The "Hidden Judiciary": An Empirical Examination of Executive Branch Justice

Authors

Chris Guthrie, Vanderbilt University Law SchoolFollow
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Cornell Law SchoolFollow
Andrew J. Wistrich, U.S. District Court, Central District of California

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

4-2009

Keywords

Administrative law judges, ALJs, Executive branch judges, Judicial intuition, Judicial decisionmaking, Intuitive thinking, Empirical legal studies

Disciplines

Administrative Law | Judges | President/Executive Department

Abstract

Administrative law judges attract little scholarly attention, yet they decide a large fraction of all civil disputes. In this Article, we demonstrate that these executive branch judges, like their counterparts in the judicial branch, tend to make predominantly intuitive rather than predominantly deliberative decisions. This finding sheds new light on executive branch justice by suggesting that judicial intuition, not judicial independence, is the most significant challenge facing these important judicial officers.

Recommended Citation

Guthrie, Chris; Rachlinski, Jeffrey J.; and Wistrich, Andrew J., "The "Hidden Judiciary": An Empirical Examination of Executive Branch Justice" (2009). Cornell Law Faculty Publications. 1368.
https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub/1368

Publication Citation

Published in: Duke Law Journal, vol. 58, no. 7 (April 2009).