Document Type
Article
Comments
Published in vol. 68, no. 4 (2003) of Brooklyn Law Review.
Abstract
In the Anglo-American legal tradition, people are responsible for damage caused by their failure to conform their conduct with that of the "reasonable person." With few exceptions, so long as one's conduct conforms to that of the reasonable person, then even if the conduct harms others, it does not create liability. Courts understand that the "reasonable person" is an idealized legal fiction but believe the construct to be a useful way to identify culpable conduct. For the reasonable-person test to be useful, courts must identify the characteristics of this reasonable person. As to cognitive and perceptual abilities, courts endow this hypothetical reasonable person with what they believe are "ordinary" skills and abilities. Recent cognitive psychological research, however, indicates that intuitions about ordinary skills and abilities vastly overstate the cognitive skills people actually possess. Consequently, reliance on intuition and folk wisdom about ordinary abilities leads courts to overattribute accidents to negligent carelessness, rather than unavoidable misfortune.
Date of Authorship for this Version
1-20-2005
Keywords
Reasonable person, Objectivity, Cognition
Recommended Citation
Rachlinski, Jeffrey J., "Misunderstanding Ability, Misallocating Responsibility" (2005). Cornell Law Faculty Publications. 23.
https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/lsrp_papers/23