimate a zoning ordinance that allowed both a “family” and a “functional equivalent of a traditional family” and rejecting the arguments of landlords who rented properties primarily to college students).

2. Cases Upholding Strict Definitions of Family

For every case striking down limits on unrelated household members, there are several upholding such limits under *Belle Terre* or interrelated or independent state law. These cases are often factually analogous to each other. First, most cases are brought by, or defend an enforcement action against, a landlord alone. Second, many cases upholding unrelated household limits involve college students as residents. Others involve other tenants as residents.

The courts upholding restrictive definitions of family lean into precedential language that emphasized the high burdens on challengers and the deference given to validity. These courts all emphasize the deferential nature of the rational basis test employed in such zoning cases. Additionally, the zoning ordinances are presumed constitutional, and the burden is on the challenger to prove unconstitutional, even to the extent of eliminating *every* possible reasonable basis for the enactment.

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114. See Dinan v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals of Stratford, 595 A.2d 864 (Conn. 1991); Ames Rental Prop. Ass'n v. City of Ames, 736 N.W.2d 255 (Iowa 2007) (involving a landlord association as party); City of Baton Rouge/Parish of E. Baton Rouge v. Myers, 145 So. 3d 320 (La. 2014); State v. Champoux, 566 N.W.2d 763 (Neb. 1997); Town of Durham v. White Enters., Inc., 348 A.2d 706 (N.H. 1975); City of Brookings v. Winker, 554 N.W.2d 827 (S.D. 1996). A few cases have upheld unrelated household member limits with household members as parties. See Dvorak v. City of Bloomington, 796 N.E.2d 236 (Ind. 2003) (including the four unrelated college students as parties); City of Ladue v. Horn, 720 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (involving the cohabitating couple alone as the parties); McMaster v. Columbia Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 719 S.E.2d 660 (S.C. 2011) (per curiam) (including one of the unrelated tenants as a party).

115. See Dvorak, 796 N.E.2d at 236; Ames Rental, 736 N.W.2d at 255; Durham, 348 A.2d at 706; McMaster, 719 S.E.2d at 660; Winker, 554 N.W.2d at 827.

116. See Dinan, 595 A.2d at 864; Myers, 145 So. 3d at 320; Horn, 720 S.W.2d at 745; Champoux, 566 N.W.2d at 763.

117. See Ames Rental, 736 N.W.2d at 259, 261 (“Under this deferential standard, the zoning ordinance is valid unless the relationship between the classification and the purpose behind it is so weak the classification must be viewed as arbitrary or capricious. . . . [Deference is given to council members to] legislate based on their observations of real life.”); Horn, 720 S.W.2d at 752 (“In making such a determination [of whether there is a reasonable basis for the ordinance], if any state of facts either known or which could reasonably be assumed is presented in support of the ordinance, we must defer to the legislative judgment.”); McMaster, 719 S.E.2d at 662–63 (“Every presumption will be made in favor of the constitutionality of a legislative enactment; and a statute will be declared unconstitutional only when its invalidity appears so clearly as to leave no room for reasonable doubt that it violates some provision of the Constitution.”).

118. See Ames Rental, 736 N.W.2d at 259 (“A statute or ordinance is presumed constitutional and the challenging party has the burden to ‘negat[e] every reasonable basis that might support the disparate treatment.’”) (alteration in original) (quoting Racing Ass'n of Cent. Iowa v. Fitzgerald, 675 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Iowa 2004)); Myers, 145 So. 3d at 327 (“An ordinance, like a state statute, is presumed to be constitutional.”); Horn, 720 S.W.2d at 747–48 (“A zoning ordinance is presumed valid. . . . The legislative body is vested with broad discretion and the appellate court cannot interfere unless it is shown that the legislative body has acted arbitrarily. . . . If the council's action is fairly debatable, the court cannot substitute its opinion.” (citations omitted) (first citing Deacon v. City of Laude, 294 S.W.2d 616, 624.
Iowa’s rational basis test is so deferential that it stretches the bounds of the rational basis test: “For legislation to be violative of the Iowa Constitution under the rational basis test, the classification must involve ‘extreme’ degrees of overinclusion and underinclusion in relation to any particular goal.”119 Unlike those courts striking down restrictive definitions of family, courts upholding restrictive definitions find a legitimate governmental interest.

