International financial regulation, Regulatory reform, New Governance, Regulatory pluralism
Administrative Law | Banking and Finance Law | International Law | Law and Economics | Transnational Law
A central challenge for international financial regulatory systems today is how to manage the impact of global systemically important financial institutions (G-SIFIs) on the global economy, given the interconnected and pluralistic nature of regulatory regimes. This paper focuses on the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and proposes a new research agenda for the FSB’s emerging regulatory forms. In particular, it examines the regulatory architecture of the New Governance (NG), a variety of approaches that are supposed to be more reflexive, collaborative, and experimental than traditional forms of governance. A preliminary conclusion is that NG tools may be effective in resolving some kinds of problems in a pluralistic regulatory order, but they are unlikely to be suitable for all problems. As such, this article proposes that analyses of the precise conditions in which NG mechanisms may or may not be effective are necessary. It concludes with some recommendations for improving the NG model.
Riles, Annelise, "Is New Governance the Ideal Architecture for Global Financial Regulation?" (2013). Cornell Law Faculty Publications. 666.
Published in: Monetary and Economic Studies, Vol. 31 (November 2013).
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