Keywords
Moral Psychology, Social Obligation, Pluralism
Abstract
Few scholars have argued as eloquently as Gregory Alexander for the normative force of social obligation in American property law and for a broader understanding of property as inherently relational. The idea that mutual regard for the ability of each person to have meaningful life choices means that ownership entails duties to others has always seemed to me-perhaps not surprisingly given my own moral intuitive priors-deeply compelling. But it is clear that other moral intuitions lead people to value just as deeply and just as intuitively property's ability to establish individual sanctuary within strong, clear boundaries. I don't have the answer to how to overcome this epistemic gap, but I do think it would be well worth the attention of property scholars to try.
Recommended Citation
Davidson, Nestor M.
(2020)
"Much Obliged? Moral Psychology and the Social Obligation of Property: An Essay in Honor of Gregory Alexander,"
Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy: Vol. 29:
Iss.
3, Article 3.
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cjlpp/vol29/iss3/3