Reading cases upholding restrictive definitions of family, one starts to feel that they have “heard the song before.” In evaluating whether a definition of family is rationally related to a legitimate state interest, state courts often fail to even evaluate whether the interest advanced is related to the definition of family.120 Courts often justify restrictive definitions by quoting from Belle Terre that “every line drawn by a legislature leaves some out that might well have been included.”121 Nevertheless, the line drawn may focus on the presumed permanency of related and unrelated households.122 Some courts, however, leave the door open to what they consider functional families.123

(Mo. Ct. App. 1956); and then quoting Vatterott v. City of Florissant, 462 S.W.2d 711, 713 (Mo. 1971); Champoux, 566 N.W.2d at 769 (“The validity of a zoning ordinance will be presumed in the absence of clear and satisfactory evidence to the contrary.”) (quoting Gas ‘N Shop, Inc. v. City of Kearney, 539 N.W.2d 423 (Neb. 1995)); McMaster, 719 S.E.2d at 662–63 (“A municipal ordinance is a legislative enactment and is presumed to be constitutional. . . . [A] statute will be declared unconstitutional only when its invalidity appears so clearly as to leave no room for reasonable doubt that it violates some provision of the Constitution.”) (citations omitted) (first quoting Town of Scranton v. Willoughby, 412 S.E.2d 424, 425 (S.C. 1991); and then quoting City of Rock Hill v. Harris, 705 S.E.2d 53, 55 (S.C. 2011)).

119. Ames Rental, 736 N.W.2d at 260 (quoting Racing Ass'n of Cent. Iowa v. Fitzgerald, 675 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Iowa 2004)).

120. See Horn, 720 S.W.2d at 750–52; Champoux, 566 N.W.2d at 68; McMaster, 395 S.C.719 S.E.2d. at 664–65.

121. Dinan, 595 A.2d at 871; Myers, 145 So. 3d at 335; Horn, 720 S.W.2d at 750; Champoux, 566 N.W.2d at 766; McMaster, 719 S.E.2d at 664; City of Brookings v. Winker, 554 N.W.2d 827, 831 (S.D. 1996).

122. See Ames Rental Prop. Ass'n, 736 N.W.2d at 261 (“[A]lthough related persons may live together in large numbers, they normally live together in a more permanent status and remain in one place for a longer period of time.”); Horn, 720 S.W.2d at 748–49 (“To approximate a family relationship, there must exist a commitment to a permanent relationship and a perceived reciprocal obligation to support and to care for each other . . . . Only when these characteristics are present can the conceptual family, perhaps, equate with the traditional family. In a traditional family, certain of its inherent attributes arise from the legal relationship of the family members. In a non-traditional family, those same qualities arise in fact, either by explicit agreement or by tacit understanding among the parties.”).

123. See Dinan, 595 A.2d at 870–71 (stating “the five persons who occupy one floor of the plaintiffs’ two-family house may well constitute a single housekeeping unit . . . an issue we need not decide” and “[o]ur determination in Part I that the restriction of ‘family’ use of a dwelling to occupancy by a traditional family of related persons is not invalid as applied to the plaintiffs and that the ten persons presently occupying the property do not qualify as such a family makes it unnecessary to address this issue, because the plaintiffs cannot prevail in this case whether or not relief may be available”); Horn, 720 S.W.2d at 748–49 (“In a traditional family, certain of its inherent attributes arise from the legal relationship of the family members. In a non-traditional family, those same qualities arise in fact, either by explicit agreement or
Challengers of local government regulation in these cases often fail to raise “winnable” arguments. Claims based on equal protection and privileges and immunities clauses invite an unfavorable judgment as those doctrines focus on the distinction between the groups, which courts often frame as families and non-families. Others fail to frame their challenges under a specific constitutional provision.

C. Observations

Outcomes of both the federal and state cases necessarily depend on the facts presented to the court and the nature of the local ordinance at issue. In general, though, the cases suggest courts will protect, or at least can find reasons to protect, true functional families—particularly when they find it irrational to distinguish between related families and unrelated functional families.

