Publication Date
11-2020
Abstract
Adjudicators have a social responsibility. When the Judiciary/judges carry out their constitutional mandate of dispensing justice it is critical to bear in mind that judges carry a level of responsibility for the impact that their decisions have on society. For this reason, judges ought to be held responsible for every judgment they render either good or bad. Contempt is an exceedingly powerful instrument in the hands of the courts to tame the conduct and behaviour of lawyers and lay people who come into contact with judicial authority. Like any other power, the exercise of contempt power has to be checked. The use of contempt power by the courts if unchecked risks violating or infringing upon the right of freedom of speech and free press. This in return has a deterring effect on the public’s freedom of speech and the vibrancy of advocacy for judicial accountability. The public and the press become fearful that any criticism altered against the judiciary or its judicial decisions coupled with any lapses in judicial decorum will result in personal liability for contempt of court. The lapses in judicial decorum flow from fervent advocacy for judicial accountability and also from the ordinary pursuit of freedom of expression. Consequently, the public and the press will have no choice but to either practice an indecisive brand of advocacy for judicial accountability or to operate under suppressed conditions of freedom of expression. Such a scenario is harmful to a democratic society. In writing this commentary, I take the position that any misplaced, uninformed, unjustified and personal attacks against judges or the judiciary’s judicial integrity in a broader sense regardless of its source is unacceptable and must not be entertained.
Recommended Citation
Kabwabwa, Mwami
(2020)
"Savenda Management Services Limited v Stanbic Bank Zambia Limited & Gregory Chifire (Alleged Contemnor) (Appeal No. 37/2017) [2018] ZMSC 11,"
SAIPAR Case Review: Vol. 3:
Iss.
2, Article 6.
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/scr/vol3/iss2/6