Coercing Virtue or Superintending Constitutional Order? A Comment on Munir Zulu and Celestine Mukandila v Attorney General

Authors

O'Brien Kaaba, University of Zambia; Southern African Institute for Policy and Research
Emmanuel N. Nyambe, University of Zambia, LLB

Publication Date

5-2025

Abstract

In Munir Zulu and Celestine Mukandila v Attorney General, the Constitutional Court of Zambia intervened for the first time in a constitutional amendment process before a bill was tabled, asserting its authority to oversee executive conduct in line with constitutional principles. While the author commends the Court’s departure from a historically passive judiciary, a pointed critique is offered of the judgment’s conceptual shortcomings. The analysis highlights the Court’s conflation of constituent and constituted power, its reliance on an inaccurate historical account of past amendments, and the jurisdictional inconsistency it created with the earlier Bill 10 ruling, all of which weaken the decision’s foundational logic. This commentary is indispensable for those grappling with the complex interplay between judicial power and constitutional design in Zambia.

Recommended Citation

Kaaba, O'Brien and Nyambe, Emmanuel N. (2025) "Coercing Virtue or Superintending Constitutional Order? A Comment on Munir Zulu and Celestine Mukandila v Attorney General," SAIPAR Case Review: Vol. 8: Iss. 1, Article 5.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/scr/vol8/iss1/5