The Supreme Court has not dealt squarely with whether a functional family may cohabitate in violation of a restrictive zoning code. Both Justice Marshall, dissenting in Belle Terre, and Justice Stevens, concurring in Moore, suggested that they would have extended rights granted in those cases to functional families. In Justice Marshall’s view, even the college students challenging the local ordinance should have received protection; a more intentional arrangement like the functional family would have merited such protection even more clearly. Justice Stevens, similarly, cited caselaw at the state and federal levels that supported protection for, among other arrangements: a half-dozen priests, a group home, two unrelated college students, four unrelated young men, an indeterminate number of elderly women, and others seeking to cohabitate. Of course, neither of these Justices wrote the majority opinion in the respective cases.

In parsing the language, however, it seems possible and even likely that a modern Supreme Court would protect a true functional family. The liberal justices may, like Justice Marshall, find a social justice element in expanding the zoning definition of family. The conservative justices may find that such an expansion can help protect the property rights and freedom of association they value. In the meantime, lower level federal courts seem reluctant to get involved. For example, a Connecticut district court rejected the attempt by the Scarborough 11 to federalize their claim of

by tacit understanding among the parties.”).  
124. See Dinan, 595 A.2d at 865 (challenging the zoning ordinance as a violation of the state equal protection and due process clauses); Dvorak v. City of Bloomington, 796 N.E.2d 236, 237 (Ind. 2003) (challenging the zoning ordinance as a violation of the state equal privileges and immunities protection clause); Ames Rental, 736 N.W.2d at 257 (challenging the zoning ordinance as a violation of the federal and state equal protection clauses); Myers, 145 So. 3d at 332 (challenging the zoning ordinance as a violation his and his potential tenants’ rights under the state equal protection clause, due process, and association clauses); Winker, 554 N.W.2d at 828 (challenging the zoning ordinance as a violation of the state equal protection clause).

125. See, e.g., Town of Durham v. White Enters., Inc., 348 A.2d 706, 709–10 (N.H. 1975); Horn, 720 S.W.2d at 748–49.

discrimination before granting a motion to reopen the case, which has since been withdrawn.127

State courts, as we have learned, have more squarely addressed the functional family. Several state courts have declared limitations on unrelated people to be unconstitutional when applied to functional families.128 There may be a few reasons why there are not more state decisions holding similarly. First, it appears that few cases rise to the appellate level in state courts or are even brought challenging restrictive definitions of family.129 Indeed, cases from fewer than twenty states are cited in this Article, despite an exhaustive search. Second, cases presented to appellate courts usually involve landlords, college students, or other individuals not living as a functional family. Courts will not generally declare the ordinances unconstitutional as applied to these groups. Moreover, many of the courts upholding limits on unrelated household members have refused to entertain hypothetical or facial challenges to the ordinances.130 As noted above, some courts that have upheld restrictions as applied to particular groups have left open the possibility to reject them when applied to a functional family.

State judicial decisions protecting functional families are generally rooted in the rational basis review associated with the right to due process. The most prominent exception to this general rule is City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson,131 the California Supreme Court decision that struck down, after a strict scrutiny review, an ordinance that infringed the right to privacy. Yet the legal scholar who has most directly and recently weighed in on the question of the functional family in zoning, Rigel Oliveri, suggests that legal protections for functional families are best supported by arguments for the rights of privacy and intimate association.132 She argues that definitions of the “functional family” are problematic because they “create[] the potential for a tremendous invasion of privacy.”133 Although her paper on this topic

127. De La Torre, supra note 3 (“U.S. District Judge Janet C. Hall initially ruled in the city's favor and dismissed the suit on Oct. 14, ruling that the Scarborough Street clan, embroiled in a bitter zoning fight with city officials, had not exhausted all local options before raising a constitutional challenge in federal court. But Hall, in a move that gave the plaintiffs hope, said she would reconsider the case if they could prove why seeking a variance from the city would have been futile. They apparently succeeded. On Tuesday, Hall granted the Scarborough 11’s motion to reopen the case.”).

128. See supra Section II.B.1.

129. One may also query whether the lack of appellate cases indicate a correlation between zoning enforcement and traditionally marginalized groups with fewer resources and political power.


