Document Type


Publication Date

Winter 2003


Damages, Rescission, Efficient fraud


Contracts | Legal Remedies | Torts


Buried in the details of legal doctrine governing misrepresentation is a remedial anomaly that raises some interesting questions about how law should deal with moral wrongs such as fraud. We tend to think of deliberate deception--fraud--as a grave moral wrong. At least, we think of deception as gravely wrong when the deceiver's objective is not to avert harm or spare feelings, but to obtain someone's money or goods. Deception denies the autonomy of the person deceived and undermines the foundation of trust in human interaction. The law, however, does not penalize every instance of fraud. Moreover, the standards governing when fraud is actionable vary according to the remedy sought.


This article predates the author’s affiliation with Cornell Law School.

Publication Citation

Published in: Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, vol. 36, no. 2 (Winter 2003).