Government Regulation, International Law, article, Jurisdiction, Economic Development, Competition, Economic Policy, Evaluation, Antitrust law, Commercial policy, Management, International trade, International trade regulation, Jurisdiction (International law), Practice, International competition (Commerce)
Argues that eliminating international institutions is the best way to solve the problem of inadequate national regulation. Private actions that frustrate competition are highlighted to show that the problem of government failure exists at the international level. The nature of competition policy & its potential for abuse are described to point out the inseparability of competition policy & trade policy, as well as difficulties that result from the less transparent nature of competition law. A review of proposals to develop international regimes to accommodate substantive competition law or allocate regulatory jurisdiction emphasizes why such regimes are likely to be unsatisfactory. Considerations that prompt countries to use competition law are addressed, along with additional problems of administration, application, & adaptation presented by international regimes. Long-term incentives to avoid the protection that nations face under conditions of factor mobility are discussed & the empirical literature on trade /development is reviewed to argue in favor of a similar positive correlation between optimal choices of competition policy & economic growth. Areas for further research are suggested. J. Lindroth
Stephan, Paul B.
"Global Governance, Antitrust, and the Limits of International Cooperation,"
Cornell International Law Journal: Vol. 38
, Article 4.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj/vol38/iss1/4