133. Oliveri, supra note 132 at 1435. She goes on to say, “Simply broadening the definition
delves deeply into many important issues, I remain skeptical that courts or
communities are ready to do what her argument implies, which is to cast aside most
or all regulations governing how people associate with each other within their
homes.\textsuperscript{134} Her work might be seen as an extension of the work of Rebecca Brown
and Kenji Yoshino.\textsuperscript{135} They have suggested that we should view government
infringement on important rights (including privacy and due process) in terms of the
extent to which it deprives someone of their liberty.\textsuperscript{136} While this idea has proven to
be popular among academics, it may be ahead of its time, at least in the zoning arena.
Few courts seem to be ready to declare liberty, intimate association, or privacy as
supreme over a community’s right to govern who lives within the community. And
no courts in my research have gone so far as to uphold challenges to zoning codes
by groups of people who do not function at least in some ways as a single
housekeeping unit. In other words, courts are still looking to the identity of the
plaintiffs and the nature of their relationships in deciding zoning cases involving
household units. Group of friends, or assemblies of roommates aiming to save
money, need not apply.

There is a lot more to say on these points, but what struck me most is that it seems
that at least some of the goals of these scholars can be achieved, even by courts who
want to avoid expanding (or creating more) constitutional rights. I make three
suggestions. First, we should focus exclusively on the functional family. Courts have
already begun to recognize that the functional family has no distinct land use effects
from the traditional related family. But not all courts have done so, so there is room
for progress. Second, we should focus on exclusion, rather than regulation. No court
has said that functional families should not be regulated; to the contrary, many of the
courts striking down zoning challenges have recommended alternative ways to
regulate for potential land use effects of these groups. Fighting for the absence of any
regulation on liberty or other grounds seems futile—again, at least at this point in
time. Third, we must spend more time thinking about the rational basis inquiry:
whether zoning that excludes functional families is rational. This inquiry cuts across

of family fails to question how local governments can use zoning to prevent people from living
together based on their relationship to one another in the first place. These reforms require
courts and zoning boards to make value judgments about whether particular households are
acceptable family substitutes and to condition their ability to live together on how they
measure up. While this approach allows more groups to live together than a restrictive regime,
it still does violence to the concept of associational rights.” \textit{Id}.

134. \textit{See id.} (saying that zoning regulations on household composition do “violence to the
case of associational rights. If it means anything, the right to choose household companions
must protect all people who wish to live together—or coreside—regardless of their identities,
relationship, or reason for doing so”).

135. Oliveri does not cite this work in her article.

136. \textit{See, e.g.}, Kenji Yoshino, \textit{The New Equal Protection}, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 747, 750,
760 (2011) (observing that the Supreme Court has “opened doors in its liberty jurisprudence”
and citing to the 1973 decision in \textit{U.S. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno} as an example of
rational basis review); Rebecca L. Brown, \textit{Liberty, the New Equality}, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1491,
1500 (2002) (observing the “striking preference” in the Supreme Court for claims of equality
over claims of liberty, and urging courts to “employ the lessons from equality jurisprudence
to . . . the protection of liberty”). I have not fully explored their views in this paper, though I
suggest zoning for families as a fertile topic of exploration in that context.
most analyses of constitutional rights, including the due process clause analysis that has been most commonly used to strike down restrictive definitions of family and to allow functional families. With that in mind, we turn now to Part III, which will flesh out the argument, in the way no court has yet done, that excluding functional families fails the rational basis test.

### III. IS EXCLUDING FUNCTIONAL FAMILIES RATIONAL?

The question on which the exclusion of functional families seems to hinge on most—no matter what constitutional claim is made—is whether excluding the functional family is rational. Published judicial decisions cited in Part II have already held that it is not rational for the law to distinguish between groups of people who function like a family and groups of people who do not. Corresponding with this judicial trend is the fact that a growing number of communities have determined that the land use effects of functional families do not significantly differ from the land use effects of families, as traditionally defined. These communities have written or revised their ordinances to allow for functional families, as described in Part I.

Might excluding functional families be irrational for reasons other than the land use impact? This Part draws from sociological and anthropological literature demonstrating the rapid diversification in family structure since many zoning codes were written. In other words, there is a growing preference to live in configurations that depart from those anticipated by the traditional zoning code definition of family.

In the late 1950s, around two-thirds of children were raised in married-couple, male-breadwinner households. However, the ubiquity of this “nuclear family” arrangement has been in decline for decades. As of 2012, only 22% of children lived in married, male-breadwinner families. A wide variety of alternative family structures have gained ground. In 2012, 12% of children lived with a formerly married mother, 11% with a never-married mother, 7% with a parent cohabitating with a nonparent, 4% in a married-couple, female-breadwinner household, 3% with a single father, and 3% with grandparents only (small percentages also lived in married-couple households with both parents unemployed or with neither biological parents or grandparents). The largest group of children, around 34%, lived with dual-earner, married parents (up from only 18% in 1960).

