Document Type
Article
Publication Date
4-2009
Keywords
Administrative law judges, ALJs, Executive branch judges, Judicial intuition, Judicial decisionmaking, Intuitive thinking, Empirical legal studies
Disciplines
Administrative Law | Judges | President/Executive Department
Abstract
Administrative law judges attract little scholarly attention, yet they decide a large fraction of all civil disputes. In this Article, we demonstrate that these executive branch judges, like their counterparts in the judicial branch, tend to make predominantly intuitive rather than predominantly deliberative decisions. This finding sheds new light on executive branch justice by suggesting that judicial intuition, not judicial independence, is the most significant challenge facing these important judicial officers.
Recommended Citation
Guthrie, Chris; Rachlinski, Jeffrey J.; and Wistrich, Andrew J., "The "Hidden Judiciary": An Empirical Examination of Executive Branch Justice" (2009). Cornell Law Faculty Publications. 1368.
https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub/1368
Publication Citation
Published in: Duke Law Journal, vol. 58, no. 7 (April 2009).