Traditional two-parent households are being supplanted by a multiplicity of new arrangements. In 1960, 73% of all children lived with two parents in their first...
marriage—that number declined to 61% by 1980 and had further shrunk to a mere 46% in 2014.\textsuperscript{143} Children are increasingly born to mothers who are single or living with a non-marital partner, as is the case for fully four-in-ten born today.\textsuperscript{144} Nonmarital cohabitation and divorce,\textsuperscript{145} together with the prevalence of nonmarital re-coupling and re-marriage,\textsuperscript{146} have resulted in an unprecedented level of fluidity and blending in family structure. A recent U.S. Census study found that between 2008 and 2011, 31% of children under 6 years old experienced a change in their family/household structure (i.e., at least one entrance or exit of a parent or parent’s cohabitating partner).\textsuperscript{147} As of 2015, 62% of all children lived with two married parents (an all-time low), and a sizeable 26% lived with only one parent (up from 22% in 2000 and 9% in 1960).\textsuperscript{148} While around 7% of children currently live with cohabitating parents,\textsuperscript{149} estimates suggest that a much larger proportion (perhaps as high as 39%) may experience a bout of maternal cohabitation with a nonparent by the time the child turns 12.\textsuperscript{150} A study based on 2002 National Survey of Family Growth data concluded that about 20% of children born within a marriage and 50% of children born within a cohabitating, nonmarital union will experience the breakup of their parents by age 9.\textsuperscript{151} Interestingly, the prevalence of multigenerational households is also on the rise, driven by a growing immigrant share of the population.\textsuperscript{152}

\begin{footnotes}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[144.] \textit{Id.}
\item[146.] See Gretchen Livingston, \textsc{Pew Research Ctr.}, \textit{Four-in-Ten Couples are Saying ‘I Do,’ Again} 4 (2014), https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2014/11/14/four-in-ten-couples-are-saying-i-do-again/ [https://perma.cc/HM4M-BM5D] (locate the “Report Materials” column on the right side of the page; then click “Complete Report PDF” to view the report) (stating that in 2013, fully four-in-ten new marriages included at least one partner who had been married before, and two-in-ten marriage were between partners whom were both previously married).
\item[148.] \textsc{Pew Research Ctr.}, \textit{supra} note 143, at 16; see also \textit{id.} at 25 (40 percent of families with children under 18 at home include mothers who earn the majority of the family income).
\item[149.] \textit{Id.} at 18.
\item[151.] \textit{Id.} at 1684–85.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotes}
The unified, nuclear family arrangement is no longer the norm. The new norm is diversity and a great deal of flux emanating from the expanding variety of pathways and transitions in and out of family arrangements.153 As stated by Philip Cohen, a sociologist specializing in the area of household and family structure, “In sum, the dominant married-couple household of the first half of the twentieth century was replaced not by a new standard, but rather by a general increase in family diversity.”154

There are a number of factors that have played a role in the appearance of increased variety, complexity, and fluidity among family arrangements in the United States. According to Cohen, the fanning out of family structures has been driven by: (a) technological innovations that concurrently reduced the difficulty of household tasks and allowed for women to control the timing and number of their births—thus boosting female market employment and giving women freedom within, and also from, their families; (b) the creation of pension and welfare programs post-Depression (e.g., social security & welfare support for children) that provided opportunities for people to structure their lives more independently of family members and other relatives; and (c) market forces that increased the ability of middle-class and educated women to delay, forgo, or leave marriage, while spurring on falling wages and job insecurity among less-educated men—making them risky as potential marriage partners.155 The rise of family diversity has tracked with a marked growth in educational attainment and labor force participation, and substantial decline in marriage and fertility rates, among American women over the last fifty years.156

The rise of cohabitation among people outside of the “traditional” family may also result from feelings of loneliness in modern society. In his seminal work, Bowling Alone, Robert Putnam argues that Americans are increasingly disconnected and lonely due to an erosion of social capital.157 Others have advanced similar arguments in recent years, such as Sherry Turkle’s critique of technology’s disintegrating effects on social bonds in Alone Together.158

While the question of whether Americans are truly lonelier today than ever before is highly debated,159 the dangers of loneliness are becoming increasingly

Materials” column on the right side of the page; then click “Complete Report PDF” to view the report).

154. Id. at 3.
155. Id. at 4–5.
156. See id. at 6.
158. Sherry Turkle, Alone Together: Why We Expect More From Technology and Less from Each Other (3d ed. 2017).
159. See Eric Klinenberg, Going Solo: The Extraordinary Rise and Surprising Appeal of Living Alone 57–59 (2012) (arguing that on average solo dwellers are deeply engaged in civic and social life rather than being lonely and isolated); see also Claude S. Fischer, Still Connected: Family and Friends in America Since 1970, at 98–99 (2011) (finding that Americans’ contact with relatives and friends, as well as accompanying emotional connectedness, has changed relatively little since the 1970s); Claude S. Fischer, Comment, The 2004 GSS Finding of Shrunken Social Networks: An Artifact?, 74 Am. Soc.
clear through recent scientific research. The influence of social isolation on risk of death is comparable to other well-established risk factors such as smoking and actually exceeds risk factors like obesity and physical inactivity.\textsuperscript{160} Loneliness has been proven to spur on inflammation, which is linked to conditions like coronary heart disease, type 2 diabetes, arthritis, and Alzheimer’s disease.\textsuperscript{161} Beyond increased risk of chronic disease and mortality,\textsuperscript{162} loneliness is also “characterized by impairments in attention, cognition, affect, and behavior.”\textsuperscript{163} Psychologist Abraham Maslow posited that most “maladjustment and . . . more severe psychopathology” resulted from a failure to fulfill the human need to belong.\textsuperscript{164} The bottom line: feelings of loneliness and social isolation have been proven to adversely impact health outcomes. Flexible and communal living arrangements may be more socially supportive and may combat our collective loneliness problem.


\textsuperscript{164} See Lindley A. Bassett, Note, \textit{The Constitutionality of Solitary Confinement: Insights from Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs}, 26 HEALTH MATRIX 403, 415–16 (2016) (footnotes omitted) (“Maslow felt that most ‘maladjustment and more severe psychopathology’ could be traced to an unsatisfied need to belong. An individual seeking to belong: ‘will feel keenly, as never before, the absence of friends, or a sweetheart, or a wife, or children. He will hunger for affectionate relations with people in general, namely, for a place in his group, and he will strive with great intensity to achieve this goal. He will want to attain such a place more than anything else in the world.’ The need to belong therefore encompasses relationships among friends and family as well as an individual’s relation to society at large.”) (quoting Abraham H. Maslow, \textit{A Theory of Human Motivation}, 50 PSYCHOL. REV. 370, 381 (1943)) (citing Roy F. Baumeister & Mark R. Leary, \textit{The Need to Belong: Desire for Interpersonal Attachments as a Fundamental Human Motivation}, 117 PSYCHOL. BULL. 497, 507 (1995)).
Family arrangements are becoming substantially more diverse, and individuals are choosing to cohabitate at a higher rate than ever before. Yet, America’s housing stock has not caught up with the times. In 1940, around 64% of the country’s housing stock consisted of detached, single-family homes.\textsuperscript{165} This undoubtedly reflected the dominance of the nuclear family and relatively low proportion of Americans living alone (only 7.8% of total households at the time).\textsuperscript{166} In an era of a wide diversity of family arrangements and high number of single-person households (28% of total households), how much ground has the detached, single-family home lost?\textsuperscript{167} Surprisingly—none. In 2013, the American Housing Survey reported that just over 64% of the country’s housing stock consisted of detached, single-family homes.\textsuperscript{168} Communities across the country must fill these detached homes with people who want to live in them—a challenge if that housing is restricted to just the nuclear “family.”

In this new era of family diversity, local governments must examine how zoning codes—often written many decades ago, during the dominance of the nuclear family—can be updated to accommodate the diverse family structures people want and need. To refuse to do so would be irrational in the face of these clear trends.

IV. POSSIBLE REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS

If it is irrational and thus unconstitutional to exclude functional families, as judicial and demographic trends suggest, local governments must ensure their zoning codes accommodate them. To achieve this goal most directly, a local government can strip its zoning code of all regulation of household composition: say, deleting the definition of family, the concept of the housekeeping unit, and any maximum occupancy standards. Eliminating all regulation of the household would satisfy those scholars who prioritize liberty or the right of intimate association.\textsuperscript{169} Yet it would dissatisfy many others, and it would be unlikely to be adopted given entrenched expectations of the people to whom decision-makers are politically accountable. (Indeed, I know of no zoning code that takes this approach.)

If we assume, then, that governments will choose to regulate for the functional family, then governments must identify the goals of regulation. Three come to mind: controlling density, protecting privacy, and ensuring compatibility with community character. No rule can achieve all of these goals, so communities will have to make choices. Three distinct regulatory frameworks highlight these choices: the density


\textsuperscript{167} Id.


\textsuperscript{169} See, e.g., supra note 136.
model, the privacy model, and the character model. Because we have already discussed the privacy and character models in Part I, we will explore the density model first here.

A. The Density Model

Regulations that prioritize density aim to control the number of people living in a particular type or size of dwelling unit, without regulating for character of the relationships of members of a household. In that respect, the density model of regulations protects privacy and avoids some of the more difficult questions explored in this Article. There is no need to define family, nor grapple with the question of how many unrelated people may constitute a household. Zoning officials need not ask for evidence of legal bonds or proof of voter registrations. Households need not submit applications with affidavits stating that they dine together or share a bank account.

While there may be benefits to this approach, I know of no jurisdiction that exclusively regulates on the basis of density. There may be significant practical barriers for doing so. For one thing, the density model infringes on personal choice in that it requires households to maintain membership below a maximum number—whether households consist of related or unrelated persons. For this reason, these regulations may be vulnerable to constitutional challenges. The U.S. Supreme Court has never said that density restrictions for related people are acceptable. In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, the Court invalidated a zoning rule prohibiting certain related people from living together. Whether this could be read as an absolute bar to regulating families is debatable and may depend on a number of factors. Chief among those factors may be whether the nature of the density-controlling regulation implicates some broader value. Moore could not be read as a bar to occupancy limits that threaten the health or safety of the occupants. For reasons explained in the next paragraph, however, it may be hard to set an occupancy limit that satisfies this criteria. For his part, Justice Marshall, dissenting in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, recommended that cities categorically limit the number of adults (whether related or unrelated) living in a single household to achieve density-limiting goals while avoiding running afoul of the equal protection clause. He suggested limiting each household to a specific number of adults, placing controls on rent, or limiting the number of vehicles per household. State courts have also suggested density controls in lieu of character model regulation.

There are practical reasons as to why density controls may not work. Let’s take the Scarborough 11 as an example. The house they occupy is about 5800 square feet in size, and maybe six bedrooms. If what neighbors really wanted to see was more like five people in the house, the rule would have to limit density to one person

172. See id.
173. See, e.g., State v. Baker, 405 A.2d 368, 372–73 (N.J. 1979) (suggesting restrictions such as limits on floor area per occupant, sleeping and bathrooms facilities per occupant, limits on the number of cars, and other use and area restrictions).
maximum per 1100 square feet, and one person per bedroom up to five. How would
neighbors in more densely packed neighborhoods—say, downtown—fare in a
density model? Applying the rule to downtown Hartford, where the average
apartment may be closer to 800 square feet, would mean that most apartments would
be single occupancy. However, such a limitation would fly in the face of what we
have seen in practice, which is that people “double up” in the more expensive housing
downtown. At the same time, in small units across the city—in our “triple deckers”
or “perfect sixes”—there would be significant discrepancies between permitted
density and actual density.

Yet setting the square footage lower to a more reasonable 400 square feet, say, or
three people per bedroom, would allow for fifteen people to occupy the house at
Scarborough using the square footage formula and eighteen using the per-bedroom
formula. Meanwhile, building and housing codes—perhaps most likely to satisfy the
rational basis test—hover around maximum occupancies of one per seventy square
feet. At the Scarborough 11 house, eighty-three people could shack up if that formula
were applied in Hartford. While the Scarborough 11 house is about twice as large as
the average new house in the United States (around 2700 square feet)174, it helps to
illustrate the practical problems with a density model approach.

There are equity issues, too, with a density formula. Tying density to a number of
kitchens, bathrooms, or square feet (of the dwelling unit or of the site) means that
wealthy people can have more people in their household than poor people can.

In sum, there is no perfect way to simply limit the number of adults living in a
particular type or size of dwelling. There are trade-offs for communities seeking to
regulate for families by eliminating the definition of family and adhering strictly to
a density formula.

B. The Privacy Model

The vast majority of jurisdictions addressing the functional family have chosen to
do so through a privacy model. As discussed through examples in Section I.B.1, a
privacy model prioritizes privacy. It generally establishes a broad, loose definition
of a household without requiring a functional family to submit an application to be
considered as such. There are no public hearings or proof in advance of relationships
among members of a household. In a privacy model jurisdiction, density may be
constrained by limitations on the number of unrelated persons that may constitute a
household.

I acknowledge here that the name of this model may be misleading in that the
density model approach may protect privacy better than the so-called privacy model,
given that the density model only asks questions about the number of persons in a
household, rather than their relationships with one another. But in any regulatory
regime—including the density model—privacy of individual households will be
constrained. There will always be an inherent tension between the desire to allow for

https://www.census.gov/construction/chars/pdf/c25ann2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/F6NW-
X7MY] (identifying an average square foot for new U.S. Houses completed and built for sale
of 1,660 in 1973 and 2,740 in 2015).
flexible living arrangements and the desire to have some limitations on household composition.

C. The Character Model

Finally, there are some jurisdictions that have chosen the character model. As discussed through examples in Section I.B.2, a character model sets forth regulatory requirements for the functional family focusing on the nature, length, and depth of their bonds. This approach protects the character of the community by delving deeply into individual households through a public process exposing information about them. In that sense, privacy is obliterated in favor of community character. Communities choosing this approach would need to ensure that the aim and content of the regulation was not of a discriminatory character and did not have discriminatory intent. They would need a rational basis for the criteria used, they would have to have a fair and uniform process, and they would have to have fair and neutral decision-makers.

* * *

The most important point in this discussion is that unless a jurisdiction declines to regulate for household composition or size altogether, there is no way to equally achieve the goals of controlling density, protecting privacy, and stabilizing community character. There may be other models of regulating for the functional family, but I have yet to find any jurisdiction that fails to use either the privacy or the character approach. Additionally, I cannot conceive of other paths to allow the functional family that satisfy the constitutional constraints of zoning law. Communities have to choose, and I hope this Article has highlighted the trade-offs among their choices.

CONCLUSION

Most zoning codes are fifty years old or older, and few have been significantly revised since being adopted. Yet, during that same period, how we live our lives, how our cities develop, and how we relate to each other have all radically shifted. Thus, zoning codes must be modernized to accommodate the way many Americans choose to live today.

Although only a handful of courts have squarely tackled zoning regulation of functional families, and few scholars have addressed the issue, it is worth a careful study because it presents fundamental questions about the role of law in our private lives. Ultimately, I have contended that to avoid constitutional scrutiny, communities must allow for functional families. A court reviewing the land use impact of a true functional family will see no distinction between the functional family and the “traditional” family, and demographic trends have shifted so far from the

175. See Sara C. Bronin, Comprehensive Rezonings, 2019 BYU L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (confirming that fewer than twenty-six cities over 100,000 persons have comprehensively rezoned in the last ten years).
“traditional” family that it would be irrational to exclude modern familial arrangements.

The vast majority of communities responding to this call will seek to regulate functional families by placing restrictions on their ability to locate in particular neighborhoods and by requiring satisfaction of certain criteria. In making these rules, communities must choose how to prioritize the potentially competing goals of density control, privacy, and community character. No community can achieve all of these goals while still accommodating fellow community members’ increasingly diverse living arrangements and preferences. My guess is that most will opt for a model that imposes few up-front requirements on households, while a smaller number will choose prospective regulation that requires approvals before functional families may locate themselves within a neighborhood.

Let’s return now to the Scarborough 11. A few months after becoming mayor, my husband withdrew the nearly two-year-old zoning enforcement suit that his predecessor had filed against the Scarborough 11. Around the same time, I had been circulating draft revisions to our zoning code that would have allowed for a limited number of “intentional communities” in Hartford using the character model approach. The proposed revisions were stymied both by local opposition to legitimate the Scarborough 11—and by the Scarborough 11 themselves, who were reluctant to subject themselves to external scrutiny. For now, the Scarborough 11 are living in legal limbo: not using their property in a manner expressly allowed by the zoning code, and yet not being fined or evicted for doing so. I suspect they are joined by thousands, if not tens of thousands, of functional families across the country—and will remain in limbo until the laws catch up.